


CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MATTHEW ARNOLD



Anupama Roy
Dr. Kanupriya Verma



Critical Interpretation of Matthew Arnold

Anupama Roy
Dr. Kanupriya Verma

Critical Interpretation of Matthew Arnold

Anupama Roy
Dr. Kanupriya Verma

W
Wisdom Press
NEW DELHI

Critical Interpretation of Matthew Arnold

Anupama Roy, Dr. Kanupriya Verma

*This edition published by Wisdom Press,
Murari Lal Street, Ansari Road, Daryaganj,
New Delhi - 110002.*

ISBN: 978-93-82006-24-4

Edition: 2022 (Revised)

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

-
- This publication may not be reproduced, stored in
- a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by
- any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
- recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of
- the publishers.

Wisdom Press

Production Office: "Dominant House", G - 316, Sector - 63, Noida,
National Capital Region - 201301.
Ph. 0120-4270027, 4273334.

Sales & Marketing: 4378/4-B, Murari Lal Street,
Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002.
Ph.: 011-23281685, 41043100.
e-mail : wisdompress@ymail.com

CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Matthew Arnold: A Life of Literary	1
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 2. Matthew Arnold: A Critical Assessment of His Poetry and Prose	8
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 3. Critique and Reflection: Matthew Arnold's Unwavering Judgment.....	15
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 4. Matthew Arnold: A Journey from Diplomacy to Education.....	23
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 5. Matthew Arnold's Vision: Compulsory Education and the Quest for Equality	35
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 6. Matthew Arnold Vision for a More Cultured Society.....	46
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 7. Matthew Arnold: Culture, Equality, and Governance.....	57
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 8. Matthew Arnold's Perspective on Religion and Morality	67
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 9. Emergence of Matthew Arnold as a Theological Critic.....	79
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 10. Matthew Arnold's Controversial Critique of Religious Doctrine and the Bible	89
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 11. Exploring the Role of Criticism and Creative Power in Literature and Thought.....	98
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 12. A Brief Study onCuriosity and the Pursuit of Perfection.....	107
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	
Chapter 13. A Brief Discussion on Clash of Ideals	116
— <i>Dr. Kanupriya Verma</i>	

CHAPTER 1

MATTHEW ARNOLD: A LIFE OF LITERARY

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

The summary of "Matthew Arnold: A Life of Literary" captures the core of Arnold's complex journey through the fields of literature and philosophy. This thorough investigation digs into Arnold's formative years at Rugby School and Oxford's Balliol College as well as his early life, which was shaped by significant individuals like Reverend John Keble. From the release of "The Strayed Reveller" until his well-known poem "Dover Beach," it follows him through his creative undertakings, highlighting his function as a link between Romanticism and Modernism. The main focus of Arnold's works is how his philosophy developed through time. He struggled with issues of religion, uncertainty, and the human condition while often juggling the conflicts between his polished, somewhat sarcastic public presence and the extreme gravity of his critical viewpoints. His views on happiness, introspection, and accepting life's flaws are constant themes, demonstrating his faith in the efficacy of reflection and self-discovery. This summary highlights Arnold's accomplishments as a poet, critic, and thinker, underscoring his ongoing importance in literary and intellectual dialogue. It highlights how relevant his thoughts are in the current intellectual and cultural climate.

KEYWORDS:

Early Life, Literary Evolution, Modernism, Matthew Arnold, Poetry, Prose, Philosophical Journey.

INTRODUCTION

Early life Matthew had the Reverend John Keble as his godfather, who would go on to become one of the founders of the Oxford Movement. When Keble's old friend turned into a Rome ward-tending 'High Church' reactionary in the 1830s, Thomas Arnold reversed himself with exasperation. In 1828, Arnold's father was appointed Headmaster of Rugby School, and his young family moved into the headmaster's house that year. In Laleham, Middlesex, in 1831, Arnold received instruction from his uncle, the Reverend John Buckland. The Arnold family lived at Fox How, a vacation property in the Lake District, in 1834. A close friend and neighbor were William Wordsworth. Arnold was sent to Winchester College in 1836, but he later returned to Rugby School and enrolled in the fifth form there in 1837. In 1838, he transferred to the sixth form, when his father began to supervise him closely. For the family's entertainment from 1838 to 1843, he composed poetry for the manuscript Fox How Magazine, which was created by Matthew and his brother Tom.

He received school awards for his English essay writing, as well as his Latin and English poetry, throughout his time studying at Rugby. Rugby published "Alaric at Rome," the poem he won best in show. He was awarded an open scholarship at Oxford's Balliol College in 1841. His connection with Arthur Hugh Clough, another Rugby old boy who had been a favorite of his father, grew throughout his time at Oxford. Arnold heard the sermons delivered by John Henry Newman at St. Mary's but he chose not to join the Oxford Movement. After his father's unexpected death from heart illness in 1842, the family made Fox How their permanent home. The "Cromwell" poem by Arnold was awarded the 1843 Newdigate Award.

After a brief stint of teaching at Rugby, he earned his degree in "Greats" the following year and was elected Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, in 1845. He was appointed Lord President of the Council Lord Lansdowne's private secretary in 1847. His first collection of poems, *The Strayed Reveller*, was released in 1849. Wordsworth passed away in 1850, and Arnold wrote "Memorial Verses" in his honor, which were published in *Fraser's Magazine*. Marriage and career Arnold wanted to get married but knew he couldn't support a family on the salary of a private secretary. He applied for and was appointed one of Her Majesty's Inspector of Schools in April 1851. He married Frances Lucy, a Justice of the Queen's Bench whose father is Sir William Wightman, two months later[1].

The Arnolds had six kids:

1. Thomas (1852-1868),
2. Trevenen William (1853-1872),
3. Richard Penrose (1855-1908),
4. Lucy Charlotte (1858-1934),
5. Eleanore Mary Caroline (1861-1936), and
6. Hon. Basil Francis (1866-1868),

The inspectorship forced him, at least initially, to travel continuously and throughout much of England. Arnold often referred to his responsibilities as a school inspector as "drudgery," yet "at other times he acknowledged the benefit of regular work." "Initially, Arnold was responsible for inspecting Nonconformist schools across a broad swath of central England. He spent many dreary hours during the 1850s in railway waiting-rooms and small-town hotels, and longer hours still in listening to children reciting their lessons and parents reciting their grievances. But that also meant that he, among the first generation of the railway age, travelled across more of England than any man of letters had ever done. Although his duties were later confined to a smaller area, Arnold knew the society of provincial England better than most of the metropolitan authors and politicians of the day. Literary career in 1852, Arnold published his second volume of poems, *Empedocles on Etna, and Other Poems*. In 1853, he published *Poems: A New Edition*, a selection from the two earlier volumes famously excluding *Empedocles on Etna*, but adding new poems, *Sohrab and Rustum* and *The Scholar Gipsy*. In 1854, *Poems: Second Series* appeared; also, a selection, it included the new poem, *Balder Dead*. Arnold was elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford in 1857. He was the first to deliver his lectures in English rather than Latin. He was re-elected in 1862. On *Translating Homer* (1861) and the initial thoughts that Arnold would transform into *Culture and Anarchy* were among the fruits of the Oxford lectures. In 1859, he conducted the first of three trips to the continent at the behest of parliament to study European educational practices[2].

He self-published *The Popular Education of France* (1861), the introduction to which was later published under the title *Democracy* (1879) In 1865, Arnold published *Essays in Criticism: First Series*. *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* would not appear until November 1888, shortly after his untimely death. In 1866, he published *Thyrsis*, his elegy to Clough who had died in 1861. *Culture and Anarchy*, Arnold's major work in social criticism (and one of the few pieces of his prose work currently in print) was published in 1869. *Literature and Dogma*, Arnold's major work in religious criticism appeared in 1873. In 1883 and 1884, Arnold toured the United States and Canada delivering lectures on education, democracy and Ralph Waldo Emerson. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1883. In 1886, he retired from school inspection and made another trip to America. Arnold died suddenly in 1888 of heart failure, when running to meet a tram that would have taken him to the Liverpool Landing Stage to see his daughter, who was visiting from the United States where she had moved after marrying an American. Mrs.

Arnold died in June 1901. Arnold's character Caricature from *Punch*, 1881: "Admit that Homer sometimes nods, that poets do write trash, Our Bard has written 'Balder Dead,' And also Balder-dash" Matthew Arnold, wrote G. W. E. Russell in *Portraits of the Seventies*, is "a man of the world entirely free from worldliness and a man of letters without the faintest trace of pedantry" (Russell, 1916). A familiar figure at the Athenaeum Club, a frequent diner-out and guest at great country houses, fond of fishing and shooting, a lively conversationalist, affecting a combination of foppishness and Olympian grandeur, he read constantly, widely, and deeply, and in the intervals of supporting himself and his family by the quiet drudgery of school inspecting, filled notebook after notebook with meditations of an almost monastic tone. In his writings, he often baffled and sometimes annoyed his contemporaries by the apparent contradiction between his urbane, even frivolous manner in controversy, and the "high seriousness" of his critical views and the melancholy, almost plaintive note of much of his poetry. "A voice poking fun in the wilderness" was T. H. Warren's description of him. Poetry Arnold is sometimes called the third great Victorian poet, along with Alfred, Lord Tennyson and Robert Browning. Arnold was keenly aware of his place in poetry. In an 1869 letter to his mother, he wrote:

It could be reasonably argued that I have less poetical sentiment than Tennyson and less intellectual vigor and abundance than Browning; however, because I have perhaps more of a fusion of the two than either, my poems will likely have their day as people become conscious to themselves of what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions which reflect it." Arnold's poetry continues to get a lot of academic attention, in part because it seems to provide such compelling evidence for a number of key elements of the intellectual history of the nineteenth century, including the corroding of 'Faith' by 'Doubt'. Harold Bloom echoes Arnold's self-reference in his introduction (as series editor) to the *Modern Critical Views* volume on Arnold: "Arnold got into his poetry what Tennyson and Browning scarcely needed (but absorbed anyway), the main march of mind of his time." Of his poetry, Bloom says that no poet, presumably, would wish to be called upon by later ages merely as a historical witness. At his finest, Arnold is a very talented but heavily derivative poet.

Keats served as Arnold's primary inspiration, as it did for Tennyson, Hopkins, and Rossetti, but this presents an unfortunate conundrum because Arnold (unlike the others) professed not to greatly admire Keats while producing embarrassingly similar diction, meter, and imagistic techniques in his own elegiac poems. Sir Edmund Chambers noted that "in a comparison between the best works of Matthew Arnold and that of his six greatest contemporaries... the proportion of work which endures is greater in the case of Matthew Arnold than in any one of them." Chambers judged Arnold's poetic vision by "its simplicity, lucidity, and straightforwardness; its literalness.; the sparing use of aureate words, or of far-fetched words, which are all the more effective when they come; the avoidance of inversions, and the general directness of syntax, which gives full value to the delicacies of a varied rhythm, and makes it, of all verse that I know, the easiest to read aloud." He has a primary school named after him in Liverpool, where he died, and secondary schools named after him in Oxford and Staines.

His literary career leaving out the two prize poems had begun in 1849 with the publication of *The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems* by A., which attracted little notice although it contained perhaps Arnold's most purely poetical poem "The Forsaken Merman" and was soon withdrawn. *Empedocles on Etna and Other Poems* (among them "Tristram and Iseult"), published in 1852, had a similar fate. In 1858 he brought out his tragedy of "Merope," calculated, he wrote to a friend, "rather to inaugurate my Professorship with dignity than to move deeply the present race of humans," and chiefly remarkable for some experiments in

unusual and unsuccessful meters. His 1867 poem "Dover Beach" depicted a nightmarish world from which the old religious verities have receded. It is sometimes held up as an early, if not the first, example of the modern sensibility. In a famous preface to a selection of the poems of William Wordsworth, Arnold identified himself, a little ironically, as a "Wordsworthian." The influence of Wordsworth, both in ideas and in diction, is unmistakable in Arnold's best poetry[3].

Arnold's poem, "Dover Beach" appears in Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451* and is also featured prominently in *Saturday* by Ian McEwan. It has also been quoted or alluded to in a variety of other contexts (see *Dover Beach*). Some consider Arnold to be the bridge between Romanticism and Modernism. His use of symbolic landscapes was typical of the Romantic era, while his skeptical and pessimistic perspective was typical of the Modern era. The rationalistic tendency of certain of his writings gave offence to many readers, and the sufficiency of his equipment in scholarship for dealing with some of the subjects which he handled was called in question, but he undoubtedly exercised a stimulating influence on his time. His writings are characterized by the finest culture, high purpose, sincerity, and a style of great distinction, and much of his poetry has an exquisite and subtle beauty, though here also it has been doubted whether high culture and wide knowledge of poetry did not sometimes take the place of true poetic fire. Henry James wrote that Matthew Arnold's poetry will appeal to those who "like their pleasures rare" and who like to hear the poet "taking breath."

The mood of Arnold's poetry tends to be of plaintive reflection, and he is restrained in expressing emotion. He felt that poetry should be the 'criticism of life' and express a philosophy. Arnold's philosophy is that true happiness comes from within, and that people should seek within themselves for good, while being resigned in acceptance of outward things and avoiding the pointless turmoil of the world. However, he argues that we should not live in the belief that we shall one day inherit eternal bliss. If we are not happy on earth, we should moderate our desires rather than live in dreams of something that may never be attained. Arnold valued natural scenery for its peace and permanence in contrast with the ceaseless change of human things. His descriptions are often picturesque, and marked by striking similes. However, at the same time he liked subdued colours, mist and moonlight. He seems to prefer the 'spent lights' of the sea-depths in "The Forsaken Merman" to the village life preferred by the merman's lost wife. In his poetry he derived not only the subject matter of his narrative poems from various traditional or literary sources but even much of the romantic melancholy of his earlier poems from Senancour's "Obermann".

Prose Assessing the importance of Arnold's prose work in 1988, Stefan Collini stated, "for reasons to do with our own cultural preoccupations as much as with the merits of his writing, the best of his prose has a claim on us today that cannot be matched by his poetry." "Certainly, there may still be some readers who, vaguely recalling 'Dover Beach' or 'The Scholar Gipsy' from school anthologies, are surprised to find he 'also' wrote prose." George Watson follows George Saintsbury in dividing Arnold's career as a prose writer into three phases: early literary criticism that begins with his preface to the 1853 edition of his poems and ends with the first series of *Essays in Criticism* (1865); a prolonged middle period (overlapping the first and third phases) characterized by social, political and religious writing (roughly 1860–1875); a return to literary criticism with the selecting and editing of collections of Wordsworth's and Byron's poetry and the second series of *Essays in Criticism*. Both Watson and Saintsbury declare their preference for Arnold's literary criticism over his social or religious criticism. More recent writers, such as Collini, have shown a greater interest in his social writing, while over the years a significant second tier of criticism has

focused on Arnold's religious writing. His writing on education has not drawn a significant critical endeavor separable from the criticism of his social writings. Selections from the Prose Work of Matthew Arnold[4].

Literary criticism Arnold's work as a literary critic began with the 1853 "Preface to the Poems". In it, he attempted to explain his extreme act of self-censorship in excluding the dramatic poem "Empedocles on Etna". With its emphasis on the importance of subject in poetry, on "clearness of arrangement, rigor of development, simplicity of style" learned from the Greeks, and in the strong imprint of Goethe and Wordsworth, may be observed nearly all the essential elements in his critical theory. George Watson described the preface, written by the thirty-one-year-old Arnold, as "oddly stiff and graceless when we think of the elegance of his later prose." Criticism began to take first place in Arnold's writing with his appointment in 1857 to the professorship of poetry at Oxford, which he held for two successive terms of five years. In 1861 his lectures *On Translating Homer* were published, to be followed in 1862 by *Last Words on Translating Homer*, both volumes admirable in style and full of striking judgments and suggestive remarks, but built on rather arbitrary assumptions and reaching no well-established conclusions.

Especially characteristic, both of his defects and his qualities, are on the one hand, Arnold's unconvincing advocacy of English hexameters and his creation of a kind of literary absolute in the "grand style," and, on the other, his keen feeling of the need for a disinterested and intelligent criticism in England. Although Arnold's poetry received only mixed reviews and attention during his lifetime, his forays into literary criticism were more successful. Arnold is famous for introducing a methodology of literary criticism somewhere between the historicist approach common to many critics at the time and the personal essay; he often moved quickly and easily from literary subjects to political and social issues. His *Essays in Criticism* (1865, 1888), remains a significant influence on critics to this day. In one of his most famous essays on the topic, "The Study of Poetry", Arnold wrote that, "Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry". He considered the most important criteria used to judge the value of a poem were "high truth" and "high seriousness". By this standard, Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* did not merit Arnold's approval. Further, Arnold thought the works that had been proven to possess both "high truth" and "high seriousness", such as those of Shakespeare and Milton, could be used as a basis of comparison to determine the merit of other works of poetry. He also sought for literary criticism to remain disinterested, and said that the appreciation should be of "the object as in itself it really is"[5].

Social criticism He was led on from literary criticism to a more general critique of the spirit of his age. Between 1867 and 1869 he wrote *Culture and Anarchy*, famous for the term he popularized for the middle class of the English Victorian era population: "Philistines", a word which derives its modern cultural meaning from him. *Culture and Anarchy* is also famous for its popularization of the phrase "sweetness and light," first coined by Jonathan Swift. Arnold's "want of logic and thoroughness of thought" as noted by John M. Robertson in *Modern Humanists* was an aspect of the inconsistency of which Arnold was accused. Few of his ideas were his own, and he failed to reconcile the conflicting influences which moved him so strongly. "There are four people, in especial," he once wrote to Cardinal Newman, "from whom I am conscious of having learnt a very different thing from merely receiving a strong impression learnt habits, methods, ruling ideas, which are constantly with me; and the four are Goethe, Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, and yourself." Dr. Arnold must be added; the son's fundamental likeness to the father was early pointed out by Swinburne, and was later attested by Matthew Arnold's grandson, Mr. Arnold Whit ridge. **Journalistic criticism** Lord

Northcliffe's turn-of-the-century press empire was the target of Arnold's annoyance at the time, not the sensational journalism of Pall Mall Gazette editor, W.T. Stead, who he had a long and mutually beneficial relationship with. Arnold is credited with coining the term "New Journalism" in 1887, which went on to define an entire genre of newspaper history. Criticism based on religion His religion was exceptional for his period. On the nature of Arnold's own religious views, scholars of his works are divided. He rejected the supernatural aspects of religion under the influence of Baruch Spinoza and his father, Dr. Thomas Arnold, although still finding church ceremonies fascinating. Arnold seems to fall into a pragmatic middle ground that is more interested in religion's poetry and the benefits and ideals it may provide for society than it is in the question of whether God exists. In the preface of *God and the Bible*, published in 1875, he stated: "The personages of the Christian heaven and their conversations are no more matter of fact than the personages of the Greek Olympus and their conversations." He also stated in *Literature and Dogma*: "The word 'God' is used in most cases as by no means a term of science or exact knowledge, but a term of poetry and eloquence, a term thrown out, so to speak, only those who have such a strong connection with Christianity that they cannot let it go but nevertheless must deal with it honestly may bring it about. Reputation Matthew Arnold's poetry is arresting from cover to cover, possibly with the exception of *Merope*, according to admirer John Cowper Powys. He is known as the great amateur of English poetry and always exudes the air of an ironic and urbane scholar conversing freely, if not slightly indiscreetly, with his disrespectful students[6].

DISCUSSION

"A Life of Literary" is an engrossing investigation of the varied path made by one of the most important individuals in Victorian literature and thinking. The life and work of Matthew Arnold provide an intriguing prism through which to look at how a poet, critic, and thinker evolved during the 19th century. Arnold's godfather, Reverend John Keble, a pivotal participant in the Oxford Movement, was one of many influential figures who had a big impact on him growing up. His literary and philosophical research was built on these formative experiences. His schooling and exposure to the academic world began with his family's relocation to Rugby School, where his father later assumed the position of headmaster. Arnold shown exceptional aptitude in English essay writing and poetry throughout his academic career, indicating that he would go on to become a significant literary personality. Arnold's participation in the Oxford Movement, which aimed to reconnect the Church of England with its Catholic origins, was a crucial feature of his life and work.

Arnold's decision to stay away from the movement in spite of this impact shows his early propensity for a more philosophical and critical viewpoint. His subsequent investigation of faith and doubt, a subject that would resound strongly in both his poetry and prose, was made possible by this choice.

The development of Arnold's writing is a major topic of this debate. His paintings demonstrate the transition between Romanticism and Modernism, which he is often seen as bridging. His early work, such as "The Strayed Reveller" and "Empedocles on Etna," is characterized by rich, scenic descriptions and sensual imagery, which are hallmarks of Romanticism. Arnold's poetry, however, evolved into a more solemn and contemplative style as the Victorian age went on and doubt started to erode religion. This culminated in the renowned "Dover Beach," which offers a gloomy outlook on a world without religious certainty. The development of Arnold's philosophy is equally fascinating. He valued introspection and worked to resolve the tension that existed between the human yearning for pleasure and the harsh facts of life. Introspection, self-discovery, and moderation of wants are often encouraged in his texts. His written writings, such as "Culture and Anarchy" and

"Literature and Dogma," which deal with the difficulties of a fast-changing society and the disintegration of old values, are good examples of these issues[7].

CONCLUSION

Arnold's capacity for combining literary analysis, philosophical analysis, and cultural criticism is evidence of his depth of thought. His contributions to educational reform in England as a school inspector and as a writer go beyond his published works. During his travels in the late 1850s, he engaged with European educational techniques, which further widened his viewpoint and deepened his thoughts. Ultimately, "A Life of Literary" offers a thorough and provocative examination of a unique person who made a lasting contribution to Victorian literature and philosophy. Arnold's life and writings serve as a constant source of inspiration and philosophical inquiry because of his transition from faith to doubt, his development as a poet, and his philosophical insights.

REFERENCES

- [1] S. Grimble, "Intellectuals and the Politics of Style," *Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc.*, 2017, doi: 10.1007/s10767-016-9231-9.
- [2] S. O'Kane, "Touchstones: John McGahern's classical style," *Ir. Stud. Rev.*, 2017, doi: 10.1080/09670882.2017.1330185.
- [3] T. Eagleton, *Culture*. 2016.
- [4] S. Lecourt, *Cultivating belief: Victorian anthropology, liberal aesthetics, and the secular imagination*. 2018. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198812494.001.0001.
- [5] N. Lennartz, "'The ache of modernism': James Joyce's Pomes Penyeach and their literary context," *James Joyce Quarterly*. 2010. doi: 10.1353/jjq.2011.0005.
- [6] S. Lecourt, "Matthew Arnold and religion's cosmopolitan histories," *Victorian Literature and Culture*. 2010. doi: 10.1017/S1060150310000124.
- [7] M. Elizabeth, "The Comfort of Strangers: Social Life and Literary Form by Gage McWeeny," *ESC English Stud. Canada*, 2016, doi: 10.1353/esc.2016.0036.

CHAPTER 2

MATTHEW ARNOLD: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF HIS POETRY AND PROSE

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

This summary explores Matthew Arnold's literary accomplishments and distinctive style while providing a broad overview of the critical evaluation of his poetry and prose. In this thorough research, Matthew Arnold, a significant character in Victorian literature, is analyzed. The evaluation separates his accomplishments into those of a poet and a prose writer, stressing the benefits and drawbacks of both. The poetry of Arnold is evaluated for its lack of general appeal as well as its subjects, style, and resonant with academics and introspective people. On the other hand, his language is lauded for its extraordinary naturalness, elegance, and clarity. Additionally, the abstract mentions Arnold's standing among his contemporaries and the lasting impact of his works. In the end, this critical analysis highlights Matthew Arnold's importance as a Victorian-era writer of poetry and prose and provides insightful information about his literary legacy.

KEYWORDS:

Critical Assessment, Matthew Arnold, Poetry, Prose, Scholarly Influence, Victorian Era.

INTRODUCTION

This book's focus is on content rather than aesthetics. However, it would be absurd to completely ignore the characteristics of writing that so deeply permeated and influenced the intellectual life of the Victorian era when evaluating the performance of a teacher who only taught with a pen. We must thus provide a quick assessment of Arnold's prose and poetry abilities before moving on to discuss the practical impact those abilities allowed him to have. A devoted and appreciative follower must thus take care to protect against the danger of overstating things in this situation. Unrestrained and improper praise would have been oddly upsetting to the Master's unfailing taste, rational judgment, and sober perspective. This warning is especially important in light of how highly we regard his poetry. The most demanding and contradictory critique will rarely dispute the fact that he was a poet, but when we come to assess his standing among poets, self-control and moderation are urgently needed. Should we refer to him as a great poet? The solution has to be properly considered[1].

First of all, he didn't write all that much. His corpus of work as a poet is not very large. He only wrote in his early years of life and only during the little free time he had at his demanding job. Later in life, he seemed to believe that the "ancient fount of inspiration" had dried up. After delivering his message to his generation, he wisely chose not to say anything more. Then it is obvious that he had difficulties writing. His poetry lacks spontaneity, ease, and fluidity. Every line contains remnants of the time-consuming file. He possessed the brains and heart of a poet, but these did not easily translate into poetry. He searched eagerly and with tears for lyrical expression since he felt it was his only suitable outlet. He succeeded rather often, but more often than not, he gave the sense that it was difficult to master and

certain to be attained[2]. Once again, if we consider Milton's tripartite canon, we must acknowledge that his poetry is lacking in three very important components of strength. He lacks simplicity, sensibility, and passion. He cannot be really basic since he is fundamentally contemporary. The complex crosscurrents of thinking and emotion from his high-strung civilisation stimulate and confound his poetry. He does continually strive for simplicity of style, which he achieves with the help of a meticulous culture. But his simplicity is more comparable to simplest than to simplicity, to the developed and artificial appearance than to the true quality, to use the term he himself adopted from France. Except inasmuch as the most delicate and refined appreciation of nature in all of her shapes and phases may be claimed to constitute a sensual experience, he is not sensuous. Additionally, he is clearly not passionate. He exudes serenity, equilibrium, restraint, sanity, and austerity. Passion is impossible because of his own characteristics, which are his greatest splendor.

The fact that he is not and never could be a poet of the masses is another obstacle to his claim to be a great poet. His poem is devoid of any popular appeal. Scholars, philosophers, and men who live a life of solitary reflection or peaceful natural communion find it to their pleasure. However, it is completely removed from the commotion and strain of everyday life. His tone is once again gravely gloomy, but not morbidly so, and this is deadly to his appeal. Not only is his ideology anti-popular, but so is his writing style, as he himself put it: "The life of the people is such that in literature they require joy." The fact that so much of his most complex work is written in blank verse is a significant drawback. Many passages are also written in strange and unfamiliar meters, which must always be more of a chore than a treat for the vast majority of English readers. And even when he wrote in our native meters, his ear often misled him. His sentences are overstuffed with jerking monosyllables, and his rhymes are sometimes only true to the eye. Let one stark example be sufficient[3].

The poet scorned the notion that childhood fantasies would portend eternity, and he discovered inspiration in the instant consideration of current goodness rather than in the unending search for inspiration shared by poets throughout history. The guiding principles of that section of his poetry that addresses issues related to human life are what his brother-poet termed "self-reverence, self-knowledge, and self-control." When he discusses these subjects, he talks to his listeners' deepest awareness, revealing to us what we already know about ourselves but have kept secret from everyone else, or else putting into words what we have vaguely sensed but have tried in vain to express. It is this trait that makes poetry like *Youth's Agitations*, *Youth and Calm*, *Self-dependence*, and *The Grande Chartreuse* such priceless pieces of our intellectual history. He is thus, in his own words, "interpretative." They were both from a class too poor to buy books, and had first come across the poem in a newspaper. In 1873, he wrote to his sister, "I have a curious letter from the State of Maine in America, from a young man who wished to tell me that a friend of his, recently dead, had been especially fond of my poem, *A Wish*, and often had it read to him in his last illness."

Even while his teachings on mankind are nuanced and introspective, they may serve as a gentle reminder that Arnold's admiration for nature has won him more admirers than his teachings on people have. His is the type of nature worship that doesn't accept anything used. He gave "the Mighty Mother" the only honor worthy of her acceptance: a thorough examination of her strategies and moods. Before he dared to leave her feet and assume the role of an exponent of her teaching, he humbled himself and sat at her feet as a respectful student. His local coloring is so vibrant and accurate because of how precisely he observed the scene. This lends his landscape paintings their endearing beauty, whether the setting is set in Kensington Gardens, the Alps, or the Thames Valley. This brims with immaculate pearls of natural description and felicities of phrase that haunt the appreciative memory in *The*

Scholar-Gipsy, Thyrsis, Obermann, and The Forsaken Merman[4]. In short, I don't think he was a great poet since he lacked the abilities to influence the masses and grab people's attention. However, he was a real poet, full of the attributes that create a beloved and trusted teacher of a select group, as he would have put it, of "the Remnant" and he is deserving of association with the highest names of all. We may boldly assert about him that he was not only of the school but also of the bloodline of Wordsworth, which makes him unique among his contemporaries. In a letter from 1869, he expressed his opinion of where he stood among contemporary poets, saying that his works "represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind of the last quarter of a century, and thus they will probably have their day as people become conscious of what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions which reflect it. It might be fairly argued that I have less poetic sentiment than Tennyson, and less intellectual vigor and abundancy."

Caution and qualifications become considerably less important when we start to think of him as a prose writer. Whatever one may think of the works' content, it is certain that he was a great master of style. And he had a very own sense of style. In the last year of his life, he told the current author, "People think I can teach them style. What stuff it all is! Have something to say, and say it as clearly as you can. That is the only secret of style."

His own most notable quality is undoubtedly his clarity, to which he added exceptional elegance, exceptional phrase-crafting ability, exceptional talent for exquisite description, faultless naturalness, and unwavering ease. The easygoing styles of a guy who wrote as he spoke are the same flaws that the admirers of a more pretentious language claim to discern in his work. There is significant basis for the claim that their institution produced Cardinal Newman, Dean Church, and Matthew Arnold when they brag of "the Oriel style." However, even while it is a wonderful source of pleasure and power, style is not everything, thus we must not base our case for him as a prose writer just on style. His writing style was the deserving and appropriate medium for much of the finest critique found in English literature.

We examine the whole of his critical writing from the Discourse on Milton and the Preface to Wordsworth to the Essays in Criticism and Lectures on Homer and we ask, Is there anything better? His sense of style, his temperament, and his judgment were almost imperturbable when he wrote as a book reviewer. He coupled a free and even audacious use of his own discretion with a devoted and reasonable deference to literary authority. Incomparably more knowledgeable than some more traditional critics, his appreciation for the writers who are often regarded as masters of human expression—Homer, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe—was sincere and ardent.

However, this polite deference to established authority and this sincere loyalty to a good name did not make him blind to flaws, did not lure him into unwarranted praise, and did not stop him from calling attention to Burke and Jeremy Taylor's tendency toward verbiage, Wordsworth's excessive blankness in much of his blank verse, Macaulay's undercurrent of mediocrity, and the absurdities of Ruskin's etymology. And just as in big affairs, so in little ones. Regardless of the literary work that was brought to his attention, he had sound, empathetic, and impartial judgment. He was quick to recognize actual brilliance, had a keen eye for technique and the minor virtues, and had a strong intolerance for pomposity and turgidity what he termed "desperate attempts to render a platitude enduring by making it pompous" as well as a passionate detest of affectation and unrealism. These were, in his opinion, the unforgivable crimes, both in writing and in reality[5].

Overall, it can be argued that he had the fame and popularity he earned throughout his lifetime as a book reviewer. However, his criticism in other areas hasn't exactly been taken

seriously enough. His politics were undoubtedly wonderful. They were affected by his father's fiery but restricted Liberalism, by the abstract speculation which thrives perpetually at Oxford, and by the cultured Whiggery which he imbibed as Lord Lansdowne's Private Secretary; and the outcome frequently looked wayward and whimsical. He was at least somewhat aware of this. In any case, he was well aware that politicians had little regard for his politics, and he used to blame it on the envy that all professional men have when an outsider interferes with their work. However, he showed the greatest interest in both the daily operations and the inner workings of the firm, in addition to the larger issues of politics. He loved politics, enjoyed engaging in lively debates, and was fascinated by the people, the little details, and the personal and home issues that dominate political discourse.

However, politics did not technically provide a proper area for his special abilities. When he started criticizing national life, that's when the master's influence became apparent. His insight was profound, his point of view was completely unique, and his judgment, if not always sound, was always suggestive in all matters pertaining to national character and tendency, the advancement of civilization, public manners, morals, habits, and idiosyncrasies, as well as the influence of institutions, education, and literature. These characteristics, among others, provided publications like *Essays in Criticism*, *Friendship's Garland*, and *Culture and Anarchy* an appeal and worth that were completely unrelated to the literary brilliance of the works. And in his *Discourses in America*, which are divorced from any simple levity and vivacity, they are presented in their most serious and methodical form. He said to the current writer that of all his literary pieces, this was the one he wanted to be remembered for the most. It was a unique and intriguing decision.

Another crucial aspect of his prose is that he would never have become renowned as a comedian if he hadn't created prose. And it would have been a difficult to quantify intellectual loss. His friends and acquaintances were fully aware of how clean, delicate, but natural and spontaneous his humor was, and which is by no means always the case that the humor in his work was of the same caliber as the humor in his conversations. It gained nothing throughout the transplanting procedure. He was not a popular writer, as he was fond of saying, and he was never less popular than when writing in a comic style. In contrast to the guffaws, antics, and "full-bodied gaiety of our English Cider-Cellar," there is a keen eye for subtle absurdity, a glance that penetrates bombast and reveals affectation, the most delicate sense of incongruity, the liveliest disrelish for all the moral and intellectual qualities that constitute the Bore, and a vein of personal raillery that is as refined as it is pungent in his fun. The terms used by Sydney Smith to characterize Sir James Mackintosh's manner of dealing with literary and personal pretentiousness accurately depict Arnold's approach to "abating and dissolving pompous gentlemen with the most successful ridicule[6]."

He is praised across all of literature's Churches as a phrase-maker. He received the most enthusiastic praise from a transcendent performer in the same profession for his brilliance in this area. In 1881 he wrote to his sister: "On Friday night I had a long talk with Lord Beaconsfield. He ended by declaring that I was the only living Englishman who had become a classic in his own lifetime. The fact is that what I have done in establishing a number of current phrases, such as Philistinism, Sweetness and Light, and all that is just the thing to strike him." In 1884 he wrote from America about his phrase, *The Remnant* "That term is going the round of the United States, and I understand what Dizzy meant when he said that I had performed 'a great achievement in launching phrases.'" But his wise epigrams and compendious sentences about books and life, admirable in themselves, will hardly recall the true man to the recollection of his friends so effectually as his sketch of the English Academy, disturbed by a "flight of Corinthian leading articles, and an eruption of Mr. G.A.

Sala;" his comparison of Miss Cobbe's new religion to the British College of Health; his parallel between Phidias' statue of the Olympian Zeus and Coles' truss-manufactory; Sir William Harcourt's attempt to "develop a system of unsectarian religion from the Life of Mr. Pickwick;" the "portly jeweler from Cheapside," with his "passionate, absorbing, almost blood-thirsty clinging to life;" the grandiose war-correspondence of the Times, and "old Russell's guns getting a little honey-combed;" Lord Lumpington's subjection to "the grand, old, fortifying, classical curriculum," and the "feat of mental gymnastics" by which he obtained his degree; the Rev. Esau Hittall's "longs and shorts about the Caledonian Boar, which were not bad;" the agitation of the Paris Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph on hearing the word "delicacy"; the "bold, bad men, the haunters of Social Science Congresses," who declaim "a sweet union of philosophy and poetry" from Wordsworth on the duty of the State towards education; the impecunious author "commercing with the stars" in Grub Street, reading "the Star for wisdom and charity, the Telegraph for taste and style," and looking for the letter from the Literary Fund, "enclosing half-a-crown, the promise of my dinner at Christmas, and the kind wishes of Lord Stanhope for my better success in authorship[7]." The examination of literary skills and graces may go on, but enough has been stated to remember some of Arnold's most notable qualities as a genius of both poetry and prose. We will now begin looking at what he achieved. The scope of his authority was broad almost as broad as our national existence. We will look at each of the areas of it one by one where his effect was most noticeable, but first, a word about his Method is necessary.

DISCUSSION

Victorian author Matthew Arnold had a lasting impression on the field of writing during his day. He made contributions in both poetry and prose, and a close examination of his output exposes the subtleties and complexity of his writing. A topic of special interest is Arnold's poetry. His body of work is distinguished by a unique style that often rejected the vogue of the day. His poetry's emphasis on substance above form is among its most remarkable features. Instead of writing elaborate, flowery lines, Arnold tried to communicate important concepts and participate in Victorian-era intellectual currents. This feature of his writing might be understood as a reflection of his function as a cultural critic, in which he actively participated in the hot-button problems and philosophical discussions of the day. Arnold's poetry was criticized for not having a broad appeal, nevertheless. It appealed to academics, philosophers, and those who value solitude, yet it remained far from the bustle of daily life. Although not morbid, his lyrics sometimes had a seriously dismal tone that distinguished them from the vibrant and joyous attitude that many readers desired in literature. Arnold recognized the importance of pleasure in writing, demonstrating the underlying conflict between his philosophy and the prevailing aesthetic of the day.

Arnold's difficulty with lyrical expression is another facet of his poetry that merits consideration. Despite having the mind and sensibility of a poet, he had trouble expressing his ideas and feelings via poetry. His precise poems, which sometimes lacked the spontaneity, ease, and flow typically associated with excellent poetry, are a clear indication of this struggle. Milton's three pillars of poetry's powers—simplicity, sensitivity, and passion—serve as a reminder of Arnold's limitations as a poet. Although Arnold aimed for stylistic simplicity, it frequently seemed more forced than real. His poetry lacked the emotional zeal that distinguished the works of other poets since he was not sensual in his writing. His personality, which valued calmness, balance, restraint, rationality, and austerity above flamboyant emotion, might be blamed for this lack of enthusiasm.

Arnold's small body of poetry, much of which was written in his formative years, further complicates attempts to rank him among poets. It is unclear if his literary legacy is complete given his subsequent choice to stop composing poems due to a lack of inspiration. On the other hand, a different image shows up when we focus on Arnold's text. His literary work is distinguished by great naturalness, elegance, and clarity. Arnold distinguished himself from his peers by having a distinctive sense of style. As he famously counseled, "Have something to say, and say it as clearly as you can.," his work is distinguished by a direct style. The only stylistic secret is that. This analysis of the poetry and prose of Matthew Arnold shows, in the end, a complicated and diverse writer who had a considerable impact on Victorian literature. While his poetry may not have been widely read and may have had stylistic and emotional depth restrictions, his writing showed a command of language and a dedication to precision. Arnold is a topic of ongoing attention and critical scrutiny in the field of literature due to his standing among his contemporaries, his persistent impact on academics and thoughtful readers, and his unique position as a writer of both poetry and prose during the Victorian period.

CONCLUSION

Finally, the analysis of Matthew Arnold's poetry and prose provides a thorough understanding of this varied Victorian author. By carefully analyzing his creative output, we see a contradiction between his poetry and prose, each of which has its own unique set of advantages and disadvantages. As a cultural critic who was intensely involved with the intellectual currents of his period, Arnold's poetry is distinguished by its preference for substance above aesthetics. It also highlights the difficulties in gaining wide appeal, sometimes falling short of the joyful and sensual aspects desired by the larger audience. Arnold was a very brilliant man, yet his poetry lacked the spontaneity and flow of great poetry, and it lacked the emotional intensity of great poetry. Arnold, on the other hand, writes writing that is brilliant. He stood out as a master of style because of his dedication to writing with simplicity and clarity. His naturalistic and precise exquisite style appeals to people looking for clear and informative dialogue. Arnold's distinctive sense of style in his literary writings is evidence of his capacity to clearly convey complicated concepts.

In the end, Matthew Arnold's position in literary history is unique and merits more analysis. He may not be regarded as a great poet with widespread appeal, but there is no denying his effect on academics, thinkers, and thoughtful readers. For those who value the power of lucid, beautiful language, his work in particular continues to be a useful resource. The analysis of Matthew Arnold's poetry and prose essentially emphasizes the ongoing significance of his writing while also providing a complex portrait of a writer whose contributions to Victorian literature continue to enthrall and arouse emotion. Our understanding of the intricacies of literary expression and the lasting worth of lucid, careful language are challenged by Arnold's legacy.

REFERENCES

- [1] L. R. Pratt, "Passionate reporting: Arnold on elementary schools, teachers, and children," *Nineteenth Century Prose*, 2007.
- [2] G. Thomas, "Emily Bronte: A Biography; Dickens and the Rhetoric of Laughter; Thackeray: The Major Novels; Matthew Arnold: A Survey of his Poetry and Prose; A Publisher and his Circle; I, Jane Austen," *English*, 1972, doi: 10.1093/english/21.110.71.

- [3] W. E. Bezanson, "Melville's Reading of Arnold's Poetry," *PMLA/Publications Mod. Lang. Assoc. Am.*, 1954, doi: 10.1632/460065.
- [4] J. W. Caufield, *Overcoming Matthew Arnold: Ethics in Culture and Criticism*. 2016. doi: 10.4324/9781315599281.
- [5] D. Wheatley, "Professing poetry: Heaney as critic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Seamus Heaney*, 2008. doi: 10.1017/CCOL9780521838825.008.
- [6] J. W. Caufield, *Overcoming Matthew Arnold: Ethics in culture and criticism*. 2013.
- [7] W. E. Buckler, "Studies in Three Arnold Problems," *PMLA/Publications Mod. Lang. Assoc. Am.*, 1958, doi: 10.2307/460243.

CHAPTER 3

CRITIQUE AND REFLECTION: MATTHEW ARNOLD'S UNWAVERING JUDGMENT

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@mut.in

ABSTRACT:

The book "Critique and Reflection: Matthew Arnold's Unwavering Judgment" explores the great Victorian writer and poet Matthew Arnold's unique and steadfast critical approach. This abstract looks at Arnold's steadfast adherence to the ideals of clarity, objectivity, and calmness in his literary critique. Arnold's critique has always been distinguished by its fair-minded and measured tone, from his earliest publications through his important lectures on interpreting Homer. This abstract also demonstrates Arnold's readiness to critique renowned literary personalities and his aptitude for pointing out faults and imperfections that often went unnoticed by his contemporaries. Arnold left behind a legacy of insightful and morally upright criticism that still influences and informs the study of literature and culture today.

KEYWORDS:

Critical Approach, Criticism, Impartiality, Judgment, Literary, Matthew Arnold.

INTRODUCTION

The Matthew Arnold that we are familiar with first appears in his letters to his mother and elder sister in 1848, and by the time we meet him, he is already a critic. He is just 25 years old and writing throughout the American Revolution. All throughout Europe, thrones are falling with a crash, screams of victorious liberation are in the air, and it seems that the long-awaited millennium of peace and fraternity is about to come to pass. The young philosopher, however, maintains his composure and unwavering composure throughout all of this beautiful commotion, this "joy of eventful living," while being utterly detached and objectively critical. He is convinced that "the hour of the hereditary peerage and eldest sonship and immense properties has struck"; he believes that a five-year continuation of these institutions is "long enough, certainly, for patience, already at death's door, to have to die in." He pities (in a sympathetic way) those who have to endure the hereditary peerage and eldest sonship and immense properties. He observes how American slang and "laideur" are threatening to flood Europe.

He thinks England, as it is, "not liveable-in," but is convinced that a Government of Chartists would not mend matters; and, after telling a Republican friend that "God knows it, I am with you, in fine, he is critical of his own country, critical of all foreign nations, critical of existing institutions, critical of well-meant but uninstructed attempts to set them right. And, as he was in the beginning, so he continued throughout his life and to its close. It is impossible to conceive of him as an enthusiastic and unqualified partisan of any cause, creed, party, society, or system. Admiration he had, for worthy objects, in abundant store; high appreciation for what was excellent; sympathy with all sincere and upward-tending endeavour. But few indeed were the objects which he found wholly admirable, and keen was his eye for the flaws and foibles which war against absolute perfection. On the last day of his life, he said in a note to the present writer: " has written a letter full of shrieking's and

cursing's about my innocent article; the Americans will get their notion of it from that, and I shall never be able to enter America again." That "innocent article" was an estimate, based on his experience in two recent visits to the United States, of American civilization. "Innocent" perhaps it was, but it was essentially critical. He began by saying that in America the "political and social problem" had been well solved; that there the constitution and government were to the people as well-fitting clothes to a man; that there was a closer union between classes there than elsewhere, and a more "homogeneous" nation. But then he went on to say that, besides the political and social problem, there was a "human problem," and that in trying to solve this America had been less successful indeed, very unsuccessful.

The "human problem" was the problem of civilization, and civilization meant "humanization in society" the development of the best in man, in and by a social system. And here he pronounced America defective. America generally life, people, possessions was not "interesting." Americans lived willingly in places called by such names as Briggsville, Jacksonville and Marcellus. The general tendency of public opinion was against distinction. America offered no satisfaction to the sense for beauty, the sense for elevation. Tall talk and self-glorification were rampant, and no criticism was tolerated. In fine, there were many countries, less free and less prosperous, which were more civilized[1].

This "innocent article," which was published in 1888, has the same well-balanced tone and temper as the letters from 1848, as well as the same critical stance toward issues that, for the most part, he sympathizes with. From beginning to end, he was a critical calm and impartial judge, a serene distributor of praise and blame never a zealot, a prophet, an advocate, or a dealer in that "blague and mob-pleasing" of which he truly said that it "is a real talent and tempts many men to apostasy." Some great masters have taught by passionate glorification of favorite personalities or ideals, passionate denunciation of what they dislike or despised; not such was Arnold's method; he himself described it, most happily, as "sinuous, easy, unpolemical." By his free yet courteous handling of subjects the most difficult of subjects, he never dogmatized, preached, or laid down the law.

However, these will be more conveniently considered when we come to estimate his effect on Society and Politics. That effect will perhaps be found to have been more considerable than his contemporaries imagined; for, though it became a convention to praise his literary performances and judgments, it was not uncommon for him to criticize institutions in his earliest and most recent criticisms. When one thinks of criticism, they typically think of prose, but when we speak of Arnold's criticism, it is necessary to broaden one's observation because he was never more fundamentally the critic than when he disguised the true character of his method in the guise of poetry. Even if we decline to accept his strange judgment that all poetry "is a form of prose," we must nonetheless discuss his critical method when applied to life and when applied to books[2].

But surely, we find in his own poetry a sustained doctrine of self-mastery, duty, and pursuit of truth, which is essentially ethical, and, in its form, as nearly "scientific" and systematic as the nature of poetry permits. And this doctrinal satire was directed at those misguided Wordsworthians who sought to glorify their master by claiming for him an "ethical system as distinctive and capable of exposition as Bishop Butler's," and "a scientific system of thought." The main concerns of human life, according to Swift's "two noblest of things, Sweetness and Light" though heaven only knows what he meant by them, were Truth, Work, and Love; to these he added the third great ideal, Love; and so that is all for his *Criticism of Life*, as applied in and through his poems. It is difficult to estimate, even roughly, the effect produced by a loved and gifted poet. We must now turn our attention to his performances in the field of literary criticism; and we begin in the year 1853. He had won the prize for an

English poem at Rugby, and again at Oxford. In 1849 he had published without his name, and had recalled, a thin volume, called *The Strayed Reveller*, and other Poems. He had done the same with *Empedocles on Etna*, and other Poems in 1852. The best contents of these two volumes were combined in *Poems*, 1853, and to this book he gave a Preface, which was his first essay in Literary Criticism. In this essay he enounces a certain doctrine of poetry, and, true to his lifelong practice, he enounces it mainly by criticism of what other people had said. A favourite cry of the time was that Poetry, to be vital and interesting, must "leave the exhausted past, and draw its subjects from matters of present import." It was the favourite theory of Middle-Class Liberalism. The *Spectator* uttered it with characteristic gravity; Kingsley taught it obliquely in *Alton Locke*.

Arnold assailed it as "completely false," as "having a philosophical form and air, but no real basis in fact." In assailing it, he justified his constant recourse to Antiquity for subject and method; he exalted Achilles, Prometheus, Clytemnestra, and Dido as eternally interesting; he asserted that the most famous poems of the nineteenth century "left the reader cold in comparison with the effect produced upon him by the latter books of the *Iliad*, by the *Oresteia*, or by the episode of Dido." He glorified the Greeks as the "unapproached masters of the grand style." He even ventured to doubt whether the influence of Shakespeare, "the greatest, perhaps, of all poetical names," had been wholly advantageous to the writers of poetry. He weighed Keats in the balance against Sophocles and found him wanting[3].

He thus explained his doctrine in a Preface to a Second Edition of his *Poems*: "It has been said that I wish to limit the poet, in his choice of subjects, to the period of Greek and Roman antiquity; but it is not so. Of course, this criticism, so hostile to the current cant of the moment, was endlessly misinterpreted and misunderstood. A few years later, in a letter that has never been published, he wrote to a friend: "The modern world is the widest and richest material ever offered to the artist; but the moulding and representing power of the artist is not, or has not yet become, commensurate with his material, his mundus representans. I only counsel him to choose for his subjects' great actions, without regarding to what time they belong. In this sense, the Homeric and Elizabethan poetry seems to me to be of a higher class than ours, even though the world represented by them was much less full and significant. This adequacy of the artist to his world, this command of the latter by him, seems to me to be what constitutes a first-class poetic epoch and to distinguish it from such an epoch as our own.

The two Prefaces, which can be found in the volume titled *Irish Essays*, and *Others*, require no further explanation, but they are noteworthy nonetheless because, in them, at the age of thirty, he first demonstrated the peculiar temper in literary criticism which so conspicuously marked him to the end; and that temper happily infected the critical writing of a whole generation; until the Iron Age returned, and the bludgeon was taken away. He judged for himself; and, however much his judgment might run counter to prejudice or tradition, he dared to announce it and persist in it. In his criticism of books, as well as in his criticism of life, he aimed first at lucidity at that clear light, unclouded by prepossession, which should enable him to see things as they really are. Arnold openly admitted that, in his opinion, "a man's power to detect the ring of false metal in the Lays of Ancient Rome was a good measure of his fitness to give an opinion about poetical matter at all."

Although Macaulay is, perhaps less rightly, another object of national worship, Arnold denounced the "confident shallowness which makes him so admired by public speakers and leading-article writers, and so intolerable to all searchers for truth." He applied it in turn to Jeremy Taylor, Addison, Milton, Pope, Gray, Keats, Shelley, and Scott all the major figures in our literary heaven and it was wonderfully brave critique that qualified sympathetic adoration.

Devout Wordsworthian as he is, he does not hesitate to say that much of Wordsworth's work is "quite uninspired, flat, and dull," and sets himself to the task of "relieving him from a great deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him." He went to great lengths to praise Byron's "sincerity and strength," but he qualified the praise by saying that "he taught us little." As a result, the Truth-revealing Lucidity makes its judgments with unwavering confidence, and the icing on the cake is serenity. He never loses his patience with the author he is criticizing, regardless of how much the topic of his study may insult his taste or transgress his morality. He never beats, scalps, or scarifies; instead, he calmly points out with the authoritative gesture of someone in charge the flaws and blemishes that impair beauty but which the mindless masses overlook, or worse, love. His critical methodology underwent a significant period of development during the years 1860 and 1861. As much as anything he ever wrote, these lectures have a possibility of existing and being loved after we are dust. He was now Professor of Poetry at Oxford, and he gave his renowned lectures on translating Homer from the professorial chair, to which in 1862 he added his "Last Words." Because Homer is eternal, whoever translates Homer for Englishmen may at the very least expect to live longer than the majority of us[4].

Few are those who can still recall the graceful figure in the silken gown, the gracious address, and the slightly arrogant smile of the Milton jeune et voyageant, who had just returned from contact with the best of French culture to instruct and astound his own university. Few are those who can still recall the cadence of the opening line: "It has been suggested to me numerous times that I should translate Homer." Few are those who can still recall the fine tribute of the aged scholar who, as the Milton, as Arnold responded to a supportive reviewer who praised these lectures on translating Homer with his signature trick of humorous mock-humility: "I am glad any influential person should call attention to the fact that there was some criticism in the three lectures; most people seem to have gathered nothing from them except that I abused F.W. Newman, and liked English hexameters."

The most depressing reading in the world is criticisms of criticism, so no attempt will be made here to look into the praise that he lavished in these lectures on the greatest example of pure art or the delicious parody that he leveled at the most honorable translations of Homer into English. For the praise, one quote should do: "Homer's grandeur is not the mixed and turbid grandeur of the great poets of the North, of the authors of Othello and Faust; it is a perfect, a lovely grandeur. Certainly, his poetry has all the energy and power of the poetry of our harsher climates; but it also has, in addition, the pure lines of an Ionian horizon, the liquid clearness of an Ionian sky." We need to talk about the mocking a little bit further since, to use current parlance, this marked "a new departure" in his critical approach. English literary criticism was, and had been for a while before he released his lectures on translating Homer, a rather somber endeavor. Given that Johnson, Coleridge, De Quincey, and Hazlitt authored most of it, it was very excellent. Many things had been horribly awful, eerily similar to Mr. Girdle's pamphlet "in sixty-four pages, post octavo, on the character of the Nurse's deceased husband in Romeo and Juliet, with an enquiry whether he had really been a "merry man" in his lifetime or whether it was just his widow's affectionate partiality that caused her to report him as such" in Romeo and Juliet[5].

But regardless of its quality, criticism had always been grave. Even Arnold's early artistic performances had been as solemn as those of Wordsworth or Burke. But he added a new tool to his critical arsenal in his lectures on translating Homer. He continued to seek Clarity, Courage, and Serenity; he continued to praise moderately and criticize kindly; but now he added a lovely sense of fun to the enforcement of his literary judgment. Therefore, maybe a modest student may be allowed to claim that Arnold aimed his critiques with "chaff."

Cardinal Newman was not afraid to speak of "chucking" anything off or getting into a "scrape." In modern literary criticism, this technique of disparaging literary performances that one doesn't enjoy and expressing disagreement with literary tenets that one thinks are mistaken had become obsolete. It wasn't what one would have anticipated from a professorial chair in a prestigious institution, and it wasn't what one would have expected from a professor who was still in his thirties and who may have been expected to be burdened and solemnized by the importance of his role and the horror of his surroundings. Thus, when they discovered him poking his seraphic fun at the idea that Homer's song was similar to "an elegant and simple melody from an African of the Gold Coast," they were met with the simple and amusing wrath of mediocre poets like Mr. Ichabod Wright, fierce pedants like Professor Francis Newman, and conventional worshippers of such idols as Scott and Macaulay. In 1865's *Essays in Criticism*, this practice of using humor to support literary judgment was taken a step further. The pieces in this volume, which Mr. Paul rightly calls "a great intellectual event," were produced during the years 1863 and 1864. The prologue to the first edition dealt very hesitantly with Bishop Colenso's scriptural deviations.

The references to Colenso were carefully removed from subsequent editions, but the introduction as it is now having some of Arnold's most endearing humor in addition to the divinely lovely eulogy of Oxford. He never produced a better piece of writing than his apology to Mr. Ichabod Wright, his denial of the professorial title, "which I share with so many distinguished men Professor Pepper, Professor Anderson, Professor Frickel," and his attempt to reassure the elderly man who was afraid of being killed by saying, "il n'y a pas d'homme necessaire," all of which serve to advance serious criticism of books or of life. Given that we have already seen him performing the task of criticizing others, it would not be inappropriate to bring up certain critiques of himself in this context, even if they date from different eras. "Charm" was undoubtedly the ingredient that his earlier poems lacked, but as time went on, charm was added to thinking and emotion.

He had noted, with uncommon candor, that the major defect of his earlier poems was "the absence of charm" as early as 1853. He said in a letter to his friend F.T. Swinburne literally took my breath away. Palgrave: "Saint Beuve wrote to me with great interest about the Obermann poem, which he is getting translated. I must say the general public praise me in the dubious style in which old Wordsworth used to praise Bernard Barton, James Montgomery, and suchlike; and the writers of poetry, on the other hand Browning, Swinburne, Lytton praise me as the general public praises its favorites. This assessment of his own qualities and shortcomings was written by him to Palgrave in 1869, when the first Collected Edition of his poetry was published, after the publisher had proposed certain changes[6].

"I am really very much obliged to you for your letter. I think the printing has made too much progress to allow of dealing with any of the long things now; I have left 'Merope' aside entirely, but the rest I have reprinted. In a succeeding edition, however, I am not at all sure that I shall not leave out the second part of the 'Church of Brou.' With regard to the others, I think I shall let them stand but often for other reasons than because of their intrinsic merit. For instance, I agree that in the 'Sick King in Bokhara' there is a flatness in parts; but then it was the first thing of mine dear old Clough thoroughly liked. Against 'Tristram,' too, many objections may fairly be urged; but then the subject is a very popular one, and many people will tell you they like it best of anything I have written. All this has to be taken into account. 'Balder' perhaps no one cares much for except myself; but I have always thought, though very likely I am wrong, that it has not had justice done to it; I consider that it has a natural propriety of diction and rhythm which is what we all prize so much in Virgil, and which is not common in English poetry. For instance, Tennyson has in the *Idylls* something dainty and

tourmenté which excludes this natural propriety; and I have myself in 'Sohrab' something, not dainty, but tourmenté and Miltonically ampoullé, which excludes it. We have enough Scandinavianism in our nature and history to make a short conspectus of the Scandinavian mythology admissible. As to the shorter things, the 'Dream' I have struck out. 'One Lesson' I have re-written and banished from its pre-eminence as an introductory piece. 'To Marguerite' I had paused over, but my instinct was to strike it out, and now your suggestion comes to confirm this instinct, I shall act upon it. The same with 'Second Best.' It is quite true there is a horrid falsetto in some stanzas of the 'Gipsy Child' it was a very youthful production. I have re-written those stanzas, but am not quite satisfied with the poem even now. 'Shakespeare' I have re-written. 'Cruikshank' I have re-titled, and re-arranged the 'World's Triumphs.' 'Morality' I stick to and 'Palladium' also. 'Second Best' I strike out and will try to put in 'Modern Sappho' instead though the metre is not right. In the 'Voice' the falsetto rages too furiously; I can do nothing with it; ditto in 'Stagirius,' which I have struck out. Some half-dozen other things I either have struck out, or think of striking out. 'Hush, not to me at this bitter departing' is one of them. The Preface I omit entirely. 'St. Brandan,' like 'Self-Deception,' is not a piece that at all satisfies me, but I shall let both of them stand[7]."

Regarding the publication of his poetry in two volumes, he said in 1879:

"In starting with "early poems," as I have done throughout, I adhered to the chronological order used in the previous edition, an arrangement that, on the whole, I think is the most satisfactory. The title of "early" implies a justification for subpar work, of which I would not be assumed blind to the subpar such as the "Gipsy Child," which you suggest for exclusion; but something these early pieces have which later work has not, and many people perhaps for what are considered to be subpar. Perhaps enough has been said about his critical methodology at this point, and because the focus of this book is outcomes, it is appropriate to consider how it affected those who sought to emulate him in the practice of critique, no matter how far they were from him. The solution is simple to provide. He taught us, first and foremost, to judge for ourselves, not to rely on secondhand information, and not to kneel before any reputation, no matter how high up on the Temple of Fame's pedestal it may be, unless we were certain in its legitimacy.

Then he instructed us to distinguish between the virtues and flaws of even the things we most cherished; to chew the cud of disinterested concentration rather than swallow everything whole; and to accept or reject, laud or criticize, in line with our instinctive and conscious tastes. He taught us to admire beauty above all else, to pursue it, to seek it out, and, when we discovered it when we found something that really and unapologetically pleased our "sense for beauty" to adore it and, to the best of our abilities, to emulate it. On the other hand, Jesus taught us to avoid and avoid evil, to wage war against it, and to be on watch against its contaminating impact. The "dismal Mapperly Hills," the "uncomeliness of Margate," the "squalid streets of Bethnal Green," and "Coles' Truss Manufactory standing where it ought to, on the finest site in Europe" were all examples of hideousness in character, sight, and sound that he applied along with "watchful jealousy" and "rancor and uncleanness."

Then he taught us to aim at sincerity in our intercourse with Nature. Never to describe her as others saw her, never to pretend a knowledge of her which we did not possess, never to endow her with fanciful attributes of our own or other people's imagining, never to assume her sympathy with mortal lots, never to forget that she, like humanity, has her dark, her awful, her revengeful moods. He taught us not to be ashamed of our own sense of fun, our own faculty of laughter; but to let them play freely even round the objects of our reasoned reverence, just in the spirit of the teacher who said that no man really believed in his religion till he could venture to joke about it. Above all, he taught us, even when our feelings were

most forcibly aroused, to be serene, courteous, and humane; never to scold, or storm, or bully; and to avoid like a pestilence such brutality as that of the Saturday Review when it said that something or another was "eminently worthy of a great nation," and to disparage it "eminently worthy of a great fool." He laid it down as a "precious truth" that one's effectiveness depends upon "the power of persuasion, of charm; that without this all fury, energy, reasoning power, acquirement, are thrown away and only render their owner more miserable[8]."

DISCUSSION

The renowned Victorian poet, essayist, and critic Matthew Arnold is lauded for his unique style of literary criticism that is defined by unflinching judgment. We explore the relevance of Arnold's critical theory and its continuing influence on literature and culture in this conversation. Arnold's critical perspective was distinguished from those of his contemporaries by a number of fundamental ideas. His steadfast dedication to clarity came first. Arnold believed that effective critique required clarity of thinking and language. He repeatedly argued for the use of straightforward language that could objectively analyze a literary work's strengths and weaknesses without using jargon. His clear writing style made his criticisms understandable to a wide audience, a quality that added to his enduring impact. Arnold's strategy also included impartiality as a cornerstone. Regardless of the topic or the author under examination, he remained composed and detached in his assessment. Arnold showed a calmness that enabled him to provide fair and objective assessments of both classic literature and modern works. His ability to be objective boosted his reputation as a critic and gave his judgments more weight.

Another characteristic of Arnold's critical philosophies was serenity. Even while criticizing a literary work's shortcomings, he did it with a calmness that distinguished him from the more bombastic reviewers of his period. Arnold's criticisms were seen as smart and deliberate rather than just assaults or rants because to his measured tone and even-handed approach. This tranquility extended to his openness to discuss and question established literary trends, which eventually helped him develop his own unique style. Arnold's conceptual development was evident throughout his critical journey. He remained committed to clarity, objectivity, and calmness throughout his career, whether it was in his early literary criticism when he stressed the timeless attractiveness of classical topics above modern ones or in his later lectures on translating Homer. In particular, his lectures on translating Homer demonstrated his capacity to evaluate translation and literary adaptation while adhering to his guiding principles. Matthew Arnold left behind a legacy of unflinching judgment in literary analysis. Scholars, critics, and readers all continue to be influenced by his focus on clarity, objectivity, and calmness. Arnold's method serves as a timely reminder of the value of thoughtful analysis that goes beyond one's own prejudice or prevailing trends in order to evaluate literary works. Arnold's ideas are still relevant today as we investigate the field of literary criticism, serving as a timeless manual for making accurate, impartial, and graceful literary judgments[9].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Matthew Arnold's everlasting contribution to literature and culture is shown by his unflinching judgment in the field of literary criticism. Scholars, reviewers, and readers continue to use Arnold's unique method as a model because of its clarity, objectivity, and calmness. Arnold's stress on clarity in thinking and presentation serves as a reminder of the need of open communication while analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of literary works. His clear writing style ensured that a wide audience could understand his criticisms, allowing his ideas to be shared and understood by many. Additionally, Arnold distinguished himself as

a fair and objective reviewer due to his constant dedication to objectivity. Regardless of the author or the subject matter, he regarded every literary work with the same level of objectivity. His credibility was increased and his judgments could stand the test of time due to his objectivity. Arnold's critique was characterized by its serenity, which is still recognized and cherished today. Arnold remained calm and impartial, especially when criticizing works or questioning popular literary trends. His criticisms were seen as well-informed and deliberative, supporting the idea that literary analysis ought to be an academic pursuit rather than a venue for prejudice or sensationalism.

We are reminded of the timeless importance of Arnold's ideals when we consider his achievements. In a period when criticism may sometimes be characterized by exaggeration and sensationalism, Arnold's legacy emphasizes the value of thoughtful criticism. His method encourages us to read literature attentively, critically, and with an appreciation for its subtleties and intricacies. Matthew Arnold's steadfast judgment continues to be a guiding light of knowledge in a world where literary discourse is always changing. For people who want to analyze and enjoy literature with accuracy, fairness, and elegance, his ideals serve as a timeless road map. Arnold left a lasting legacy that serves as a reminder that in the field of literary criticism, the search for accuracy and comprehension must always be performed with brevity, objectivity, and calm.

REFERENCES

- [1] J. Barker, "Slow Down: on benjamin noys' critique of accelerationism," *Angelaki - J. Theor. Humanit.*, 2016, doi: 10.1080/0969725X.2016.1182743.
- [2] J. Marshall, "Inciting Reflection," *M/C J.*, 2005, doi: 10.5204/mcj.2428.
- [3] M. C. Kaveny, "Democracy and prophecy," in *Law and Democracy in the Empire of Force*, 2009.
- [4] F. Casey, "A Celtic Twilight in Little England: G.K. Chesterton and W.B. Yeats," *Ir. Stud. Rev.*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/09670882.2013.871850.
- [5] N. Wallace, "Matthew Arnold, Edmund Burke, and Irish reconciliation," *Prose Studies*. 2012. doi: 10.1080/01440357.2012.751259.
- [6] J. Jowett, "Disintegration, 1924," *Shakespeare*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/17450918.2013.833981.
- [7] R. M. Cook, "Kazin's Trilling: A Cold War Portrait," *Society*, 2018, doi: 10.1007/s12115-018-0301-7.
- [8] J. R. Perkin, "Matthew Arnold, the Oxford Movement, and the 'Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse,'" *Christ. Lit.*, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0148333115599910.
- [9] L. Stephen, *Studies of a biographer*. 2012. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139208017.

CHAPTER 4

MATTHEW ARNOLD: A JOURNEY FROM DIPLOMACY TO EDUCATION

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

The summary of "Matthew Arnold: A Journey from Diplomacy to Education" summarizes his life and work, focusing on how he went from considering a career in diplomacy to becoming a significant person in the area of education. Arnold took up the position of a school inspector for personal reasons, despite his original propensity for diplomacy. Arnold became a fervent and well-known supporter of educational reform throughout his 35-year stint as an elementary school inspector. His perceptions, which were made clear in his General Reports and publications, provided insight into his dedication to enhancing the English educational system. His attention included public schools and higher education, although he was less critical of these institutions overall, presumably due to his personal ties. He had a great affection for Oxford University, and his poetry often showed the tremendous influence it had on him. The summary highlights how Arnold's transition from diplomatic to teaching influenced his reputation as a devoted teacher and a literary character committed to advancing English education.

KEYWORDS:

Career Transition, Diplomacy, Education, Literary, Matthew Arnold, Oxford University.

INTRODUCTION

"Though I am a schoolmaster's son, I confess that school-teaching or school-inspecting is not the line of life I should naturally have chosen. I adopted it in order to marry a lady who is here to-night, and who feels your kindness as warmly and gratefully as I do. My wife and I had a wandering life of it at first. There were but three lay-inspectors for all England. My district went right across from Pembroke Dock to Great Yarmouth. We had no home. One of our children was born in a lodging at Derby, with a workhouse, if I recollect aright, behind and a penitentiary in front. But the *irksomeness* of my new duties was what I felt most, and during the first year or so it was sometimes insupportable." The name of Arnold is so inseparably connected with Education that many of Matthew Arnold's friends were astonished by this frank confession, which he made in his address to the Westminster Teachers' Association on the occasion of his retirement from the office of Inspector.

There is reason to believe that the profession on which he had set his early affections was Diplomacy. It is easy to see how perfectly, in many respects, diplomatic life would have suited him. The proceeds of his Fellowship, then considerable and unhampered by any conditions of residence, would have supplied the lack of private fortune. He had some of the diplomatist's most necessary gifts: love of travel, familiarity with European literature, keen interest in foreign politics and institutions, taste for cultivated society, rich enjoyment of life, and fascinating manners conspicuously free from English stiffness and shyness. As to his interest in foreign politics, it is only necessary to cite *England and the Italian Question*, which he wrote in 1859, and which deals with the unity and independence of Italy. It is the

first essay which he ever published, but it abounds in clearness and force, and is entirely free from the whimsicality which in later years sometimes marred his prose. Above all it shows a sympathetic insight into foreign aspirations which is rare indeed even among cultivated Englishmen.

In reference to this pamphlet, he truly observed: "The worst of the English is that on foreign politics they search so very much more for what they like and wish to be true, than for what *is* true. In Paris there is certainly a larger body of people than in London who treat foreign politics as a science, as a matter to *know* upon before *feeling* upon." As regards the diplomatic life, it seems certain that he would have enjoyed it thoroughly, and one would think that he was exactly the man to conduct a delicate negotiation with tact, good humour, and good sense. Some glimmering of these gifts seems to have dawned from time to time on the unimaginative minds of his official chiefs; for three times he was sent by the Education Office on Foreign Missions, half diplomatic in their character, to enquire into the condition and methods of Public Instruction on the Continent. The ever-increasing popularity which attended him on these Missions, and his excellent judgment in handling Foreign Ministers and officials, might perhaps suggest the thought that in renouncing diplomacy he renounced his true vocation.

But the thought, though natural, is superficial, and must give way to the absolute conviction that he never could have known true happiness never realized his own ideal of life without a wife, a family, and a home. And these are luxuries which, as a rule, diplomatists cannot attain till have lost something of their freshness. In renouncing diplomacy, he secured, before he was twenty-nine, the chief boon of human life; but a vague desire to enjoy that boon amid continental surroundings seems constantly to have visited him. In 1851 he wrote to his wife: "We can always look forward to retiring to Italy on £200 a year." In 1853 he wrote to her again: "All this afternoon I have been haunted by a vision of living with you at Berne, on a diplomatic appointment, and how different that would be from this incessant grind in schools." And, thirty years later, when he was approaching the end of his official life, he wrote a friend: "I must go once more to America to see my daughter, who is going to be married to an American, settled in her new home. Then I 'feel like' retiring to Florence, and rarely moving from it again[1]."

But, in spite of all these dreams and longings, he seems to have known that his lot was cast in England, and that England must be the sphere of his main activities. "Year slips away after year, and one begins to find that the Office has really had the main part of one's life, and that little remains." We, who are his disciples, habitually think of him as a poet, or a critic, or an instructor in national righteousness and intelligence; as a model of private virtue and of public spirit. We do not habitually think of him as, in the narrow and technical sense, an Educator. And yet a man who gives his life to a profession must be in a great measure judged by what he accomplished in and through that profession, even though in the first instance he "adopted it in order to marry." Though not a born educator, not an educator by natural aptitude or inclination, he made himself an educator by choice; and, having once chosen his profession, he gradually developed an interest in it, a pride in it, a love of it which astonished some of his friends.

How irksome it was to him at the beginning we saw just now in his address to the Teachers. How irksome in many of its incidents it remained we can see in his published Letters. Still, his work as an inspector might have been made more interesting and less irksome, if he had served under chiefs of more enlightened or more liberal temper, as may be inferred from some words uttered after his retirement "To Government I owe nothing. But then I have

always remembered that, under our Parliamentary system, the Government probably takes little interest in such work, whatever it is, as I have been able to do in the public service, and even perhaps knows nothing at all about it. But we must take the evil of our system along with the good. Abroad probably a Minister might have known more about my performances; but then abroad I doubt whether I should ever have survived to perform them. Under the strict bureaucratic system abroad, I feel pretty sure that I should have been dismissed ten times over for the freedom with which on various occasions I have exposed myself on matters of Religion and Politics. Our government here in England takes a large and liberal view about what it considers a man's private affairs, and so I have been able to survive as an Inspector for thirty-five years; and to the Government I at least owe this to have been allowed to survive." For thirty-five years then he served his country as an Inspector of Elementary Schools, and the experience which he thus gained, the interest which was thus awoken in him, suggested to him some large and far-reaching views about our entire system of National Education. It is no disparagement to a highly-cultivated and laborious staff of public servants to say that he was the greatest Inspector of Schools that we have ever possessed. It is true that he was not, as the manner of some is, omnidoc and omnidocent.

His incapacity to examine little girls in needlework he frankly confessed; and his incapacity to examine them in music, if unconfessed, was not less real. "I assure you," he said to the Westminster Teachers, "I am not at all a harsh judge of myself; but I know perfectly well that there have been much better inspectors than I." Once, when a flood of compliments threatened to overwhelm him, he waved it off with the frank admission "Nobody can say I am a punctual Inspector." Why then do we call him the greatest Inspector that we ever had? Because he had that most precious of all combinations a genius and a heart. Trying to account for what he could not ignore his immense popularity with the masters and mistresses of the schools which he inspected he attributed part of it to the fact that he was Dr. Arnold's son, part to the fact that he was "more or less known to the public as an author"; but, of personal qualifications for his office, he enumerated two only, and both eminently characteristic: "One is that, having a serious sense of the nature and function of criticism, I from the first sought to see the schools as they really were; thus it was felt that I was fair, and that the teachers had not to apprehend from me crotchets, pedantries, humour, favoritism, and prejudices." The other was that he had learnt to sympathize with the teachers. "I met daily in the schools' men and women discharging duties akin to mine, duties as irksome as mine, duties less well paid than mine; and I asked myself: Are they on roses? Gradually it grew into a habit with me to put myself into their places, to try and enter into their feelings, to represent to myself their life[2]."

It belongs to the very nature of an Inspector's work that it escapes public notice. Very few are the people who care to inform themselves about the studies, the discipline, the intellectual and moral atmosphere of Elementary Schools, except in so far as those schools can be made battle-grounds for sectarian animosity. And, if they are few now, they were still fewer during the thirty-five years of Arnold's Inspectorship. A conspicuous service was rendered both to the cause of Education and to Arnold's memory when the late Lord Sandford rescued from the entombing blue-books his friend's nineteen General Reports to the Education Department on Elementary Schools. In those Reports we read his deliberate judgment on the merits, defects, needs, possibilities and ideals of elementary schools; and this not merely as regards the choice of subjects taught, but as regards cleanliness, healthiness, good order, good manners, relations between teachers and pupils, selection of models in prose and verse, and the literary as contrasted with the polemical use of the Bible.

Such an enumeration may sound dull enough, but there is no dullness in the Reports themselves. They are stamped from the first page to the last with his lightness of touch and perfection of style. They belong as essentially to literature as his Essays or his Lectures. In reading these Reports on Elementary Schools we catch repeated allusions to his three Missions of enquiry into Education on the Continent. Those Missions produced separate Reports of their own, and each Report developed into a volume. "The Popular Education of France" gave the experience which he acquired in 1859, and its Introduction is reproduced in *Mixed Essays* under the title of "Democracy." A *French Eton* (not very happily named) was an unofficial product of the same tour; for, extending his purview from Elementary Education, he there dealt with the relation between "Middle Class Education and the State." "Why," he asked, "cannot we have throughout England as the French have throughout France, as the Germans have throughout Germany, as the Swiss have throughout Switzerland, and as the Dutch have throughout Holland, schools where the middle and professional classes may obtain at the rate of from £20 to £50 a year if they are boarders, and from £5 to £15 a year if they are day scholars, an education of as good quality, with as good guarantees of social character and advantages for a future career in the world, as the education which French children of the corresponding class can obtain from institutions like that of Toulouse or Sorèze?" *Schools and Universities of the Continent* gave the result of the Mission in 1865 to investigate the Education of the Upper and Middle Classes in France, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. Its bearing on English Education may be inferred from these words of its author, written in October, 1868: "There is a vicious article in the new *Quarterly* on my school-book, by one of the Eton undermasters, who, like Demetrius the Silversmith, seems alarmed for the gains of his occupation[3]."

The "Special Report on Elementary Education Abroad" grew out of his third Mission in 1885; and, over and above these books, dealing specifically with educational problems, we meet constant allusions to the same topics in nearly all his prose-writings. A life-long contact with Education produced in him a profound dissatisfaction with our English system, or want of system, and an almost passionate desire to turn chaos into order by the persistent use of the critical method. When one talks about English Education, the subject naturally divides itself into the Universities, the Public Schools, the Private Schools, and the Elementary Schools. The classification is not scientifically accurate, but it will serve. With all these strata of Education, he in turn concerned himself; but with the two higher strata much less effectively than with the two lower. It was necessary to the theoretical completeness of his scheme for organizing National Education, that the Universities and the Public Schools, as well as the Private and the Elementary Schools, should be criticized; but, in dealing with the former, his criticism is far less drastic and insistent than with the latter.

The reason of the difference probably is that, though an Inspector, a professor, and a critic, he was frankly human, and shrank from laying his hand too roughly on institutions to which he himself had owed so much. His feeling for Oxford everyone knows. The apostrophe to the "Adorable Dreamer" is familiar to hundreds who could not, for their life, repeat another line of his prose or verse. It was "the place he liked best in the world." When he climbed the hill at Hinksey and looked down on Oxford, he "could not describe the effect which this landscape always has upon me the hillside, with its valleys, and Oxford in the great Thames Valley below." Of the spiritual effect of the place upon hearts nurtured there, he said: "We in Oxford, brought up amidst the beauty and sweetness of that beautiful place, have not failed to seize one truth the truth that beauty and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human perfection. When I insist on this, I am all in the faith and tradition of Oxford." Of the Honorary Degree conferred on him by Oxford, he said: "Nothing could more gratify me, I think, than this recognition by my own University, of which I am so fond, and where,

according to their own established standard of distinction, I did so little." And, after the Encænïa at which the degree was actually given, he wrote: "I felt sure I should be well received, because there is so much of an Oxford character about what I have written, and the undergraduates are the last people to bear one a grudge for having occasionally chaffed them."

And here let me insert the moving passage in which, speaking in his last years to an American audience, he did honour to the spiritual master of his undergraduate days. "Forty years ago, Cardinal Newman was in the very prime of life; he was close at hand to us at Oxford; he was preaching in St. Mary's pulpit every Sunday; he seemed about to transform and to renew what was for us the most national and natural institution in the world, the Church of England. Who could resist the charm of that spiritual apparition, gliding in the dim afternoon light through the aisles of St. Mary's, rising into the pulpit, and then, in the most entrancing of voices, breaking the silence with words and thoughts which were a religious music—subtle, sweet, mournful? I seem to hear him still. Or, if we followed him back to his seclusion at Littlemore, that dreary village by the London road, and to the house of retreat and the church which he built there—a mean house such as Paul might have lived in when he was tent-making at Ephesus, a church plain and thinly sown with worshippers—who could resist him there either, welcoming back to the severe joys of Church-fellowship, and of daily worship and prayer, the firstlings of a generation which had well-nigh forgotten them?" When we bear in mind this devotion to Oxford, it is not surprising that he dealt very gently with the defects of English Universities.

In 1868 he laid it down that the University ought to provide facilities, after the general education is finished, for the cultivation of special aptitudes. "Our great Universities," he said, "Oxford and Cambridge, do next to nothing towards this end. They are, as Signor Mateucci called them, *hauts lycées*; and, though invaluable in their way as places where the youth of the upper class prolong to a very great age, and under some very valuable influences, their school-education, yet, with their college and tutor system, nay, with their examination and degree system, they are still, in fact, *schools*, and do not carry education beyond the stage of general and school education." This is just in the spirit of his famous quotation about the Oxford which he loved so well[4].

In 1875 he wrote: "I do not at all like the course for the History School (at Oxford). Nothing but read, read, read, endless histories in English, many of them by quite second-rate men; nothing to form the mind as reading truly great authors forms it, or even to exercise it, as learning a new language, or mathematics, or one of the natural sciences exercises it. The regulation of studies is all-important, and there is no one to regulate them, and people think that anyone can regulate them. We shall never do any good till we get a man like Guizot, or W. von Humboldt to deal with the matter, men who have the highest mental training themselves, and this we shall probably in this country never get."

In the wittiest of all his books, and one of the wisest, *Friendship's Garland*, he thus summarized the too-usual result of our "grand, old, fortifying, classical curriculum." To his Prussian friend enquiring what benefit Lord Lumpington and the Rev. Esau Hittall have derived from that curriculum, that "course of mental gymnastics," the imaginary Arnold replied: "Well, during their three years at Oxford, they were so much occupied with Bullingdon and hunting that there was no great opportunity to judge. But for my own part, I have always thought that they're both getting their degrees at last with flying colours, after three weeks of a famous coach for fast men, four nights without going to bed, and an incredible consumption of wet towels, strong cigars, and brandy-and-water, was one of the

most astonishing feats of mental gymnastics I ever heard of!" It must be admitted that his effect on the Universities was not very tangible, not very positive. It was not the kind of effect which can be expressed in figures or reported in Blue Books. One cannot stand in the High Street of Oxford, or on King's Parade at Cambridge, and point to an Institute, or a college, or a school of learning, and say: "Matthew Arnold made that what it is." His effect was of a different kind. It was written on the fleshly tables of the heart. To Oxford men he seemed like an elder brother, brilliant, playful, lovable, yet profoundly wise; teaching us what to think, to admire, to avoid. His influence fell upon a thirsty and receptive soil. We drank it with delight; and it co-operated with all the best traditions of the place in making us lifelong lovers of romance, and truth, and beauty. One of the keenest minds produced by Oxford between 1870 and 1880 thus summarized his effect on us: "I think he was almost the only man who did not disappoint one[5]."

As in dealing with the Universities, so also in dealing with the Public Schools, Arnold found it difficult to liberate himself from his early environment and prepossessions. He was the son of a Wykehamist, who had become the greatest of Head Masters; he himself was both a Wykehamist and a Rugbeian; he was the brother of three Rugbeians, and the father of three Harrovians. Thus, it was impossible for him to regard the Public Schools of England with the dispassionate eye of the complete outsider. It is true that, when he gave rein to his critical instinct, he could not help observing that Public Schools are "precious institutions where, for £250 a year, our boys learn gentlemanlike deportment and cricket"; that with us "the playing-fields are the school"; and that a Prussian Minister of Education would not permit "the keepers of those absurd cock-pits" to examine the boys as they choose, "and send them jogging comfortably off to the University on their lame longs and shorts about the Calydonian Boar."

But, when it came to practical dealing, he had a tenderness for the "cock-pit" even for the playing-fields almost for the Calydonian Boar which hindered him from being a very formidable or effective critic. Rugby, with which he was so closely connected, and to which he was so much attached, owes nothing, as far as one knows, to his suggestions or reproaches. At Harrow he lived for five years, on terms of affectionate intimacy with the Head Master and the staff; and, though he was keenly alive to the absurdities of the "catch-scholarship," as he called it, which was cultivated there, and to the inefficiency of the *Principia* and *Notabilia*, on which the Harrovian mind was nourished, his adverse judgment never made itself felt. Marlborough, he praised and admired as "a decided offspring of Rugby." At Eton his fascinating essay on "Eutrapelia" was given; and he in turn was fascinated by the Memorials of "An Eton Boy," which he reviewed in the *Fortnightly* for June, 1882. That boy, Arthur Baskerville-Mynors, was certainly a most lovable and attractive character, and he was thus commemorated in the Eton College Chronicle: "His life here was always joyous, a fearless, keen boyhood, spent *sans peur et sans reproche*. Many will remember him as fleet of foot and of lasting powers, winning the mile and the steeplechase in 1871, and the walking race in 1875.

As master of the Beagles in 1875, he showed himself to possess all the qualities of a keen sportsman, with an instinctive knowledge of the craft." On this last sentence Arnold fastened with his characteristic insistence, and used it to point the moral which he was always trying to teach. The Barbarian, as "for shortness we had accustomed ourselves to call" a member of the English upper classes, even when "adult and rigid," had often "invaluable qualities." "It is hard for him, no doubt, to enter into the Kingdom of God hard for him to believe in the sentiment of the ideal life transforming the life which now is, to believe in it and even to serve it hard, but not impossible. And in the young the qualities take a brighter colour, and the

rich and magical time of youth adds graces of its own to them; and then, in happy natures, they are irresistible[6]." And so, he goes on to give a truly appreciative and affectionate sketch of young Arthur Mynors; and then he quotes the sentence about the Master of the Beagles, and on this he comments thus: "The aged Barbarian will, upon this, admiringly mumble to us his story how the battle of Waterloo was won in the playing-fields of Eton. Alas! disasters have been prepared in those playing-fields as well as victories; disasters due to inadequate mental training—to want of application, knowledge, intelligence, lucidity. The Eton playing-fields have their great charm, notwithstanding; but with what felicity of unconscious satire does that stroke of 'the Master of the Beagles' hit off our whole system of provision of public secondary schools; a provision for the fortunate and privileged few, but for the many, for the nation, ridiculously impossible!" This is his last word on the Public Schools, as that title is conventionally understood. He had a much fuller and more searching criticism for the schools in which the great Middle Class is educated.

It may perhaps be fairly questioned whether great humorists much enjoy the humour of other people. If we apply this question to Arnold's case and seek to answer it by his published works, we shall probably answer in the negative. From first to last, he takes little heed of humorous writers or humorous books. Even in those great authors who are masters of all moods, it is the grave, rather than the humorous mood, which he chooses for commendation. He was a devout Shakespearian, but it is difficult to recall an allusion to Shakespeare's humour, except in the rather oblique form of Dogberry as the type of German officialdom. Swift, he quoted with admirable effect, but it was Swift the reviler, not Swift the jester. He says that he made a "wooden Oxford audience laugh aloud with two pages of Heine's wit"; but the lecture, as we read it, shows more of mordant sarcasm than of the material for laughter. Scott, he knew by heart, and Carlyle he honestly revered; but he admired the one for his romance and the other for his philosophy. Thackeray, sad to remember, he "did not think a great writer," and so Thackeray's humour disappears, with his pathos and his satire, into the limbo of common-place. The imaginary spokesman of the *Daily Telegraph* in *Friendship's Garland* reckons as "the great masters of human thought and human literature, Plato, Shakespeare, Confucius, and Charles Dickens"; and there, to judge from the great bulk of his writing, Arnold's acquaintance with Dickens begins and ends.

But it was one of his amiable traits that, whenever he read a book which pleased him, he immediately began to share his pleasure with his friends. In the year 1880, he writes to his colleague, Mr. Fitch, "I have this year been reading *David Copperfield* for the first time. Mr. Creakle's School at Blackheath is the type of our English Middle Class Schools, and our Middle Class is satisfied that so it should be." It would seem that he made this rather belated acquaintance with Dickens' masterpiece, through reading it aloud to one of his children who was laid up with a swelled face. But, however introduced to his notice, the book made a deep impression on him. In the following June he contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* an article on Ireland styled "The Incompatibles." In that article he suggests that the Irish dislike of England arises in part from the fact that "the Irish do not much come across our aristocracy, exhibiting that factor of civilization, the power of manners, which has undoubtedly a strong attraction for them. What they do come across, and what gives them the idea they have of our civilization and its promise, is our Middle Class."

The mention, so frequent in his writings, of "our Middle Class," seems to demand a definition; and, admitting that in this country the Middle Class has no naturally defined limits, and that it is difficult to say who properly belong to it and who do not, he adopts an educational test. The Middle Class means the people who are brought up at a particular kind of school, and to illustrate that kind of school he has recourse to his newly-discovered

treasure. "Much as I have published, I do not think it has ever yet happened to me to comment in print upon any production of Charles Dickens. What a pleasure to have the opportunity of praising a work so sound, a work so rich in merit. Of the contemporary rubbish which is shot so plentifully all round us, we can, indeed, hardly read too little. But to contemporary work so good. We are in danger of perhaps not paying respect enough, of reading it too hastily, and then putting it aside for something else and forgetting it. What treasures of gaiety, invention, life, are in that book! what alertness and resource! what a soul of good nature and kindness governing the whole! Such is the admirable work which I am now going to call in evidence. Intimately, indeed, did Dickens know the Middle Class; he was bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. Intimately he knew it bringing-up. With the hand of a master, he has drawn for us a type of the teachers and trainers of its youth, a type of its places of education. Mr. Creakle and Salem House are immortal. The type itself, it is to be hoped, will perish; but the drawing of its which Dickens has given cannot die. Mr. Creakle, the stout gentleman with a bunch of watch-chain and seals, in an armchair, with the fiery face and the thick veins in his forehead; Mr. Creakle sitting at his breakfast with the cane, and a newspaper, and the buttered toast before him, will sit on, like Theseus, forever. For ever will last the recollection of Salem House, and of the 'daily strife and struggle' there; the recollection 'of the frosty mornings when we were rung out of bed, and the cold, cold smell of the dark nights when we were rung into bed again; of the evening schoolroom dimly lighted and indifferently warmed, and the morning schoolroom which was nothing but a great shivering-machine; of the alternation of boiled beef with roast beef, and boiled mutton with roast mutton; of clods of bread and butter, dog's-eared lesson-books, cracked slates, tear-blotted copy-books, canings, rulerings, hair-cuttings, rainy Sundays, suet puddings, and a dirty atmosphere of ink surrounding all.'

By the Middle Class I understand those who are brought up at establishments more or less like Salem House, and by educators more or less like Mr. Creakle. And the great mass of the Middle part of our community, the part which comes between those who labour with their hands, on the one side, and people of fortune on the other, is brought up at establishments of this kind, although there is a certain portion broken off at the top which is educated at better. But the great mass is both badly taught, and are also brought up on a lower plane than is right, brought up ignobly. And this deteriorates their standard of life, their civilization."It surely must have been Salem House, or an institution very like it, that produced the delicious letter quoted by Arnold in his General Report for 1867. Even Mr. Anstey Guthrie never excelled it in the letter dictated by Dr. Grimstone to his pupils at Crichton House[7].

The anticipation of our Christmas vacation abounds in peculiar delights. Not only that its 'festivities,' its social gatherings and its lively amusements crown the old year with happiness and mirth, but that I come a guest commended to your hospitable love by the performance of all you bade me remember when I left you in the glad season of sun and flowers. And time has sped fleetly since reluctant my departing step crossed the threshold of that home whose indulgences and endearments their temporary loss has taught me to value more and more. Yet that restraint is salutary, and that self-reliance is as easily learnt as it is laudable, the propriety of my conduct and the readiness of my services shall ere long aptly illustrate. It is with confidence I promise that the close of every year shall find me advancing in your regard by constantly observing the precepts of my excellent tutors and the example of my excellent parents.

The present writer lately asked a close observer of educational matters if Arnold had produced any practical effect on Secondary Education, and the answer was "He pulled down the strongholds of such as Mr. Creakle." If he did that, he did much; and it is a eulogy which

he would have greatly appreciated. Let us see how far it was deserved. Let us admit at the outset that Mr. Squeers is dead; but then he was dead before Arnold took in hand to reform our system of Education. Mr. Creakle, it is to be feared, still exists, though his former assistant, the more benign Mr. Mell, has to some extent supplanted him. Dr. Blimber is, perhaps, a little superannuated, but still holds his own. Dr. Grimstone is going strong and well. In a word, the Private School for bigger boys (we are not thinking of Preparatory Schools for little boys) still exists and even flourishes. Now, if Arnold could have had his way, the Private School for bigger boys would long since have disappeared. "Mr. Creakle's stronghold" would have been pulled down, and Salem House and Crichton House and Lycurgus House Academy would have crumbled into ruins.

And what would he have raised in their place? He wrote so often and so variously about Education now in official reports, now in popular essays, now again in private letters, that it is not difficult to detect some inconsistencies, some contradictions, some changes of view. Indeed, it needs but the alteration of a single word to justify, at least to some extent, the "damning sentence," which, according to Arnold, Mr. Frederic Harrison "launched" against him in 1867. "We seek vainly in Mr. A. a system of philosophy with principles coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative." For "Philosophy" read "Education," and the reproach holds good. For in Education, as in everything else that he touched, he proceeded rather by criticism than by dogmatically showing faults in existing things rather than by theoretically constructing perfection. Yet, after all said and done, his general view of the subject is quite plain. He had in his mind an idea or scheme of what National Education ought to be; and, though from time to time he changed his view about details and methods, the general outline of his scheme is clear enough.

One of the most characteristic passages which he ever wrote is that in which he describes his interview in 1865 with Cardinal Antonelli, then Secretary of State at Rome. "When he asked me what I thought of the Roman schools, I said that, for the first time since I came on the Continent, I was reminded of England. I meant, in real truth, that there was the same easy-going and absence of system on all sides, the same powerlessness and indifference of the State, the same independence in single institutions, the same free course for abuses, the same confusion, the same lack of all idea of *co-ordering* things, as the French say that is, of making them work fitly together to a fit end; the same waste of power, therefore the same extravagance, and the same poverty of result[8]."

Enlarging on this congenial theme, and applying it to England and English requirements, he promulgated in 1868 a very revolutionary scheme for Public Education. At the apex of the pyramid there should be a Minister of Education. "Merely for administrative convenience he is, indeed, indispensable. But it is even more important to have a *centre in which to fix responsibility*." In 1886 he said to the teachers at Westminster, "I know the Duke of Richmond told the House of Lords that, as Lord President, he was Minister of Education (laughter) but really the Duke of Richmond's sense of humour must have been slumbering when he told the House of Lords that. A man is not Minister of Education by taking the name, but by doing the functions. (Cheers.) To do the functions he must put his mind to the subject of education; and so long as Lord Presidents are what they are, and education is what it is, a Lord President will not be a man who puts his mind to the subject of education. A Vice-President is not, on the Lord President's own showing, and cannot be, Minister for Education. He cannot be made responsible for faults and neglects. Now what we want in a Minister for Education is this a centre where we can fix the responsibility."

This great and responsible officer, who presumably was to be a cabinet minister and change with the changes of administration, was to preside over the whole education of the country. The Universities, the Public Schools, the Middle-Class Schools, and the Elementary Schools were all to be, in greater or less degree, subject to his sway. The Minister was to be assisted by a Council of Education, "comprising, without regard to politics, the personages most proper to be heard on questions of public education." It was to be, like the Council at the India Office, consultative only, but the Minister was to be bound to take its opinion on all important measures. It should be the special duty of this Council to advise on the graduation of schools, on the organization of examinations both in the schools and in the Universities, and to adjust them to one another. The Universities were not to be increased in number, but all such anomalous institutions as King's College and University College were to be coordinated to the existing Universities; and the Universities were to establish "faculties" in great centers of population, supply professors and lecturers, and then examine and confer degrees. Then the country should be mapped out into eight or ten districts, and each of these districts should have a Provincial School-Board, which should "represent the State in the country," keep the Minister informed of local requirements, and be the organ of communication between him and the schools in its jurisdiction. The exact amount of interference, inspection, and control which the Minister, the Council, and the Boards should exercise should vary in accordance with the grade of the schools: it should be greater in the elementary schools, less in the higher. But, in their degree, all, from Eton downwards, were to be subject to it. Then came the most revolutionary part of the whole scheme. Mr. Creakle and his congeners were to be abolished.

They were not to be put to a violent death, but they were to be starved out. The whole face of the country is studded with small grammar-schools or foundation-schools, like knots in a network; and these schools, enlarged and reformed, were to be the ordinary training-places of the Middle Class. Where they did not exist, similar schools were to be created by the State "Royal or Public Schools" and these, like all the rest, were to be subject to the Minister and to the Provincial Boards. Arnold contended that ancient schools so revived, and modern schools so constituted, would have a dignity and a status such as no private school could attain, and would be free from the pretentiousness and charlatanism which he regarded as the bane of private education. The inspection and control of these Public Schools would be in the hands of competent officers of the State, whereas the private school is appraised only by the vulgar and uneducated class that feeds it.

And so, descending from the Universities through Public Schools of two grades, we touch the foundation of the whole edifice the Elementary Schools. On this all-important topic, he wrote in 1868: "About popular education I have here but a very few words to say. People are at last beginning to see in what condition this really is amongst us. Obligatory instruction is talked of. But what is the capital difficulty in the way of obligatory instruction, or indeed any national system of instruction, in this country? It is this: that the moment the working class of this country have this question of instruction brought home to them, their self-respect will make them demand, like the working classes of the Continent, *Public* Schools, and not schools which the clergyman, or the squire, or the mill-owner calls "my school." And again: "The object should be to draw the existing Elementary Schools from their present private management, and to reconstitute them on a municipal basis[9]."

DISCUSSION

The intriguing biography "Matthew Arnold: A Journey from Diplomacy to Education" examines the life and career of the well-known 19th-century figure most recognized for his contributions to literature, criticism, and educational reform. This debate dives into the

important facets of Arnold's life, illuminating how he changed from considering a career in diplomacy to ending up as a powerful educator. Matthew Arnold was raised in a household with a strong heritage of education and learning. He did, however, at first tilt toward a diplomatic career. His exposure to European literature, politics, and his love of various languages all contributed to this tendency. His international view and the intellectual depth that would eventually characterize his work are shown by his early interest in diplomacy.

When Arnold made the decision to become a school inspector, his professional path took an unexpected turn. He made this choice because he wanted to marry a woman, a choice that would eventually influence the course of his whole career. This individual decision emphasizes the connection between personal and professional choices, a topic that would recur throughout his life. The position Arnold had as a school inspector turned out to be a turning moment in his life. His 35-year stint in this position was defined by devotion and enthusiasm, despite the fact that he may not have originally been oriented toward teaching. He gained a deep understanding of the difficulties and possibilities facing the English educational system via his work as an inspector.

Arnold became deeply interested in education while working as an inspector, and he started to push for big systemic changes. His dedication to raising educational standards in England resulted in a number of noteworthy studies and articles. These papers provided insightful analyses of the country's primary education system and suggested improvements. Arnold's publications reflect his transition from diplomacy to teaching. His articles and literary works, including "Culture and Anarchy" and "Essays in Criticism," show his dedication to the intellectual and moral growth of people via education. His views on national character, culture, and education still have an impact on educational philosophy and practice.

It is significant that Arnold had a strong attachment to Oxford University, where he had studied. His attitude to higher education was informed by his personal relationship to the school. He often stressed the importance of culture, sweetness, and aesthetics in the whole development of the human being a perspective informed by his time at Oxford. The interaction between a person's job route and personal decisions is shown through Arnold's journey. His choice to pursue a career in teaching was first motivated by personal goals, but it eventually turned into a lifetime dedication to enhancing the educational system.

CONCLUSION

Finally, "Matthew Arnold: A Journey from Diplomacy to Education" is a gripping account of a man who, in spite of his early professional aspirations, had a tremendous influence on English education. His shift from diplomacy to education represented a turning point in his life; he developed into a fervent supporter of educational reform and left behind a significant legacy in the fields of criticism, literature, and educational policy. Arnold's tale is evidence of the transformational power of individual decisions and of a commitment to advancing society via education.

REFERENCES

- [1] L. B. S., "The Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie," *Mississippi Val. Hist. Rev.*, 1921, doi: 10.2307/1886212.
- [2] C. J. Finlay, "Hugo Grotius on the law of war and peace: student edition," *Int. Aff.*, 2013.
- [3] "Book reviews," *Int. Aff.*, 2013, doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12012.

- [4] J. A. Lynn *et al.*, “Reviews of Books,” *Int. Hist. Rev.*, 2006, doi: 10.1080/07075332.2006.9641091.
- [5] “Book Reviews,” *Hist.*, 2002, doi: 10.1111/1540-6563.00028.
- [6] N. R. Bennett *et al.*, “Reviews Book,” *Int. Hist. Rev.*, 1992, doi: 10.1080/07075332.1992.9640634.
- [7] K. Hirschler *et al.*, “Reviews of Books,” *Int. Hist. Rev.*, 2009, doi: 10.1080/07075332.2009.9641175.
- [8] N. Zisko *et al.*, “Meso level influences on long term condition self-management: stakeholder accounts of commonalities and differences across six European countries,” *PLoS One*, 2015, doi: 10.1186/s12889-015-1957-1.
- [9] Y. Feng *et al.*, “Meso level influences on long term condition self-management: stakeholder accounts of commonalities and differences across six European countries,” *PLoS One*, 2015.

CHAPTER 5

MATTHEW ARNOLD'S VISION: COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

The summary of "Matthew Arnold's Vision: Compulsory Education and the Quest for Equality" explores the visionary approach to education of Matthew Arnold, focusing on his support for compulsory education and its contribution to establishing social equality. Arnold's vision emerges as a potent narrative that aims to use education to bridge the gap between different socioeconomic strata. The abstract illustrates Arnold's vision's fundamental ideas, which include not just mandatory schooling but also the notion of universal access to high-quality education. It also makes a suggestion about the issues and discussions surrounding Arnold's suggestions, such as the opposition from certain social groups and the difficulties of putting such a comprehensive educational system into place. In the end, these abstract lays the groundwork for a thorough investigation of Arnold's principles and their applicability to contemporary education and social equality.

KEYWORDS:

Education, Literary Evolution, Matthew Arnold, Social Equality, Social Classes, Teaching.

INTRODUCTION

The key to his whole approach is the word he italicized, "public." The nation's whole educational system was to be public. The Universities were to be made "public" in the sense that the State would oversee and, to some degree, govern them. The Universities are already "public" in the sense that they are not private enterprises. The so-called public schools were supposed to become more really public by being placed under the control of the minister and school boards. A transfer of their funds and a reorganization of their structure were to be used to make the smaller foundation-schools public. New schools, which were already public by virtue of their existence, were to be positioned next to the older ones. Therefore, private enterprise schools would be abolished. Thus, the whole nation's basic education was to be planned and carried out by State authorities, taking it out of the hands of groups or individual citizens. Last but not least, the public education system's four grades were to work in unison and be supervised by a top Minister of State in charge of a sizable department. Here was a national education plan that was adequately comprehensive and had broad contours that were evident.

The public elementary school in France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland has, and exists by having, the Commune and the Municipal Government of the Commune as its foundations, and it could not exist without them. But we in England have our own system of local government, which makes it difficult for the public elementary school in those countries to exist. It would be impossible to determine how much the current educational system owes to the influence of Matthew Arnold unless one could follow the thought processes of the Bishop of Rochester, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Sir John Gorst, and other notable individuals who contributed to the creation of the Education Acts of 1892 and 1893. It is the fate of great

ideas to fall onto quite diverse types of soil, to be trampled underfoot by one group of adversaries and dragged away by another, and yet sometimes to find a hospitable lodging, to spring into life after a long period of dormancy, and to present themselves in the most unexpected places. So, it's possible that Arnold's beliefs on schooling were true. Undoubtedly, during the last five and a half decades, people have begun to see education in all of its forms as a public issue rather than a private business. We have increasingly realized that the State and the Municipality, within their respective jurisdictions, have opinions on the topic. The concept of the "Golden Ladder," which has its foundation in elementary schools and its summit rung in the highest university honors, has captured the public's attention and moved from the realm of abstractions into everyday life. Local government institutions have grown independently along the lines Arnold envisioned in 1868. Although it is a novel and dangerous experiment, he specifically wanted to see education subordinated to local power. The revival of Edwardian and Elizabethan Grammar Schools throughout the nation has rattled, if not yet destroyed, Mr. Creakle's stronghold and pushed the idea of the Public School to the very door of the Middle Class.

The State has acted on a tip that Arnold offered to the radical reformers of his day, even in the case of denominational education in elementary schools, where many believe that a backward step has been made. Let them understand, however, that on the Continent generally everywhere except in Holland the public elementary school is denominational and its teaching is religious as well as secular. "Most English Liberals seem persuaded that our Elementary Schools should be undenominational, and their teaching secular; and that with a public elementary school it cannot well be otherwise," he said. He did not support compulsory education in a forceful or impartial manner. In his opinion, compulsion did not arise as a result of a national sense of education in the foreign nations where it did. People that place a high value on knowledge will argue that every kid should have the opportunity to learn it. However, forcing families to take their kids to school would not be able to provide that great of value. He seems to have been concerned that any law that prevented a youngster from working for their own or their parents' maintenance would be very controversial and would be avoided as late as the end of the year 1869. "A law leveled at the employer is preferable so long as this is the case," the author writes. "A law of direct compulsion on the parent and child would probably be violated every day in practice[1]."

But compulsion was there at the time those words were penned. The first democratically elected parliament, which served from 1868 to 1874, was committed to reform and vehemently opposed fathers' rights to starve their offspring's minds. Forster, who was the Council's vice president at the time, was given the task of creating a bill establishing compulsory education. In November 1869, Arnold, Forster's brother-in-law, "heard the contents" of the Bill. After the Second Reading, he wrote: "The majority on the Education Bill is a great relief; it will now, if William has tolerable luck, get through safely this session." By this point, he must have converted to the system of compulsion. He said: "I think William's Bill will do very well. I am glad it is so little altered." Maybe he saw the clamor for the Bill as evidence that the English people were now beginning to understand the importance of education. But even while the State established compulsion, surpassing his objective, it fell short of his ideal by severely restricting the people to whom compulsion was to be used.

He often reminded his fellow countrymen, who were at the time unfamiliar to how Compulsory Education really functioned, that it would be insufferable, unfair, and ludicrous if it applied just to the children of the poor. He argued that, in order for their children to have a quality education, the Upper and Middle Classes needed a mandatory system just as much as the Working Classes, for whom legislation was being suggested. He depicted this topic in

a letter written in 1867 and sent to the Pall Mall Gazette, which was later included in *Friendship's Garland*, with the utmost extravagant joy and fantasy. The well-educated Prussian Arminius goes to a town's Petty Sessions with his English friend and is outraged by the deplorable treatment of an elderly peasant who is being tried for poaching. The English buddy (the fictitious Arnold) claims that he is more worried about his children than the poacher, speaking for himself. They are already let to mature. He really believes that it is now necessary to impose coercion on the education of kids in this class. "The difference between them and our intelligent and educated classes is really too frightening[2]."

The English friend, thus rudely challenged, leads the Prussian into the justice room, where they find on the Bench three excellent specimens of education and intelligence: Lord Lumpington, the Rev. Esau Hittall, and Mr. Bottles. "Your educated and intelligent classes," sneered Arminius, in his most offensive manner, "Where are they? I should like to see them." They must disclose their credentials for the position of magistrate, according to Arminius. He starts out by outlining the idea behind compulsory education. The principle is equally good for all classes, and it is only by applying it impartially that you save its application from being insolent and invidious. You propose to make old Diggs' boys instruct themselves before they go bird-scaring or sheep-tending. I want to know what you do to make those boys educate themselves before they go bird-scaring or sheep-tending. However, Arminius maintains that sending boys from the wealthier classes to school is unnecessary since their lives naturally lead them there.

"In my country, we should have started to put pressure on those future magistrates at school," he continued, "but don't suppose that by doing this, you are applying the principle of Compulsory Education fairly, and as you apply it to Diggs' boys. Lord Lumpington and Mr. Hittall should have been scrutinized before we even let them to enter the university. These young men would have been kept from the University, as Diggs' boys are kept from their bird-scaring, until they had educated themselves. There would have been some Mr. Grote as a School Board Commissary, pitching them questions about history, and some Mr. Lowe as a Crown Patronage Commissary, pitching them questions about English literature. After three years of university, there would be further pressure if they desired to become judges. An excellent civil service test in English law, Roman law, English history, and legal history was held in front of a Board of Experts.

"In the view of the English friends of compulsory education, the educated and intelligent Middle and Upper Classes amongst us are to confer the boon of compulsory education upon the ignorant lower class, which needs it while they do not. But, on the Continent, instruction is obligatory for Lower, Middle, and Upper Class alike. I doubt whether our educated and intelligent classes are at all prepared for this. I have an acquaintance in easy circumstances, of distinguished connexions, living in a fashionable part of London, who, like many other people, deals rather easily with his son's schooling. Sometimes the boy is at school, then for months together he is away from school, and taught, so far as he is taught, by his father and mother at home. He is not the least an invalid, but it pleases his father and mother to bring him up in this manner. Now, I imagine, no English friends of compulsory education dream of dealing with such a defaulter as this, and certainly his father, who perhaps is himself a friend of compulsory education for the working classes, would be astounded to find his education of his own son interfered with.

But, if my worthy acquaintance lived in Switzerland or Germany, he would be dealt with as follows. I speak with the school-law of Canton Neufchatel, immediately under my eyes, but the regulations on this matter are substantially the same in all the states of Germany and of German Switzerland. The Municipal Education Committee of the district where my

acquaintance lived would address a summons to him, informing him that a comparison of the school-rolls of their district with the municipal list of children of school-age, showed his son not to be at school; and requiring him, in consequence, to appear before the Municipal Committee at a place and time named, and there to satisfy them, either that his son did attend some public school, or that, if privately taught, he was taught by duly trained and certificated teachers. On the back of the summons, my acquaintance would find printed the penal articles of the school-Law, sentencing him to a fine if he failed to satisfy the Municipal Committee; and, if he failed to pay the fine, or was found a second time offending, to imprisonment. In some Continental States he would be liable, in case of repeated infraction of the school-Law, to be deprived of his parental rights, and to have the care of his son transferred to guardians named by the State. It is indeed terrible to think of the consternation and wrath of our educated and intelligent classes under a discipline like this; and I should not like to be the man to try and impose it on them. But I assure them most emphatically and if they study the experience of the Continent, they will convince themselves of the truth of what I say that only on these conditions of its equal and universal application is any law of compulsory education possible." We have now seen, at least in general outline, the system of National Education which he would have wished to set up how he would have coordinated all instruction from the lowest to the highest, and how he would have compelled all classes alike to submit their children, and in the higher ranks of life to submit themselves, to the training which should best equip them for their chosen or appointed work. We must now ask what kind of information he would have aimed to spread via his organized system[3].

He repeatedly stated that culture's goal was to "know ourselves and the world," and that as a means of achieving this goal, we should "know the best that has been thought and said in the world." He openly and fully acknowledged the claims of the physical sciences, as well as their application to and value in education. The verification of the rules of grammar, in the examples provided by one's reading, is unquestionably a far less fruitful stimulus of one's powers of observation and comparison than the verification of the rules of a science like botany in the example, for example, when giving advice about the instruction of a young girl in whom her teacher wished to arouse "perception," he said. "My own studies have been almost entirely in Letters, and my visits to the field of the natural sciences have been very slight and inadequate, although those sciences have always strongly moved my curiosity," he said to his American audience in 1884. "A single line of poetry, working in the mind, may produce more thought and lead to more light, which is what man wants, than the fullest acquaintance with the processes of digestion." Curiously, his opinion on several speeches given by the late person illustrates what humanism meant to him. On his first visit to Oxford as the University's Chancellor, Lord Salisbury gave a speech. Arnold praises his ability and manners before declaring: "He is a dangerous man, though, and chiefly from, his want of any true sense and experience of literature and its beneficent function. Religion he knows, and physical science he knows; but the immense work between the two, which is for literature to accomplish, he knows nothing of."

The enormous task that literature must complete. He believed that this work, which was situated between the works of science and religion, represented the whole human civilization. Science and religion each had their own fields of study, but literature rather than any of them was to have an impact on culture. When it comes to the sub-divisions of literature, we note that he was preeminently a classicist. The literature he extolled was literature in its widest sense ancient and modern, English and Continental, Occidental and Oriental whatever contained "the best which had been thought and said in the world." He was this in part due to disposition, in part due to training, and in part due to his refined and methodical judgment. He was undoubtedly a classicist by nature because of his intrinsic love of beautiful form and

his "sentiment against hideousness and rawness," which cannot be disputed. His education was mainly classical at that point. He used to argue against the idea that his father had been a poor student with comical sincerity. "People talk the greatest nonsense about my father's scholarship. The Wykehamists of his day were excellent scholars. Dr. Gabell made them so. My father's Latin verses were not good; but that was because he was not poetical not because he was a bad scholar.

But he wrote the most admirable Latin prose; and, as for his Greek prose, you couldn't tell it from Thucydides." His knowledge of both Greek and Latin was thorough and exact; it is possible that his knowledge of Latin was stronger, as shown by the fact that he was a finalist for the Hertford Scholarship at Oxford. In Rugby's Sixth Form, he had studied Plato, and Oxford had taught him Aristotle. Homer, Sophocles, and Hesiod were his "unapproachable favorites" from the beginning to the end, and Hesiod was "a Greek friend to whom he turned with excellent effect." But while he was thus fundamentally a classicist, he was not a simple classicist.

No one, and this is noteworthy, had the Bible's text more precisely at his fingertips; no one had a larger, more acquainted, or more discerning knowledge of English literature. He was an accurate and wise critic in French, as is clearly shown by his article on *The French Play* in London. He had read all that was finest in French, German, and Italian. He was proficient enough in Hebrew to "follow and weigh the reasons offered by others" for a new translation of the Old Testament, and he made at least one notable foray into Celtic literature[4].

A person with such skills was fundamentally a man of letters; he was a classicist first and foremost, albeit he was much more than that. Therefore, it was only natural for him to believe that a classical education was the best one that could be provided for boys and to want to see classics, taught in a literary rather than a pedantic manner, become a mainstay of instruction in all public schools, regardless of whether they were founded on an ancient or modern foundation, to which the Upper and Middle Classes should turn. He was completely prepared to follow Dr. Whewell's philosophy and pave the way for a significant change in public education by making composing in Greek and Latin a luxury for a select few with a particular talent for it. But reading the finest Latin and Greek writers should be a boy's main focus in school, along with having a thorough understanding of English and the necessary knowledge of Science and Mathematics for contemporary life.

He "hazarded the opinion that for the majority of mankind a little of mathematics goes a long way, once, in the very Senate-House and heart of Cambridge," thinking it no particular gain for a boy to know that "when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water," but a clear loss that he should not know the last book of the *Iliad*, or the sixth book of the *neid*, or the *Agamemnon*. He urged the Eton students to laugh at "Scientific lectures, and lessons on the diameter of the sun and moon," but he was nearly inconsolable when "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" was offered as a parody of "Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased." He listened with amused interest to the teachers who determined that our ancestors were "a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ear, probably arboreal in the thorough instruction in Greek, Latin, and English that was to serve as the cornerstone of the students' culture would have been given to the public schools, and once that was done, he would have demanded that the university provide space for the fullest development of any special aptitude that the student might exhibit.

In essence, the university was to specialize while the school was to train in broad knowledge. He stated in an essay from 1868: "An admirable English mathematician told me that he should never recover the loss of the two years that he wasted after receiving his degree

without appropriate instruction at an English University, when he ought to have been under superior instruction, for which the present University course in England makes no provision. I daresay he will recover it, for a man of genius counts no worthy effort too hard; but who can estimate the loss to the mental training and intellectual development that he would.

But because these more expansive perspectives on education are more theoretical in nature, he never got the chance to put them into practice, except for very indirectly. He had real, formal, and direct interactions with the Elementary Schools, but even here, as in so many other sectors, his effect was more detrimental than beneficial. A brother-inspector claims that he only had a limited amount of sympathy for "that somewhat terrible character, the scientific educator," and that if he saw young children "looking good and happy, and under the care of a kind and sympathetic teacher, he would give a favorable report, without enquiring too curiously into the percentage of scholars who could pass the "standard" examination." The frightened children and the worried teacher watch as the great man assessed the proficiency in some such humble art as spelling. They notice the tall figure, at once graceful and stately; the benign air, as of an affable archangel; the critical brow and enquiring eyeglass bent on some very immature performance in penmanship or needlework; and the frightened children and the anxious teacher, gradually lapsing into smiles and peace. "Well, my little man, and how do you spell dog?" "Please sir, d-o-g." "Capital, very good indeed.

I couldn't do it better myself. And now let us go a little further, and see if we can spell cat. "Now, this is really excellent. You have brought them on wonderfully in spelling since I was here last. You shall have a capital report. Good-bye." To those who cherish these memories there is nothing surprising in this tribute by a friend: "His effect on the teachers when he examined a school was extraordinary. He was sympathetic without being condescending, and he reconciled the humblest drudge in a London school to his or her drudgery for the next twelve months." As regards the matter of education, he was all for Reality, as against Pretentiousness, "the stamp of plainness and freedom from charlatanism." He had no notion that children could be humanized by being made to read that "the crocodile is oviparous," or that "summer ornaments for grates are made of wood shavings and of different coloured papers." He wished that the youngest and poorest children should be nurtured on the wholesome and delicious food of actual literature, instead of "skeletons" and "abstracts." He set great store on learning poetry by heart, for he believed in poetry as the chief instrument of culture. He expressed the appropriate disdain for the vile nonsense that was all too often passed off as poetry in school reading materials. When one considers how pure and admirable true popular poetry is, it is upsetting to consider that a poor youngster would be given such garbage, seemingly with the approval of the Education Department and its funds[5].

With regard to the special evil of teaching poetry by "selections" or "extracts," he wrote in his Report for 1880: "That the poetry chosen should have real beauties of expression and feeling, that these beauties should be such as the children's hearts and minds can lay hold of, and that a distinct point or centre of beauty and interest should occur within the limits of the passage learned all these are conditions to be insisted on. Some of the short pieces by Mrs. Hemans, such as 'The Graves of a Household,' 'The Homes of England,' 'The Better Land,' are to be recommended because they fulfil all three conditions; they have real merits of expression and sentiment; the merits are such as the children can feel, and the centre of interest, these pieces being so short, necessarily occurs within the limits of what is learnt. On the other hand, in extracts taken from Scott or Shakespeare, the point of interest is not often reached within the hundred lines which is all that children in the Fourth Standard learn.

The Judgment Scene in the Merchant of Venice affords me a good example of what I mean the children in the Fourth Standard begin at the beginning and stop at the end of a hundred

lines. Now the children in the Fourth Standard are often a majority of the children learning poetry, and this is all their poetry for the year. But within these hundred lines the real interest of the situation is not reached; neither do they contain any poetry of signal beauty and effectiveness. How little, therefore, has the poetry-exercise been made to do for these children, many of whom will leave school at once, and learn no more poetry!" He greatly favored all such exercises as tend to make the mind "creative," and give it "a native play of its own, as against such exercises as learning strings of promontories, battles, and minerals." As to the number of subjects taught, he was in favor of few rather than many. Despite this well-founded fear of an excessive multiplication of subjects, he wanted to make Latin mandatory in the upper standards of elementary schools and he wanted to see it taught through the Vulgate. He dreaded the strain of having to receive a large number of "knowledges" and "store them up to be reproduced in an examination." However, Matthew Arnold provided his opinion on the Vulgate's potential use in primary classrooms.

"Latin is the foundation of so much in the written and spoken language of modern Europe, that it is the best language to take as a second language; in our own written and book language, above all, it fills so large a part that we perhaps hardly know how much of their reading falls meaningless upon the eye and ear of children in our elementary schools, from their total ignorance of either Latin or a modern language derived from it. For the little of languages that can be taught in our elementary schools, it is far better to go to the root at once; and Latin, besides, is the best of all languages to learn grammar by. But it should by no means be taught as in our classical schools; far less time should be spent on the grammatical framework, and classical literature should be left quite out of view. A second language, and a language coming very largely into the vocabulary of modern nations, is what Latin should stand for to the teacher of an elementary school. I am convinced that for his purpose the best way would be to disregard classical Latin entirely, to use neither Cornelius Nepos, nor Eutropius, nor Caesar, nor any delectus from them, but to use the Latin Bible, the Vulgate.

A chapter or two from the story of Joseph, a chapter or two from Deuteronomy, and the first two chapters of St. Luke's Gospel would be the sort of delectus we want; add to them a vocabulary and a simple grammar of the main forms of the Latin language, and you have a perfectly compact and cheap school book, and yet all that you need. In the extracts the child would be at home, instead of, as in extracts from classical Latin, in an utterly strange land; and the Latin of the Vulgate, while it is real and living Latin, is yet, like the Greek of the New Testament, much nearer to modern idiom, and therefore much easier for a modern learner than classical idiom can be. True, a child whose delectus is taken from Cornelius Nepos or Cæsar will be better prepared perhaps for going on to Virgil and Cicero than a child whose delectus is taken from the Vulgate. But we do not want to carry our elementary schools into Virgil or Cicero; one child in five thousand, with a special talent, may go on to higher schools, and to Virgil, and he will go on to them all the better for the little we have at any rate given him. But what we want to give to our Elementary Schools in general is the vocabulary, to some extent, of a second language, and that language one which is at the bottom of a great deal of modern life and modern language.

This, I am convinced, we may give in some such method as the method I have above suggested, but in no other." There is, perhaps, no more interesting or more characteristic feature of his doctrine about elementary schools than his insistence, early and late, on a close and familiar acquaintance with the Bible. "Chords of power," he said, "are touched by this instruction which no other part of the instruction in a popular school reaches, and chords various, not the single religious chord only. The Bible is for the child in an elementary school almost his only contact with poetry and philosophy. and how much do our elementary

schools lose by not having any such courses[6]. He felt that the theological and dogmatic significance of Holy Scripture was completely beyond the purview of the school. He saw quite well the many and contradictory dangers to which a simple love and understanding of the Bible were exposed the minute that exegesis started to toy about it, and he said, "The Bible's application and edification belong to the Church; its literary and historical substance to the school." In response to Protestants who claimed that this was an incorrect application of the passage, he pointed out that Cardinal Newman would have interpreted the words, "I will lay thy stones with fair colours and thy foundations with sapphires," as authorizing "the sumptuosities of the Church of Rome"; "and in these cases of application who shall decide"? He believed that everyone should have access to the Bible since it is a valuable work of art and literature. He wanted it to be taught with wisdom, compassion, reverence, and above all, "as a Literature," because biblical instruction should highlight the vastly different components that make up the Bible.

These components include the significant differences between the books' authors, styles, and tones, as well as the historical contexts in which they were written, as well as the demographics and historical contexts to which each book appealed. "Let the school managers make the main outlines of Bible history, and the getting by heart a selection of the finest Psalms, the most interesting passages from the historical and prophetic books of the Old Testament, and the chief parables, discourses, and exhortations, of the New, a part of the regular school work, to be submitted to inspection and to be seen in its strength or weakness like any other. This could raise no jealousies; or, if it still raises some, let a sacrifice be made of them for the sake of the end in view. Some will say that what we propose is but a small use to put the Bible to; yet it is that on which all higher use of the Bible is to be built, and its adoption is the only chance for saving the one elevating and inspiring element in the scanty instruction of our primary schools from being sacrificed to a politico-religious difficulty. There was no Greek school in which Homer was not read; cannot our popular schools, with their narrow range and their jejune aliment in secular literature, do as much for the Bible as the Greek schools did for Homer?" In 1870 he wrote about a book by two young Jewish ladies: "I am sure it will be found, as I told them, that their book meets a real want; there were good books about the Bible for the learned, and there were bad books about it that is to say, bad résumés of its history and literature for the general public; but anything like a good and sound résumé for the general public did not exist till this book came."

It is noteworthy to note that his only direct and positive attempt to improve the infrastructure of the schools he examined is attributable to his strong belief in the ethical and pedagogical value of the Bible. He provided them enough opportunity for growth via criticism and suggestions, but giving them a new book to read was a break from his typical approach. Nevertheless in 1872 he wrote: "An ounce of practice, they say, is better than a pound of theory; and certainly, one may talk for ever about the wonder-working power of Letters, and yet produce no good at all, unless one really puts people in the way of feeling their power. The friends of Physics do not content themselves with extolling Physics; they put forth school-books by which the study of Physics may be with proper advantage brought near to those who before were strangers to it; and they do wisely.

For anyone who believes in the civilizing power of Letters, and often talks of this belief, to think that he has for more than twenty years got his living by inspecting schools for the people, has gone in and out among them, has seen that the power of Letters never reaches them at all, and that the whole study of Letters is thereby discredited, and its power called in question, and yet has attempted nothing to remedy this state of things, cannot but be vexing and disquieting. He may truly say, like the Israel of the prophet, 'We have not wrought any

deliverance in the earth! and he may well desire to do something to pay his debt to popular education before he finally departs, and to serve it, if he can, in that point where its need is sorest, where he has always said its need was sorest, and where, nevertheless, it is as sore still as when he began saying this twenty years ago. Even if what he does cannot be of service at once, owing to special prejudices and difficulties, yet these prejudices and difficulties years are almost sure to dissipate, and the work may be of service hereafter[7]."

The Great Prophecy of Israel's Restoration, Arranged and Edited for Young Learners, is a little book with the subtitle *A Bible Reading for Schools*. Its Preface has some insightful, though a bit depressing, comments. He lamented that "the fatal thing about our version is that it so often spoils a chapter in the Old Testament by making sheer nonsense out of one or two verses, and so throwing the reader out." Arnold himself was a constant and attentive student of Holy Writ, and he preferred "reading his Bible without being baffled by unmeaningness's." He frequently used a Bible that was a gift from his godfather, John Keble, "where the numbers of the chapters are marked at the side and do

The humbleness of what is professed in this small book cannot be emphasized enough from the outset. In order to allow English schoolchildren to read the last 27 chapters of Isaiah without being frequently interrupted by passages whose meaning is almost or completely unintelligible, I have tried to select the best meanings among those that have been offered for each passage and to weave them into a coherent whole. There is never a break in the regal flow and rhythm of old English. No allowance is made for such pedantries as Professor Robertson Smith's "greaves of the warrior that stampeth in the fray" or such barbarisms as Professor Cheynes' "boot of him that trampleth noisily," but occasionally a sentence is given a turn that reveals its true meaning for the first time, or occasionally a word is substituted that actually represents the Hebrew in place of one that renders the sentence meaningless.

The little book has been republished several times, but when it was published as "A Bible Reading for Schools," it was a failure because, based on his own mournful thoughts about it, he seemed to have predicted that it would fail. People in charge of elementary education in England, whether in church-affiliated or public schools, are understandably wary of novel religious ideas. The Great Prophecy of Israel's Restoration gave legitimacy to an idea that, in 1872, was probably unfamiliar to the majority of school administrators and school boards. He carefully denied having any desire to choose who wrote the chapters he edited[8].

DISCUSSION

A significant individual from the 19th century named Matthew Arnold, who is recognized for his contributions to literature, criticism, and educational reform, had a forward-looking viewpoint on education.

The idea of obligatory education as a way of achieving social equality was at the center of his vision; this idea is still relevant in today's educational debate. Arnold thought that access to education shouldn't be restricted to a certain social group or class. Instead, he argued in favor of making education mandatory in order to guarantee that all children, regardless of their socioeconomic situation, had access to high-quality education. His dedication to leveling the playing field and removing obstacles that exacerbate social inequity was highlighted by this vision.

The idea that education might be a potent weapon for bridging the socioeconomic gap was one of the main tenets of Arnold's philosophy. He maintained that society might empower people from all origins to overcome their situations by making education mandatory, so promoting more social mobility and equality. Arnold's concept faced obstacles and opposition

even though it was based on equitable and just values. Overcoming ingrained cultural conventions, political barriers, and economic concerns were necessary for the implementation of compulsory schooling. The concept of making education compulsory was opposed by certain groups in society who saw it as a restriction on their right to privacy. In contemporary culture, the idea of compulsory education and its contribution to attaining equality are still hot topics. As governments, educators, and activists continue to face the difficulties of guaranteeing equitable access to high-quality education, Arnold's vision, which has its roots in the nineteenth century, still has relevance today[9].

We should consider how education and social equality are now faring in light of Arnold's goal. Arnold's views serve as a timeless reminder of the significance of tackling these challenges in an age defined by conversations on educational equality, the digital gap, and discrepancies in access to high-quality education. Arnold's goals are consistent with the more general notion that education is a driving force behind societal advancement. It has the capacity to encourage critical thinking, empower people, and question social conventions, eventually leading to a more fair and equitable society. Arnold's goal must be realized via a diverse strategy that includes lobbying, change of educational policy, and a dedication to provide resources to neglected populations. It serves as a reminder that attaining educational equality requires active participation from all spheres of society[10].

CONCLUSION

Finally, "Matthew Arnold's Vision: Compulsory Education and the Quest for Equality" illuminates Arnold's forward-looking viewpoint on education and its ability to eliminate societal inequity. His theories, which have their roots in the 19th century, are still relevant today as we work to achieve educational justice and make sure that everyone has the chance to reach their full potential. Arnold's vision stands as a timeless reminder of the ability of education to change lives and advance the cause of social equality.

REFERENCES

- [1] H. A. Weber, "Literature as a Social Tool: Education and Cohesion or Class Domination?," *Inq. J.*, 2012.
- [2] F. Casey, "A Celtic Twilight in Little England: G.K. Chesterton and W.B. Yeats," *Ir. Stud. Rev.*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/09670882.2013.871850.
- [3] B. Novak, "Humanizing democracy: Matthew Arnold's nineteenth-century call for a common, higher, educative pursuit of happiness and its relevance to twenty-first-century democratic life," *American Educational Research Journal*. 2002. doi: 10.3102/00028312039003593.
- [4] L. Zenderland, "Constructing American studies: Culture, identity, and the expansion of the humanities," in *The Humanities and the Dynamics of Inclusion since World War II*, 2006.
- [5] B. Lightman, "Science and culture," in *The Cambridge Companion to Victorian Culture*, 2010. doi: 10.1017/CCOL9780521886994.002.
- [6] L. R. Pratt, "Matthew Arnold, the Masses, and Arts Education," *Arts Educ. Policy Rev.*, 2007, doi: 10.3200/AEPR.108.3.19-24.
- [7] R. Snape, "Objects of utility : cultural responses to industrial collections in municipal museums 1845-1914," *Museum Soc.*, 2010.

- [8] T. Lacy, "Dreams of a Democratic Culture: Revising the Origins of the Great Books Idea, 1869-1921," *J. Gilded Age Progress. Era*, 2008, doi: 10.1017/S1537781400000840.
- [9] D. Came, "To Relish the Sublime? Culture and Self-realization in Postmodern Times," *Br. J. Aesthet.*, 2003, doi: 10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.3.322.
- [10] K. Donnelly, "The humanities in Australia: Past, present and future," in *The Humanities: Past, Present and Future*, 2017.

CHAPTER 6

MATTHEW ARNOLD VISION FOR A MORE CULTURED SOCIETY

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,

Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India

Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

This abstract explores Matthew Arnold's perceptive criticism of modern liberalism and his desire to promote a more civilized society. Arnold's views presented a particular challenge at a time when liberal values were on the rise. He argued for a greater appreciation of culture and religion as essential components of human satisfaction and questioned the prevalent focus on individual freedom and financial advancement. In addition to presenting a different outlook for a society that strives to greater cultural diversity and moral growth, this investigation of Arnold's viewpoint offers insightful observations into the changing intellectual and social scene of his day. Arnold's criticism of modern liberalism is still relevant today, inspiring discussion on how to strike a balance between individual freedom and community welfare.

KEYWORDS:

Human Flourishing, Individual Liberty, Liberalism, Liberal Ideology, Matthew Arnold, Moral Development.

INTRODUCTION

A preacher of the smooth things we liked to hear and an encourager of the daydreams we had learnt at Locksley Hall, we would have expected to discover in such a person a friend, an ally, a comforter, and a fellow worker. Instead of all of this, we discovered a criticone who was so kind that we could not argue with him, who was so rational that it was difficult to argue with him, who was so completely devoid of conceit that we could not laugh at him, who was so really and recently amusing that we could not help but laugh with him but who was still a critic. He disregarded our wonderful country and did not believe anything we said. He downplayed our heroes, laughed at our triumphs, questioned our forecasts, and mocked our goals. He said that we were being held captive by a serious illusion. He forewarned us that the magnificent Democracy, upon which we had based our firm foundation, would crumble under our feet. He emphasized that Labour had no more reason than to hope to be saved by conservatism or liberalism.

He insisted that all of our political reform was merely machinery, that social reform was the goal of politics, and that the future belonged to those who would make us better, wiser, and happier. He also suggested that those who were more interested in the end result of the machine than the machine itself those who weren't content to constantly disassemble it and reassemble it would be more interested in learning what it would be when it was perfected would be better off. "It is not fatal to our Liberal friends to labor for Free Trade, Extension of the Suffrage, and Abolition of Church Rates, instead of graver social ends; but it is fatal to them to be told by their flatterers, and to believe them," he said, implying that "the present troubled state of our social life" had at least some bearing on "the thirty years' blind worship of their idols by our Liberal friends." And although our new critic showed such contempt for many of the things we revered, like political machinery, rational governance,

and individual freedom of speech and action, he brought our attention to certain revered items that we had forgotten about, or at least some of us had. He emphasized the significant importance of continuity and history in a nation's political existence.

He declared that external beauty, stateliness, splendor, and gracious manners were indispensable elements of civilization and that these were the contributions that aristocracy made to the welfare of the State, extolling the "institutions which incorporate tradition and prolong the reign of the dead." He emphasized that a country's genuine greatness should not be measured by its coal supply, commerce volume, capital accumulation, or number of railroads, but rather by its culture, values, appreciation of beauty, and accomplishments in the intellectual and moral arenas. Above all, he maintained that Religion held the top spot among the components of national well-being, which was the worst blow to some in our Party. We were at the tail end of a period that was anti-religious at the time. The seeming defeat and demise of Newman's movement had left Oxford with a critical, pessimistic, and utilitarian mentality that had a significant impact on the Liberal Party.

Gladstone's saturation with the spirit of that symphony was a cause of mistrust that his genius and courage could barely overcome; and, even when it was overcome, a good many of his Party followed him as reluctantly and as mockingly as Sancho Panza followed Don Quixote. It was an essential characteristic of the political Liberals to pour scorn on that "retrograding transcendentalism" which was "the hardheads' nickname for the AngloCatholic Symphony." The portion of the Party that regarded itself as the intellectual wing, seemed to have reverted to the temperament described by Bishop Butler; "taking for granted that Christianity is not so much a subject of enquiry, but that it is now at last discovered to be fictitious," and regularly speaking as if "this were an agreed upon position." This was the only heaven that the political Liberal dreamed of. He asserted that religion was the best, the sweetest, and the strongest thing in the world; he insisted that without religion there could be no perfect culture, no full civilization; he displayed a reverent admiration for the historical figure and teaching of Jesus Christ; he urged following the example of His "mildness and sweet reasonableness"; and he taught that the best way to further Christ's kingdom on earth was by improving the moral character and illuminating the lives of men and women[1].

Investigating what he meant by religion and Christianity, as well as how closely or how widely his interpretations adhered to the conventional belief of Christendom, belongs to another section of this book. But maybe enough has been said to explain why the "old Liberal hacks" and the well-liked irreligious instructors were so deeply alarmed by the arrival of Culture and Anarchy. One of these called Christianity "that awful plague which has destroyed two civilizations and but barely failed to slay such promise of good as is now struggling to live amongst men." Of that teacher, and of others like him, Arnold wrote in later years: "If the matter were not so serious one could hardly help smiling at the chagrin and manifest perplexity of such of one's friends as happen to be philosophical radicals and secularists, at having to reckon with religion again when they thought its day was quite gone by, and that they need not study it any more or take account of it anymore; that it was passing out, and a kind of new gospel, half Bentham, half Cobden, in which they were themselves particularly strong, was coming in.

And perhaps there is no one who more deserves to be compassionated than an elderly or middle-aged man of this kind, such as several of their Parliamentary spokesmen and representatives are. For perhaps the younger men of the Party may take heart of grace, and acquaint themselves a little with religion, now that they see its day is by no means over. But, for the older ones, their mental habits are formed, and it is almost too late for them to begin such new studies. However, a wave of religious reaction is evidently passing over Europe,

due very much to our revolutionary and philosophical friends having insisted upon it that religion was gone by and unnecessary, when it was neither the one nor the other." We shall go into the contents of *Culture and Anarchy* chapter by chapter since a study of Arnold's work should provide more than just a description of the prose book through which he most significantly influenced the thinking of his day. The Preface should not be taken seriously as it merely serves as a synopsis of the book. The Introduction makes a quick allusion to the ignorance of orators and leader-writers who believed that culture meant "a smattering of Greek and Latin," before tackling the problem of coming up with a better definition. "I propose now to try and enquire, in the simple unsystematic way which best suits my taste and my powers, what Culture really is, what good it can do, and what is our own special need of it; and I shall seek to find some plain grounds on which a faith in Culture both my own faith in it and the faith of others—may rest securely[2]."

The First Chapter bears the memorable heading "Sweetness and Light"; in reference to which Lord Salisbury so happily said that, when he conferred the degree of D.C.L. on Arnold, he ought to have addressed him as "Vir dulcissime et lucidissime." In this chapter Arnold lays it down that Culture, as he understands the word, is, in part, "a desire after the things of the mind, simply for their own sakes, and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are." But he goes on to say that "there is of Culture another view, in which not solely the scientific passion, the sheer desire to see things as they are, natural and proper in an intelligent being, appears as the ground of it. There is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it motives eminently such as are called social come in as part of the grounds of Culture, and the main and pre-eminent part."

Culture is then properly described not as having its origin in curiosity, but as having its origin in the love of perfection; it is a study of perfection. It moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good. There is no better motto which it can have than these words of Bishop Wilson: "To make reason and the will of God prevail." Thus, the true disciple of Culture will not be content with merely "learning the truth for his own personal satisfaction"; but will try to make it prevail; and in this endeavour Religion plays a commanding part. It is "the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself"; it is "the voice of the deepest human experience." It teaches that "The Kingdom of God is within you," and that internal perfection must first be sought; but then it goes on, hand in hand with Culture, to spread perfection in widest commonalty. "Perfection is not possible, while the individual remains isolated." "To promote the Kingdom of God is to increase and hasten one's own happiness."

Finally, Perfection as Culture conceives it, is a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature: "and here," says Arnold, "Culture goes beyond Religion, as Religion is generally conceived by us." Stress must be laid upon those last words; for Religion, according to its full and catholic ideal, is the perfection and consecration of man's whole nature, intellectual and physical, as well as moral and spiritual. All that is lovely, splendid, moving, heroic, even enjoyable, in human life all health and vigour and beauty and cleverness and charm all nature and all art, all science and all literature are among the good and perfect gifts which come down from the Father of Lights. But this is just the conception of Religion which Puritanism never grasped, nay, rather which Puritanism definitely rejected." And here probably is the origin of that quarrel with Puritanism, at least in its more superficial and obvious aspects, which so coloured and sometimes barbed Arnold's

meditations on Religion. "As I have said with regard to wealth: Let us look at those who live in and for it so I say with regard to religious organizations: Look at the life imaged in such a newspaper as the *Nonconformist* life of jealousy of the Establishment, disputes, tea-meetings, openings of chapels, sermons; and then think of it as an ideal of human life completing itself on all sides, and aspiring with all its organs toward sweetness, light, and perfection[3].

That concludes his definition of culture, and we must admit that "the old Liberal hacks," speakers on liberal platforms, and writers in liberal publications were not without excuse when they completely failed to understand what the new Teacher meant by repeatedly using a word that Bacon and Pope had used in such a different sense. We adhered to Milton's ideal of freedom: "to know, to utter, and to argue freely, according to conscience," and we felt that our actions should only be based on our convictions. We considered the freedom as thus conceived to be the greatest blessing of human life, for which no other could possibly be taken in exchange. We believed that such freedom had only one tenable limit, and that was the requirement that no man should use his own freedom in such a way as to lessen his brother's.

Then the new Liberalism Teacher appeared with a teaching that not only incensed us but also got us to ponder. "Our common praise of the British Constitution, under which we live, is that it is a system of checks a system which stops and paralyzes any power in interfering with the free action of individuals. As Feudalism, with its ideas and habits of subordination, was for many centuries the driving force behind the British Constitution, and we are left with nothing but our system of checks, and our notion that it is the great right and happiness of an Englishman to do as far as he pleases, dies out. It had relaxed certainty that all of life's blessings high status, vast riches, and great power were its by divine right. It had led England in a way that was both honorable to it and helpful to the nation. According to Lord Beaconsfield, the only reason a murderous Earl was hung was because a Whig Minister wanted to win over the public.

Since the Reform Act of 1832, the Middle Class had also, at any rate, "done what it liked," in a manner that was too comfortable and self-satisfied but not nearly as great. It had implemented several significant improvements that were close to its heart. It had instituted Free Trade, much to its benefit, and had amassed huge riches. "Every man for himself in business, every man for himself in religion," had been its guiding principle, and the devil takes the hindmost. But the judgment of this world is now, according to Arnold. The Middle Class and the Aristocracy had reached the end of their dominance. The young Liberals and Radicals of the time did not deny that a "tide of secret dissatisfaction had mined the ground under the self-confident Liberalism of the last thirty years (1839-1869) and had prepared the way for its sudden collapse and supersession." They had proclaimed this theory, which they had enjoyed, but after this, they and their new Teacher split off. The working class had gained its rights, and Arnold felt a peculiar terror toward them, or at least toward some of their most prominent representatives. Since the Aristocratic and Middle Classes have long been acting however, they please with great vigor, his appearance is somewhat embarrassing; however, now that he has arrived, he does so in enormous numbers and is rather undeveloped and rough[4].

A number of occurrences that occurred soon before they were granted the Franchise and may have even prompted their admittance might be linked to the working-men's fear and concern about the improper use they would make of their new authority. The Reform Bill, which Lord Russell and Mr. Gladstone were in charge of, was rejected in the House of Commons in June 1866, and the Tories took power. The failed Bill, which would have given citizenship to the

elite class of craftsmen, caused significant riots in which several working-class leaders played prominent roles. The Hyde Park fences were smashed, and the crowd took everything in its path. The Conservative government acted with the most unbelievable fecklessness. Home Secretary cried in public. The whole business, half scandalous and half ridiculous, furnished Arnold with an illustration for his sermon on "Doing What One Likes." Reviewing, three years after their occurrence, the events of July, 1866, he wrote thus: "Everyone remembers the virtuous Alderman-Colonel or Colonel-Alderman, who had to lead his militia through the London streets; how the bystanders gathered to see him pass; how the London roughs, asserting an Englishman's best and most blissful right of doing what he likes, robbed and beat the bystanders; and how the blameless warrior-magistrate refused to let his troops interfere. 'The crowd,' he touchingly said afterwards, 'was mostly composed of fine, healthy, strong men, bent on mischief; if he had allowed his soldiers to interfere, they might have been overpowered, their rifles taken from them and used against them by the mob; a riot, in fact, might have ensued, and been attended with bloodshed, compared with which the assaults and loss of property that actually occurred would have been as nothing.' Honest and affecting testimony of the English Middle Class to its own inadequacy for the authoritative part which one's convictions would sometimes incline one to assign to it.

'Who are we?' they say by the voice of their Alderman-Colonel, 'that we should not be overpowered if we attempt to cope with social anarchy, our rifles taken from us and used against us by the mob, and we, perhaps, robbed and beaten ourselves? Or what light have we, beyond a freeborn Englishman's impulse to do as he likes, which would justify us in preventing, at the cost of bloodshed, other freeborn Englishmen from doing as they like, and robbing and beating as much as they please?' And again, 'the Rough is just asserting his personal liberty a little, going where he likes, assembling where he likes, bawling as he likes, hustling as he likes. He sees the rich, the aristocratic class, in occupation of the executive government; and so, if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear-garden or the streets impassable, he cries out that he is being butchered by the aristocracy[5].'"

The sentences portray a genuine anxiety that, at the time Household Suffrage was claimed and accepted, really gripped Arnold's thoughts. This is true despite all the humor and sarcasm in the passages. He eventually realized that it was illusory and that the working classes in England are just as steady, law-abiding, inaccessible to ideas, and little in danger of being hurried into revolutionary courses as the aristocracy and middle class. They are also just as unwilling to jeopardize their national interests and their stake in the country. However, it's fascinating to note how he searched for social redemption during the time period we're discussing, when he had really come to fear popular violence. In an age that idolized individual action and opposed all collectivism as tyranny, he looked to the State for salvation. He did not turn to our traditional institutions, such as the Church, the Throne, or the House of Lords; to a military despotism, an established religion, or a governing Aristocracy; certainly not to the Middle Class with its wealth and industry least of all to the Populace, with its "bright powers of sympathy."

The State, however, must be one in which every man feels that he has a place and a part, and whose power he can accept without losing self-respect, if it is to fulfill its great duty. Arnold advocated expanding the State's jurisdiction, strengthening its arms, and "stablishing it on behalf of whatever great changes are needed, just as much as on behalf of order." And, forasmuch as the State, in its ideal, was "the organ of our collective best self," our first duty was to cultivate, each man for himself, the qualities that the State was "the organ of our collective best self" in 1866. We return to the central premise of the book, which is that Culture is the enemy of Anarchy: "We find no basis for a firm State-power in our ordinary

selves; culture suggests one to us in our best self."He classified English society into three primary groups, to whom he given three well-remembered nicknames, in the third chapter, "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace." The name "Philistine" in its application to the great Middle-Class dates from the Lecture on Heine delivered from the Chair of Poetry at Oxford in 1863. He named the aristocracy the Barbarians (not very happily, seeing as how he so greatly admired their fine manners); the Middle Class he had already named the Philistines; and to the great mass which lies below the Middle Class he gave the name "Populace." And since it caught on and has stuck around, at least as a term for a sort of mind, if not precisely as a name for a social class, it appears to have filled a need in our nomenclature system.

Arnold uses the term for the first time in the Lecture on Heine when he mentions Heine's lifelong struggle with what. Philistinism is used. "Philistinism! We have not the expression in English. Perhaps we have not the word, because we have so much of the thing. At Soli, I imagine, they did not talk of solecisms; and here, at the very headquarters of Goliath, nobody talks of Philistinism. The French have adopted the term *épiciér* (grocer) to designate the sort of being whom the Germans designate by the term Philistine; but the French term besides that it casts a slur upon a respectable class, composed of living and susceptible members, while the original Philistines are dead and buried long agois really, I think, in itself much less apt and expressive than the German term. Efforts have been made to obtain in English some term equivalent to Philister or *épiciér*; Mr. Carlyle has made several such efforts: "Respectability with its thousand gigs," he says; well, the occupant of every one of these gigs is, Mr. Carlyle means, a Philistine.

However, the word respectable is far too valuable a word to be thus perverted from its proper meaning; if the English are ever to have a word for the thing we are speaking of and so prodigious are the changes which the modern spirit is introducing, that even we English shall perhaps one day come to want such a wordI think we had much better take the word Philistine itself."The term "Philistine" must have originally been used to describe a tenacious, unenlightened foe of the Children of Light and the Chosen People. The party of change viewed itself, with the robust self-confidence natural to reformers, as a chosen people, as children of the light. They were the would-be remodelers of the old traditional European order, the invokers of reason against custom, and the representatives of the modern spirit in every sphere where it is applicable. They saw their antagonists as common people who were captives to routine, enemies of light, tyrannical and ignorant, but yet immensely powerful. We now consider Philistia to be the real Land of Promise, despite the fact that it is everything but; in this nation, the born thinker must feel as if the sky above him is made of brass and iron. The man who views the practice of these practical conveniences as something sufficient in itself that compensates for the absence or surrender of the idea, of reason, is in his eyes a Philistine. The enthusiast for the idea, for reason, values reason, the idea, in and for themselves; he values them, irrespective of the practical conveniences which their triumphs may obtain for him[6].

In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold thus elaborates the term "Philistine," and justifies, not without some misgiving, its exclusive appropriation to the Middle Class. "Philistine gives the notion of something particularly stiffnecked and perverse in the resistance to light and its children, and therein it specially suits our Middle Class, who not only do not pursue Sweetness and Light, but who even prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, tea-meetings, and addresses from Mr. Murphy, which make up the dismal and illiberal life on which I have so often touched." The force of Philistinism in English life and society is the force which, from first to last, he set himself most steadily to fight, and, if possible, transform. That the effort was arduous, and even perilous, he was fully aware. He must, he

said, pursue his object through literature, "freer perhaps in that sphere than I could be in any other, but with the risk always before me, if I cannot charm the wild beast of Philistinism while I am trying to convert him, of being torn in pieces by him, and, even if I succeed to the utmost and convert him, of dying in a ditch or a workhouse at the end of it all."

He defended the Aristocracy's moniker as "Barbarians" by pointing out that, like the historical Barbarians who revitalized and renewed our worn-out Europe, they had exceptional qualities, such as steadfast individualism and a passion for doing what one enjoys; a love of field sports; vigor, good looks, fine complexions, care for the body and all manly exercises; distinguished bearing, high spirit, and self-confidence; a truly admirable collection of. But beyond this, there is a sizable element of the Working Class that is underdeveloped and raw, has long been somewhat buried within its poverty and filth, and is now emerging to claim an Englishman's divinely granted right to do as he pleases. In dividing the country in this way, he is careful to note that we may occasionally find "aliens" men free from the prejudices, faults, and temptations of the class in which they were born; elect souls who, unrestricted by their ancestors, share the higher life of intellectual and moral aspiration.

After making this exception, however, he shows how the same sin is present in all three classes, and how it affects them all in different ways. All alike, through a stubborn persistence in doing as they please, have come to disregard the existence of Authority or Right Reason; and this irreognition of what ought to be the rule of life operates not only in the political sphere, but also, and obviously, in the spheres of morals, taste, society, and literature. Self-satisfaction blinds all of all the phrases which Arnold either created or popularized, there is none more closely associated with his memory than this famous conjunction of Hebraism and Hellenism; and in this connexion, it is not out of place to note his abiding interest in, and affection for, the House of Israel. The present writer once delivered a rather long and elaborate lecture on Arnold's genius and writings; and next morning a daily paper gave this masterpiece of condensed and tactful reporting: "The lecturer stated that Mr. Arnold was of Jewish extraction, and proceeded to read passages from his works."

It might have been more truly said that the lecturer suggested, as interesting to those who speculate in race and pedigree, the question whether Arnold's remote ancestors had belonged to the Ancient Race, and had emigrated from Germany to Lowestoft, where they dwelt for several generations. There is certainly no proof that so it was; and genealogical researches would in any case be out of keeping with the scope of this book. It is enough to note the fact of his affectionate and grateful feeling towards the Jewish race, and this can best be done in his own words. The present Lord Rothschild, formerly Sir Nathaniel de Rothschild, is the first adherent of the Jewish faith whoever was admitted to the House of Lords, though of course there have been other Peers of Jewish descent. When Mr. Gladstone created this Jewish peerage, Arnold wrote as follows to an admirable lady whose name often appears in his published Letters[7].

I would have been tempted to send you a message of congratulations on Sir Nathaniel's peerage in any case because of the kindness shown to me by your family and the respect I have for you personally, but I also feel proud and happy that the British public has signaled through this peerage the final and complete abandonment of its previous policy of exclusion. We have been excluding individuals for years, yet what have we not learnt and gained from them? And how each of us will perceive and communicate this in the future!"

"The only discipline by which man is able to free his life from thralldom to the passing moment and to his bodily senses, to ennoble it, and to make it eternal is to walk steadfastly by

the best light he has, to be strict and sincere with himself, to not be among those who say and do not, to be in earnest. And the School of Hebraism is the only institution where this subject has been taught with such success. The intensity and conviction with which the Hebrew, both in the Old and New Testaments, threw himself upon his ideal of righteousness, and which inspired the unparalleled definition of the great Christian virtue, Faith, the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, this intensity of devotion to its ideal has been unique to Judaism. We will still turn to Hebraism for that fervent zeal in embracing our objective, which alone can provide to man the delight of doing what he knows, as our conception of perfection broadens beyond the restricted boundaries to which the excessive rigor of, Hebraism has sought to constrain it. The adage "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them!" will forever be used to describe human weakness. Our species will return to Hebraism for as long as the earth exists because of this word, which is repeated with a strength that is both magnificent and touching but always admirable. Having thus described the function of Hebraism, Arnold goes on to define Hellenism as "the intelligence driving at those ideas which are, after all, the basis of right practice, the ardent sense for all the new and changing combinations of them which man's development brings with it, the indomitable impulse to know and adjust them perfectly." These two great forces divide the empire of the world between them; and we call them Hebraism and Hellenism after the two races of men who have most signally illustrated them. "Hebraism and Hellenism between these two points of influence moves our world." The idea of Hellenism is to see things as they are: the idea of Hebraism is conduct and obedience.

Our aim should be to combine the merits of both ideas, and be "evenly and happily balanced between them." Enlarging on this text, he traces the working of the two principles, which ought not to be rivals but have been made such by the perverseness of men, philosophy and history; and then, turning to our own day and its doings, he says that Puritanism, which originally was a reaction of the conscience and moral sense against the indifference and lax conduct of the Renaissance, has gone counter, during the last two centuries, to the main stream of human advance; has hindered men from trying to see things as they really are, and has made strictness of conduct the great aim of human life. "It made the secondary the principal at the wrong moment, and the principal it at the wrong moment treated as secondary." Hence have arisen all sorts of confusion and inefficiency. Everywhere we see the signs of anarchy, and the need for some sound order and authority. "This we can only get by going back upon the actual instincts and forces which rule our life, seeing them as they really are, connecting them with other instincts and forces, and enlarging our whole view and rule of life[8]."

"The Puritan's great danger is that he believes himself to be in possession of a rule telling him the *unum necessarium*, or one thing necessary, in addition to the things he already knows and considers, he seeks a broader understanding of human nature that demonstrates the several different places at which his nature must flourish. There is no "*unum necessarium*," or "one thing necessary," that may absolve human nature of the need to strive for excellence at each of these aspects. Our vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, and violence are actually many touchstones that try our one thing necessary and show that, at least in the state in which we ourselves have it, it is not all we want. This is in contrast to our "one thing necessary" justifying in us vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, and violence. And just as Hebraism, a term for allowing our consciousness free rein and expanding its range, encourages us to stick rigidly to the rule and foundation we have, Hellenism, on the other hand, encourages us to test the very foundation on which we appear to stand.

The Liberal Party was just then busy disestablishing and disendowing the Irish Church. He was in favour of Established Churches, and of Concurrent Endowment. He realized the absurdity of the Irish Church as it then stood; but, true to his critical character, he rebuked the "Liberal Practitioners" for the spirit in which they were disestablishing and disendowing it. They did not approach the subject in the spirit of Hellenism: they did not appeal to Right Reason: they did not attempt to see the problem of religious establishment as it really was. But they Hebraized about it that is, they took an uncritical interpretation of biblical words as their absolute rule of conduct. "It may," he said, "be all very well for born Hebraizers, like Mr. Spurgeon, to Hebraize; but for Liberal statesmen to Hebraize is surely unsafe, and to see poor old Liberal hacks Hebraizing, whose real self belongs to a kind of negative Hellenisma state of moral in difference, without intellectual ardour is even painful." In the same manner he dealt with the movement to abolish Primogeniture, strongly urged by John Bright; the movement to legalize marriage with a wife's sister "the craving for forbidden fruit" joined with "the craving for legality"; and the doctrine, then supposed to be incontrovertible, of Free Trade. In all these cases, he proposed to "Hellenize a little," to "turn the free stream of our thought" on the Liberal policy of the moment; and to "see how this is related to the intelligible law of human life, and to national well-being and happiness." Thus, we came to the conclusion of the whole thing: the stock-beliefs and stock-performances of Liberalism were exhausted, uninteresting, and in some grave respects mischievous. Seekers after truth, disciples of culture, men bent on trying to see things as they truly are, should lend no hand to these Philistine labors. Their right course was to stand completely apart from the political work that was taking place around them; and to pursue, with undeviating coherence, their own personal agenda.

This is his response to Charles Kingsley's praise: "Of my reception by the general public I have, perhaps, no cause to boast; but from the men who lead in literature, from men like you, I have met with nothing but kindness and generosity." It is interesting to recall that Charles Kingsley praised Culture and Anarchy in a letter which greatly pleased Arnold, as showing "the generous and affectionate side" of Kingsley's disposition. Being so heavily involved for the past twenty years with Dissenters and observing their great strength and great impenetrability—how they seemed to believe that in their "gospel," which was really just a caricature of the real Gospel, they had a secret that allowed them to judge all literature and all art and to avoid modern ideas set me to wondering how they might be approached and on the use of this Hebraism and Hellenism parallel. If I were to think only of the Dissenters or if I were in your position, I would constantly push for more Hellenism; however, given Swinburne's tendency and Huxley's influence, I lean towards Hebraism and work to keep the balance from flying up out of sight on this side. Dean Church also wrote about the subject. He pursued this line of thought for twenty years; Friendship's Garland, with its inimitable fun, appeared in 1871, and was followed by a long series of essays and lectures; but the germ of whatever Arnold's political and social teaching may have been was planted in the structure and teaching of Culture and Anarchy, which I have dwelt on at this rather disproportionate length on, partly because it was to men who were young in 1869 a landmark in their mental life, and partly because it gives the

To answer first by negatives, we did not learn to undervalue personal liberty, or to stand aloof from the practical work of citizenship, or to despise Parliamentary effort and its bearing on the better life of England. To these lessons of a fascinating teacher, we closed our ears, charmed he never so wisely. To answer affirmatively, we learned that our first object must be to attain our own best self, and that only so could we hope to help others. We learned to discard prepossessions, and try to see things as they really are. We learned that the Liberty which we worshipped must be conditioned by Authority an authority not wielded by rank or

bureaucracy, but by the State acting as a whole through its accredited representatives, and depending for its existence on the co-operation of the entire nation. In self-government so founded, however stringently it might exercise its power, there was no degradation for the governed, because, in the wider sense, they were also governors.

In brief, Arnold's idea of the State was exactly that which in later years one of his disciples Henry Scott Holland conceived, when, defending Christian Socialism against the reproach of "grandmotherly legislation," he said that, in a well-governed commonwealth, "every man was his own grandmother." But, while Authority belongs to the State as a whole, it must be exercised through the agency of officialdom through the action of officers or governors designated for the special functions. And here he taught us that we must not, as Bishop Westcott said, "trust to an uncultivated notion of duty for an improvised solution of unforeseen difficulties"; must not, like the Alderman-Colonel, "sit in the hall of judgment or march at the head of men of war, without some knowledge how to perform judgment and how to direct men of war." He taught us that all political reconstruction was at best merely an improvement of machinery, that political reform was related to social reform as a means to an end, and that the end was the perfection of the race in all its physical, mental, and moral attributes. On the other hand, he taught us to value machinery not for itself but for what it could produce. Above all, and perhaps the most significant lesson we learned, was to think little of material blessings, vulgar wealth, stolid comfort, and ignoble ease; to focus on the joys of the soul and spirit; and to recognize that practicing religion represents the highest level of human development and the most fulfilling application of human potential[9].

DISCUSSION

Matthew Arnold, a well-known person in Victorian England, presented his ideas for a more educated society together with a strong criticism of modern liberalism. Arnold's thoughts went against the grain of the time, which was characterized by rapid industrialization, political change, and an enthusiasm for individual liberty. This debate focuses on Arnold's criticism of liberalism and his plea for a society that fosters moral advancement and cultural richness.

Liberalism became the dominant political and intellectual worldview in the 19th century. Individual liberty, limited government involvement, and free-market capitalism were promoted. Arnold thought that despite the fact that these concepts supported individual liberty and economic expansion, they ignored crucial elements of human happiness. Arnold criticized liberalism for focusing only on individual liberty and economic advancement. He claimed that the moral and cultural aspects of society had been neglected as a result of a fixation with economic and political liberty. He felt that the general wellbeing of people and communities was harmed by this limited viewpoint.

Arnold's worldview was centered on the idea of culture. Culture, according to him, is "the best that has been thought and said in the world." Literature, art, philosophy, and religion, according to Arnold, are all parts of culture that raise society beyond just materialistic concerns and nourish the human spirit. Arnold saw religion as a crucial element of civilization. He did not advocate a return to rigorous religious orthodoxy, but he did think that morality and spirituality were crucial for a well-balanced society. Arnold's demand for a more spiritually sensitive society challenged the dominant secular attitude in an era of rising secularism. Arnold tried to create a compromise rather than completely reject the liberal tenets. He maintained that society should supplement its pursuit of economic advancement and individual liberties with a stronger commitment to moral advancement. Arnold criticized liberalism, and that criticism is still relevant today. His views cause people to pause and

consider the need of a holistic approach to human well-being in the modern world, when arguments over private property rights, monetary policy, and social values are still hotly contested.

CONCLUSION

The conflict between individual freedom and society advancement is explored in depth in Matthew Arnold's criticism of modern liberalism. His vision for a more civilized society serves as a constant reminder of the significance of moral principles, spirituality, and culture in the pursuit of human happiness. In a time when political and social beliefs are constantly changing, Arnold's thoughts still challenge us to think about the bigger picture of a society that is really enlightened and cultured.

REFERENCES

- [1] G. McWeeny, "Crowd management: Matthew Arnold and the science of society," *Vic. Poet.*, 2003, doi: 10.1353/vp.2003.0014.
- [2] T. Striphas, "Known-unknowns: Matthew Arnold, F. R. Leavis, and the government of culture," *Cult. Stud.*, 2017, doi: 10.1080/09502386.2016.1271818.
- [3] D. E. Latané, "Literary criticism," in *A New Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture*, 2014. doi: 10.1002/9781118624432.ch28.
- [4] O. Bennett, "Beyond Machinery : Matthew Arnold," *Hist. Polit. Econ.*, 2005.
- [5] X. Gao, "Poetic Truth as the Expression of Anxiety in the 19th-Century English Literature," *Foreign Lit. Stud.*, 2018.
- [6] C. R. Hayward, "The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy," *Polit. Sci. Q.*, 2000, doi: 10.2307/2658049.
- [7] C. West, "The new cultural politics of difference," in *The Identity in Question*, 2014. doi: 10.4324/9780203760215-16.
- [8] C. Hogsbjerg, "'We Lived According to the Tenets of Matthew Arnold': Reflections on the 'Colonial Victorianism' of the Young C. L. R. James," *Twent. Century Br. Hist.*, 2013, doi: 10.1093/tcbh/hws010.
- [9] C. J. Finlay, "Hugo Grotius on the law of war and peace: student edition," *Int. Aff.*, 2013.

CHAPTER 7

MATTHEW ARNOLD: CULTURE, EQUALITY, AND GOVERNANCE

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

The book "Matthew Arnold: Culture, Equality, and Governance" explores the deep thoughts of the 19th-century philosopher Matthew Arnold, whose observations still have relevance today. Arnold's vision includes the use of culture to overcome racial and religious barriers and pushes for the spread of international ideas. His theory places a focus on a society in which people are free to participate in intellectual activity and may develop their brains without restrictions. His perspective places a high priority on the role of educated people in promoting equality. This investigation also digs into Arnold's distinctive view of governance, which challenges conventional wisdom by arguing for active state intervention in the control of religion and education while highlighting the significance of tradition and continuity in the formation of a country's political identity. Arnold's worldview encompasses topics like Irish governance, where he advocates for efficient local government, support for religions, and investment in education. This research shows how Arnold's views not only influenced the language of his day but also provide useful context for current debates about culture, equality, and government. It is still possible to evaluate the dynamics of society, government, and individual liberty through the prism of Arnold's worldview, making his work as relevant now as it was back then.

KEYWORDS:

Class Divide, Culture, Equality, Education, Governance, Individual Liberty, Matthew Arnold, Social Vision.

INTRODUCTION

"Culture seeks to do away with classes and sects; to make the best that has been known and thought throughout the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them itself, freely; nourished, and not bound, by them. This is the social idea; and the men of culture are the true apostles of equality. "The words "social idea," which Arnold emphasized in the aforementioned passage from Culture and Anarchy, will make clear the meaning meant by the term "Society" in this context. We don't mean what Pennialinus means when he uses terms like "Society gossip" or "a Society function"; rather, we're interested in how men think, feel, and act when they're part of a larger group of people. Using "Society" in this context, we'll look at Arnold's impact on the Society of his day. The process of politics; the clear and concrete activity of human law; and whatever efforts we may make to influence that action are undoubtedly the most evident and tactile ways to alter society and to many Englishmen, the only ways imaginable.

There would be nothing to say about his impact on society if the political technique were the sole option. Politics, in the constrained and traditional meaning just now stated, were not very relevant to his area of work. He was concerned about them, had ideas about them, and sometimes got involved. However, he had no influence on the political activities of his day and, as far as one can tell, had no ambition to do so. In politics, as in everything else he

touched, he was critical rather than constructive; and in politics, "immersed," as Bacon said, "in matter," a man must be constructive if his influence is to be felt and to endure. He was quoted as saying of the man of letters in the field of politics: "He is in truth not on his own ground there, and is in peculiar danger of talking at random." "Politicians," he said in 1880, "we all of us here in England are and must be, and I too cannot help being a politician; but a politician of that commonwealth of which the pattern, as the philosopher says, exists perhaps somewhere in Heaven, but certainly is at present found nowhere on earth." In 1887, he described himself as "an aged outsider," thus stating his own attitude toward political issues. "The professional politicians are always apt to be impatient of a candid outsider's intervention in politics, and he must expect to provoke contempt and resentment in a good many of them."

However, the action of the regular politicians continues to be, for the most part, so very far from successful that the outsider is perpetually tempted to brave their anger and to offer his observations, with the hope of possibly doing some little good by saying what many quiet people have been thinking. He always declared himself to be on the Liberal side and undoubtedly held this belief. When a Tory Committee requested for the benefit of his name during the General Election in 1868, he politely responded that he was "an old Whig," raised in the Lansdowne House traditions. Although I am a Liberal, he said in 1869, "I am a Liberal tempered by experience, reflection, and renunciation." In 1878, he called himself a "sincere but ineffectual Liberal." In 1880, he said he was "a Liberal of the future rather than a Liberal of the present." In 1887, he said he was "one of the Liberals of the future, who happen to be grown, alas! rather old[1]."

Although he considered himself to be a Liberal, he had a very strong distaste for the Liberalism of the vast Middle Class, which throughout the most of his life had a significant influence on Liberal politics. In 1882, he reviewed the different classes of English society in his preferred way and discussed whether they were able to live up to the ideal of perfect citizenship. "Let's take that figure we know so well, the earnest and non-conforming Liberal of our Middle Classes, as his schools and civilization have made him. He is for Disestablishment, he is for Temperance, he has an eye to his Wife's Sister, he is a member of his local caucus, and he is learning to go up to Birmingham every year to the feast of Mr. Chamberlain. His inadequacy is but too visible." Arnold's liberalism undoubtedly had little in common with that of the wealthy Middle Class. In fact, in terms of philosophy, it was based on democracy, since he believed that democracy was a byproduct of natural law and that it was our responsibility to adapt our political and social structures to it. As the aristocracy had attempted and succeeded in doing before it, democracy was "trying to affirm its own essence: to live, to enjoy, to possess the world," he remarked.

He saw the democratic movement as an "operation of nature," and like other natural processes, it was neither praiseworthy nor deserving of condemnation. His main concern was, if he could, to steer it in the proper direction and ensure that it utilized its dominating role in human affairs at least as wisely as the aristocracy that had come before it. He was neither a "partisan" of it nor its "enemy." He held similar views to most persons about aristocratic authority in other nationsnamely, the rule that existed before to the French Revolutionbut he had a special regard for the aristocracy of England. It is true that he gave it a moniker, made fun of its lack of education and its inability to access ideas, was irritated by "immense inequalities of condition and property," large estates, and negligent landlordism, and despised the Middle Class's "hideous English toadyism" and "immense vulgar-mindedness" when confronted with "lords and great people."

Despite this, he wrote the following about the English aristocracy in 1859: "I desire to speak of it with the most unbounded respect. It is the most popular of aristocracies; it has avoided

faults that have ruined other aristocracies equally splendid. While the aristocracy of France was founding English agriculture and commanding respect by a personal dignity, the aristocracy of England was destroying its estates by its extravagance. Despite his great regard for what the Aristocracy had previously done, he saw that power was shifting from its hands and into those of the Multitude. But he also believed and this was undoubtedly one of his deepest convictions that the Multitude could never govern effectively, could never control its own affairs, and could never adequately represent England to the outside world unless it abandoned the individualism it had been raised with and resolved to act in and through the State. Perhaps an Educated Democracy that operates through Collectivism in Government, Religion, and Social Order is the best way to characterize his dream of a State.

"If experience has taught us anything in this world, it is that it is best for any great class or description of men in society to be able to speak for itself and not have other classes, the so-called educated and intelligent classes, acting for it as its proctors, and supposed to understand its wants and to provide for them. They do not really understand its wants, they do not really provide for them. A class of men may often it is well for any great class or description of men to be able to say for itself According to his vision of governance, the State should manage, administrate, regulate, and inspire in a democratic era, just as the Aristocracy had done in previous ones. Because it served as the "representative acting-power of the nation," it was also, in one crucial way, a considerably more noble thing than the finest aristocracy could ever be. As a result, the relationship between a citizen and the state was far more honorable than it could ever be with an aristocracy.

The citizens of a State, the members of a society, are really "a partnership," as Burke nobly says, 'in all science, in all art, in every virtue, in all perfection.' Towards this great final design of their connexion, they apply the aids that co-operative association can give them." We turn now to the practical application of this doctrine. We saw in the last chapter how persistently and fervently he encouraged the State to take over and, to the extent necessary, fund, the Education of the whole country throughout his professional life. "How futile, how meaningless," he exclaimed, "to tell a man who receives assistance from the State for the education of his offspring that he is humiliated! Humiliated by receiving assistance from himself in his corporate and associated capacity for assistance for himself as an individual from assistance to which his own money, as a tax-payer, contributes, and assistance for which, as a result of the combined energy and intelligence of the entire community in employing as powers, he himself deserves some of the disparaged private organizations and individual endeavors in religion as well as in education. The State, or "the nation in its corporate and collective capacity," ought to go beyond the individual citizen. It should give him what he desired education or religion in a grand manner, on a large scale, with all the authority that comes from receiving recognition from the government and with the dignity of a long lineage[2].

As we've previously seen, Arnold's call for publicly funded and regulated education has had some pragmatic reaction and, for the most part, aligns with the current liberal philosophical trend. He was more interested in maintaining an established tradition than in advancing a novel thought by preserving State-supported and State-controlled Religion, and contemporary liberalism is drifting away from him. However, in other significant ways, all simply political, his support for further state intervention was consistent with the Liberal movement of the moment. He had always hated Ireland's dreadful misgovernance. He was affected by it long before the vast majority of Englishmen were. Burke's most illuminating quotes on Ireland and her problems were collected in a book for the purpose of educating people about the Irish dilemma. According to him, those statements "Show at work all the causes which have

brought Ireland to its current state, including the tyranny of the grantees of confiscation, the English garrison, Protestant ascendancy, and the reliance of the English Government on this ascendancy and its instruments as their means of government; the yielding to threats of danger and insurrection of what was never yielded to considerations of equity and reason; the return to the old perversity of mismanagement."

He would have had the State fund Irish faiths and their ministers, provide Ireland with top-notch educational facilities, and protect Irish tenants from the extortions of dishonest landlords. However, in the turmoil of 1885-8, he never lost his head, never forgot his old sympathy with Irish wrongs, never "drew up an indictment against a whole people." All through these turbulent years, he stood firm for an effective system of Local Government in Ireland. He was vehemently opposed to Gladstone's scheme of Home Rule because, in his opinion, it tended to disintegrate where he especially desired cohesion. He wanted a system that should reflect the interests of the majority, claiming that Irish governance had "been conducted in accordance with the wishes of the minority, and of the British Philistine." In spite of the fact that Forster's "expression of general objection to home rule" was unpleasant, he disapproved of it since there was another kind of home rule that was feasible and even desirable.

He was quite concerned that his supporters, the Liberal Unionists, would seize the chance and propose a "counter scheme to Gladstone's" that would provide effective local government powers. He stated once again in 1887 that the "opinion of quiet reasonable people throughout the country" was firmly in favor of granting the Irish the proper sovereignty over their own local affairs. He argued for a system "built on sufficiently large lines, not too complicated, not fantastic, not hesitating and suspicious, not taking back with one hand what it gives with the other." He wished to see a similar system extended to England and noted that it admirably facilitated the national control of Secondary Education for which he was always pleading[3].

On the other hand, his conviction in the State's actions was quite evident when it came to Irish land. He believed that the State should expropriate the bad landlords after conducting a thorough and impartial investigation to resolve the agrarian unrest in Ireland. Once again, he was in accordance with liberal views when he wished to broaden the base of the State by expanding the vote in turn to the Artisans and the Labourers. He believed that this would "give the sort of equity, the sort of moral satisfaction, which the case needed." At least in one area, he was more in line with Collectivist Radicalism than with traditional liberalism since he had no qualms about the government becoming involved in the relationship between employers and employees. He wanted to restructure the House of Lords in order to strengthen Parliament, the highest instrument of the public will, although vehemently disagreeing with a reform plan that was now popular.

The Archbishop of Canterbury and the young gentlemen who swarm to the House of Lords when pigeon-shooting is in question are two members of the Second Chamber that one could hardly imagine sensible men planning, but our precious Liberal Reformers are in favor of keeping the pigeon-shooters and expelling the Archbishop of Canterbury. He anticipated what would happen even during the Liberal triumph flood that followed the 1880 general election. "What strikes one is the in secureness of the Liberals' hold upon office and upon public favour; the probability of the return, perhaps even more than once, of their adversaries to office, before that final and happy consummation is reached the permanent establishment of Liberalism in power." And, while he saw what was coming, he thus ascertained the cause. At best, the official and dominating wing of the Liberal Party was stolidly uninterested in social reform; at worst, it was vehemently hostile against the movement and those who promoted it. Places like St. Helens, which the capitalists referred to as "great centers of

national enterprise" and Cobbett referred to as "Hell-Holes" due to the commercialism of the Great Middle Class, had spread across the face of England, where people were forced to live in abject poverty and were learning that "free political institutions do not guarantee the well-being of the toiling class." The General Election of 1885 more than vindicated Arnold's concerns regarding the survival of the Liberal Party, although his contribution to the pragmatic politics of his period has already been sufficiently discussed. The impact he had on society via non-political means criticism, banter, literary felicities, and other "sinuous, easy, unpolemical" means must be given considerably more room[4].

He was originally well-known in England as a poet before becoming a literary critic. Then came the vague notion that he was a reformer of education whose ideas could be worth considering. His people didn't completely recognize him as a social analyst and commentator on life and society until 1869. Looking back, it would seem that his poetical role had been completed at that point. In terms of poetry as a form, he had made his point and done it incomparably beautifully and effectively. Now it seemed as if he was given a new role; a large and useful door had been unlocked for him. Applying his analytical technique to his countrymen's goals and follies their way of life, manner of thinking and behaving, biases, customs, and limitations he discovered a new area of usefulness and impact. As we've previously seen, Mr. Paul called the publication of *Essays in Criticism* "a great intellectual event." This is absolutely accurate, and the publication of *Culture and Anarchy* was a significant social event.

The book with that name was released in 1869, but some previous publications laid the foundation for it, so we must first have a look at them before moving on to the book itself. After returning from one of his Continental excursions, Arnold wrote an article titled "My Countrymen" that was published in the *Cornhill Magazine* in February 1866. In this piece, he attempted to show the English people what the sophisticated intellect of Europe was actually thinking of them. In general, European opinion of us came to this: that England had been great, powerful, and prosperous under an aristocratic government, at a time when the primary requirement for national greatness was Action, "for aristocracies, poor in ideas, are rich in energy; but that England was rapidly losing ground." The Middle Class has shown a glaring lack of intellect, which is now the primary need for national greatness. It had shown "rash engagement, intemperate threatening, undignified retreat, ill-timed cordiality," in other words, every trait best suited to sink England in the regard of the civilized world" in her relations with Russia and Turkey, Germany, and America.

Thus, the foreign critic's description of the Middle Class's way of thinking and living in home issues. "The fineness and capacity of man's spirit is shown by his enjoyments; your Middle Class has an enjoyment in its business, we admit, and gets on well in business, and makes money; but beyond that? Drugged with business, your Middle Class seems to have its sense blunted for any stimulus besides, except Religion; it has a religion, narrow, unintelligent, repulsive. What other enjoyments have they? The newspapers, a sort of eating and drinking which are not to our taste, a literature of books almost entirely religious or semi-religious, books utterly unreadable by an educated class anywhere, but which your Middle Class consumes by the hundred thousand, and in their evenings, for a great treat, a lecture on Teetotalism or Nunneries.

Can any life be imagined more hideous, more dismal, more unenviable? Your Middle-Class man thinks it the highest pitch of development and civilization when his letters are carried twelve times a day from Islington to Camberwell, and from Camberwell to Islington, and if railway trains run to and from between them every quarter of an hour. He thinks it is nothing that the trains only carry him from an illiberal, dismal life at Islington to an illiberal, dismal

life at Camberwell; and the letters only tell him that such is the life there." And, as to political and social reform, "Such a spectacle as your Irish Church Establishment you cannot find in France or Germany. Your Irish Land Question you dare not face." English Schools, English vestrydom, English provincialism all alike stand in the most urgent need of reform; but with all alike the Middle Class is serenely content. Arnold provides his own opinion on the issues under discussion after relaying to his English readers these very open criticisms from international reviewers. "All due deductions made for envy, exaggeration, and injustice, enough stuck by me of these remarks to determine me to go on trying to keep my mind fixed on these, instead of singing hosannahs to our actual state of development and civilization. The old recipe, to think a little more and bustle a little less, seemed to me still to be the best recipe to follow. So, I take comfort when I find the Guardian reproaching me with having no influence; for I know what influence means a party, practical proposals, action; and I say to myself: 'Even suppose I could get some followers, and assemble them, brimming with affectionate enthusiasm, to a committee-room in some inn; what on earth should I say to them?

What resolutions could I propose? I could only propose the old Socratic commonplace, know thyself; and how black they would all look at that!" No; to enquire, perhaps too curiously, what that present state of English development and civilization is, which according to Mr. Lowe is so perfect that to give votes to the working class is stark madness; and, on the other hand, to be less sanguine about the divine and saving effect of a vote on its possessor than my friends in the committee-room at the Spotted Dog that is my inevitable portion. To bring things under the light of one's intelligence, to see how they look there, to accustom oneself simply to regard the Marylebone Vestry, or the Educational Home, or the Irish Church Establishment, or our railway management, or our Divorce Court, or our gin-palaces open on Sunday and the Crystal Palace shut, as absurdities that is, I am sure, invaluable exercise for us just at present. Let all persist in it who can, and steadily set their desires on introducing, with time, a little more soul and spirit into the too, too solid flesh of English society[5]."

So much for his first conscious effort at societal critique. We see that it was directed against the ideas and deeds of the Great Middle Class, thus it only makes sense to wonder why that group was singled out for his derision. He was fond of saying, partly in jest and half seriously, that he personally belonged to such class. He used to say, "I always thought my marriage such a perfect marriage of the Middle Classes a schoolmaster's son and a judge's daughter." In the preface to the *Essays in Criticism*, he spoke of "the English Middle Class, of which I am myself a feeble unit." He used to say, "My heart's desire and prayer for them is that they may be saved." He appreciated the aristocracy's refined demeanor, ruling ability, and modest behavior. Even when its outward manifestations bordered on the absurd, he made fun of them: "Everyone knows Lord Elcho's appearance, and how admirably he looks the part of our governing classes; to my mind, indeed, the mere cock of his lordship's hat is one of the finest and most aristocratic things we have."

In a more serious vein, he taught and enraged the Guardian by teaching that, "ever s He felt sorry for the woes of "people who suffer," "dim, common populations," and "poor who faint all the time," but he felt sorry for them from above. Without a doubt, he did not adopt their perspective, adopt their views, or experience their tragedies as a part of his own experience. He claims in an amazing passage that when we latch onto a strong opinion out of ignorance and passion, when we yearn to crush an opponent through outright violence, when we are envious, when we are cruel, when "we add our voices to swell a blind clamour against some unpopular personage," when "we trample savagely on the fallen," then we find in our own bosom "the eternal spirit of the Populace." His description of his personal transformation is

accurate thus far. However, the work of his life had brought him into close and continuous contact with the great Middle Class, which practically had the entire management of Elementary Education in its hands.

He had "broken with the ideas of his own class, and had not come much nearer to the ideas and works of Aristocracy or the Populace." He slept in their homes, ate at their meals, and closely examined their literature, hobbies, and social lives to get to know the people of that class, as he put it, "experimentally." As a result, he evaluated their society through close contact and found it to be immensely repugnant and flawed. The Middle Class ruled England from 1832 until 1867, using the House of Commons as a tool to influence the Aristocracy. The Aristocracy, although maintaining its position of outward dignity, kept a wary watch on the Middle Class's movement, both imminent and real. This kind of governance, which was dominated by the Middle Class, was not only offensive to culture, but it also posed a threat to national security when it came to foreign policy. So, it was to the failings of the Middle Class, from which he pretended to have sprung and which he understood so well, that he first focused his social critique. "That makes the difference between Lord Grenville and Lord Granville." The "My Countrymen" essay caught everyone's attention right away. It presented a novel viewpoint and cheerfully contradicted the overwhelming majority of the prevalent bias. It was new and energetic. Sincere to say, he was happy with how it was received. It was noted, cited, and discussed[6].

He did not expect it to be well received by people who belonged to "the old English time, of which the greatness and success was so immense and undeniable that no one who flourished when it was at its height could ever lose the impression of it," or realize how far we had fallen in Continental regard. He reported to his mother that it was thought "witty and suggestive," "timely and true," Carlyle "almost wholly approved of it," and Bright was "full of it." The Whig newspapers were "almost all unfavorable, because it tells disagreeable truths to the class which furnishes the great body of what is called the Liberal interest," and from the foreign side came a criticism in the Pall Mall Gazette, "professing to be by a Frenchman," but "I am sure it is by a woman I know something of in Paris, a half Russia." This goal for Englishmen of the Middle Class was incorporated in it, and it dealt with the opposing but not incompatible demands of Culture and Libertythe former so deficient in England and the latter so plentiful. I don't want them to be the domino-playing, café-hopping Frenchmen, but rather a third entity that is neither themselves nor the Frenchmen.He had now successfully started down the path of social critique.

His articles drew more and more attention over timesometimes kind, sometimes angry, but always inquisitive and sometimes aroused. Some of the criticisms of the fresh and brave critic were implausibly ridiculous. Mr. Goldwin Smith called him "a gentleman of a jaunty air, and on good terms with the world"; the Times said he seemed "a sentimentalist whose dainty taste requires something flimsier than the strong sense and sturdy morality of his fellow-Englishmen"; Arnold said of Mr. Frederic Harrison's retort that it was "scarcely the least vicious, and in parts so amusing that I laughed till I cried" "We are, in reality, a serious people. He specifically targeted the Middle Class, which is really seriously serious. Seriousness has become a religion thanks to philosophers and critics like those at the Spectator and Edinburgh. Editors, main writers, critics, and the press as a whole were taken very seriously. They were unable to comprehend and were strongly disposed to dislike the arrival of this dazzling, humorous, unorthodox soul, who loved the world's brightness and pleasure as much as his own;

He first presented his friend Arminius, Baron Von Thunder-Ten-Tronckh, the learned and inquisitive Prussian who had come to England to study our politics, education, local

government, and social life, in a letter to the Pall Mall Gazette on July 21, 1866. Throughout the years 1866, 1867, 1869, and 1870, a string of related letters appeared at random intervals. And Arnold's critiques of the Press, the Deceased Wife's Sister, Compulsory Education, and Arminius' extreme approach to inquiry and argumentation found the ideal platform in Arminius. Friendship's Garland, a little-read but incredibly fascinating book that collected the letters, was eventually published in 1871. But before that book was published, Arnold, who had already put his social criticism skills to the test with these erratic pieces, set out to make a more serious and substantial effort in the same area. The writings that would ultimately make up the book *Culture and Anarchy* first appeared in the July 1867 issue of *Cornhill Magazine* and continued in 1868. In 1869, the book was released. We already saw that he said that of all of his literary compositions, his *Discourses in America* were the ones he would most want to be known for. *Essays in Criticism*, in the opinion of many of his readers, is his most significant writing composition. Some might crown *Dogma and Literature* as the best. Respect is owed to what a great master thought of his own work, and to what his most competent pupils thought of it. "It has been more in demand," the author informed us in 1883, "than any other of my prose-writings."

However, we do respect each individual's right to their own view, and this writer firmly believes that *Culture and Anarchy* is Arnold's most significant literary composition. It was not a book, but rather an event, to steal a word from Mr. Gladstone in another context. We must take it into account in the appropriate temporal and contextual context. A significant period in our nation's political and social history occurred at the start of 1869. The fervent supporters of freedom and progress have been calling for a further expansion of the franchise ever since the euphoria that accompanied the Reform Act of 1832 had gone away in disappointment and disillusionment. The next Reform Bill was to provide the workers a voice, and the Millennium would arrive with a Parliament chosen by the workers. The requested vote was granted by the Act of 1867, and the laborers utilized it for the first time in the 1868 general election. The new Parliament had only just begun to come together when it was conceivable to assess it, break it down into its component pieces, estimate its capability, and predict its goals. The legislature was a liberal one. Regarding it, there was no misunderstanding. "Gladstone will be in power, at the head of a majority of something like 100, elected on the unique topic of "Gladstone and the Irish Church," wrote Bishop Wilberforce shortly after the election[7].

Irish disestablishment was undoubtedly a key issue in the election, but it was merely one component of a wider plan. Late in the day, the Liberal Party decided to "govern Ireland according to Irish ideas," or what was meant by that taking phrase, after being pushed to do so by a statesman who had never visited Ireland. We were to restructure the Irish land-tenure system, rebuild the Irish Universities, and disestablish and disendow the Irish Church. We, the rank and file, believed this claptrap; however, to us it was not claptrap because our whole hearts were in the great enterprise of pacification in which we believed our leaders to be engaged. Robert Lowe, who was a prominent member of the new Cabinet, burst into rather premature dithyrambics, crying, "The Liberal Ministry resolved to knit the hearts of the Empire into one harmonious concord, and knitted they were accordingly." Ireland did not, however, completely exhaust our passion for transformation.

For several Constitutional departments, we had more than enough. We were committed to ensuring the preservation of the ballot for the laborers and compelling them to send their kids to school. We intended to abolish tests at the university and purchases in the army, and some of us started to consider making even more significant changes. We yearned for universal suffrage, fantasized about simultaneous disarmament, predicted the end of monarchical

institutions, and listened complacently to criticisms of the Civil List and House of Brunswick impeachments. Overall, Reformers had a victorious and upbeat attitude. We were forced to acknowledge that the new House of Commons' personal makeup was a touch Philistine not as democratic or reminiscent of Labour as we had anticipated. But we thought the future held hope for us. We felt that by granting the craftspeople voting rights, we had made significant progress toward the Commonwealth's ideal completion. We felt that these newly naturalized citizens, who had just shown themselves deserving of their citizenship, would continue to support Liberal governments and Liberal policies with growing fervor and dedication. Above all, we thought that since our recent successes were the direct results of lofty ideals upheld in the past, they would eventually lead to constitutional changes that would be much more significant, and that the realization of such changes represented the sole chance for true human happiness.

This accurately captures the mental attitude that young, inexperienced Liberals were in that year; there was plenty to comfort us in our complacency. Gladstone, to whom during the somewhat depressing reign of exhausted Whiggery we had looked as to our rising star the one man who combined Religion, Poetry, and Romance with the love of Progress and the passion of Freedom had told us that "the great social forces were on our side," and that our opponents "could not fight against the future." Philosophers, like Mill, had told us that all of the intelligence, all of science, all of the mental courage of the world were with us. The future of liberalism was to be one long series of victories, uninterrupted until the crack of doom, as a fervent press sang its loud hymn of triumph each morning, assuring us that, even if for a moment our chariot-wheels drove somewhat heavily, still we were going forth conquering and to conquer[8].

DISCUSSION

The book "Matthew Arnold: Culture, Equality, and Governance" explores the deep perceptions and insights of the great British poet and cultural critic of the 19th century, Matthew Arnold. Many of Arnold's works and ideas are still important in conversations today because of their profound influence on the social and political climate of his day. This conversation focuses on culture, equality, and government as it examines the main ideas and contributions of Arnold's social vision. Culture as a Force for Unity in Arnold's perspective, culture is emphasized as playing a crucial role in society. He claimed that culture ought to be a uniting factor that cuts across socioeconomic barriers. According to him, culture is the culmination of everything that has been learned and thought, providing a common ground for advancement in knowledge and morality. Arnold thought that culture may aid in closing the gap between various socioeconomic strata and promote a more peaceful society. Through Education Arnold was a fervent supporter of education as a strategy for attaining greater societal equality.

Regardless of socioeconomic status, he thought that everyone should have access to education, and that it should emphasize the growth of a person's moral and intellectual skills. Arnold's theories paved the way for educational changes intended to create a more egalitarian educational system. Arnold's new conception of government was part of his social vision. He pushed for the state to have a more active role in advancing education and culture. Arnold thought that the government need to support educational institutions and make sure they provide a broad education that encourages personal development and social cohesiveness. This viewpoint ran counter to the prevalent laissez-faire philosophy of the day. Class Conflict and Social Unrest Arnold was intensely aware of the social unrest and socioeconomic disparities that characterized Victorian England. He saw that the inequities between the rich

and the underprivileged needed to be addressed. In reaction to the societal inequities of his day, he placed a strong focus on culture and education as vehicles for social improvement[9].

Arnold's social vision promoted a balance between individual liberty and civic duty rather than an authoritarian state. He believed that although people should be free to use their moral and intellectual capacities, they should also be aware of their obligation to make a meaningful contribution to society. The applicability of Arnold's social vision to modern society may also be discussed. Arnold's theories are still relevant at a time when discussions about government, social injustice, and education are common. His ideas are often cited by academics and policymakers as they brainstorm solutions to today's socioeconomic problems. Finally, it is possible to examine Matthew Arnold's enduring influence. His thoughts and concepts have had an impact on current intellectuals, educators, and decision-makers. Understanding how Arnold's social vision influenced subsequent advancements in culture, education, and government offers insightful information about the development of social theory.

CONCLUSION

The book "The Social Vision of Matthew Arnold: Culture, Equality, and Governance" concludes with a thorough examination of Arnold's lasting principles and their applicability to current social problems. His focus on the value of culture, promoting equality via education, and the contribution of government to the creation of a fair and peaceful society continue to serve as a catalyst for conversations and activities aimed at tackling social issues.

REFERENCES

- [1] C. J. Finlay, "Hugo Grotius on the law of war and peace: student edition," *Int. Aff.*, 2013.
- [2] K. N. B. Ninh and M. Arnold, "Decentralization in Myanmar: A Nascent and Evolving Process," *Southeast Asian Econ.*, 2016, doi: 10.1355/ae33-2g.
- [3] K. L. Steenwerth *et al.*, "Climate-smart agriculture global research agenda: Scientific basis for action," *Agriculture and Food Security*. 2014. doi: 10.1186/2048-7010-3-11.
- [4] K. L. Steenwerth *et al.*, "Climate-smart agriculture global research agenda: scientific basis for action," *Agric. Food Secur.*, 2014.
- [5] Z. Brooke and M. Patrick, "A Preliminary Assessment of Decentralization in Education," 2013.
- [6] K. E. Arnold, S. Lonn, and M. D. Pistilli, "An exercise in institutional reflection: The learning analytics readiness instrument (LARI)," in *ACM International Conference Proceeding Series*, 2014. doi: 10.1145/2567574.2567621.
- [7] A. A. Shash *et al.*, "Modeling Strategic Bidding Behavior in Power Markets," *Constr. Manag. Econ.*, 2015.
- [8] B. C. Chaffin *et al.*, "Adaptive water governance: Assessing the institutional prescriptions of adaptive (co-)management from a governance perspective and defining a research agenda," *Ecol. Soc.*, 2018.
- [9] "Book reviews," *Int. Aff.*, 2013, doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12012.

CHAPTER 8

MATTHEW ARNOLD'S PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION AND MORALITY

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@mut.in

ABSTRACT:

The summary of "Matthew Arnold's Perspective on Religion and Morality" explores the complex opinions of Matthew Arnold, a well-known Victorian author and critic, on how religion and morality interact. Through the examination of Arnold's viewpoint through the glasses of behavior and religion, a complex understanding of the interactions between these two facets of human existence is revealed. The summary emphasizes Arnold's focus on the significance of morality and conduct as fundamental elements of religion and his sharp critique of moral failures and religious dogmatism. It sheds light on Arnold's conviction that writing, particularly poetry, serves as a vehicle for evaluating and bettering human existence and underscores his function as a moral counselor and critic within the framework of literature and society. Overall, the abstract invites readers to interact with Arnold's complex and thought-provoking viewpoints on religion and morality by giving a brief summary of the key topics and insights that will be covered in the complete text.

KEYWORDS:

Ethical Critique, Literature, Matthew Arnold, Morality, Religion, Society Theology.

INTRODUCTION

"By wanting what is perfectly good, even when we don't quite know what it is and can't do what we would, we are part of the divine power against evil, widening the skirts of light and making the battle with darkness narrower," the poet said. Whether Lactantius was etymologically correct or not, there is no denying that his definition of religion as that which ties the soul to God was mostly accurate. Thusly understood, religion inevitably splits between duty and dogma, practice and theory, behavior and theology. The Bible explains both concepts to us. Even the separate roles of the Synoptists and St. John appear to fit themselves to this natural division: of the one it is written: "The wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein," and of the other: "Which things the angels desire to look into." As suggested, we will examine Arnold's impact on religion under the two headings of conduct and theology. The Middlemarch paragraph that serves as the introduction to this chapter seems to convey his perspective on the religious issues of his day. Arnold "desired" it with an even stronger desire and came a great deal closer to it than many professors of a more orthodox theology.

It would be impossible for a convinced believer in the Christian Church to claim that Arnold "knew what was perfectly good" in the realm of religion. He said that Conduct made up three-fourths of life, and it is true that, like his favorite poet, he "saw life steadily and saw it whole." He had the greatest tolerance for all the innumerable variations and conflicts in simple opinion because he understood that no viewpoint is guilty in and of itself. He had the same ardent esteem and, in some ways, affection for thinkers as disparate as Wordsworth, Bunsen, Clough, and Palgrave; Church and Temple; Lake and Stanley; Lord Coleridge;

William Forster; and John Morley. His judgment only got harsh and his empathy diminished once the realm of behavior was in reach. The flaws in politics that he could not forgive were frivolity, time-serving, mob-pleasing, and the attitude that favors partisanship above patriotism. His mediocre sympathy for Mr. Gladstone, a regrettable but unavoidable reality, was more attributable to criticism of his personality than to disagreement with his conception of the public good. He is brilliantly clever, of course, and he is honest enough, but he is passionate, and in no way great, I think. "Respect is the very last feeling he excites in me; he has too little solidity and composure of character or mind for that." In Religion obscurantism, resistance to the light, the smug attempt to make the best of both worlds, offended Arnold as much on the one hand, as insolence, violence, ignorant negation, "Because he preferred a "free handling, in a becoming spirit, of religious matters," he did not always find it in the works of his liberal friends.

However, he later withdrew it out of genuine regret that "an illustration likely to be torn from its context, to be improperly used, and to give pain, should ever have been adopted." In literature, too, his charity was unrestricted even though his judgment was critical. He was able to identify merit in even the most juvenile and unassuming endeavors, and he was able to distinguish what is simply awful from what is "good of its sort," or good in the second order of accomplishment. He only became censorious in literature, as in opinion, when moral failings were combined with intellectual shortcomings. He hated literary humbug, which he defined as a pretense of knowing without the truth, a philosophy show that covered up a lack of philosophical depth, the vanity of quaintness, the "ring of false metal," and the exaltation of banalities[1].

And thus, once again, when it comes to Life the social life of the civilized community he served as the constant guide and the shining example of a high moral code. Even the intellectual brilliance of writers he really appreciated did not always make him immune to moral failings. It is true that several of the authors he admired Goethe, Byron, and George Sand could hardly be considered moral role models; yet, he expressed his disdain of the moral flaw while praising the literary talent. Byron, whom he regarded as "the greatest natural force, the greatest elementary power" to have appeared in our literature since Shakespeare, was roundly criticized for his "vulgarity and effrontery," "coarseness and commonness," "affectation and brutal selfishness," and "the moralist and the man of the world m" in the case of Goethe, he said that "the moralist and the man of the world m" Heine, with all of his genius, "lacked the old-fashioned, laborious, eternally needful moral deliverance" he left a name marred by "intemperate susceptibility, unscrupulousness in passion, inconceivable attacks on his enemies, stitching, and slander" Heine, with all of his genius, "lacked the old-fashioned, laborious, eternally needful moral deliverance": he "lacked the old-fashioned, laborious and although he used this to criticize the moral failings of authors he really respected, he was perhaps inevitably more harsher on the moral failings of writers he held in lower regard. Burns is a beast with splendid gleams, and the milieu in which he lived Scottish peasants, Scotch Presbyterianism, and Scotch drink is repulsive, he declared. On Coleridge, critic, poet, and philosopher, he passed judgment that he "had no morals," and that his character inspired "disesteem, nay, repugnance."

The moral component the feeling of conduct thus mixes with his literary judgment everywhere. But he most vehemently expressed his hatred of moral failings and his awareness of how they harm the creative acts of brilliance in his assault on Shelley, which was penned only four months before his own death. It can scarcely be disputed that the publishing of that biography did a notable harm to the memory of the poet whom Professor Dowden worshipped. "In this article on Shelley," he wrote, "I have spoken of his life, not his

poetry. Professor Dowden was too much for my patience." The total, though obviously inadvertent, condoning of atrocious wickedness and the lack of taste, judgment, and humor that permeate the book warranted a harsh rebuke, which Arnold delivered with a vigor and thoroughness that demonstrate how severely his moral sense had been shaken. As this history of "the occurrences of Shelley's private life" comes to an end, we exclaim, "What a set! What a world! Godwin's house of sordid horror, and Godwin preaching and holding the hat, and the green-spectacled Mrs. Godwin, and Hogg the faithful friend, and Hunt the Horace of this precious world!" Arnold says with sincere outrage, "After reading his book, one feels sickened forever of the subject of irregular relations. I conclude that an entirely human inflammability, joined to an inhuman lack of humor and a super-human power of self-deception, are the causes which chiefly explain Shelley's abandonment." Professor Dowden's grim narrative of seduction and suicide is followed step by step. He still maintains his admiration for the "ideal Shelley," "the delightful Shelley," "the friend of the unfriended poor," the radiant and many-colored poet, with his mastery of the medium of sounds, and the "natural magic in his rhythm," but he adds this helpful warning: "Let no one suppose that a lack of humor and a self-delusion such as Shelley's have no effect upon a man."

Arnold also believed that moral qualities in an author may elevate and expand his authorship, just as moral flaws in an author were likely to detract from the purity of his work. Hear him on his friend Arthur Clough: "He possessed, in an eminent degree, these two invaluable literary qualities: a true sense for his object of study, and a single-hearted care for it. He had both; but he had the second even more eminently than the first. He greatly developed the first through means of the second. In the study of art, poetry, or philosophy, he had the most undivided and disinterested love for the object in itself, the greatest aversion to mixing up with it anything accidental or personal. His interest was in literature itself; and it was this which gave so rare a stamp to his character, which kept him so free from all taint of littleness. In the saturnalia of ignoble personal passions, of which the struggle for literary success, in old and crowded communities, offers so sad a spectacle, he never mingled. He had not yet traduced his friends, nor flattered his enemies, nor disparaged what he admired, nor praised what he despised. Those who knew him well had the conviction that, even with time, these literary arts would never be his.

His poem, *The Bothie of Toper-na-Fuosich*, has some admirable Homeric qualities—out-of-doors freshness, life, naturalness, buoyant rapidity. Some of the expressions in that poem come back now to my ear with the true Homeric ring. But that in him of which I think oftenest is the Homeric simplicity of his literary life. "We have repeatedly seen that Arnold believed poetry to be a criticism of life; nevertheless, he insisted that this only applied to poetry since it is a kind of literature and all literature is a critique of life. He was committed to his own ideology, and in practice, from the beginning to the end, he utilized writing as a means for criticizing the lives and actions of his fellow men. The statement may be disputed as being far too unguarded in its wording, but he was undoubtedly true to his own doctrine. In the year before his death, he produced with approval "a favorite saying of Ptolemy the astronomer, which Bacon quotes in its Latin version thus: *Quum fini appropinquas, bonum cum augmen- to operare*" As you approach your latter end, redouble your efforts to do good." And in his case, this redoubled effort was entirely consistent with what had come before. In an 1863 letter to a friend, he stated: "In trying to heal the British demoniac, true doctrine is not enough; one must convey the true doctrine with studied moderation; for, if one commits the least extravagance, the poor madman seizes hold of this, tears and rends it, and quite fails to perceive that you have said anything else[2]."

Nothing in his genuine teaching was more obvious than his early and late stress on the paramount significance of character and behavior. His whole creative life was devoted to striving to express "true doctrine with studied moderation." The primary goal of life is to actualize one's best self, which calls for more than just intelligence or knowledge; even brilliance would not be sufficient in and of itself, much less devotion to any specific set of beliefs. Character issuing in Conduct this was the true culture we must all follow if by any means we were to attain to our predestined perfection; and, if that were once secured, all the rest talent, fame, influence, length of days, worldly prosperity mattered little if a man was unrespectable. "Not even the merit of not being a Philistine could make up for it." When his eldest son passed away, the father wrote to a friend: "He is gone and all the absorption in one's own occupations which prevented one from giving to him more than moments, all one's occasional impatience, all one's taking his ailments as a matter of course, come back upon one as something inconceivable and inhuman.

And his mother, who has nothing of all this to reproach herself with, who was everything to him and would have given herself for him, has lost the We are brought back to Tertullian's view on the *anima naturaliter Christiana* by that example, which shines out clearly across the interspace of fifteen years. Never in history was a person more truly kind. He was born with these traits: a quick wit, a bright disposition, and an endless supply of fun. But something more than nature must have contributed to his unwavering altruism, manly endurance of unfavorable circumstances, noble cheer in the face of adversity, buoyancy in the face of challenges, and unwavering concern for the happiness and welfare of those closest to him. His life's secret was that he had worked hard to develop his own persona. He laments the "worldly element which enters so largely into his composition," which threatens to distance him from the rigid, even Puritanical, connotations of his boyhood, although still relatively young.

But as Thomas à Kempis advised, "*frequentur tibi violentiam fac*," he writes in a letter to his sister, "so I intend not to give myself the rein in following my natural tendency, but to make war against it until it ceases to isolate me from you, and leaves me with the power to discern and adopt the good which you have and I do not." All the qualities that are claimed to be distinctively and singularly Christian were produced in him as a consequence of his self-discipline and self-culture. "Christianity impressed the Roman world by its power of producing men who were strong in self-control, and this must always be its contribution to the world," said Bishop Creighton. Arnold's self-control was absolute and unshakable; to self-control he added the distinctly Christian virtues of surrender, placability, readiness to forgive wrongs, and perfect freedom from envy, hatred, and malice. "Christianity," he said, "is Hebraism aiming at self-conquest and rescue from the thrall of vile affections, not by obedience to the letter of a law, but by conformity to the image of a self-sacrificing example. To a world stricken with moral enervation Christianity offered its spectacle of an inspired self-sacrifice; to men who refuse themselves nothing it showed obedient love.

"Kindness and Pureness," he said, "Charity and Chastity. If any virtues could stand for the whole of Christianity, these might. Let us have them from the mouth of Jesus Christ Himself. 'He that loveth his life shall lose it; a new commandment gives I unto you, that ye love one another.' There is charity. 'Blest are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. He was passionate and steadfast in his affection. He loved his mother (whom in his brightness, fun, and elasticity he closely resembled), the sisters who so keenly shared his intellectual tastes, his children living and deceased, with equal fondness. He loved his wife with increasing devotion as the years went on, when she had become "my sweet Granny," and they both felt that "we are too old for separations." "That little darling, we have left behind us at Laleham;

and he will soon fade out of people's memories, but we shall remember him as long as we live, and he will be one more bond between us, even more perhaps in his death than in his sweet little life," "Dick was a tower of strength," "Lucy is such a perfect companion," "Nelly is the dearest girl in the world," and "That little darling" were all used to describe Nelly[3].

Outside of his immediate family, his devotion was widely expressed and consistently upheld. He had a genuine gift for forming bonds with people, and when he signed himself "affectionately," he meant it. He had no enemies. If he had ever been hurt, it was forgiven, forgotten, and hidden from view. He always avoided resentment, hostility, and detraction, even in the debates about which he had the strongest opinions. He added, in absolute honesty, "Fiery hatred and malice are what I detest, and I would always allay or avoid if I could." The two basic precepts of the Christian gospel, charity and chastity, are used by him to explain "the natural truth of Christianity," as opposed to any concerns of revelation or law, in the prologue to his *Last Essays on the Church and Religion*. "Now, really," he writes in 1877, "if there is a lesson which in our day has come to force itself upon everyone, in all quarters and by all channels, it is the lesson of the solidarity, as it is called by modern philosophers, of men. If there was ever a notion tempting to common human nature, it was the notion that the rule of 'every man for himself' was the rule of happiness. but at last, it turns out as a matter of experience, and so plainly that Then, he continues with what he rightly refers to as "the other great Christian virtue, Pureness."

When he was thirty-two, he had written. "The lives and deaths of the 'pure in heart' have, perhaps, the privilege of touching us more profoundly than those of others partly, no doubt, because the disproportion of suffering to deserts seems so unusually great with them. However, with them one feels even I feel that for their purity's sake, there can be no more crucial issue for human civilization, he claims, than the fact that science is starting to cast doubt on the "truth and validity of the Christian idea of Pureness." Experience must make a decision on the side of natural truth. Nevertheless, he continues, "finely-touched souls have a presentiment of a thing's natural truth, even if it be questioned, and long before the palpable proof by experience convinces all of the world. All well-inspired souls will perceive the profound natural truth of the idea of pureness, and will be sure, therefore, that the more boldly it is challenged the more sharply and signally will experience the experience.

Once again, a very illuminating paragraph about the relationship between the sexes may be found in *God and the Bible*. "Here," he says, "we are on ground where to walk right is of vital concern to men, and where disasters are plentiful." He speculates on that relation as it may be supposed to have subsisted in the first ages of the human race, and tries to trace it down to the point of time "where history and religion begin." "And at this point we first find the Hebrew people, with polygamy still clinging to it as a survival from the times of ignorance, but with the marriage-tie solidly established, strict and sacred, as we see it between Abraham and Sara. Presently this same Hebrew people, with that aptitude which characterized it for being profoundly impressed by ideas of moral order, placed in the Decalogue the marriage-tie under the express and solemn sanction of the Eternal, by the Seventh Commandment: Thou shalt not commit adultery." Such was Israel's genius for the ideas of moral order and of right, such his intuition of the Eternal that makes for righteousness, that he felt without a shadow of a doubt, and said with the most impressive solemnity, that Free Love was to speak, again, like our modern philosopher fatal to progress. He knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell.

The fact that Arnold stated in his final years that his *Discourses in America* was the book by which, of all his prose writings, he most wished to be remembered gives everything he said in those *Discourses* a unique authority and weight for his disciples. Nowhere is his testimony on

behalf of Virtue and Right Conduct more fervently delivered. Voltaire, a despicable man, advised his followers to "Crush the Infamous," with an emphasis on the virtue that is uniquely Christian. *Les frivoles out peut-être raison* "The gay people are perhaps in the right." A century later Renan said: "Nature cares nothing for chastity." Arnold sounded a protesting and a warning voice against this philosophy of demons. He was, who knows? not a foe of France. He had nearly excessive admiration for all that was great about French culture and literature. However, despite, or perhaps because of, this sympathy with France, he felt compelled to object and warn. Sainte-Beuve even wrote to him saying, "You have traversed our life and literature by an inner, deep line that makes the initiates, and that you will never lose." Speaking to his American audience in November 1883, he emphasized the risks that England, Ireland, America, and France face as a result of habitually disobeying some virtue or grace that is necessary for national perfection in each instance. He utilized the well-known Philippians verse as a kind of text for his speech. "If there is any virtue or anything worthy of praise, keep it in your mind and let it guide your thoughts," the proverb says. "Whatever is true, whatever is elevated, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is amiable, whatever is of good report[4]."

"The question was once asked by the Town Clerk of Ephesus: 'What man is there that knoweth not how that the city of the Ephesians is a worshipper of the great goddess Diana?' Now really, when one looks at the popular literature of the French at this moment their popular novels, popular stage-plays, popular newspapers and at the life of which this literature of theirs is the index, one is tempted to make a goddess out of a word of their own, and then, like the Town Clerk of Ephesus, to ask: 'What man is there that knoweth not how that the city of the French is a worshipper of the great goddess Lubricity?' Or rather, as Greek is the classic and euphonious language for names of gods and goddesses, let us take her name from the Greek Testament, and call her the goddess *Aselgeia*. That goddess has always been a sufficient power amongst mankind, and her worship was generally supposed to need restraining rather than encouraging. But here is now a whole people, law, literature, nay, and art too, at her service! Stimulations and suggestions by her and to her meet one in it at every turn. 'Nature,' cries M. Renan, 'cares nothing about chastity.' What a slap in the face to the sticklers for 'Whatsoever things are pure'.

Even though a gifted man like M. Renan may be so carried away by the tide of opinion in France where he lives, as to say that Nature cares nothing about chastity, and to see with amused indulgence the worship of the great goddess Lubricity, let us stand fast and say that her worship is against nature human nature and that it is ruin. For this is the test of its being against human nature, that for human societies it is ruin. And the test is one from which there is no escape, as from the old tests in such matters there may be. For, if you allege that it is the will of God that we should be pure, the sceptical Gallo-Latins will tell you that they do not know any such person. And in like manner, if it is said that those who serve the goddess *Aselgeia* shall not inherit the Kingdom of God, the Gallo-Latin may tell you that he does not believe in any such place. But that the sure tendency and upshot of things establishes that the service of the goddess *Aselgeia* is ruin, that her followers are marred and stunted by it, and disqualified for the ideal society of the future, is an infallible test to employ.

The divine Plato tells us that we have a many-headed beast and a man inside of us, and that by engaging in dissolute behavior we feed or strengthen the beast in us and starve the man; and finally, following the divine Plato among the sages at a humble distance, comes the prosaic and unfashionable Paley, and says in his precise way: "This vice has a tendency, why it is followed by hardness and insolence, the latter of which grows until it irritates and alienates everyone, and the former of which develops until the man can, at last, hardly take

pleasure in anything other than cupidity and greed outside of serving his goddess and cannot be moved by any other language than Fustian. These are the results of the great goddess Aselgeia's adoration. The Eternal has attached to certain moral causes the safety or ruin of States, and the current popular literature of France is a sign that she has a most dangerous moral disease, so instead of saying that Nature cares nothing about chastity, let us say that human nature, our nature, cares about it a great deal[5].

The miracle of the Incarnation is an homage to the virtue of Purity and to the manifestation of this virtue in Jesus. What is Lent, and the miracle of the temptation? A tribute to the virtue of self-control, and to the manifestation of this virtue in Jesus. "When we are asked, what really is Christmas, and what does it celebrate? we answer, the birthday of Jesus." The popular instinct paid homage to purity when it attributed to Jesus His miraculous Incarnation and believed He was born of a pure virgin, and this, to which the popular instinct thus did homage, was an essential characteristic of Jesus and an essential virtue of Christianity, the obligation of which, though apt to be questioned and discredited in the world, is at the same time I've used a lot of quotations to demonstrate how Arnold is, to use his own words, "made for righteousness," and is continuously and indisputably created for righteousness in respect to the most crucial aspect of human activity. In season and out of season, whether men would bear or would forbear, he preached the holiness of marriage. Such was his conviction of the paramount worth of this uniquely Christian virtue that he built what traditional theologians would have termed a "hedge of the law."

He just had hatred for the Divorce Court and all of its practices. Along with our gin palaces, he listed it as one of the blemishes on our society. He cites approvingly from Goethe, who is perhaps an odd authority on the matter, in which he protests against the ease with which divorce is granted and acknowledges that Christianity has achieved "culture-conquest" by establishing the sanctity of marriage. According to him, maintaining such "culture-conquests" is essential to advancing humankind. He was the most ferocious opponent of any efforts made to reverse these conquests, return what we have gained, and inculcate laxity in the public mind. If we think back to 1863 and the involvement of Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister of England at the time and then in his eighty-first year, in a very unsightly scandal with the Divorce Court as its focal point, it might help to remind us that, despite all our flaws, we have come a little closer to virtue or at least to decency. The Lord Palmerston scandal, which your charming newspaper, the *Star* that true reflection of the rancor of Protestant Dissent in alliance with all the vulgarity, meddling, and grossness of the British multitude has done all it could to spread abroad, is what Arnold writes: "We had with us one day.

He was quite full of the Lord Palmerston scandal, which your charming newspaper, the *Standard* that true reflection of the vulgarity, meddling, and grossness of the British multitude has done all it could to friendship's Garland, an outstanding work of satire, often takes aim at such national deviations. People who admire the aristocracy in the same way that men like the stars followed the terrible story of a fashionable divorce case that occurred in 1870 with considerable attention. He quotes to his imaginary friend Arminius the noble words of Barrow in reference to this case: "Men will never be heartily loyal and submissive to authority till they become really good; nor will they ever be very good till they see their leaders such." Arminius responds, in his thoughtful way: "Yes, that is what makes your Lord so inexpressibly precious!" A certain Lord, be it observed, having figured very conspicuously in the trial[6].

With reference to the enormous publicity given in England to such malefic matter, Arnold says to Arminius: "When a Member of Parliament wanted to abridge the publicity given to the case, the Government earnestly reminded him that it had been the solemn decision of the

House of Commons that all the proceedings of the Divorce Court should be as open as the day. When there was a suggestion to hear the case in private, the upright magistrate who was appealed to said firmly that he could never trifle with the public mind in that manner. All this was as it should be. So far, so good. But was the publicity in these cases perfectly full and entire? Were there not some places which the details did not reach? There were few, but there were some. And this, while the Government has an organ of its own, the *London Gazette*, dull, high-priced, and of comparatively limited circulation! I say, make the price of the *London Gazette* a halfpenny; change its name to the *London Gazette and Divorce Intelligencer*; let it include besides divorce news, all cases whatever that have an interest of the same nature for the public mind; distribute it gratis to mechanics' institutes, workmen's halls, seminaries for the young (these latter more especially), and then you will be giving the principle of publicity a full trial. This is what I often say to Arminius; and, when he looks astounded, I reassure him with a sentence which, I know very well, the moment I make it public will be stolen by the Liberal newspapers. But it is getting near Christmas-time, and I do not mind making them a present of it. It is this: The spear of freedom, like that of Achilles, has the power to heal the wounds which itself makes."

Because of the way the book is written, Friendship's Garland's serious judgments must be spoken by his Prussian friend. His assessment of our public concessions to lust is as follows: "By shooting all this garbage on your public, you are preparing and assuring for your English people an immorality as deep and wide as that which destroys the Latin nations." But in addition to the thorns, he used to penetrate the Divorce Court and its repulsive literature, his "hedge of the law" included additional jagged edges. He poured scorn on the newspapers that celebrated "the great sexual insurrection of the Anglo-Teutonic race" and the author who extolled the domestic life of Mormonism. He had shrewd sarcasms for all who, by whatever method, sought to gratify "that double craving so characteristic of our Philistine, and so eminently exemplified in that crowned Philistine, Henry the Eighth." He thus predicts the actions of a Philistine House of Commons in 1871: "Mr. Hepworth Dixon may almost be called the Colenso of Love and Marriagesuch a revolution does he make in our ideas on these matters, just as Dr. Colenso does in our ideas on religion."

The devoted opponents of the Contagious Diseases Act will spread a helpful discussion of this ambiguous measure and of all matters connected with it throughout the length and breadth of the country, and will thus, at the same time that they oppose immorality, enable the followers of even the very strict religious beliefs. "Mr. T. Chambers will again introduce that enfranchising measure, against which I have had some prejudices the Bill for enabling a man to marry his deceased wife's sister. Thus, the *Daily Telegraph's* fictitious editor-in-chief summarizes the issue: "Why, I ask, is Mr. Job Bottles' liberty, his Christian liberty, as our reverend friend would say, to be abridged in this manner? And why is Protestant Dissent to be diverted from its great task of abolishing State Churches for the purpose of removing obstacles to the 'sexual insurrection' of our race? Why are its poor devoted ministers to be driven to contract for my part, my resolve is formed: this great question shall henceforth be seriously taken up in Fleet Street. As a sop to those toothless old Cerberuses the bishops, who impotently exhibit still the passions of another age, we will accord the continuation of the prohibition which forbids a bishop from appointing a woman to a position of authority."

The idea to legalize marriage with a wife's sister is maybe the only social wrong that Arnold opposed with such tenacity. Councils and Synods, Decrees and Canons, were held in the lowest respect by him; even the most ardent supporters of that "enfranchising measure" can hardly imagine that his antipathy was due to what John Bright so sweetly termed "ecclesiastical rubbish." He had little interest in or fear of the formal side of religionthe side

of theology, doctrine, discipline, and definition. He had no idea that the Third Table of the Divine Law was the Table of Kindred and Affinity. Yet he disapproved of the "enfranchising measure" just as strongly as the clergyman who complained to the Guardian about incest, despite the fact that he expressed his disapproval in a very different way.

His appeal in these matters was not to Moses or Tertullian, but rather to "the genius of the race which invented the Muses, and Chivalry, and the Madonna." He adopted his "sinuous, easy, unpolemical" approach here as he did everywhere else, making his opposition to the proposed change clear to people who otherwise would not have paid attention to arguments from Leviticus or nuanced distinctions between *malum per se* and *malum prohibitum*. His deep belief which has previously been demonstrated that marriage is sacrosanct and that the conventions that govern it were cultural victories that had been gained through painstaking struggle from the unrestrained promiscuity of prehistoric existence was the main source of his repulsion. It was a step backward into darkness and disorder to compromise that holiness and disrupt those traditions.

The "great sexual insurrection" was not just a grotesque phrase; it was a movement of the time that threatened national disaster and to which, in its most plausible manifestations, the stoutest resistance must be offered. This was confirmed by his keen moral sense that instinctive knowledge of evil that, as Frederick Robertson said, comes not of contact with evil but of repulsion from it. Again, his love of coherence and logical symmetry, his innate dislike of anomalies, and his conviction that Reason is the only reliable source of knowledge made him intolerable of all the blatantly false efforts to conclude, "This far, and no further." He understood that all affinity rules must be upheld or disregarded jointly and that no reasonable argument can be made against a marriage to a husband's brother that does not also argue against a marriage to a wife's sister. He believed that the planned adjustments once again revealed the haughty viciousness of the more full-blooded Philistines.

The fact that the "enfranchising measure" invaded delicacy by removing the legal barrier was undoubtedly not the least of his objections to it. Whatever invaded delicacy contributed to the emergence of egregious, though maybe unanticipated, evils. Unfortunately, there are huge groups of people entire classes for whom tactlessness, whether in voice or deed, signifies nothing. For the masses, eating, drinking, sleeping, buying and selling, marrying and being given in marriage, is the aim and the rule of life. They no longer want these goods, and they despise and resent any limitations or refinements placed on them. In another place we have cited the mysterious effect produced upon the Paris Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph by the sudden sound of the word "Delicacy." And that word was uttered in connexion with the "enfranchising measure."

If legislation on this subject were impeded by the party of bigotry, if they chose not to wait for it, if they got married without it, and if you were to meet them on the boulevard at Paris during their wedding tour, should you go up to Bottles and say: 'Mr. Bottles, you are a profligate man' Poor Mr. Matthew Arnold, upon this, emerged suddenly from his corner, and asked hesitatingly: 'But will anyone dare to call him a man of delicacy?' The question was so utterly unpractical that I took no note of it whatever, and should not have mentioned it if it had not been for its extraordinary effect upon our Paris Correspondent. My friend Nick, who has all the sensitive temperament of genius, seemed inexplicably struck by this word delicacy, which he kept repeating to himself. 'Delicacy,' said he 'delicacy surely, I have heard that word before! Yes, in other days,' he went on dreamily, 'in my fresh enthusiastic youth; before I knew Sala, before I wrote for that infernal paper, before I called Dixon's style lithe and sinewy 'Collect yourself, my friend,' laying my hand on his shoulder; 'you are unmanned.

But in mentioning Dixon you redouble my strength; for you bring to my mind the great sexual insurrection of the Anglo-Teutonic race, and the master-spirit which guides it[7].'

But in matters far outside the region of marriage, that word "delicacy," which so powerfully affected the Paris correspondent, is the key to a great deal of what Arnold felt and wrote. In the sphere of conduct he set up, as we have seen, two supreme objects for veneration and attainment: Chastity and Charity. He practiced them, he taught them, and he used them as decisive tests of what was good and what was bad in national life. But plainly there are large tracts of existence which lie outside the purview of these two virtues. There is the domain of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing; there is a loyalty to truth, the pursuit of conscience at all costs and hazards; there is all that is contained in the idea of beauty, propriety, and taste. None of these are touched by charity or chastity. For example, a man may have an unblemished life and a truly affectionate heart; and yet he may be incorrigible in money-matters, or be ready to sacrifice principle to convenience, or, like our great Middle Class generally, may be serenely content with hideousness and bad manners.

Now Arnold extended the delicacy criteria to all of these areas of human existence, which were certainly less significant than the two most significant, but were nonetheless significant. "A finely-touched nature," he observed, "will respect in itself the sense of delicacy not less than the sense of honesty." The worship of sharp bargains is fatal to delicacy; nor is that missing grace restored by accompanying the sharp bargain with an exhibition of fine sentiments." Then, again, as regards loyalty to conviction, he knew full well that, in Newman's phrase, he might "have saved himself many a scrape, if he had been wise enough to hold his tongue." "The thought of you," he wrote to Mr. Morley, "and of one or two other friends, was often present to me in America, and, no doubt, contributed to make me hold fast to 'the faith once delivered to the Saints.'"

The slightest deviation from the line of clear conviction the least turning to left or right in order to cocker a prejudice or please an audience or flatter a class, showed a want of delicacy a preference of present popularity to permanent self-respect which he could never have indulged in himself, and with difficulty tolerated in others. He had nothing but contempt for "philosophical politicians with a turn for swimming with the stream, and philosophical divines with the same turn." And then, again, in the whole of that great sphere which belongs to Beauty, Propriety, and Taste, his sense of delicacy was always at work, and not seldom in pain. "Ah," he exclaimed, quoting from Rivarol, "no one considers how much pain any man of taste has to suffer, before ever he inflicts any." To inflict pain was not, indeed, in his way, but to suffer it was his too-frequent lot. From first to last he was protesting against hideousness, rawness, vulgarity, and commonplace; craving for sweetness, light, beauty and colour, instead of the bitterness, the ugliness, the gloom and the drab which provided such large portions of English life. "The εὐφνής is the man who turns towards sweetness and light; the ἀφνής on the other hand is our Philistine." "I do not much believe in good being done by a man unless he can give light." "Oxford by her ineffable charm keeps ever calling us nearer to the true goal of all of us, to the ideal, to perfection, to beauty."

In his constant quest for these glorious things—beauty, colour, sweetness, and light, his sense of delicacy had much to undergo; for, in the class with which he was by the work of his life brought in contact, they were unknown and unimagined; and the only class where "elegance and refinement, beauty and grace" were found, was inaccessible to Light. In both classes he found free scope for his doctrine of Delicacy, one day remonstrating with a correspondent for "living in a place with the absurd, and worse, name of 'Marine Retreat';" another, preaching that "a piano in a Quaker's drawing-room is a step for him to more humane life;" and again "liking and respecting polite tastes in a grandee," when Lord Ravensworth consulted him

about Latin verses. "At present far too many of Lord Ravensworth's class are mere men of business, or mere farmers, or mere horse-racers, or mere men of pleasure." That was a consummation which delicacy in the Aristocratic class would make impossible. To cultivate in oneself, and apply in one's conduct, this instinct of delicacy, was a lesson which no one, who fell under Arnold's influence, could fail to learn. He taught us to "liberate the gentler element in oneself," to eschew what was base and brutal, unholy and unkind. He taught us to seek in every department of life for what was "lovely and of good report," tasteful, becoming, and befitting; to cultivate "man's sense for beauty, and man's instinct for fit and pleasing forms of social life and manners." He taught us to plan our lives, as St. Paul taught the Corinthians to plan their worship, εὐσχημόνοιο καὶ κατὰ τάξιν, "in right, graceful, or becoming figure, and by fore-ordered arrangement." Alike his teaching and his example made us desire to perceive in all the contingencies and circumstances of life exactly the line of conduct which would best consist with Delicacy, and so to make virtue victorious by practising it attractively[8].

DISCUSSION

The book "Matthew Arnold's Perspective on Religion and Morality" explores the insightful observations and critical assessments made on the complex connection between religion and morality by the eminent Victorian poet and writer Matthew Arnold. Arnold's viewpoint on these issues is grounded on his intellectual and literary accomplishments, which continue to shape debates about literature, spirituality, and ethics. The contrast between behavior and theology is one of Arnold's viewpoint's main topics.

He contends that religion may be broken down into its two fundamental parts, or, in other words, practice and theory: duty and dogma. This split highlights a key idea in Arnold's philosophy, which emphasizes that a person's moral acts and conduct are more important than their doctrinal views. This viewpoint is consistent with his assertion that "conduct makes up three-fourths of life." In this regard, Arnold contends that character development and the development of our connection with God are directly influenced by our moral behavior.

Arnold's literary and intellectual pursuits have a significant influence on his moral and religious beliefs. He thought that literature and poetry had the ability to criticize society and provide moral lessons.

As a result, he believed that literature was an important instrument for examining the subtleties of human conduct and highlighting both moral qualities and flaws. As he investigated how a writer's moral code and philosophical views affected their creative works, Arnold's literary criticism often merged with his ethical analysis.

He was renowned for praising literary genius but excoriating writers whose moral failings marred their works[9]. Arnold's viewpoint emphasizes his dedication to a more comprehensive social vision. He thought that literature and education ought to be important forces for advancing morality and society. Arnold promoted publicly supported and controlled education, highlighting the value of education in fostering moral and intellectual growth. His worldview included politics and the state's role in promoting a more civilized and morally upright society[10].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, "Matthew Arnold's Perspective on Religion and Morality" examines how Arnold's observations on the relationship between religion, morality, literature, and society have persisted through time. A complex and thought-provoking conversation is made possible

by Arnold's focus on the importance of ethical behavior, his critique of religious dogma, and his conviction that literature has the ability to mold moral character. His point of view offers a convincing foundation for current discussions on the moral implications of religion and the duties that people and communities have to one another.

REFERENCES

- [1] M. Rectenwald, "Secularism," in *George Eliot in Context*, 2011. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139019491.033.
- [2] B. Xiao, "Morality in Victorian Period□," *Theory Pract. Lang. Stud.*, 2015, doi: 10.17507/tpls.0509.07.
- [3] M. H. Barzoki *et al.*, "Book Reviews," *J. Child Fam. Stud.*, 2015.
- [4] J. J. Franklin, "The Influences of Buddhism and Comparative Religion on Matthew Arnold," *Lit. Compass*, 2012, doi: 10.1111/j.1741-4113.2012.00925.x.
- [5] D. L. Burge *et al.*, *Yoga and Kabbalah as World Religions? A Comparative Perspective on Globalization of Religious Resources*. 2014.
- [6] G. Nash, "Aryan and semite in Ernest Renan's and Matthew Arnold's quest for the religion of modernity," *Religion and Literature*. 2014.
- [7] E. M. M. H. van Konijnenburg *et al.*, "A mixed methods study on evaluations of Virginia's STEM-focused governor's schools," *Diss. Abstr. Int. Sect. B Sci. Eng.*, 2018.
- [8] S. Lecourt, *Cultivating belief: Victorian anthropology, liberal aesthetics, and the secular imagination*. 2018. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198812494.001.0001.
- [9] A. H. Savitri *et al.*, "Compare Resilience of Families with Mentally Retarded Children and Family with Normal Children," *Soc. Psychol. Educ.*, 2015.
- [10] R. McGregor, "Moderate autonomism revisited," *Ethical Perspect.*, 2013, doi: 10.2143/EP.20.3.2992656.

CHAPTER 9

EMERGENCE OF MATTHEW ARNOLD AS A THEOLOGICAL CRITIC

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@mutit.in

ABSTRACT:

In-depth analysis of Matthew Arnold's amazing development from a famous poet and cultural critic to a strong theological critic is provided in this work, providing light on his deep understanding of the Puritan interpretation of St. Paul's teachings. This study investigates how Arnold struggled with the theological complexities of Puritanism and its representation of St. Paul via a careful analysis of Arnold's intellectual development, eventually providing a new perspective on his contributions to the area of religious criticism. Arnold's transition into theological critique is examined in light of his overall intellectual growth, emphasizing the crucial occasions and influences that sparked his interest in theological issues. This research reveals how Arnold's theological criticism gradually emerged by analyzing his most important works and speeches. It also shows how he handled conflicts between conventional religious interpretations and the needs of a changing cultural environment in the Victorian age. Arnold's condemnation of Puritanism, a religious movement renowned for its severe interpretation of Christianity, is at the heart of this research. The study dives into Arnold's examination of how Puritanism's image of St. Paul was influenced by stressing certain of his teachings while downplaying others. Arnold's analysis of Puritanism's theological inclinations sheds important light on the larger theological and cultural discussions of his day.

KEYWORDS:

Cultural Critique, Faith, Intellectual Evolution, Matthew Arnold, Puritanism, Religious, St. Paul, Theological Critic.

INTRODUCTION

It was a striking simile, and if well worked out by a rhetorician, say of the type of Dr. Liddon, it might have powerfully sealed some great argument for the necessary place of dogma in Christian theology. Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, wrote this after hearing a sermon by Dr. Howson, Dean of Chester: "One good bit that the emptying Christianity of dogma would perish it, like Charlemagne's face when exhumed." However, the sermon is no longer available, and given the entry's date October 5, 1869 we can only speculate that the good Dean was furious because Matthew Arnold had made his first entrance in the area of theological debate. Arnold had actually touched on that topic six years earlier, in *The Bishop and the Philosopher*, when he questioned Colenso, "the arithmetical bishop who couldn't forgive Moses for having written a Book of Numbers," about his "jejune and technical manner of dealing with Biblical controversy." "It is," he wrote, "a result of no little culture to attain to a clear perception that science and religion are two wholly different things."

The multitude will forever confuse them. However, he had just critiqued another critic in that previous article; he had not created any of his own. He had thus been exposed to religious debate, albeit he had not performed there. He presumably looked this way today because of the success that accompanied *Culture and Anarchy*. The circle of his audience has been

greatly expanded by the release of the book. Few people are interested in literature, although many others are. And despite the fact that the politics of *Culture and Anarchy* were novel, strange, difficult to comprehend, and veering off the beaten path in all directions, professional politicians and that group of everyday citizens who strive for education and seek out a broader knowledge took note of *Culture and Anarchy* as a book that must be read and that, even if they didn't always understand it, at least would let them know which way the wind was blowing. The author of this piece vividly recalls the friendly merchant who said, upon returning from a business trip to his suburban home, "Well, I shall spend this Saturday afternoon on Mat Arnold's new book, and I shall not understand one word of it." The good man had no idea that he was either a Hebraizer or a Hellenizer. He had always considered himself to be a liberal, a member of the Low Church, and a silk merchant.

Arnold's discovery that he had a pulpit was a novel and energizing experience for him. He now had a position from which he could preach his message with confidence that it would be heard and considered, if not accepted. He immediately started to take advantage of his chance. He started expanding his activity from the realm of political and social critique to that of religious dispute when the Press was still rife with accusations of *Culture and Anarchy*. The second experiment seemed to have evolved naturally from the first. He accused Puritanism in *Culture and Anarchy* of assuming that the Bible contained an unum necessarium, which made it independent of Sweetness and Light and directed it correctly without the assistance of culture. Nowhere more than in the writings of St. Paul, and in that apostle's greatest work, the Epistle to the Romans, has Puritanism found what seemed to provide it with the one thing necessary, and to give it canons of truth that are absolute and final. He appears to have set out to determine how well the Puritans had actually understood the meaning of the authors on whom they depended, and in especially on St. Paul, after learning of their dependence on Holy Scripture or specific passages of it. And a statement by Renan that had only recently been published appears to have pointed him in this direction: "After having been for three hundred years, thanks to Protestantism, the Christian doctor par excellence, Paul is now coming to an end of his reign[1]."

As was his habit, Arnold focused on these last lines and used them as the basis for his essay on St. Paul and Protestantism, which started to be published in October 1869. The Protestantism that has so exploited and abused St. Paul is coming to an end; yet, the actual reign of St. Paul is just starting. Exactly the opposite, I hazard to suppose, is the judgment to which a true evaluation of persons and of things leads us. He had demonstrated in *Culture and Anarchy* that "no man, who knows nothing else, knows even his Bible," and that "the over-Hebraizing of Puritanism, and its lack of a wide culture, so narrow its range and impair its vision that even the documents it thinks all-sufficient, and to the study of which it exclusively rivets itself, it does not rightly understand, but is apt to make of them something quite different from what it really is." Now, he advised, let's continue down the same road and "instead of lightly disparaging the great name of St. Paul, let us see if the needful thing is not rather to rescue St. Paul and the Bible from the perversion of them by mistaken men."

Although he refers to his work as *St. Paul and Protestantism* in the treatise, therein adopting Renan's phraseology, in the treatise itself, he speaks more of St. Paul and Puritanism. Remove the Protestant doctrine schemes that occasionally appear in her documents, he claims, and "all that is most valuable in the Church of England would still remain"; however, these doctrine schemes are the very life and substance of Puritanism and the Puritan bodies, and the Church of England "existed before Protestantism and contains much besides Protestantism." Leaving the Church of England on one side, we fix our gaze on Puritanism and we see that "the conception of the ways of God to man which Puritanism has formed for itself" has the terms

Election and Justification for its cardinal points. This is because "it is the positive Protestantism of Puritanism with which we are here concerned, as distinguished from the negative Protestantism of the Church of England." When we are told that St. Paul is a Protestant doctor whose reign is coming to an end, "we in England can best try the assertion by fixing our eyes on our own Puritans, and comparing their doctrine and their hold on vital truth with St. Paul's," it is said that "Puritanism's very reason for existing depends on the worth of this its vital conception." He begins by dividing Puritanism into Calvinism and Arminianism, or Methodism. Predestination has the top spot in Calvinistic theology, whereas Justification by Faith holds that position in Methodist theology. The worries of man are what Calvinism and Methodism both rely on the most. Both Calvinism and Methodism use the Bible, and especially St. Paul, as evidence for their respective doctrines. Arnold states that if such is the case, we will investigate Paul's portrayal of God's interactions with humans to see whether it agrees with the diverse depictions of the same topic offered by Puritanism's two major branches.

He adds that we shall likewise follow Puritanism's lead and go to the Epistle to the Romans as the primary source for learning Paul's actual views on the relevant issues. He freely uses quotes from the other, unquestionably Pauline epistles to support his points, but he typically credits Apollos with writing the Epistle to the Hebrews because it is "just such a performance as might naturally have come from 'an eloquent man and mighty in the Scriptures,' and in whom the intelligence, and the powers of combining, type-finding, and expounding somewhat dominated the religious perceptions." The term atonement in Romans v. II, which has been changed to reconciliation in our Revised Version, serves as a powerful illustration of their methodology. Another thing to keep in mind is that Paul wrote about religion "in a vivid and figured way" rather than with the formal, scientific approach of a theological treatise, and that, as a Jew, "he uses the Jewish Scriptures in a Jew's arbitrary and uncritical fashion "quoting them haphazardly and applying them fantastically[2].

Arnold moves on to the order in which Paul's thoughts naturally stand and the connections between one another after taking these warnings into consideration. Here, it is immediately apparent that Paul and Puritanism are incompatible. The desire for righteousness, which we have previously noted as the master-impulse of Hebraism, is what drives Paul, as evidenced by his lengthy and frequent lists of moral sins to be avoided and of virtues to be cult. "What drives the Calvinist appears to be the desire to flee from the wrath to come; and what drives the Methodist, the desire for eternal bliss. Paul's character is characterized by this fervor for righteousness, both before and after his conversion. No, it explains why he converted. The characteristic doctrines of Christ, whom he had never seen but who was in everyone's words and thoughts, the Teacher who was meek and lowly in heart, who said men were brothers and must love one another, that the last should often be first, that the exercise of dominion a that was so possessed with the hunger and thirst for righteousness, and precisely because it was so possessed by it, the characteristic doctrines of Christ, which brought a new aliment to feed this hunger and He repeatedly hits the same note in all of his lectures.

If he takes even a little break from upholding the law, it is only to do so more successfully. This individual, from whom an incredible critique has inferred Antinomianism, is really so consumed by hatred of Antinomianism that he visits grace with the express intent of exterminating it and, even then, is unable to stop narrating his journey to grace. Therefore, according to St. Paul, righteousness consists of abiding by the law and thereby honoring God. Although it is not an easy task, serving God requires us to "follow that central clue in our moral being which unites us to the universal order." According to Bishop Wilson, "every man is conscious of an opposition in him between the flesh and the spirit." No one is more acutely

aware of this opposition than St. Paul himself. How is he supposed to reconcile the bad and self-centered impulses of his composite nature with God's law and will? "Mere commanding and forbidding are of no avail, and only irritates opposition in the desires it tries to control. Neither the law of nature nor the law of Moses availed to bind men to righteousness.

So, we come to the word which is the governing word of the Epistle to the Roman the word all. As the word righteousness is the governing word of St. Paul's entire mind and life, so the word all is the governing word of this his chief epistle. The Gentile with the law of nature, the Jew with the law of Moses, alike fail to achieve righteousness. 'All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.' All do what they would not, and do not what they would; all feel themselves enslaved, impotent, guilty, miserable. 'O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' Hitherto we have followed Paul in the sphere of morals; we have now come with him to the point where he enters the sphere of religion." Paul is profoundly conscious of his own imperfections, of the tendencies in his nature which war against righteousness; of his inability, in common with all the human race, to follow perfectly the law of God. He now understands the thoughts and actions of Christ. He is certain that Christ did so in order to bring him into full, not partial, righteousness into complete obedience with God's plan. He says that Christ has seized him laid hold on him. He had learned about complete righteousness by knowing Christ, and he felt that Christ had taken hold of him specifically to help him achieve it[3].

And we are seasonably reminded of the sequence in which Paul's thoughts arise when we reach the vision of that perfect Righteousness and his desire to achieve it. "For us, who approach Christianity through a scholastic theology, it is Christ's divinity which establishes His being without sin. For Paul, who approached Christianity through his personal experience, it was Christ's being without sin which established His divinity. The large and complete conception of righteousness to which he himself had slowly and late, and only by Christ's help, awakened, in Christ he seemed to see existing absolutely and naturally. The devotion to this conception which made it meat and drink to carry it into effect, a devotion of which he himself was strongly and deeply conscious, he saw in Christ still stronger, by far, and deeper than in himself. But for attaining the righteousness of God, for reaching an absolute conformity with the moral order and with God's will, he saw no such impotence existing in Christ's case as in his own. For Christ, the uncertain conflict between the law in our members and the law of the spirit did not appear to exist. Those eternal vicissitudes of victory and defeat, which drove Paul to despair, in Christ were absent; smoothly and inevitably He followed the real and eternal order in preference to the momentary and apparent order.

Obstacles outside there were plenty, but obstacles within Him there were none. He was led by the spirit of God; He was dead to sin, He lived to God; and in this life to God, He persevered even to His cruel bodily death on the cross. As many as are led by the spirit of God, says Paul, are the sons of God. If this is so with even us, who live to God so feebly and who render such an imperfect obedience, how much more is He who lives to God entirely and who renders an unalterable obedience, the unique and only son of God?" This, says Arnold, is undoubtedly the main line of movement which Paul's ideas respecting Christ follow; and so far, we have no quarrel with our guide. But he quickly moves on to a claim that appears arbitrary and debatable. He must acknowledge that Paul linked Christ with the Eternal Word or Wisdom of God, which, according to Jewish theology, had been with God from the beginning and through which the world was formed. Paul recognized perfect righteousness in Christ and trusted in His Divinity as a result. He must also concede that Paul compared Christ to the Jewish Messiah, who would one day make an appearance to overthrow the existing

kingdoms and establish His own. However, owing to his background in the scholastic theology of Judaism and his treatment of St. Paul's concept as a sort of afterthought in each of these circumstances, he considers it as fairly minor to his overriding view. This concept held that if we were to live according to God's rule and be virtuous, we needed to take a cue from the All-Holy Christ and learn to let go of all moral failings and rebellious tendencies in order to live with Him in ever-increasing obedience to His high standard of moral perfection[4].

Paul had his own name because he had the authority to inspire others to emulate this holiness. The enormous tidal surge of compassion and feeling suddenly strengthened the struggling stream of duty, which "had not volume enough to bear man to his goal," and Paul gave the term of faith to this new and powerful effect. This term is so crucial to Paul's religious theory that it has become the focal point of all Pauline theology and conflict. "To believe in Christ is to be joined to him, to love him, to be one with him," but how? All of Paul's teaching boils down to this, and it is sufficient, he responds, "By dying with Him." To the law of the body, we must die with Christ, and to the law of the mind, we must live with Christ. After death, to rise with Christ is to dwell with Him forever. It suggests the Resurrection. Arnold is once again forced to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Catholic perspective. He cannot dispute Paul's unwavering belief in the tangible, material actuality of Christ's bodily Resurrection. Although he acknowledges this reality, he believes that Paul emphasizes the spiritual meaning of it far more. According to Paul, "resurrection is the rising, within the sphere of our earthly existence, from death in this sense to life in this sense."

Death, in Paul's view, is living according to the flesh; life, mortifying the body by the spirit. However, despite the fact that St. Paul uses the term "resurrection" so often in this ethereal and mystical meaning, it is certain that he also, and frequently, employs it in its literal and physical sense. In that regard, it suggests that Christ really died on the cross. What does St. Paul teach about that Death? Not that it was a replacement, satisfaction, appeasement of wrath, or expiation of guilt, but that in it and by it "Christ parted with what, to men in general, is the most precious of things individual self and selfishness; He pleased not Himself, obeyed the spirit of God, died to sin and to the law in our members, consummated upon the Cross this death"; in all this, He sought to demonstrate to His followers that whosoever would cease from sin. Arnold thus sums up his general contention: "The three essential terms of Pauline theology are not, therefore, as popular theology makes them calling, justification, sanctification; they are rather these: dying with Christ, resurrection from the dead, growing into Christ."

And thus, he concludes his controversy with the theologians who have misinterpreted their favorite Apostle: "It is to Protestantism, and its Puritan Gospel, that the reproaches thrown on St. Paul, for sophisticating religion of the heart into theories of the head about election and justification, rightly attach. St. Paul himself, as we have seen, begins with seeking righteousness and ends with finding it; from first to last the practical religious sense never deserts him. If he could have seen and heard our preachers of predestination and justification, they are just the people he would have called 'diseased about questions and word-battling.' He would have told Puritanism that every Sunday when in all its countless chapels it reads him and preaches from him, the veil is upon its heart. The moment it reads him right, a veil will seem to have been taken away from its heart; it will feel as though scales were fallen from its eyes.... The doctrine of Paul will arise out of the tomb where for centuries it has lain covered; it will edify the Church of the future; it will have the consent of happier generations, the applause of less superstitious ages. All, all, will be too little to pay half the debt which the Church of God owes to this 'least of the apostles, who was not fit to be called an apostle, because he persecuted the Church of God'[5]."

The articles from the Cornhill Magazine's October and November 1869 issues that the preceding pages provide the material for were published. Whether or not I have rendered St. Paul's ideas with perfect correctness, there is no doubt that the confidence with which these people regarded their conventional rendering of them was quite baseless, made them narrow and intolerant, and prevented all progress, said Arnold in a jubilant letter on November 13 that was published in the organs of the Independent and the Baptist Churches. In due time, that "last paper" emerged, and it articulated the Church of England's position as the historical and ongoing Church in this country with a frankness that would have pleased Bishop Stubbs or Professor Freeman. It traced, briefly but very clearly, the history and development of the Universal Church, justified the Church of England in separating from Rome due to Rome's moral corruptions, condemned the Nonconformists for separating, and asserted with equal directness that Protestantism, with its three notable tenets of predestination, original sin, and justification, "has been pounding away for three centuries at St. Paul's wrong words, and missing his essential doctrine." They would merely be following their natural inclination, which commands all Christians to worship together, by doing this. "Securus colitorbis terrarum" - those who pursue a goal in concert do so most successfully. Because they clearly have a tendency to pursue it jointly, barring external circumstances, as the history of the Church's expansion demonstrates.

The two papers on St. Paul and Protestantism, along with the one on Puritanism and the Church of England, were published in 1870 in a single volume with the same name. Arnold prefixed a preface to this volume, enforcing his doctrine with some vehement jabs at dissenting MP Winterbotham for bragging about his "watchful jealousy" attitude; at Mill for his "almost feminine vehemence of irritation" against the Church of England; at FaSt. Paul and Protestantism gained him a hearing from clergymen, religious teachers, and amateur theologians, just as Culture and Anarchy first got its author a hearing from politicians and social reformers. Dr. Vaughan, who had just been appointed Master of the Temple, was moved to preach a sermon, pointing out what indeed was true enough that Arnold omitted from St. Paul's teaching any mention of the Divine Pardon. I think it is and that it is significant because it establishes an unbreakable foundation for how we utilize the Bible and its language. The Bishop of Manchester told me that while it had been strikingly unfamiliar to him, the more he considered it, the more he believed it to be true.

He himself was delighted with this success. He hoped to exercise a "healing and reconciling influence" in the troubled times which he saw ahead; "and it is this which makes me glad to find what I find more and more that I have influence." He delighted in finding that the "May Meetings" abounded in comments on St. Paul and Protestantism. "We shall see," he exclaims gleefully, "great changes in the Dissenters before long." "The two things the position of the Dissenters and the right reading of St. Paul and the New Testamentary closely connected; and I am convinced the general line I have taken as to the latter has a lucidity and inevitableness about it which will make it more and more prevail." The book soon reached a second edition, and he wrote thus about it to his friend Charles Kingsley: "I must have the pleasure of sending you, as soon as it is reprinted, a little book called St. Paul and Protestantism, which the Liberals and physicists thoroughly dislike, but which I had great pleasure and profit in thinking out and writing." He had exalted the Church of England as the historic Church in this land; scorned the "hole-and-corner religions" of separatism; advised the Dissenters to submit to Episcopal government and return to the Church and strengthen its preaching power; and he had re-stated, in terminology of his own, what he believed to be St. Paul's teaching on religion. This work was finished. "We must discover for the Bible some other foundation than that which the Churches ascribe to it, a demonstrable basis and not an assumption, if we want the public to accept a religion of the Bible. The people may acquire this new version of the

Bible's religion; they will not obtain the present version[6]. He sets out on this enterprise by repeating what he had said in *St. Paul and Protestantism* about the misunderstandings which had arisen from affixing to certain phrases such as grace, new birth, and justification, a fixed, rigid, and quasi-scientific meaning. "Terms which with St. Paul are literary terms, theologians have employed as if they were scientific terms." In saying this he goes no further than several of his predecessors and contemporaries on the Liberal side in theology. Even so orthodox a divine as Dr. Vaughan laid it down that "Nothing in the Church's history has been more fertile in discord and error than the tendency of theologians to stereotype metaphor. "Bishop Hampden's much-criticized Bampton Lectures had merely aimed at stating the accepted doctrines in terms other than those derived from schoolmen and metaphysicians. Dean Stanley's unrivalled powers of literary exposition were consistently employed in the same endeavour. To call Abraham a Sheikh was only an ingenious attempt at naturalizing Genesis. But in *Literature and Dogma* Arnold applies this method far more fundamentally.

According to him, even "God" is a literary term to which a scientific sense has been arbitrarily applied. He pronounces, without waiting to prove, that there is absolutely no foundation in reason for the idea that God is a "Person, the First Great Cause, the moral and intelligent Governor of the Universe." We are not to dream that He is a "Being who thinks and loves"; or that we can love Him or address our prayers to Him with any chance of being heard. What then, according to Arnold, is God? and here he answers with his celebrated definition. God is a "stream of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for Righteousness," or good conduct. Because this power works eternally and unchangeably, it is called "The Eternal," which thus becomes a sort of nickname for God. And as for our relations with God, called by most people Religion, well "Religion is morality touched by Emotion." This, and nothing more. The Israelites, he was always insisting, had a strong sense of Righteousness, or Conduct; and they found happiness in pursuing it; the enjoyment of Righteousness was their religion, and this simple conception held its own for generations; but, by the time of the Maccabees, the Israelites had become familiar with the idea of a resurrection from the dead and an afterlife[7].

"Israel, who originally followed righteousness because he felt that it tended to life, might and did naturally come at last to follow it because it would enable him to stand before the Son of Man at His coming, and to share in the triumph of the Saints of the Highest." This, says Arnold, was Extra-belief, "Aberglaube," belief beyond what is certain and veritable. "Extra-belief is the poetry of life." The Messianic ideas were the poetry of life to Israel in the age when Jesus Christ came. When He came, Israel was looking for a Messiah; and, when He began to preach, the better conscience of Judaism recognized in His teaching a new aspect of religion which it had desired. National Righteousness had been the idea of the older Judaism. Personal righteousness was the idea of the New Teaching. "Jesus took the individual Israelite by himself apart, made him listen for the voice of his conscience, and said to him in effect: 'If everyone would mend one, we should have a new world.'" A Teacher so winning, so acceptable, so in unison with Israel's higher aspirations must surely be the Messiah whom earlier generations had expected; and so, in virtue of the purity and nobility of His teaching, Jesus Christ attained His unique position.

He became, in popular acceptance, the Great, the Unique Man, in some sense the Son of God, Prophet and Teacher of the new and nobler morality. So there grew up "a personal devotion to Jesus Christ, who brought the doctrine to His disciples and made a passage for it into their hearts." And almost immediately after "Aberglaube" regathered; and devotion to Jesus took the form of an Extra-belief of some future advent in splendour and terror, the destruction of His enemies, and the triumphs of His followers. And this process of development, begun

while Christ was still on earth, extended with great rapidity after His death. "As time went on, and Christianity spread wider and wider among the multitude, and with less and less of control from the personal influence of Jesus, Christianity developed more and more its side of miracle and legend; until to believe Jesus to be the Son of God meant to believe other points of the legend. His preternatural conception and birth, His miracles, His bodily resurrection, His ascent into heaven, and his future triumphant return to judgment. And from the accounts of Jesus, popular religion extrapolated these and similar issues as the fundamentals of believing[8].

He then moves on to the attempts made by contemporary theology to prove the veracity of Christianity through prophecy and miracle. With regard to prophecy, he has little difficulty in demonstrating that predictions have frequently failed and that passages in the Old Testament have been interpreted as relating to Christ, which probably had no such reference. The human mind is moving away from them as its experience grows. And for this reason: it sees, as its experience widens, how they arise." Our duty, then, if we love Jesus Christ and value the New Testament, is to make men see that the claim of Christianity to our allegiance is not based upon Miracles, but rests on quite other grounds, substantial and indestructible. The good faith of the writers of the New Testamentthe "reporters of Jesus," as Arnold oddly calls themis admitted; but, if we are to read their narratives to any profit, we must convince ourselves of their "liability to mistake." Excited, impassioned, wonder-loving disciples surrounded the simplest acts and words of Christ with a thaumaturgical atmosphere, and, when He merely exercised His power of moral help and healing, the "reporters" declared that He cured the sick and drove out evil spirits.

In brief, when the "reporters" narrated miracles wrought by Christ, they were deceived; but, in spite of that, they were excellent men, and our obligations to them are great. "Reverence for all who, in those first dubious days of Christianity, chose the better part, and resolutely cast in their lot with 'the despised and rejected of men'! Thank you to everyone who, when the tradition was still young, contributed via their writings to preserve and clarify the priceless record of Jesus's teachings and life!"The Church, which has preserved their written tradition and kept it concurrently with her own oral tradition, has fallen into enormous and fundamental delusion about those "words" and that "life." According to Arnold, that record, as they wrote it, is brimming with errors, both in fact and in interpretation. The birth, ministry, and death of Christ, however, are now seen by our culture's dominant religion as being completely prodigious and full of miraclesyet miracles do not occur.

It has been noted that any man, woman, or child that has ever lived could have said this, and have caused no startling sensation; however, when Arnold uttered these words, emphasized them, and seemed to base his case against the Catholic creed upon them, it has been noted that any man, woman, or child that has ever lived might have said this, and have caused no startling sensation."Miracles do not happen" shattered the Rev. Robert Elsmere's faith. That long-legged weakling, with his auburn hair and "boyish innocence of mood," and sweet ignorance of the wicked world, went down, it will be remembered, like a ninepin before the assaults of a skeptical squire who had studied in Germany. It has not even been mentioned in a single sentence what tools the Rector used or what blows he made for it.The ruthless Squire persisted, and Elsmere apparently read Literature and Dogma, and when he came to "Miracles do not happen" he resigned; threw up his Orders; and founded what Arnold would have called "a hole-and-corner" religion of his.

Well, but it may be urged, Elsmere is after all only a fictitious character, taken from a novel purporting, as Bishop Creighton said, to describe a man who once was a Christian and ceased to be one, but really describing a man who never was a Christian, and eventually found it out.

This, of course, is true, but it must be presumed that the Reverend Robert is not absolutely the creature of a vivid imagination, but stands for some real men and women who, in actual life, came under the author's observation. If that be so, we must admit that Arnold's dogma about Miracles had a practical effect upon certain minds. An Elsmere of a different type a flippant Elsmere, if such a portent could be conceived might have answered that, if miracles happened, they would not be miracles; in other words, that events of frequent occurrence are not called miracles; and that it belongs to the idea of a miracle that it is a special and signal suspension of the Divine Law, for a great purpose and a great occasion. If, again, Robert, eschewing flippancy, had retired on abstract theory, he might have said that an event so unique and so transcendent as the assumption of human nature by Eternal God seems to demand, in the fitness of things, a method of entry into the material world, and a method of departure from it, wholly and strikingly dissimilar to the established order in common parlance, miraculous. Answers conceived in these two senses some rough and popular and declamatory, some learned and argumentative and scientific appeared in great numbers. "Grave objections are alleged against the book[9].

DISCUSSION

The interesting development of Matthew Arnold from a renowned poet and cultural critic to a notable theological critic raises crucial issues about the connections between literature, theology, and cultural criticism in the Victorian period. We will go into further detail about the main features of this transition in this discussion, as well as the consequences it has for how we comprehend Arnold's contributions to theological criticism and his critique of Puritanism's presentation of St. Paul. Arnold's shift from poetry and cultural criticism to religion wasn't sudden; rather, it happened gradually. His writings, lectures, and private letters all reveal this evolution. It shows how adaptable he was to the Victorian era's shifting intellectual and cultural landscape. It might be helpful to put Arnold's development as a theological critic into perspective by talking about the significant turning points and influences in his intellectual life. Arnold's method of theological critique was unique in that it placed a strong focus on moral necessity, culture, and reason. He sought to reconcile religion and reason, in contrast to orthodox theologians, by approaching religious texts and doctrine through a critical and literary perspective. Understanding his contribution to theological critique requires examining his distinctive approach to analyzing religious concepts and their societal ramifications.

Arnold's assessment of Puritanism's understanding of St. Paul's teachings was a key component of his theological criticism. Puritanism, known for its rigid and sometimes austere approach to Christianity, had a big impact on religious ideas throughout the Victorian period. Arnold gives insight on the complexities of religious interpretation at the period via his examination of how Puritanism selectively accentuated certain parts of St. Paul's teachings while underplaying others.

The wider religious and cultural discussions of the 19th century are reflected in Arnold's rise as a theological critic. Due to the difficulties presented by scientific breakthroughs and the conflict between tradition and modernity, the Victorian age was characterized by significant shifts in religious practices and beliefs. As a reaction to these difficulties and as an effort to reconcile religion and reason in a changing world, Arnold's work might be understood as an attempt to do both. As academics and theologians continue to debate issues of religion, culture, and reason, the influence of Matthew Arnold's theological critique remains. His method of religious criticism, which is rooted in literature and culture, provides an insightful viewpoint for current arguments on the role of religion in a secular society. The rise of Matthew Arnold as a theological critic emphasizes the use of interdisciplinary methods in the

investigation of religion and literature. His aptitude for bridging the fields of literary criticism, theology, and cultural criticism is an example of the depth that may result from interdisciplinary research.

CONCLUSION

Finally, Matthew Arnold's development as a theological critic and his exposure of Puritanism's image of St. Paul provide an enthralling prism through which to examine the dynamic interaction between literature, religion, and society in the Victorian period. Discussions on faith, reason, and the function of religion in the contemporary world are still influenced by his contributions to theological critique, which are still relevant today. Arnold's distinct viewpoint serves as a reminder of the persistent influence of literature and cultural criticism on how we comprehend difficult theological concerns.

REFERENCES

- [1] W. Lin *et al.*, "Structural Basis of Mycobacterium tuberculosis Transcription and Transcription Inhibition," *Mol. Cell*, 2017, doi: 10.1016/j.molcel.2017.03.001.
- [2] S. Lecourt, "Matthew Arnold and religion's cosmopolitan histories," *Victorian Literature and Culture*. 2010. doi: 10.1017/S1060150310000124.
- [3] A. Coté, "Imagined Spiritual Communities in Britain's Age of Print," *Victorians Inst. J.*, 2015, doi: 10.5325/victinstj.43.1.0260.
- [4] J. J. Franklin, *Spirit Matters: Occult Beliefs, Alternative Religions, and the Crisis of Faith in Victorian Britain*. 2018. doi: 10.5325/victinstj.45.1.0235.
- [5] A. Tam, U. Arnold, M. B. Soellner, and R. T. Raines, "Protein prosthesis: 1,5-Disubstituted[1,2,3]triazoles as cis-peptide bond surrogates," *J. Am. Chem. Soc.*, 2007, doi: 10.1021/ja075865s.
- [6] J. C. Trueswell and M. K. Tanenhaus, *Approaches to studying world-situated language use : bridging the language-as-product and language-as-action traditions*. 2005.
- [7] J. S. Dorman, *Chosen People: The Rise of American Black Israelite Religions*. 2013. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195301403.001.0001.
- [8] J. H. Mason, *The value of creativity: The origins and emergence of a modern belief*. 2017. doi: 10.4324/9781315236643.
- [9] W. Fleeson *et al.*, "The Spanish Electricity System," *Red Eléctrica España*, 2017.

CHAPTER 10

MATTHEW ARNOLD'S CONTROVERSIAL CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE AND THE BIBLE

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@mutit.in

ABSTRACT:

A summary of Matthew Arnold's fascinating investigation of religious theory and the Bible is given in this abstract. Matthew Arnold, a well-known author of the 19th century, took a risky step by challenging and criticizing accepted theological doctrines. This inquiry explores Arnold's bold reading of religious materials, his defiance of conventional Bible readings, and his unconventional evaluation of holy books, notably the Gospels. Examining Arnold's distinctive viewpoint on what constitutes "God" and how people conceptualize the divine reveals the intense debates that surround his beliefs. In contrast to his ambitious entrance into theological topics, Arnold's literary skill, which was developed via his criticism of secular literature, is shown. While he showed a strong eye for analyzing literary works, his use of a similar approach to religion met with much criticism and opposition. He faced fierce resistance because of his propensity to judge religious material indiscriminately, classifying some as traditional and others as out-of-date. This abstract focuses on Arnold's challenges to accepted theological beliefs, particularly his critical assault of Puritanism's Justification theology.

KEYWORDS:

Controversial Critique, Faith, Literary Perspective, Matthew Arnold, Religious Doctrine, The Bible, Theology.

INTRODUCTION

Strong challenges are raised to our interpretation of the Bible writings as a whole, to our account of the Gospels' canon, and to our assessment of the Fourth Gospel. Its findings on the definition of the word "God" and man's ability to understand God are harshly rejected. Arnold might have added one more persuasive critique to those already made. Many of his readers, including some of his most devoted followers, believed that the "sinuous, easy, unpolemical method" he praised and used so gleefully to critique literature and daily life was not serious enough or convincing enough to be used to critique religion. His approach was random from the start." He did a great job of criticizing literature. It was completely within his purview to describe a Macaulay lyric as painful or a Francis Newman phrase as repulsive. It was also within his rights to claim that one author wrote in the Grand Style while another had a note of provinciality. To claim that a Sophocles line was of the purest and most edifying kind of religious poetry, while the Eternal Power disapproved of "such doggerel hymns as Sing Glory, Glory, Glory to the Triune Great God."

Again, this was all fine; issues of this kind exclude debate and evidence. However, this arbitrary approach this inherent and unthinking claim to determine what is good or evil, genuine or false provokes revolt when it comes to managing religion. Nobody criticized Puritanism's doctrine of Justification as harshly as Arnold did, and yet he was equally as certain that man's entire conception of God could be securely based on the fact that at a

particular point in their history, the Jews began using a word that denotes "Eternal" to express God. He appears to believe that by only reciting the biblical phrases "Rejoice and give thanks" and "Rejoice evermore," he has disregarded the more sobering aspects of the Bible's teaching on human life and destiny. His portrayal of the Lord's command to the Apostles is an even more intriguing example of literary self-confidence. Jesus commanding his Apostles to "baptize all nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost" is very implausible, according to one scholar. However, "He may have perfectly well said: 'Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted; whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.'" Arnold believes that one formula is out of date and improbable, while the other is very normal. Although all of this is really fascinating and may be accurate, it is too dogmatic to be persuasive. In this situation, one may politely object that Letters are moving beyond of their purview and that a single individual's opinion of a piece's literary merits, style, and suitability is insufficient justification for casting doubt on its reliability[1].

Arnold's solvent methods and free handling of the sacred text may have been alarming and revolutionary to minds accustomed from childhood to the worship of the letter; to believers in "the Bible and the Bible only" as the ground of their religion. However, they feel harmless on the minds that had long schooled themselves in the Christian tradition; which took the perspective that documents, however well-tested and established, are not the foundation of the Christian religion. He seems to have avoided getting into close quarters with the historical defenders of the Christian Creed. It was easy enough to poke fun at Archbishop Thomson, Bishop Wilberforce, and Bishop Ellicott; Mr. Moody, and the Rev. W. Cattle, and the Rev. Although priests are so discreetly dismissed from court, a layperson may still be heard. One almost wishes that he had lived to handle such a confession of faith as that made by Lord Salisbury in 1894 in a new introduction to *Literature and Dogma*. "The Resurrection of Christ, which I believe, is the main theme for me.

First of all, because it is supported by men whose testimony has been put to the test by the most extreme challenges of willpower and endurance over the course of lengthy lives, and who have had every chance to witness and know. Second, due of the wonderful impact it made on the globe. The growth and dominance of Christianity are unparalleled as moral phenomena. I cannot accept that massive moral repercussions may exist without a reason any more than I can accept that the magnet's many movements lack a cause, even though I am unable to fully explain them. Anyone who accepts Christ's Resurrection will have minimal trouble with the other points. Anyone who holds that conviction will have no reason to question that the messages Paul, Peter, Mark, and John brought were inspired by God. The same may be said of St. Matthew. The generation of Christians who saw and heard the others have given St. Luke their approval.

Arnold, who is known to have liked and memorialized one Dean of Westminster, would he have allowed the testimony of another layperson? "The Church has always believed in the Resurrection of Christ, and she continues to believe in it now. Because she is older than the oldest of her documents and has passed down the message of the first Easter morning" "The Lord is risen indeed" "from father to son throughout the centuries, the Church would still shout her Easter praises and offer her Easter sacrifice of thanksgiving even if all the documents that recount the story of the first Easter Day were to vanish. Three editions of *Literature and Dogma* were published in 1873, a fourth in 1874, a fifth in 1876, and the "popular edition" in 1883. Nevertheless, despite various criticism, *Literature and Dogma* was well received. As usual, he was serenely pleased with his work. In an 1874 letter to his sister, he wrote: "It will more and more become evident how entirely religious is the work which I have done in *Literature and Dogma*. Ten years later, he wrote from Cincinnati: "What strikes

me in America is the number of friends Literature and Dogma has made me, amongst ministers of religion especially and how the effect of the book here is conservative.

The enemies of religion see this well enough already."He started responding to the book's many critiques in the *Contemporary Review* for October 1874, and in a letter to Lady de Rothschild in November of the same year, he urged her to read his answer in the most recent issue. The completed reply was published as *God and the Bible* in 1875. It was a reassertion and development of the previous work, and was written, as the preface said, "for a reader who is more or less conversant with the Bible, who can feel the attraction of the Christian religion, but who has not yet made up his mind as to whether or not to accept Christianity." Whatever the circumstances, he will fairly handle this important religious issue. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate to such a guy that his honesty will be rewarded, just as it was with *Literature and Dogma*.

I write in order to persuade the religious enthusiast that he would not lose anything by developing serious intellectual habits.As Mr. Gladstone rightly noted, he was "placed, by his own peculiar opinions, in a position far from auspicious with respect to this particular undertaking." In 1877, he set himself the task of convincing the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution that Bishop Butler was an unreliable guide in that mysterious region which lies between Philosophy and Religion. He mixed a fierce fervor for Christianity with a not less brazenly professed resolve to change it so that neither friend nor adversary would be able to recognize it. As a result, he felt somewhat compelled to denounce Bishop Butler's creation, which in a way gives it a fresh charter[2].

This is the argument against the Deists which he puts into Butler's mouth: "You all concede a Supreme Personal First Cause, the almighty and intelligent Governor of the Universe; this, you and I both agree, is the system and order of nature. But you are offended at certain things in revelation.... Well, I will show you that in your and my admitted system of nature there are just as many difficulties as in the system of revelation." And on this, says Arnold, he does show it, "and by adversaries such as his, who grant what the Deist or Socinian grants, he never has been answered, he never will be answered. The spear of Butler's reasoning will even follow and transfix the Duke of Somerset, who finds so much to condemn in the Bible, but 'retires into one unassailable fortress faith in God.'" Butler's method, then, is allowed to be potent enough to crush all such half-believers as still clung to the idea of a Personal God and Intelligent Ruler; but it had no force or cogency against such as, following Arnold, attenuated the idea of God into a Stream of Tendency.

In his book *Bishop Butler and the Zeitgeist*, he developed this theme with great inventiveness and characteristic dogmatism; however, since attacking the teaching of a man whose brilliance and character one recognizes as among the formative influences of one's life is one of the most distasteful tasks one can undertake, I will leave the conclusion of this misguided endeavor to be summarized by Butler's great defender, Mr. Gladston. It is impossible to absolve Mr. Arnold of the charge of a carelessness implying levity and of an ungovernable bias towards finding fault. Mr. Arnold himself will probably suffer more from his own censures than the great Christian philosopher who is the subject of them. And it is well for him that his criticisms remain wholly isolated and unsupported.It is time to ask what tangible impact his literature (and a significant amount that came after it in a similar fashion) had on the religious philosophy of his day. In the lack of any conclusive or universal evidence, one can only respond to this issue in the context of one's personal experience.

According to the current author's own knowledge, Robert Elsmere's peculiar situation was an isolated occurrence. He has obviously known a lot of folks who, regrettably! They either saw

revealed Religion the Gospel and the recognized Faith of the Churches a meaningless fairy tale or with bitter and enraged contempt. However, in each of these instances, disagreement with the Christian doctrine was based on denials that went far further than "Miracles do not happen." Instead, it was based on a glaring inability to comprehend the concepts of God, authorized evil, sin, its effects and cure, and life beyond death. Men who were able to comprehend these secrets were not bothered by trivial issues like miracle, prophecy, and literary analysis. To cite an example from another article the author has written, they weren't swayed by Robert Elsmere or convinced by *Lux Mundi*. They were even less stirred by Matthew Arnold's literary dogmatism. Many individuals disapproved of his mannerisms, techniques, and pictures, as well as the guy himself despite not knowing him. However, as he correctly noted, no one would have read him if he had written in the manner in which his detractors wanted him to write. As a result, he continued in his "sinuous, easy, unpolemical" manner, while his detractors turned a deaf ear and "flocked all the more eagerly to Messrs.

Moody and Sankey."When M. Arnold brings up religious issues, Mr. Gladstone said in 1895, "It is very difficult to maintain one's composure. His patronage of a Christianity fashioned by himself is to me more offensive and trying than rank unbelief."However, there were also those and we might hope the vast majority who, whether or not they knew the man, appreciated his techniques, adored his temper, and had no trouble separating what was good from what was terrible in his teaching, just as he had done with his teacher, Wordsworth. Thus, a Catholic priest who now serves in the English Church after formerly serving in the Roman Church, relates the support he received from Arnold during a difficult moment. "I started reading Matthew Arnold in 1882; first his prose, then his verse. For several years I read him over, over, and over again with growing delight and profit; until, so far as I was able to understand something of his mind and methods. He taught me how to think, and how to write. He undoubtedly saved me from leaving the Papal Church a dull and blank mat[3].

This is a wonderful homage to everything that was most admirable and distinctive in his teaching. Without a doubt, by insisting on the connection between letters and religion, he helped many young men read their Bibles with more comprehension and appreciation and gave many who are outside the church the opportunity to experience the spirit and allure of Christianity for the first time. In addition, persons who were established in age, rank, and orthodoxy sensed his assistance and recognized it. A divine so profoundly Evangelical as Bishop Thorold larded his sermons and charges with excerpts from Arnold's prose and verse. When he delivered an address on "The Church of England" to a gathering of clergy at Sion College, he tells us that "Clergyman on clergyman turned on the Chairman" (who had scented heresy), "and said they agreed with me far more than with him."

Arnold had dinner with Archbishop Benson in 1893 and "thought it a gratifying marvel, considering what things I have published"; yet, the wonder had become so commonplace that it had nearly lost its novelty. This was undoubtedly made possible by the charisma with which he interacted and conducted himself. Anyone who knew him found it difficult to take significant offense at anything he wrote. Similar to how a friend saw Coleridge's metaphysics as "only his fun," Arnold's theology was seen by his fans as a component of his humor. It was challenging to separate what he really intended to teach from his jokes about the Celestial Council-Chamber's hangings, "Willesden beyond Trent," "Change Alley and Alley Change," Professor Birks' procession to the Temple of Aphrodite while "his brows were crowned with myrtle," and the Duke of Somerset "running into the strong tower" of Deism where he believed himself "safe" from further interrogation.

This manner of presentation gave the subject it was illustrating a comical aspect, and the critic only had himself to blame if his critique failed to shake people's trust in Biblical

doctrine. The fact that he was such a staunch supporter of the Church of England had a role in how well-liked he became among nobles and clerics. He was always in favor of the idea of Established Churches as a component of the larger idea of expanding the reach of the State everywhere, but he recognized the difficulty in upholding them in places like Scotland where all they had to offer was "a religious service that is perhaps the most dismal performance ever invented by man" and a theology that was shared by all nearby non-established bodies. No such issue arose in the case of the Church of England, with its historical claim, its seemly worship, and its unique teaching; as a result, he was the Church's steadfast defender as established by law. He was always implacable against ugly, repulsive, or rawness, whether it showed itself in real life or in writing, and this attitude undoubtedly explains a large portion of his animosity of Dissent. Margate, in his opinion, was a "brick-and-mortar image of English Protestantism, representing it in all its prose, all its uncomeliness let me add, all its salubrity." When he objected to the idea of allowing dissenters to bury their dead according to their own rituals in national churchyards, he compared the dissenting Service to a reading from Eliza Cook and the Church's Service to He cannot publicly admit the truth since he is with his Festus Chamberlain and Drusilla Collings, but he does so in his heart, as stated in the phrase "Scio, rex Agrippa, quia credis[4]."

Arnold had the deepest appreciation for the grace, poetry, and victoriousness of Catholic worship and life. He dwelled with delighted interest on Eugénie de Guérin's devotional practices, her happy Christmas in the soft air of Languedoc, her midnight Mass, and her beloved Confession. He said, "The need for beauty is a real and ever rapidly growing need in man; Puritanism cannot satisfy it, Catholicism and the Church of England can." No one has written more warmly about the Mass itself, despite the fact that he rejected the basic teaching that the Mass is based on. "Once you admit the miracle of the 'atoning sacrifice,' once you move in this order of ideas, what can be more natural and beautiful than to imagine this miracle every day repeated, Christ offered in thousands of places, everywhere the believer enabled to enact the work of redemption and unite himself with the Body whose sacrifice saves him?" among actuality, he had a deep understanding of worship as different from prayer and as the particular purpose of a religious assembly, which is unusual among Protestants.

In religion, he said, there are two parts: the part of thought and speculation, and the part of worship and devotion. It does not help me to think a thing more clearly, that thousands of other people are thinking the same; but it does help me to worship with more devotion, that thousands of other people are worshipping with me. He wrote on the flyleaf of a prayer book given to a child, we have seen His Star in the East, and are come to worship Him. Worship should have as little of what divides us in it as possible, and it should be as much as possible a common and public act," he argues. He cites Joubert once more: "The best prayers are those that have nothing distinctive about them, and which are thus of the nature of simple adoration." He continued, "Unity and continuity in public religious worship are a need of human nature, an eternal aspiration of Christendom.

A Catholic Church transformed is, I believe, the Church of the future. He said that Catholic worship "is likely, however modified, to survive as the general worship of Christians, because it is the worship which, in a sphere where poetry is permissible and natural, unites most of the elements of poetry." "Your letter has reached me here, where I am staying with Lord Coleridge, the Lord Chief Justice, who is a grand-nephew of the poet. He loves literature, and, being a great deal richer than his grand-uncle, or than poets in general, has built a library from which I now write, and on which I wish that you could feast your eyes with me. The Church Congress has just been held, and shows as usual that the clergy have no idea of the real situation; but indeed, the conservatism and routine in religion are such in

England that the line taken by the clergy cannot be wondered at. Nor are the conservatism and routine a bad thing, perhaps, in such a matter; but the awakening will one day come, and there will be much confusion.

Have you looked at Tolstoi's books on religion: in French they have the titles *Ma Religion*, *Ma Confession*, *Que Faire?* The first of these has been well translated, and has excited much attention over here; perhaps it is from this side, the socialist side that the change is likely to come: the Bible will be retained, but it will be said, as Tolstoi says, that it's true, socialistic teaching has been overlooked, and attention has been fixed on metaphysical dogmas deduced from it, which are at any rate, says Tolstoi, secondary. He does not provoke discussion by denying or combating them; he merely relegates them to a secondary position. And now that we have enquired into Arnold's influence on theology, it is, perhaps, proper to ask what he himself believed. His faith seems to have been, by a curious paradox, far stronger on the Christian than on the Theistic side. "A Stream of Tendency" can never satisfy the idea of God, as ordinary humanity conceives it. It is not in human nature to love a stream of tendency, or worship it, or ask boons of it; or to credit it with powers of design, volition, or creation. A prayer beginning "Stream" would sound as odd as Wordsworth's ode beginning "Spade[5]."

The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ; and he placed salvation in conformity to that teaching, as it is explained by St. Paul. However, as we have already seen, he had an unending admiration homage which did not stop far short of worship for the character and teaching of Jesus Christ; and this meant death to sin; the abrogation and annulment of bad habits and tendencies; and resurrection with Christ to the higher life which He taught us to pursue. Nothing more dogmatic than this could safely be put forward as representing his theology; but, though not dogmatic, his mind was intensely ecclesiastical. His contempt for individual whims and fancies, his love of corporate action and collective control, operated as powerfully in the religious as in the social sphere. He admired and clung to the Church of England because it was not, like Miss Cobbe's new religion and the British College of Health, the product of an individual fancy, setting out to make all things new on a plan of its own.

The Church of England, whether it could theologically be called "Catholic" or not, was certainly "the continuous and historical Church of this country." In 1869 he praised his friend Temple, afterwards Archbishop, for "showing his strong Church feeling, and sense of the value and greatness of the historic development of Christianity, of which the Church is the expression." It was the National organ for promoting Righteousness and Perfection by means of Culture and for diffusing Sweetness and Light. In the last year of his life, he wrote to Mr. Lionel Tollemache: "I consider myself, to adopt your very good expression, a Liberal Anglican; and I think the times are in favor of our being allowed so to call ourselves." He believed that the Church must maintain Episcopacy as a matter of historical development, as well as "its link with the past its share in the beauty and the poetry and the charm for the imagination," which belong to Catholicism. This being the case, he believed that the "latitudinarianism of the Broad Churchmen" who wished to entice the Dissenters into the Church was "quite illusory" as long as opposition to Episcopacy was maintained.

He had no more sympathy with hysterical devotions than with fanatical faiths, so far as his practice was concerned, and he observed with amusement the gestures and behavior of the "Energumens" during the celebration of Holy Communion in a Ritualistic church "the floor of the church strewn with what seem to be the dying and the dead, progressing toward death" This was a perfectly just criticism on the nascent ritualism of thirty years ago. Time and study have pruned this devotional exuberance, but he rightly described what he saw.

With such performances he had no sympathy; but he loved what he had been accustomed to the grave and reverend method of worship which was traditional in our cathedrals and college chapels. He communicated by preference at an early service. He revelled in the architecture of our great churches, and enjoyed, though he did not understand, their fine music. And he added one or two little mannerisms of his own, which were clearly intended to mark his love of ecclesiastical proprieties. Thus, the present writer remembers that he used, with great solemnity and deliberation, to turn to the east at the Creed in Harrow School Chapel, where the clergy neglected to do so. It was the traditional mode of the Church of England, and that was enough for him. Again, we all know that he described the Athanasian Creed as "Learned science with a strong dash of temper"; yet I remember him saying, with an air of stately admiration, after Service on Ascension Day, "I always like to hear the Athanasian Creed sung. BUT ONE GOD sounds amazing, especially with the organ's full swell. It seems to be accompanied by all of the Church's power. The list of his favorite religious authors, however, reflects his devotional practices' taste and temperament exactly.

It includes Cardinal Newman, whom he had listened to with great pleasure when he was an undergraduate, St. Augustine, the "glorious father of the Catholic Church," "the nameless author of the Imitation," Bishop Thomas Wilson, whose Maxims and Sacra he frequently quoted, Isaac Barrow, whose sermons he used to read to his family on Sunday evenings, and St. Arnold was true to his own doctrine that we must cultivate our best selves in every department of our being, and be content with nothing less than our predestined performance, from first to last. In too many cases, the transition from an account of a man's religious sentiment to that of his daily life would be abrupt and even painful; however, in the case of Arnold, it is the easiest and most natural in the world. Before all else he was a worshipper of nature, watching all her changing aspects with a lover-like assiduity, and never happy in a long-continued separation from her.

Then his manifold culture and fine taste enabled him to appreciate at its proper value all that is good in high civilization, and yet the unspool naturalness of his character found a zest in the most commonplace pleasures of daily existence. Probably Art, whether in music or painting, affected him less than most men of equal cultivation; but there never lived a human being to whom Literature and Society books and people taking each word in its most comprehensive sense, yielded a livelier or more constant joy. "Never," as Mr. John Morley said, "shall we know again so blithe and friendly a spirit." As we think of him, the endearing traits come crowding on the memory his gracious presence, his joy in fresh air and bodily exercise, his merry interest in his friends' concerns, his love of children, his kindness to animals, his absolute freedom from bitterness, rancor, or envy; his unstinted admiration of beauty, or cleverness, his frank enjoyment of light and colour, of a happy phrase, an apt quotation, a pretty room, a well-arranged dinner, a fine vintage; his childlike pleasure in his own performances "Did I say that? Oh, it was really amazing."

But all these trifling touches of character-painting, perhaps, tend to overlay and obscure the true portraiture of Matthew Arnold. He was pre-eminently a good man, gentle, generous, enduring, laborious, a devoted husband, a most tender father, an unfailing friend. Qualified by nature and training for the highest honours and successes which the world can give, he spent his life in a long round of unremunerative drudgery, working even beyond the limits of his strength for those whom he loved, and never by word or gesture betraying even a consciousness of that harsh indifference to his gifts and services which stirred the fruitless indignation of his friends. His theology, once the subject of such animated criticism, seems now a matter of little moment; for, indeed, his nature was essentially religious. He was loyal to truth as he knew it, loved the light and sought it earnestly, and by his daily and hourly

practice gave sweet and winning illustration of his own doctrine that conduct is three-fourths of human life. He was our fascinating and unfailing guide in the tangled paradise of literature, and while for all this we bless his memory, we claim for him the praise of having inspired us. We can never overstate what we owe to his genius and his sympathy. He showed us the highest ideal of character and conduct. He taught us the science of good citizenship[6].

DISCUSSION

The unusual and provocative analysis of biblical theory and theology by Matthew Arnold continues to be a source of discussion and fascination. His approach to these holy topics and literary background sparked debate in his day and continue to arouse debate among academics and theologians now. We will examine some significant facets of Arnold's contentious criticism in this debate. Arnold's training as a poet and literary critic had a big impact on how he approached religion. His ability to analyze secular literature with accuracy inspired him to see religious materials through a similar critical perspective. This raises significant concerns regarding the relationship between literature and religion and whether or not it is wise to use this method to comprehend religious teaching. A key component of Arnold's criticism was his readiness to question accepted biblical and religious doctrinal interpretations. He challenged long-held views and dared to challenge the prevalent religious dogma. Discussions regarding the development of religious thought and the function of critical thinking in forming religion are sparked by this element of his work. Arnold's notion of "God" was one of the most contentious components of his criticism. He put out a novel interpretation of the divine that went against accepted theological notions. This raises concerns about the nature of God, our ability to understand the divine, and the limits of theological inquiry. The rejection of dogmatism within religious discourse was also a target of Arnold's criticism. He supported open, critical discussion of religious literature as opposed to blind acceptance. Discussions regarding the harmony between faith and reason in religious belief are sparked by this part of his work. Different religious congregations were affected differently by Arnold's strategy. Some were open to his views, while others strongly rejected them. Discussions regarding the flexibility of religion in the face of opposition and the function of dissent within religious traditions are prompted by the variety of responses. In today's religious conversations, Arnold's criticism's issues and concerns are still pertinent. Religious discourse is still shaped by the conflict between tradition and modernity, the need of critical thinking in religion, and the changing readings of holy texts. Arnold's writings, such as "Literature and Dogma," had a significant influence on how religion and literature interacted. His legacy inspires debates on the significance of thinkers and writers in influencing religious discourse as well as the lasting significance of his contributions to the area[7].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Matthew Arnold's contentious criticism of biblical theory and theology continues to pique interest and spark discussion. His work is a significant source for examining the complexity of religion, reason, and the changing nature of religious belief because of his literary viewpoint, pressing conventional interpretations, and reinterpretation of theological notions. The debates around Arnold's criticism prompt us to consider the concepts he presents and how they have affected the larger field of religious interpretation.

REFERENCES

- [1] T. J. Boynton, "Things that are outside of ourselves: Ethnology, colonialism, and the ontological critique of capitalism in Matthew Arnold's criticism," *ELH - English Lit. Hist.*, 2013, doi: 10.1353/elh.2013.0002.

- [2] S. Kozloff, "Notes on sontag and 'jewish moral seriousness' in American movies," in *Project Muse* 4, 2012.
- [3] L. Brake, "The Functions of Criticism and the Politics of Appreciation," *19 Interdiscip. Stud. Long Ninet. Century*, 2018, doi: 10.16995/ntn.8701.
- [4] J. R. Perkin, "Matthew Arnold, the Oxford Movement, and the 'Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse,'" *Christ. Lit.*, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0148333115599910.
- [5] F. Casey, "A Celtic Twilight in Little England: G.K. Chesterton and W.B. Yeats," *Ir. Stud. Rev.*, 2014, doi: 10.1080/09670882.2013.871850.
- [6] N. Wallace, "Matthew Arnold, Edmund Burke, and Irish reconciliation," *Prose Studies*. 2012. doi: 10.1080/01440357.2012.751259.
- [7] T. S. Eliot, "The Three Senses of 'Culture,'" *Notes Towar. Defition Cult.*, 2010.

CHAPTER 11

EXPLORING THE ROLE OF CRITICISM AND CREATIVE POWER IN LITERATURE AND THOUGHT

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

This multidisciplinary investigation explores at the complex interplay between criticism and creative force in the fields of ideas and literature. This research aims to provide light on the dynamic interaction between criticism and creativity as guiding factors that determine the growth of human consciousness and cultural development in an age distinguished by various viewpoints and developing ways of expression. The research starts by deconstructing the complexity of criticism, looking at its origins in history and current applications. It examines how critique, as an intellectual pursuit, has the power to contest, undermine, and question accepted beliefs and ideologies, acting as a spark for novel ideas and literary change. The research also looks at the creative force behind literary and intellectual pursuits. It explores the numerous ways that creativity is expressed, from the written word to the visual and performing arts, demonstrating how creativity has the power to rethink preexisting paradigms and inspire new ones. This study also reveals the delicate balance that exists between criticism and creative force, demonstrating how supportive criticism may fuel the creative process and encourage the production of ground-breaking literary and intellectual works. On the other hand, it investigates situations when criticism could hinder creativity or inspire resistance, provoking thought about the limits and ethics of criticism.

KEYWORDS:

Criticism, Creative Power, Constructive Critique, Ethical Considerations, Intellectual Evolution, Innovation.

INTRODUCTION

Even less should be anticipated from those who are dependent on the creation of "false or malicious criticism," as Wordsworth calls it. However, everyone would agree that a nasty or untrue comment should have never been published. Everyone would agree that the critical faculty is inferior than the innovative faculty as a general principle. But is it really true that criticism is a bad and harmful activity in and of itself? Wouldn't it be much better to spend all the time spent writing comments on other people's works on original creativity, regardless of its genre? Is it true that Wordsworth would have been better off writing his Ecclesiastical Sonnets than his famed Preface, which is so full of criticism and criticism of other people's works? Likewise, is it certain that Johnson would have been better off continuing to write his Lives of the Poets rather than producing more Irenes? Goethe was one of the best critics, and we may honestly congratulate ourselves that he has left us with so much criticism. Wordsworth was a wonderful critic himself, and it is regrettable that he did not leave us with more critique.

Without wasting time on the exaggeration that Wordsworth's judgment on criticism unmistakably contains or an attempt to identify the causes which, in my opinion, are easily traceable that may have contributed to Wordsworth's exaggeration, a critic may benefit from

taking the opportunity to examine his own conscience and consider what real benefit the practice of criticism may be providing to his own mind and spirit, as well as the minds and spirits of others, at any given time. The critical power is inferior than the creative power in rank. True, however there are a few of factors to keep in mind while agreeing with this statement. The fact that man discovers his genuine satisfaction in the exercise of his creative capacity and unrestrained creative activity proves that it is his true role. But it is also undeniable that men may have the sense to use this free creative activity in ways other than by creating outstanding works of literature or art if this were not the case, all but a very small number of men would be excluded from the genuine happiness of all men. They may find it in doing well, in learning, or even in criticizing. One thing to keep in mind is this. Another is that the exercise of the creative power in the creation of great works of literature or art, however high this exercise of it may rank, is not at all epochs and under all conditions possible; as a result, labor may be wasted in trying to make it possible when it could have yielded more fruit in making it possible in the first place [1].

This creative ability uses materials and components; what if it doesn't already have those materials and elements at hand? If so, it must wait until they are prepared. Now, the elements with which the creative power works in literature I will limit myself to literature for the sake of this discussion are ideas; the best ideas, on every subject that literature touches, current at the time. At any rate, we can say with certainty that in contemporary literature, no manifestation of the creative power that does not work with these can be very significant or fruitful. The grand work of literary genius is a work of synthesis and exposition, not of analysis and discovery. Its gift lies in the faculty of being happily inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, by a certain order of ideas, when it finds itself in them. Creative literary genius does not primarily show itself in discovering new ideas; that is more the business of the philosopher. To function freely, however, it needs the right environment and a place in the hierarchy of ideas, both of which are difficult to control. Because two powers the power of the man and the power of the moment must cooperate for the creation of a masterwork of literature, and the man is insufficient without the moment, the great creative epochs in literature are rare, and this is why there is so much that is unsatisfactory in the works of many men of true genius.

The creative power has designated elements for its happy exercise, and those elements are not under its own control. No, the vital power has greater influence over them. The critical power is responsible for seeing an object as it truly is in all fields of knowledge, including theology, philosophy, history, art, and science. As such, it strives to create an intellectual environment in which the creative power can flourish. In order to ensure the better ideas triumph, it tends to build an order of ideas that, although not necessarily true in and of itself, is true in relation to what it replaces. The touch of truth is the touch of life, and when these new ideas spread throughout society, there is a stir and a development that gives rise to literary epochs. Alternatively, to focus our attention and abandon these societal and general intellectual progress issues [2].

The creation of a modern poet, to be valuable, implies a great deal of critical effort behind it; otherwise, it must be a relatively poor, barren, and short-lived affair. Considerations that are prone to become too abstract and impalpable, for example, everyone can see that a poet ought to know life and the world before dealing with them in poetry. This explains why Goethe's poetry had such a strong sense of endurance while Byron's poetry lacked it. Goethe's poetry benefited from a strong critical effort that provided the true materials for it, whereas Byron's did not. Goethe also knew life and the world, the poet's essential subjects, much better than Byron did. He was much more familiar with them and had a better understanding of who they

truly were. Despite the sanguine hopes that accompanied and continue to accompany them, I have long believed that the burst of creative activity in our literature during the first quarter of this century was in fact premature, and that as a result, most of its works are destined to prove no more durable than those of far less glorious eras.

And since it moved forward without having the right information or enough things to work with, it was premature. In other words, although having a lot of vitality and creative power, English poetry during the first 25 years of this century lacked knowledge. This renders Byron so devoid of substance, Shelley so illogical, and Wordsworth, as deep as he is, so deficient in completeness and diversity. Wordsworth disdained Goethe and had little regard for literature. I adore Wordsworth so much that I can't imagine him any other way. It is undoubtedly pointless to think of him as anything other than what he is, to think that he might have been different, but there is one thing that would have made Wordsworth an even better poet than he already is: reading more books, including, undoubtedly, those by the Goethe he disparaged without having read them. However, talking about books and reading might easily cause confusion in this situation. Our poetry at this time did not actually lack for books or reading; Coleridge and Shelley both did a ton of reading.

Pindar and Sophocles didn't have many books; Shakespeare wasn't a serious reader, as we all remark so glibly and often with little understanding of the true significance of what we are saying. True; however, in the Greece of Pindar and Sophocles and in the England of Shakespeare, the poet lived in a current of ideas that were to the greatest extent animating and nourishing to the creative power; society was, to the fullest extent, permeated by fresh thought, intelligent, and alive; and this state of affairs is the true basis for the creative power's exercise, in which it finds its data, its materials, truly ready for its hand. All the books and reading in the world are only valuable. Books and reading can help a person create a world of knowledge and intelligence, even if it doesn't actually exist, in their own minds, where they can live and work. This is in no way a substitute for the nationally diffused life and thought of the epochs of Sophocles or Shakespeare for the artist, but it does actually constitute, if many people participate in it, a quickening and sustenance for such epochs.

When Goethe lived and worked in Germany, the multifaceted education system and the country's long history of collective critical thought created this environment for him. There was no national radiance of life and intellect as in Pericles' Athens or Elizabeth's England. The poet's shortcoming was that. But a big portion of Germans had something like to that in their whole culture and unrestricted thought. His forte was that. In the first part of this century, neither the culture nor the power of study and critique that could be found in Germany, nor the national flame of life and thought that we had in the period of Elizabeth, existed in England. Therefore, a comprehensive interpretation of the universe was inescapably withheld from poetry's creative potential in order for it to succeed in the greatest sense.

At first glance, it appears strange that the enormous upheaval of the French Revolution and its time did not produce a crop of genius works on par with those that emerged from the upheaval of ancient Greece's great productive period or from the upheaval of the Renaissance, which included the influential Reformation. However, the fact remains that the French Revolution's uproar developed a personality that fundamentally set it apart from similar uprisings. These were primarily apolitical intellectual and spiritual revolutions, in which the human spirit sought fulfillment in itself and in the increased exercise of its own energy; the French Revolution assumed a political, practical dimension. The movement that took place in France under the old régime, which lasted from 1700 to 1789, was far more closely related to the Renaissance movement than the Revolution itself; the France of Voltaire

and Rousseau had a much stronger influence on the minds of Europeans than the France of the Revolution [3]. Nay, and the genuine key to how much in our Byron, even in our Words, value is this! Goethe specifically blamed this last for having "thrown quiet culture back. "That they originated from a powerful emotional movement rather than a powerful mental activity. The French Revolution, on the other hand, the subject of such blind love and such blind hatred, undoubtedly found its motivation in the intelligence of men rather than their practical sense; this is what sets it apart from the English Revolution of Charles the First's time; it is also what makes it a more spiritual event than our Revolution, an event of much greater power and global interest, though practically less successful; it appeals to an order of ideas which is which is appeals to Is it rational? was a question posed in 1789. Is it legal? was a question posed in 1642. alternatively, when it had gone the farthest, was it morally right? This is English fashion, which should be regarded with the utmost respect within its own field of endeavor given its phenomenal accomplishment there.

The old woman who threw her stool at the surpliced minister's head in St. Giles' Church in Edinburgh obeyed an impulse to which millions of members of the human race may be permitted to remain strangers. However, what is law in one place is not law in another; what is law here today is not law even here tomorrow; and as for conscience, what is binding on one man's conscience is not binding on another. The tens system is the simplest way to count, according to reason, which is absolute, unchanging, and universally valid. A writer for the Saturday Review, who has given me some style advice for which I am truly grateful, suggests that this should be understood as follows: To take as your unit an established base of notation, with ten being given as the base of notation, is the simplest way to count, except for numbers under twenty. I did try it that way, but I can promise him that I wasn't envious when I said that the more, I considered his enhanced manner of stating the matter, the less I liked it. In my opinion, the maxim would never be accepted in this form in a society where the majority of people are just easy-going.

He neglects the fact that he is a thinker, a follower of the great Bentham, and that he naturally speaks in the scientific style of his school, with exact accuracy, philosophic propriety; I am merely a lone wanderer seeking the light, and I speak in a language that is artless, unstudied, commonplace, and familiar. However, this is the language spoken by the majority of people worldwide. To count by tens has the advantage of taking the base of an as your unit, which is a proposition that every person from here to the Antipodes feels the force of; at least, I would say so, if we didn't live in a country where it's not impossible to wake up one morning and discover a letter in the Times claiming that a decimal coinage is an error; the majority of Frenchmen who felt the force of that prescription of the reason that my reviewer, in his when we take into account how little the mind, or something as noble and energizing as the intellect, contributes to the impulses that, in general, drive large numbers of persons. The French Revolution has a special and still-existing power because of the force, truth, and universality of the ideas it adopted as its law and because of the fervor with which it could inspire a large number of people for these ideas.

It is, and it will likely remain for a very long time, the greatest and most animating event in history. This is despite the extravagant direction given to this enthusiasm as well as the crimes and follies in which it lost itself. France has reaped from hers one fruit, the natural and legitimate fruit, though not quite the grand fruit she expected; she is the country in Europe with the most alive population. Since no sincere passion for the mind is ever completely thrown away and barren of good, even if it turns out to be an unfortunate passion in many ways. But the obsession with giving all these wonderful concepts of the reason an immediate political and practical application proved catastrophic. An Englishman is at home in this

situation, and we could all talk about this subject for hours. And what we have a tendency of saying about it is unquestionably true to a considerable extent. Ideas cannot be valued enough on their own, nor can they be lived with enough; but, to suddenly introduce them into the realms of politics and practice, or to forcefully revolutionize this world to suit them, is quite another [4].

There are two worlds: the world of ideas and the world of practice. The English often advocate for suppressing the former and the French the latter, but neither should be done. I venture to believe a member of the House of Commons who recently said, "That a thing is an anomaly, I consider to be no objection to it what-so-ever," was mistaken; that a thing is an anomaly is an objection to it, but absolutely and in the sphere of ideas; it is not necessarily an objection to it in the sphere of politics and practice, under such and such circumstances, or at such and such a moment. However, right is something moral that calls for an interior acknowledgment and free consent of the will; until we have reached this sensation of perceiving it and wanting it, it is not ready in our eyes. The way we see it and want it when the time comes will determine how the present order of things may shift and transform for us and how it can then legitimately dominate the globe.

Therefore, it is tyranny and should be fought when others try to impose their newly discovered right onto us as if it were ours by forcefully substituting their right for our power. It nullifies the second major portion of our maxim, "force until right is ready." This was the major mistake of the French Revolution, and its intellectual movement, by abandoning the intellectual sphere and rushing headlong into the political one, ran, in fact, a prodigious and memorable course, but failed to bear the same intellectual fruit as the intellectual movement of the Renaissance, and instead produced what I might call an epoch of concentration in opposition to itself. England was the dominant power during that period of concentration, and Burke was the dominant voice.

Burke's writings on the French Revolution are often seen as superfluous and subjugated by the event; as passionate but unphilosophical tirades of prejudice and intolerance. In general, and for those who can make the necessary corrections, what distinguishes these writings is their profound, permanent, fruitful truth; they contain the true philosophy of an epoch of concentration, dispel the heavy atmosphere that its own nature is apt to elicit. I will not deny that they are frequently defaced by the violence and passion of the moment, and that Burke's view was bounded, and his observation therefore at fault. It is Burke's accident that his ideas were at the service of an epoch of concentration, not of an epoch of expansion; it is Burke's characteristic that he so lived by ideas, and had such a source of them welling up within him, that he could even float an epoch of concentration and English Tory politics with them [5].

But Burke is so great because, almost alone in England, he brings thought to bear upon politics, he saturates politics with thought. He is unaffected by Dr. Price and the Liberals' hatred against him, nor is he affected by George the Third and the Tories' admiration for him. His grandeur stems from the fact that he lived in a realm that neither English Liberalism nor English Toryism are likely to enter the world of ideas, not the world of catchphrases and party customs. The claim that he "to party gave up what was meant for mankind" at the very end of his intense battle with the French Revolution is so far from the truth about him. Burke's self-reflection has long struck me as one of the best literary works in English, if not all literature. What I mean by living by ideas is being able to think, to be carried, if need be, by the current of thought to the opposing side of the question, and, like Balaam, to be unable to speak anything other than what the Lord has commanded.

This is what it means to hear only one language spoken around you, to have all of your feelings engaged, and to have your party speak this language like a steam engine and be unable to imagine any other. Nothing is more startling, and I must say, nothing is more un-English. Because the average Englishman thinks that just because something is an abnormality, there is absolutely no reason to oppose to it in any way, much as my buddy the member of parliament. The Englishman has been called a political animal, and he values what is political and practical so much that ideas easily become objects of dislike in his eyes, and thinkers "miscreants," because ideas and thinkers have rashly meddled with politics. He is like the Lord Auckland of Burke's day, who, in a memorandum on the French Revolution, talks of "certain miscreants, assuming the name of philosophers, who have presumed themselves capable of establishing a new system of This would be great if the disdain and disregard remained limited to concepts taken outside of their proper context and hastily interfering with practice, but they are inexorably expanded to concepts as a whole and to the entire life of intelligence; practice is everything, and mind-free play is nothing.

An Englishman hardly ever considers the idea that the free play of the mind on all subjects is a pleasure in and of itself, an object of desire, and an essential provider of elements without which a nation's spirit, whatever compensations it may have for them, must ultimately die of inanition. It is apparent that the word curiosity, which in other languages is used to mean, as a high and fine quality of man's nature, just this disinterested love of a free play of the mind on all subjects, for its own sake, has no equivalent in our language; rather, it has a rather negative and disparaging meaning. However, true criticism is fundamentally the exercise of this very quality. It abides by an instinct that compels it to seek out the best that is known and thought in the world, regardless of practice, politics, and everything else of the sort; and to value knowledge and thought as they approach this best, without the interference of any other considerations whatsoever [6].

I believe that the practical English character has little initial sympathy with this impulse, and what little there was suppressed and blighted for a very long time during the period of concentration that followed the French Revolution. But periods of focus cannot last forever; eventually, periods of expansion come after them. This nation looks to be entering such an era of growth. First and foremost, there is no longer any threat of hostile coercive pressure from foreign beliefs on our practice; as a result, we start to wear our cloak a bit more loosely, like the traveler in the story. After a period of prolonged peace, European ideals gradually and peacefully infiltrate our own beliefs, even if they do so in very little amounts at a time. Additionally, despite everything that has been said about the engulfing and brutalizing effects of our fervent material progress, it seems incontrovertible to me that this progress will eventually likely though not necessarily lead to the emergence of intellectual life.

Man, after he has made himself completely comfortable and must now decide what to do with himself next, may begin to remember that he has a mind, and that the mind may be made the source of great pleasure. To detect this end to our railroads, businesses, and fortune-making is now primarily a privilege of faith, I concede; yet, we will see whether, in this case as in others, faith does not ultimately prove to be the accurate prophet. Our comfort, mobility, and unrestricted freedom to cling as tightly and firmly as we like to the practice that our notions have given rise to all contribute to our propensity to deal a little more freely with these notions themselves, to canvass them a little, and to delve a little deeper into their true nature. We sometimes experience fluttering of interest in the non-American sense, and it is to these that criticism must turn in order to locate its justification.

First, criticism; then, possibly, a period of really creative endeavor, which, as I've already said, must ineluctably be followed by a period of criticism among us; finally, once criticism

has served its purpose. The final thing that English's criticism has to do is figure out what direction it should go in if it wants to take advantage of the opportunities that are presently available to it and produce fruit for the future. One word may best describe the rule: indifference. And how can criticism convey a lack of interest? By remaining detached from practice, by steadfastly adhering to the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play of the mind on all matters it touches, and by steadfastly refusing to lend itself to any of those ulterior, political, and practical considerations about ideas that many people will be sure to attach to them, which may often ought to be attached to them, which in this country at least are certain to be attached to them quite sufficiently, but which nonetheless have no real bearing on them. Its business is, as I've already said, to simply be aware of the greatest information and ideas now available, and by making them public, to foster a current of sound and original concepts. Its job is to carry out this task with unwavering integrity and with the necessary competence; nevertheless, it has no further obligations and must leave any practical implications and application-related concerns alone, as these issues will always get the attention they merit.

Other criticism, in addition to being fundamentally dishonest to its own nature, just follows the same path it has already taken in this nation and will undoubtedly blow this opportunity. What is now the scourge of criticism in our nation? The problem is that practical considerations cling to it and stifle it; it serves interests other than its own. Our organs of criticism are those of men and parties with practical ends to serve, and for them, the pursuit of those practical ends comes first and mental play comes second. All that is required is as much mental play as is compatible with the pursuit of those practical ends. We don't have a publication like the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, whose primary goal is to comprehend and express the best that the world has to offer; instead, we have the *Edinburgh Review*, which was founded by the old Whigs and exists for as much intellectual play as may be appropriate for its being that; and the *Quarterly Review*, which was founded by the Tories and exists for as much intellectual play as may be appropriate for its being that.

And so, it is with all the other political and religious factions in our society; each has its own organ of critique, but the idea of uniting all of these factions for the sake of a free, impartial game of mind is not well received. As soon as this play of mind tries to expand and relax the pressure of practical considerations just a little, it is restrained and made to feel the chain. We recently witnessed this with the *Home and Foreign Review's* unfortunate demise. Perhaps no other organ of criticism in this country had as much knowledge and play of mind, but these were insufficient to save it. The *Dublin Review* subordinates play of mind to the practical business of English [7].

It is inevitable that people will act in sects and parties, that each of these sects and parties will have its own organ, and that it will use this organ to further the goals of its action; however, it would also be beneficial if there were a criticism that was neither the minister of these interests nor their adversary, but completely and utterly unrelated to them. No other critique will ever achieve any genuine authority or find any true path to its goal, which is to generate a stream of true and original ideas. Criticism's best spiritual work, which is to prevent man from a self-satisfaction that is retarding and vulgarizing and to lead him towards perfection by making his mind dwell on what is excellent in itself and the absolute beauty and fitness of things, has been so poorly accomplished in this country because it has so little maintained in the pure intellectual sphere, so little detached itself from practice, and has been so directly polemical and controversial. In order to defend their practice against assault, those who engage in polemical practical critique become oblivious to even its ideal imperfections and voluntarily affirm its ideal perfection, which is obviously limiting and harmful to them [8].

DISCUSSION

An important task that provides insight on the dynamic processes that create our cultural and intellectual landscapes is the investigation of the function of criticism and creative force in literature and philosophy. In this conversation, we'll go further into the essential facets of this complicated connection and think about what it means for modern society.

In the context of literature and ideas, criticism often acts as a motivator for advancement. It calls into question accepted beliefs and conventions and promotes a critical assessment of the current quo. By removing boundaries and igniting new ideas, criticism may advance literature and thinking when it is used properly. Innovation in literature and the mind is driven by creative energy. It takes many different forms, including as artistic creations, musical compositions, and scientific discoveries. Innovative ideas and views are introduced by creative thinkers who challenge conventional wisdom, enhancing our cultural legacy and advancing human understanding. It is complex how criticism and creative power interact. Creators may benefit greatly from constructive criticism, which offers insightful commentary that helps them improve their work and promotes development.

To avoid criticism from strangling innovation or deterring risk-taking, a careful balance must be maintained. Criticism has been crucial in influencing literature and philosophy throughout history. Writing movements like the Enlightenment, which questioned established authority, and thinkers like Socrates serve as examples of how criticism may spark intellectual revolutions. The function of criticism has changed in the digital era, as information is openly shared and many viewpoints may be heard. Instantaneous criticism, both constructive and negative, may be expressed on online platforms, which can have an impact on the development of literary and intellectual conversation. To successfully navigate this environment, one must comprehend how criticism functions in the present period. When contemplating how criticism affects artists and their work, ethical issues come up. It is vital to strike a balance between the right to criticism and the need to value creative speech. How can we encourage frank critique while preventing hurtful or unjustified attacks.

The following are seven reasons why criticism and creativity may be transformative: We learn more about these forces' capacity for transformation by examining the connection between criticism and creative force. They influence not just literature and philosophy, but also how people develop, adapt, and innovate in general. Let's sum up by saying that the function of critique and originality in literature and thinking is a rich and complex subject that is always changing in response to social and technological advancements. For the growth of literature, philosophy, and human civilization as a whole, it is crucial to nurture a culture of intellectual criticism and creative inquiry. This may be done by understanding how these forces interact both historically and in the modern environment.

CONCLUSION

We have discovered a significant and complex link that supports the development of human culture, intelligence, and imagination via our exploration of the relationship between criticism and creative force in literature and philosophy. This investigation has produced a number of significant findings and ideas that need contemplation. First and foremost, criticism shows itself as a strong force for advancement, encouraging us to challenge accepted dogmas and paradigms and foster intellectual development. It is a mirror that shows the flaws and potential in our works, and when used constructively, it provides a chance to improve and innovate. In contrast, creative force is represented as the continuously stoking fire of human inventiveness. It is the force that propels us to create original stories, symphonies of thought, and universes out of the bare bones of our imagination. The healthy soil of freedom, variety,

and inspiration is where creative strength grows. The magic really comes when criticism and creative force interact. When criticism is delivered with empathy and wisdom, it acts like the wind under the creative spirit's wings, lifting it to new heights. On the other hand, the parameters of criticism must be carefully set in order to prevent dousing the creative fires or muzzling the voices of innovation. We have seen through historical instances how critical thinking has influenced revolutions in literature and ideas, upending the status quo and promoting development. Through the years, thinkers, artists, and movements have shown the ability of critical analysis and artistic expression to transform the intellectual landscape. The dynamics of criticism and creation have changed in our modern day as the internet sphere amplifies the voices of both artists and critics. The ethical obligations associated with both criticism and creativity must be more acutely understood in order to navigate this complicated environment and ensure that the power of these forces is utilized for change.

REFERENCES

- [1] K. Thomas, "Matthew Arnold's diet," *Vic. Lit. Cult.*, 2016, doi: 10.1017/S106015031500039X.
- [2] T. Owens, "'Sweetness and light' From Swift to Arnold," *Review of English Studies*. 2017. doi: 10.1093/res/hgw064.
- [3] M. Hawley, "'Grape shot culture': Charles Bradlaugh's reply to Matthew Arnold," *Ninet. Century Prose*, 2007.
- [4] K. Bahr, "The function of Matthew Arnold's criticism: Resolution and independence," *Ninet. Century Prose*, 2007.
- [5] M. E. Temple, "Paraphrasing in the *Livre de Paix* of Christine de Pisan of the *Paradiso*, III-V," *PMLA/Publications Mod. Lang. Assoc. Am.*, 1922, doi: 10.2307/457379.
- [6] J. Gooder, "Matthew arnold and the idea of the modern," *Cambridge Q.*, 1995, doi: 10.1093/camqtly/XXIV.1.1.
- [7] D. Russell, "The idea of Matthew Arnold," in *Thinking Through Style: Non-Fiction Prose of the Long Nineteenth Century*, 2018. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198737827.003.0013.
- [8] G. Ward, "Thoreau and Creeley: American Words and Things," in *Literature and Authenticity, 1780-1900: Essays in Honour of Vincent Newey*, 2016. doi: 10.4324/9781315592619-13.

CHAPTER 12

A BRIEF STUDY ON CURIOSITY AND THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@mutit.in

ABSTRACT:

This investigation explores the many facets of culture, concentrating on the interaction between curiosity and the quest for excellence. It explores the opposing viewpoints that hold that culture is either motivated by intellectual curiosity or by a deep-seated desire to ameliorate human nature and promote societal advancement. The essay examines how the word "curiosity" is used, focusing on how it is used in the English language, and explains how it may either denote a noble hunger for knowledge or frivolous, fruitless activities. The abstract clarifies via a critical examination that culture covers a wider, expanding attempt to comprehend the universe and human nature rather than only the pursuit of scientific knowledge. It also examines how religion fits into this discussion, demonstrating how culture and religion share the same ultimate objective of human perfection. Culture places a strong emphasis on the development and harmonious extension of individual potential, but it also highlights the significance of society interdependence in accomplishing this goal. In the end, "Curiosity and the Pursuit of Perfection" reveals the complex connection between intense intellectual curiosity and the deep desire to better mankind, illuminating the many elements of culture as a crucial instrument for both individual and societal growth.

KEYWORDS:

Curiosity, Culture, Human Nature, Intellectual Exploration, Knowledge, Religion.

INTRODUCTION

The critics of culture see it as being driven by exclusivity and vanity, or, sometimes, as being driven by curiosity. It is valued either out of sheer vanity and ignorance or else as an engine of social and class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other people who have not got it. This culture, which is supposed to plume itself on a smattering of Greek and Latin, is begotten by nothing so intellectual as curiosity. No individual in his right mind would refer to this culture as culture or give it any kind of worth. We need to identify a reason for culture, one that may include genuine ambiguity, in order to understand the true basis for the very divergent opinions that serious individuals will have about it. The word curiosity provides us with such a motive. I've already made the point that unlike foreigners, we English do not employ this term in both positive and negative senses. We always use the term in a somewhat critical manner.

When a foreigner uses the term "curiosity," he may be referring to a liberal and educated excitement about mental matters, but when we use the word, it invariably conjures up images of frivolous and unproductive activities. A few years ago, the renowned French critic M. was evaluated by the Quarterly Review. Sainte-Beuve, and in my opinion, it was a pretty poor assessment. And the main reason it fell short was that it used our English language without considering the double meaning that the word curiosity really carries while assuming that it was sufficient to get an M. If it were claimed that Sainte-Beuve's actions as a critic were

motivated by curiosity and that he failed to see that M. Sainte-Beuve would believe that this was commendable and not fault worthy, or he would explain why it should really be seen to be fault worthy and not commendable. Because there is a curiosity about intellectual matters that is pointless and only a disease, but there is also a curiosity about the things of the mind that is natural and admirable in an intelligent being. This curiosity is a desire for the things of the mind just for their own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are. Indeed, the mere desire to perceive things as they are suggesting a mental equilibrium and control that are seldom acquired without considerable effort and that are the very antithesis of the blind and unhealthy tendency of the mind that we want to condemn when we blame curiosity. This is the true ground to assign for the genuine scientific passion, however manifested, and for culture, viewed simply as a fruit of this passion; and it is a worthy ground, even though we let the term curiosity stand to describe it.

Montesquieu says: "The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature, and to render an intelligent being yet more intelligent." However, there is another cultural perspective that places more emphasis on the desire to perceive things for what they really are natural and right in an intelligent being rather than just the scientific zeal. There is a perspective that says all of our neighborly love, our propensities for action, assistance, and goodness, our desire to lessen human suffering, clear up human misunderstandings, and remove human error all of these noble aspirations to leave the world a better place than we found it come under the heading of social motivations and constitute the primary and preeminent component of culture. In this case, it is accurate to say that culture is a study of perfection and not something that developed out of curiosity. It is propelled by forces that include the moral and social desire for doing good as well as the scientific zeal for pursuing truth. To make an intellectual creature even more intelligent! Montesquieu's words, which we originally saw as its noble slogan[1].

Therefore, in the second perspective, Bishop Wilson's words, "To make reason and the will of God prevail," are the best motto that may be used. 'Only, the passion for doing good is apt to take its own conceptions, which proceed from its own state of development and share in all the imperfections and immaturities of this, as a basis of action; and whereas it is apt to be overhasty in determining what reason and the will of God say, because its turn is for acting rather than thinking and it wants to be beginning to act; and whereas it is apt to take its own conceptions, which proceed from its own state of Knowing that no action or institution that is not based on reason and God's will cannot be beneficial or stable, it is less determined to act and institute even with the lofty goal of lessening human error and misery constantly on its mind in order to remember that acting and instituting are useless unless we know how and what we ought to act and institute. This culture is more intriguing and expansive than the other, which is based exclusively on the desire to know in science.

But for it to thrive, there must be periods of fervor and faith when the intellectual horizon is expanding all around us. And isn't the narrow and constrained intellectual horizon that we have long inhabited and traversed suddenly opening up, allowing fresh illumination to stream in unhindered? It took a while for them to find a way in on us, at which point it was useless to consider changing how the world operated to accommodate them. Where was the possibility of making reason and God's will triumph among those who were tied inexorably by a routine, they had dubbed reason and God's will, a routine to which they had no ability to see beyond? However, the iron power of clinging to the old routine social, political, and religious has now marvelously surrendered, as has the iron force of excluding anything that is novel. The danger today is not that people will obstinately refuse to accept anything other than their old routine as reason and the will of God, but rather that they will either allow some novelty to

pass for these too easily or that they will completely underrate their importance and decide that it is sufficient to act for its own sake without bothering to ensure that reason and the will of God prevail therein.

Now, then, is the time for culture to serve, a culture that believes in letting reason and God's will triumph, believes in perfection, is dedicated to studying and pursuing perfection, and is no longer prevented from gaining acceptance for its ideas by a rigid, unbreakable ban on anything novel. The moment this understanding of culture is grasped, the moment it is regarded not only as the effort to see things as they are, to come to a knowledge of the universal order that appears to be intended and aimed at in the world, and which it is a man's happiness to go along with or his misery to go contrary to, to learn, in short, the will of God, the moment, I say, culture is regarded not only as the effort to see and learn this but as the effort, also, The very act of seeking for the truth for our own personal gratification is in reality the beginning of its triumph, paving the way for it and constantly serving it[2].

As such, it is mistakenly marked with guilt entirely in and of itself, not only for its caricature and degeneration. However, it's possible that it was maligned and given the questionable moniker of curiosity because, in contrast to this larger endeavor of such immense and obvious benefit, it seems self-centered, petty, and unprofitable. And religion, that voice of the deepest human experience, not only encourages and sanctions the goal that is the great aim of culture, namely the goal of setting ourselves to determine what perfection is and to make it prevail, but also, in determining generally what human perfection consists of, religion comes to a conclusion identical with that which is reached by culture. Religion is the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself.

The kingdom of God is inside you, according to religion, and culture similarly sees human perfection as an interior state that results from the development and supremacy of our true humanity, as opposed to our animality. It is positioned in the overall harmonic growth and ever-increasing effectiveness of those talents of intellect and emotion that contribute to the unique dignity, riches, and pleasure of human nature. As I have already stated: "The soul of the human race finds its ideal in creating unending additions to itself, in the endless extension of its capacities, in the endless increase in knowledge and beauty. Culture is a crucial tool for achieving this ideal, and this is its actual worth. Perfection, as culture sees it, has the characteristics of growth and becoming rather than possessing and resting, and in this regard, it also aligns with religion. The expansion of our humanity, to conform to the idea of perfection that culture forms, must be a general expansion because men are all parts of one great whole, and the sympathy that is inherent in human nature will not allow one member to be indifferent to the rest or to have a perfect welfare independent of the rest.

As society sees it, isolation prevents a person from achieving perfection. The person is obligated to bring others along with him in his march toward perfection, to always be doing all he can to widen and raise the volume of the human stream rolling thitherward, under punishment of being stunted and weakened in his own growth if he disobeys. To promote the kingdom of God is to increase and hasten one's own happiness, as Bishop Wilson so eloquently put it. However, perfection, as culture from a thorough disinterested study of human nature and human experience learns to conceive it, is a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the overdevelopment of human potential. In this case, culture transcends religion as we often understand it[3].

If culture is a study of harmony, general perfection, and perfection that consists of becoming something rather than having something, in an inner state of the mind and spirit rather than in

a set of external circumstances, it is evident that culture, as opposed to being the frivolous and useless thing that Mr. Bright, Mr. Frederic Harrison, and many other Liberals are apt to call it, has a very important function to fulfil for society. And in our contemporary world, when the whole civilization is much more mechanical and external than the civilizations of Greece and Rome, and tends continually to grow more so, this role is especially crucial. However, culture plays a particularly important role in our own nation since here is where the mechanical nature of civilization is most prominently shown. In fact, almost all the flawless characteristics that culture instructs us to repair run across some strong inclination in our society that thwarts them and puts them in opposition. The notion of perfection as an internal state of the mind and spirit is in conflict with the mechanical and material civilisation that is highly regarded everywhere except with us, as I have already shown. The idea of perfection as a harmonious expansion of human nature is at odds with our strong individualism, hatred of all restrictions on the unbridled swing of the individual's personality, and our maxim of "every man for himself."

Above all, the idea of perfection as a lack of flexibility, inability to see more than one side of a situation, and intense energetic absorption in the particular problem are at odds with it. Therefore, culture in this nation has a challenging problem. Its preachers are having a difficult time and will probably continue to do so for a long time. For a very long time to come, people will more often see them as elegant or fake Jeremiahs than as friends and benefactors. But if they continue, it won't stop them from providing excellent service in the end. In the meanwhile, everyone who could be ready to examine the situation carefully and objectively should be made aware of the course of action they must take and the kinds of habits they must battle against. We are in risk of believing in machinery, I continued, frequently believing it to be outrageously out of proportion to the purpose it must serve if it is to be of any use at all, but always believing it to be valuable in and of itself. What is freedom if not tools? Machines are population, right? What is coal if not equipment? Railroads are little more than equipment. What are riches if not equipment? Even religious institutions are nothing more than machines. Since these things are usually often discussed in England as if they were valuable ends in and of themselves, they inevitably acquire certain indisputable perfections[4].

I've already seen Mr. Roebuck's goto defense of England's brilliance and contentment in her current state, which effectively silences any doubters. I'm not sure why I should get tired of hearing Mr. Roebuck repeat this line of reasoning since he never gets tired of doing so. Why can't every guy in England express himself freely?'Mr. Roebuck keeps asking questions; he believes that this is sufficient, and when everyone is free to express themselves, our ambitions should be met. However, the objectives of culture, which is the study of perfection, are not met until what men say when they are free to speak anything they want is worth expressing and has more positive than negative qualities. In a similar vein, the Times stresses that the English ideal is that everyone should be free to do and to look exactly as he chooses in response to various foreign restrictions on the clothing, appearance, and behavior of the English overseas. But culture persistently works to persuade the uncultured to appreciate what is really lovely, elegant, and becoming, rather than forcing each uncultured person to form themselves according to what they may enjoy. Similarly, when it comes to railways and coal.

Everyone must have noticed the odd terminology that was being used during the late conversations about the potential breakdown of our coal supply. Thousands of individuals argued that our coal is the true foundation of our national glory; if our coal runs out, England's greatness would disappear. What, however, is greatness? Culture prompts us to

inquire. The external sign of having greatness is that we arouse affection, curiosity, and admiration. Greatness is a spiritual state deserving of these emotions. Which England the one of the last twenty years or the one of Elizabeth, a period of great spiritual effort but when our coal and the industrial processes that rely on it were still in their infancy would, if it were swallowed up by the sea tomorrow, most excite the love, interest, and admiration of humanity and, consequently, would most clearly demonstrate the presence of greatness? Then, what a bad mental habit it must be for us to consider things like coal or iron to be the foundation of England's greatness, and what a good friend culture is, devoted to seeing things for what they truly are, dispelling such illusions and establishing real standards of perfection! The most common of commonplaces tells us how men are always apt to regard wealth as a precious end in itself, and they have never been so apt to regard it as they are in England at the present time. Wealth is also the end to which our prodigious works for material advantage are directed.

Nine out of 10 Englishmen think now more strongly than ever before that our greatness and welfare are shown by our extreme wealth. Now, the benefit of culture is that it aids us in realizing and feeling that riches is nothing more than machinery via its spiritual standard of perfection. This helps us go beyond just saying that we think of wealth as nothing more than equipment. The future and the present would both surely belong to the Philistines if it weren't for the purifying impact that culture has on our thoughts. The folks we refer to as Philistines are precisely the ones who think the most strongly that our greatness and welfare are shown by our wealth and who devote the greatest time and energy to accumulating wealth. Consider these people's way of life, habits, manners, and even the tones in which they speak. Pay close attention to what they read, the things that make them happy, the words that come out of their mouths, and the ideas that furnish their minds.

Would any amount of wealth be worthwhile if it meant that one would end up becoming exactly like these people as a result of, having it? Thus, culture produces a discontent that, even if it cannot rescue the present, is of the greatest possible worth in containing the common current of men's ideas in a prosperous and industrial society. It also prevents the future from being vulgarized. Again, nowhere are population and physical health and vitality portrayed in such an ignorant, deceptive, and exaggerated manner as in England. Both are really pieces of machinery, yet how many individuals do we see around us who refuse to see beyond them in favor of relaxing? Why, after reading some Times articles on the Registrar General's returns of marriages and births in this nation, some people have spoken quite solemnly about our large English families as if they had something inherently lovely, elevating, and deserving about them; as if the British Philistine would only have to present himself before the Great Judge with his twelve children in order to be received among the sheep as a matter of ri However, it may be argued that physical vigor and health are more valuable than simple machinery, and should not be grouped with riches and population.

True, but only to the extent that they are more closely linked to an ideal spiritual state than riches or population are. As soon as we separate them from the notion of a perfect spiritual condition and pursue them as we do for their own sake and as ends in themselves, our worship of them degenerates into the same kind of mindless, vulgar worship that we practice when we worship wealth, population, or machinery. The promotion of physical vigor and activity has been markedly subordinated to higher and spiritual purposes by everyone with a reasonable conception of human ideal. The author of the Epistle to Timothy writes, "Bodily exercise profited little; but godliness is profitable unto all things." Franklin, a utilitarian, says the same thing explicitly: "Eat and drink such an exact quantity as suits the constitution of thy body, in reference to the services of the mind." However, the point of view of culture, which

keeps the mark of human perfection simply and broadly in view and does not assign to this perfection, as religion or utilitarianism assign to it, a special and limited character, is best given by these words of Epictetus, in my opinion: "It is that which is This is admirable, and in fact, the Greek word *eufuia*, a finely tempered nature, gives exactly the notion of perfection as culture brings us to think of it: a harmonious perfection, a perfection in which the characters of beauty and intelligence are both present, which unites "the two noblest of things," as Swift, who of one of the two, at least, thought the formation of the spirit and character to be our real concern. The reason for the Greeks' enormous spiritual significance is that they were motivated by the central and joyful notion of the fundamental qualities of human perfection[5].

Mr. Bright's misconception of culture as a smattering of Greek and Latin stems from this wonderful significance of the Greeks having influenced the very machinery of our education and is in some ways an homage to it. By transforming sweetness and light into idealized personalities, society adopts poetry's spirit and adheres to its one universal rule. Many of us depend on our religious institutions to preserve us much more than on our freedom, population, or industrialism. Because religion has worked on a larger scale for perfection and with larger masses of men, I have considered it an even more significant embodiment of human nature than poetry. However, the idea of beauty and a human nature perfect on all fronts, which is the dominant idea of poetry, is a true and priceless idea, even though it has not yet achieved the same level of success as the idea of overcoming the obvious flaws of our animality and a human nature perfect on the moral front, which is the dominant idea of religion.

It is destined to transform and rule the other by adding the religious idea of a devout energy to it. The best Greek art and poetry, where religion and poetry are one and the idea of beauty and a human nature perfect on all sides adds a religious and devout energy and works in the strength of that, is on account of such exceeding interest and instructiveness for us, though it was, as, having regard for the human race in general, and, in fact, having regard for the Greeks themselves, we must own, a premature attempt, an attempt which for Greece, however, did not make a mistake by placing such a high value on the ideals of harmony, beauty, and total human perfection. This thought cannot be too prevalent and important; nevertheless, moral integrity must also be strengthened. If at the same time the idea of beauty, harmony, and complete human perfection is lacking or misapprehended among us, as it clearly is at the moment, then, in my opinion, we fall into the wrong trap because we rely on our religious organizations, which in and of themselves cannot and do not give us this idea, and think we have done enough if we can get them to spread and prevail.

Nothing is more common than people confusing what I may call absolute inward peace and satisfaction the peace and satisfaction we experience as we approach complete spiritual perfection, not just moral perfection, or rather relative moral perfection with the inner calm and satisfaction that come after subduing the obvious flaws of our animality. No other race in the world has worked as hard or exerted as much effort to achieve this comparatively high moral perfection as our English people have. No humans in the whole world, however, have the command to oppose the devil and triumph over the evil one with such a compelling power and actuality. And we have received our recompense, which includes a great deal of material success as a result of our devotion to this instruction, but also and far more importantly, a great deal of inner peace and fulfillment. But for me, there are few things more pitiful than to witness people use language that is more appropriately reserved for complete perfection and is a distant echo of the human soul's prophecy of it when discussing their incomplete perfection and the religious organizations in which they have found it.

This is motivated by the inner peace and satisfaction that their rudimentary efforts toward perfection have brought them. I barely need to mention that they have access to a wealth of this beautiful language because of religion. They use it freely, but it is really the harshest critique that can be made of the imperfect perfection that only our religious organizations have managed to achieve so far. Puritanism is the one place where the English race's drive for moral advancement and self-conquest has been most strongly shown. Puritanism has never found a more suitable outlet than in the Independents' religious movement. The *Nonconformist*, a periodical published by the contemporary Independents, is written with considerable skill and conviction. There is sweetness and brightness, as well as the vision of completely harmonious human completeness, that this instrument of theirs raises aloft: "The Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion." To assess language, one need not go to culture or poetry. Religion, with its inclination toward perfection, provides words to evaluate it, language that we use every day. St. Peter adds, "Finally, be of one mind, united in feeling[6]."

The Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant faith is an ideal that evaluates the Puritan ideal. People believe in, rest in, and even offer their lives for religious organizations like these. This, I say, is the wonderful virtue of even the beginnings of perfection, of having overcome even the obvious flaws of our animality, that the religious organization that helped us achieve it can seem to us to be something precious, beneficial, and to be spread, even when it sports such a brand of imperfection on its forehead. And because men have developed the habit of giving the language of religion a special application and turning it into mere jargon, they have no ear for the criticism that religion itself passes on the flaws of their respective religious institutions and are therefore certain to deceive themselves and explain this criticism away.

They can only be attained by the critique that culture, such as poetry, which uses a simple language and steadfastly tests these institutions against the ideal of a fully perfect human being, applies to them. The subduing of the great obvious flaws of our animality, which it is the glory of these religious organizations to have helped us to subdue, is where men of culture and poetry, it will be said, are failing time and time again, and failing conspicuously. True, they often fall short. They often lacked both the virtues and the flaws of the Puritan; one of their pitfalls was that they felt the Puritan's faults so strongly that they ignored the practice of his virtues excessively. However, I won't defend them at the price of the Puritans. They often fall short morally, and morality is essential.

And when the Puritan was recognized for his success, others were chastised for their failure. Their ideal of beauty, sweetness, and light, as well as a human nature complete on all its sides, have been punished where they erred, but it still stands as the true ideal of perfection, just as the Puritan's ideal of perfection remains limited and insufficient, despite the fact that he has been amply rewarded for his good deeds. When we imagine Shakespeare or Virgil, souls in which sweetness and light, and all that is most humane in human nature, were prominent, accompanying them on their journey, and consider what intolerable company Shakespeare and Virgil would have found them, we are right to judge them and their standard of perfection. Let's assess the religious institutions that we see all around us in the same manner. We shouldn't discount the good and happiness they have brought about, but we also shouldn't fail to recognize that their conception of human perfection is limited and insufficient, and that Protestantism and dissent will never lead humanity to its true destination. With respect to religious organizations, I suggest the same thing I stated about wealth: Let's consider how people who live in and for it live. Look at the life portrayed in a newspaper like the *Nonconformist* life of envy of the Establishment, arguments, tea

gatherings, chapel openings, and sermons and consider it to be an ideal of a human life that completes itself on all sides and aspires to sweetness, light, and perfection with all of its organs[7].

DISCUSSION

It's an interesting and complicated topic that touches on many facets of human nature, culture, and society when curiosity and the goal of perfection collide. The main ideas and ramifications of this fascinating connection will be covered in detail in this debate. As the motivation underlying human inquiry and discovery, curiosity plays a crucial part in forming culture and civilization. On the one hand, people often praise curiosity as a noble attribute that inspires them to learn more, solve riddles, and push the limits of human understanding. It encourages the pursuit of knowledge, stimulates creative creativity, and inspires the exploration of the uncharted. On the other hand, when it diverts people from more important goals and results in petty or fruitless pursuits, curiosity may also be seen negatively. The idea of perfection has several facets in terms of culture and personal growth. It includes not just striving for greatness in numerous fields but also attempting to strike a healthy balance between one's personal, moral, and societal development. This goal represents a basic human desire to better oneself and have a good impact on the experience of humanity as a whole. The interaction between curiosity and the desire of perfection occurs within a cultural context. It serves as the stage for the manifestation of intellectual, artistic, and social expressions. As a result, culture serves as a catalyst for curiosity, offering the favorable conditions for curiosity to grow and find meaningful expression. Through culture, people may discover, consider, and contribute to the world around them, eventually aiming for excellence in their chosen fields. Religion often comes up in conversations as a source of instruction and a moral compass. In its desire for human advancement and the search of a higher condition of being, it has something in common with culture. The congruence of religious and cultural ideals emphasizes how important moral and personal development are to the search of perfection[8].

Balancing personal aspirations for self-improvement with larger social goals is one of the key difficulties in the interaction between curiosity and the quest of perfection. It's important to understand that, although individual curiosity may spur personal development, the quest of excellence often calls for a team effort. The contributions of those who pursue knowledge, advance understanding, and advance moral behavior help society as a whole. The connection between curiosity and the quest of excellence is more important than ever in the quickly changing world of today. Curiosity becomes a potent catalyst for creativity and problem-solving as technology develops and global concerns multiply. As civilizations struggle with issues of equality, sustainability, and the wellbeing of everyone, the desire of perfection assumes new forms.

CONCLUSION

In our investigation of "Curiosity and the Pursuit of Perfection," we have traveled across the fascinating terrain where human curiosity collides with the age-old goal for personal development and social advancement. This voyage has shown how curiosity can be both a motivating factor for intellectual progress and, on sometimes, a possible deterrent from worthwhile endeavors. We have examined the complex idea of perfection, which goes beyond just achieving excellence to include a harmonic balance between intellectual, moral, and social development. Humans have a deep-seated need for perfection, which motivates them to make meaningful contributions to their communities and pursue personal satisfaction. Curiosity is sparked by culture, which serves as the canvas where these forces

collide and offers the favorable environment for it to grow and emerge in a variety of ways. The interplay between culture, curiosity, and the quest for excellence highlights how crucial these factors have been in determining how human history and development have developed. Religion has had a tremendous influence on how human undertakings are directed, coordinating its objectives with cultural pursuits of moral advancement and human advancement. The blending of religious and cultural values emphasizes the lasting importance of moral character development and ethical behavior in the pursuit of perfection. The issue of combining individual desires with group objectives becomes apparent. While the desire for perfection typically necessitates a group effort to solve social issues and promote everyone's wellbeing, curiosity fosters personal progress. The modern world, which is characterized by technological development and increased global complexity, emphasizes the importance of this interaction in resolving the challenging problems of our day. Finally, "Curiosity and the Pursuit of Perfection" illuminates the complex dance between human curiosity and the enduring desire of personal and social improvement. It serves as a reminder that the human spirit endures and that people still want to learn more, develop themselves, and improve the world. This investigation inspires us to use our curiosity as a driver for good change as we negotiate the possibilities and difficulties of the present and the future, accepting the pursuit of perfection as a lofty and permanent ideal.

REFERENCES

- [1] B. Novak, "Humanizing democracy: Matthew Arnold's nineteenth-century call for a common, higher, educative pursuit of happiness and its relevance to twenty-first-century democratic life," *American Educational Research Journal*. 2002. doi: 10.3102/00028312039003593.
- [2] M. Hawley, "'Grape shot culture': Charles Bradlaugh's reply to Matthew Arnold," *Ninet. Century Prose*, 2007.
- [3] T. Lacy, "Dreams of a Democratic Culture: Revising the Origins of the Great Books Idea, 1869-1921," *J. Gilded Age Progress. Era*, 2008, doi: 10.1017/S1537781400000840.
- [4] K. Bahr, "The function of Matthew Arnold's criticism: Resolution and independence," *Ninet. Century Prose*, 2007.
- [5] R. Livesey, "Aestheticism and the Politics of Pleasure," in *The Oxford Handbook of Victorian Literary Culture*, 2015. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199593736.013.35.
- [6] D. Russell, "The idea of Matthew Arnold," in *Thinking Through Style: Non-Fiction Prose of the Long Nineteenth Century*, 2018. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198737827.003.0013.
- [7] M. Lamont and B. M. Berger, "An Essay on Culture: Symbolic Structure and Social Structure.," *Contemp. Sociol.*, 1996, doi: 10.2307/2077135.
- [8] G. Ward, "Thoreau and Creeley: American Words and Things," in *Literature and Authenticity, 1780-1900: Essays in Honour of Vincent Newey*, 2016. doi: 10.4324/9781315592619-13.

CHAPTER 13

A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON CLASH OF IDEALS

Dr. Kanupriya Verma, Associate Professor,
Department of Humanities, Maharishi University of Information Technology, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanupriya.verma@muit.in

ABSTRACT:

This stimulating investigation explores the complex interactions between culture, religion, and the unrelenting quest for human perfection. It explores the opposing ideologies supported by these powerful forces against the background of social vices and flaws. The plot develops with a critical study of the conflict between religious traditions that provide moral direction and human curiosity, which is represented by culture's desire for knowledge. The discussion addresses current ideas of perfection and if religious institutions really constitute the greatest important effort to advance humanity. The research emphasizes the shortcomings of conventional religious goals while stressing culture's dedication to accepting truth, reason, and a constantly developing conception of human perfection. The story also examines the tricky tension between private ambitions and society ideals, highlighting the difficulties in balancing individual development with the advancement of mankind. The abstract closes with a historical viewpoint that describes how the Oxford movement and the growth of liberalism serve as exemplars of how the struggle of values has influenced the development of humanity. In the face of hardship and change, it emphasizes the eternal relevance of beauty, sweetness, and the search for wholeness.

KEYWORDS:

Curiosity,Culture,Ideals,Liberalism, Moral Guidance,Religion,Societal Vices,Traditional Beliefs,Oxford Movement.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent article about the crowd at Epsom on Derby Day and all the vice and hideousness that could be seen there, another newspaper, representing, like the Nonconformist, one of the religious organizations of this country, suddenly turned around to Professor Huxley and asked him how he proposed to treat all this vice and hideousness without religion. I'll admit that I was moved to address the inquiry, "And how do you propose to cure it with such a religion as yours?" to the asker. How is the ideal of a life, as is the life of your religious organization as you yourself mirror it, so unlovely, so ugly, so imperfect, so limited, and so far from a real and gratifying ideal of human perfection, to fight and convert all this sin and hideousness? In fact, the state of our life and society with these in possession of it, and having been in possession of it for however many centuries, is the strongest argument for the study of perfection as pursued by culture, and the most glaring example of the actual inadequacy of the idea of perfection held by religious organizations, expressing, as I have said, the most widespread effort the human race has yet made after perfection.

We all belong to one kind of religious organization or another, and we all refer to ourselves as God's children in the lofty and aspirational religious language that I have previously seen. God's children, this is a huge pretense! And how can we defend it? by the deeds we do and the words we utter. And London is the city we have built for ourselves to live in, the job that we perform as a whole as God's children, and our big center of life. London is unmatched in

the world with its unfathomable outside hideousness and interior canker of publicè egestas, privatim opulentia, to borrow the words Sallust inserts into Cato's speech on Rome. The Daily Telegraph is the newspaper with the highest readership in England, nay, the whole globe. This is the word that we, as God's children, utter and the voice that most affects our collective mind. I assert that when our religious institutions which, I must admit, represent the most significant attempt at perfection that our race has yet made leave us with no better outcome than this, it is high time to carefully examine their conception of perfection to determine whether it fails to take into consideration aspects and forces of human nature that we could greatly benefit from; whether it wouldn't be more effective if it were more comprehensive.

And I assert that the English reliance on their religious institutions and their conceptions of human perfection as they currently exist is fruitless, similar to our reliance on freedom, muscular Christianity, population, coal, and wealth. I contend that this reliance is healthy countered by culture, which is dedicated to accepting reality as it is and advancing humanity toward a more complete, harmonious perfection. However, culture's attitude toward all of this equipment, despite its insistence that it is machinery, reveals its unwavering love of perfection, its desire only to see reason and God's will win, and its freedom from fanaticism. Fanatics, seeing the harm that people cause themselves by their blind faith in any machinery, whether it be wealth and industrialism, the development of physical strength and activity, a political organization, or a religious organization, oppose with all their might the tendency toward any such political and religious organization, any such games and athletic exercises, any such wealth and industrialism, and attempt to violently put an end to it[1].

However, the flexibility that sweetness and light provide, which is one of the benefits of culture pursued in good faith, enables a man to see that a tendency may be necessary, and even, as a preparation for something in the future, salutary, but that the generations or people who obey this tendency are sacrificed to it, that they fall short of the hope of perfection by following it; and that its mischiefs are to be criticized, lest it should take too firm a hold and become unstoppable. In a speech in Paris, Mr. Gladstone made a point of emphasizing how important the current tremendous march toward industrialism and riches is for establishing the wide foundations of material prosperity for the society of the future. The worst part of these justifications is that they are typically directed at the individuals who are physically and spiritually involved in the movement in question; they are, at any rate, always eagerly seized by these individuals and taken as fully justifying their existence, and as a result, they tend to harden them in their sins. Now, culture readily accepts that the trend towards excessive industrialism and moneymaking is necessary and that the future may benefit from it, but insists that the industrialists of previous generations who, for the most part, make up the robust main body of Philistinism be sacrificed to it.

The construction of a better and sounder physical type for the future to deal with may be the outcome of all the activities and sports that occupy the current generation of boys and young men. Culture does not set itself against the games and sports; it congratulates the future, and hopes it will make a good use of its enhanced physical base; but it points out that our passing generation of boys and young men is, meanwhile, sacrificed. However, culture points out that the harmonious perfection of generations of Puritans and Nonconformists has been sacrificed as a result, even though Puritanism may have been necessary to develop the moral fiber of the English race and Nonconformity to break the yoke of ecclesiastical domination over men's minds and prepare the way for freedom of thought in the distant future.

The future of civilization may need freedom of expression, but in the meanwhile, the Daily Telegraph's young lions are slaughtered. Future societies may need that every individual have

a say in the leadership of his nation, but Mr. Beales and Mr. Bradlaugh are sacrificed in the present. Oxford, the Oxford of the past, has a number of flaws, and she has paid a high price for them via loss, isolation, and a lack of influence on the contemporary world. Yet we Oxford natives, who were raised amongst that lovely place's beauty and sweetness, have not failed to grasp one reality: the knowledge that beauty and sweetness are necessary qualities of wholly full human completeness. I am adhering to Oxford's religion and tradition when I insist on this. I argue with confidence that our loyalty to so many defeated causes and opposition to so many successful movements has been rooted in our sympathy for beauty and sweetness as well as our sentiment against ugliness and rawness. We have not won our political battles, we have not carried our main points, we have not halted our adversaries' advance, we have not marched triumphantly with the modern world; but we have told quietly upon the mind of the country, we have prepared currents of feeling which sap our adversaries' position when it seems gained, we have maintained our own communications, and we have marched with the modern world.

Take a look at how the massive movement that rocked Oxford to its core some thirty years ago developed. It was geared, as anybody who reads Dr. Newman's *Apology* will see, against what may be referred to as "liberalism." Liberalism won; it was chosen to carry out the task at hand; it was required; its victory was unavoidable. What region in our territory is not fully engaged in our labors? The Oxford movement was shattered; it collapsed. Our wrecks are dispersed on every beach. However, what was this liberal ideology, as Dr. Newman saw it, and how did it ultimately destroy the Oxford movement? In politics, it was the Reform Bill of 1832 and local self-government; in society, it was free trade, unrestricted competition, and the creation of large industrial fortunes; and in religion, it was the Dissidence of Dissent and Protestantism of the Protestant religion. It was the great middleclass liberalism[2].

I'm not saying that other, more intelligent forces were not opposed to the Oxford movement, but this was the force that actually overcame it; Dr. Newman felt as though he was fighting with this force; until recently, it appeared to be the dominant force in this nation and to hold the future; Mr. Lowe was so indescribably proud of this force's accomplishments, and he was horrified by its rule. And where is this powerful Philistinism at this time? It has been demoted to second place, has turned into a power of the past, and has lost its sense of the future. Unable to be fully judged just yet, but unquestionably a completely distinct force from middleclass liberalism in terms of its fundamental beliefs and inclinations in every area, a new power has unexpectedly emerged. It doesn't adore or appreciate middleclass industrialists' unbridled rivalry, middleclass industrialists' legislation, middleclass vestries' local self-government, middleclass Dissent, or middleclass Protestantism.

The only thing I say is that they are completely different; I do not now praise this new power or claim that its own ideas are superior. And who will estimate how much the emotional currents sparked by Dr. Newman's movements the intense desire for beauty and sweetness it nourished, the strong opposition it displayed to the abrasiveness and vulgarity of middleclass liberalism, the strong light it shone on the hideous and grotesque illusions of middleclass Protestantism contributed to swell the tide of secret dissatisfaction that has mined the ground beneath the self-assured? I have said that it is still too early to properly appraise the new, more democratic force that is now replacing our previous middleclass liberalism. It is currently forming its major tendencies[3].

We hear claims that it will bring about administrative reform, legal reform, educational reform, and other reforms; however, these claims are more often made by those who support it in an effort to make a strong case for it over middleclass liberalism than by clearly defined tendencies that it has already established. However, it has a large number of well-meaning

allies against whom culture may profitably sustain steadfastly its vision of human perfection. This is an inwardly spiritual activity, with greater sweetness, increased light, expanded vitality, and increased compassion for its characters. Mr. Bright, who has a foot in both the worlds of middleclass liberalism and democracy but who draws the majority of his ideas from the world of middleclass liberalism in which he was raised, always inculcates that faith in machinery to which, as we have seen, Englishmen are so prone, and which has been the bane of middleclass liberalism. He complains with a sorrowful indignation of people who "appear to have no proper estimate of the value of the middle-class liberalism. Alternatively, he shouts out to the democracy, or rather, to "the men" he refers to as "upon whose shoulders the majesty of England rests," saying, "See what you have done! When I look across our nation, I can see the towns, railways, factories, and cargoes that are used to load the ships of the finest merchant fleet the world has ever seen.

This praise is exactly how Mr. Roebuck or Mr. Lowe deceive the middle classes and turn them into such Philistines: "I see that you have transformed by your labors what was once a wilderness, these islands, into a fruitful garden; I know that you have created this wealth and are a nation whose name is a word of power throughout the world." The same method is used to encourage a man to appreciate himself not for who he is, not for how far he has come toward sweetness and light, but for how many railways he has built, or for how large a tabernacle he has erected. The democratic people are told they have done everything with their hands and sinews, whereas only the middle classes are told they have done everything with their energy, independence, and money. However, encouraging the democracy to place its faith in accomplishments of this nature amounts to teaching them to be Philistines in order to replace the Philistines they are replacing[4].

They will also be encouraged, like the middle class, to sit down at the banquet of the future without wearing a wedding gown, and nothing excellent will then be able to come from them. The idea that culture presents to us of perfection, an increased spiritual activity, having for its characters increased sweetness, increased light, increased life, and increased sympathy, is an idea that the new democracy needs far more than the idea of the previous democracy, according to those who are aware of their flaws, have observed and listened to them, or who will read the instructive account recently given of them by one of themselves, the Journeyman Engineer. Other well-meaning supporters of this new authority are in favor of guiding it in ways that are naturally appealing to democracy's feet, even if they are fresh and untried in our nation. They want to steer clear of the old traps of middleclass Philistinism.

The methods of Jacobinism, if you will. Jacobinism's methods include violent resentment of the past, the broad application of abstract restoration systems, and the development of a new, black-and-white philosophy for meticulously planning a rational society for the future. Among the supporters of democracy who are for guiding it along such a route are Mr. Frederic Harrison and other followers of Comte, one of whom, Mr. Congreve, is an old friend of mine. I am pleased to have the chance to openly show my esteem for his abilities and character. Mr. Frederic Harrison has a strong dislike for culture, which is understandable given that culture is the constant foe of Jacobinism's two defining characteristics its ferocity and its attachment to an abstract system. A lower portion of the direction of human destiny is always given to system makers and systems by culture than what their friends like. People are dissatisfied with their old, limited stock of Philistine ideas, Anglo-Saxon ideas, or any other ideas.

A current in people's minds sets towards new ideas, and some man, such as Bentham or Comte, who has the real merit of having early and strongly felt and helped the new current but who brings plenty of narrowness and mistakes of his own into his feeling and help of it, is

credited with being the author of the entire current and the fit person to be entrusted with As the worship of Apollo, the god of light, healing, and reconciliation, was introduced in Rome under the Tarquin's, the excellent German historian of Roman mythology Preller will have us observe that it was not so much the Tarquin's who brought the new worship of Apollo to Rome as it was a powerful current in the Roman people's minds that set at that time towards a new worship of this kind and away from the old run of Latin and Sabine religious ideas[5].

Similar to this, culture draws our attention to the ongoing natural flow of human events and refuses to allow us to place our whole trust in any one individual or his actions. It helps us understand not just his positive traits but also how much of him was constrained by his circumstances. In fact, doing so gives us a pleasant feeling of enhanced freedom and a brighter future. I recall the relief I felt when, after feeling the sway of Benjamin Franklin's imperturbable commonsense, I came across his project for a new version of the Book of Job, to replace the old version, the style of which I feel the greatest obligations, Benjamin Franklin. Franklin was the very embodiment of sanity and clear sense, a man the most significant, in my opinion, whom America has yet produced.

We all remember the famous verse in our translation: "Then Satan answered the Lord and said: "Doth Job fear God for naught?" Franklin makes this: "Does Your Majesty imagine that Job's good conduct is the result of mere personal attachment and affection?" Franklin continues, "I give a few verses, which may serve as a sample of the kind of version I would recommend. "I still clearly recall how, upon reading it, I heaved a sigh of relief and thought to myself, "After all, humanity extends beyond Franklin's victorious good sense! "So, I open the Deontology after hearing Bentham widely proclaimed as the restorer of contemporary society and Bentham's thinking and ideas suggested as the rulers of our future. I discovered that Socrates and Plato were engaging in foolish conversation while Xenophon was writing his history and Euclid was instructing in geometry. Since reading it, I have been freed from Bentham's servitude! "This morality of theirs consisted in words; this wisdom of theirs was the denial of matters known to every man's experience." I can no longer be affected by the fervor of his followers. I sense that his thoughts and concepts are inadequate for providing the ideal order for human civilization.

The men of a system, of followers, of a school guy like Comte, or the late Mr. Buckle, or Mr. Milltend to be dealt with in this manner by culture. Regardless of how much admiration it may have for these figures or for some of them, it keeps in mind the phrase, "Be not you called Rabbi! And it quickly disappears from any Rabbi. But Jacobinism values a Rabbi; as a result, it does not desire to move on from its Rabbi in search of a yettobeattained perfection. Instead, it desires that its Rabbi and his ideas stand for perfection in order to more effectively reshape the world. As a result, culture's incessant striving for perfection is seen by Jacobinism as impertinence and an offense. However, culture really serves the world and Jacobinism itself by resisting this desire of Jacobinism to impose on us a man with his own limits and flaws in addition to the correct ideas of which he is the organ.

Similarly, Jacobinism cannot do without the endless indulgence inherent to culture, the consideration of circumstances, the harsh judgment of deeds coupled with the compassionate judgment of individuals due to its deep hate of the past and of those whom it holds accountable for the crimes of the past. Mr. Frederic Harrison exclaims, "The man of culture is in politics, one of the poorest mortals alive!" Mr. Frederic Harrison argues that the man of culture prevents him from doing business because of his "turn for small faultfinding, love of selfish ease, and indecision in action." Mr. Frederic Harrison wonders what value culture has other than for "a critic of new books or a professor of belles letters? "Why is it useful? Because it serves as a reminder that human nature is best described as sweetness and light in

the face of the tremendous irritation that permeates or maybe I should say hisses throughout the whole play in which Mr. Frederic Harrison poses that question. It is helpful because, similar to religion, that other pursuit of perfection, it attests to the fact that wherever there is bitter jealousy and conflict, there is confusion and every ill deed[6].

Therefore, seeking perfection means seeking sweetness and brightness.

Whoever strives for sweetness and brightness also strives for the triumph of reason and God's will. He who works for machinery, hate, or confusion merely strives to create chaos. Culture transcends technology, abhors enmity, and has one big passion: a love of sweetness and light. It has one that is much better! The drive to see them succeed. The sweetness and light of the few must remain imperfect until the raw and unlit masses of mankind are touched by sweetness and light; thus, it will not be pleased until we have all attained to the perfection of man. I haven't shied away from stating that we must strive for sweetness and light, and I haven't shied away from saying that we must have a wide base, that sweetness and light must be available to as many people as possible.

The times when there is a national glow of life and thought, the times when the entirety of society is fully permeated by thought, sensitive to beauty, intelligent and alive, are the happy moments of humanity, the times when those are the marking epochs of a people's life, the times when literature and art and all the creative power of genius are at their height. However, it must be genuine thinking, genuine beauty, genuine sweetness, and genuine light. Many individuals will attempt to provide the so-called masses with intellectual nourishment that has been prepared and modified in a manner they see appropriate for the real state of the masses. An example of how to influence the public is common popular fiction. Many individuals will make an effort to spread the concepts and standards that make up their profession or political party's credo throughout the general public. Our political and religious organizations serve as examples of how to influence the public in this manner[7].

I detest all options, but every society is different. It does not attempt to educate at the level of lower social strata, nor does it attempt to convert people to one of its own sects using premade judgements and catchphrases. It aims to abolish classes, make the finest knowledge and ideas in the world universally accepted, and enable all people to live in a lovely and bright environment where they may utilize ideas freely, nourished, and unrestrainedly, just as it does.

This is the social concept, and the actual proponents of equality are men of culture. The great men of culture are those who have a passion for spreading, making prevail, and carrying the best ideas from one end of society to the other; who have worked to rid knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, and exclusive; to humanize it, to make it effective outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, while still remaining the best idea and knowledge of the time, and a true sou.

Despite all of his flaws, Abelard was such a person throughout the Middle Ages, which is why he inspired such unbridled passion and excitement. At the turn of the century, Lessing and Herder were in Germany in this capacity, and their contributions to Germany were in this sense immeasurably valuable. The names of Lessing and Herder will inspire in a German a reverence and a zeal that the names of even the most talented masters will hardly awaken. Generations will pass, literary monuments will accumulate, and works far more perfect than those of Lessing and Herder will be produced in Germany. Then why? Because they democratized knowledge, expanded the foundation of existence and intellect, and exerted great force in spreading sweetness and light, ensuring the triumph of reason and God's purpose[8].

DISCUSSION

The subtitle "The Clash of Ideals" sets the setting for an in-depth debate that explores the complex interactions between culture and religion and how each has influenced the search for human perfection. This conversation examines the intricacies, inconsistencies, and difficulties present in these two significant facets of human experience. The title's representation of culture suggests that it is a dynamic force that often conflicts with conventional religious values. It is linked to intellectual inquiry, human curiosity, and the search for enlightenment. Culture encourages acceptance of reality as it is and places a strong emphasis on reason as a pillar of human advancement. This viewpoint is a driver for both individual and social development since it disproves inflexible dogmas and preconceived assumptions. Contrarily, religion is an embodiment of age-old moral and spiritual traditions that have guided countless people and cultures. It often acts as a moral compass, providing a framework for moral behavior, social ideals, and spiritual development. It may also be seen as placing restrictions on the pursuit of individual and social values, which would be at odds with the more fluid character of culture. The central idea of this debate is the idea of human perfection. It includes not just the highest standards of morality and intelligence but also the advancement of society and the fullest expression of human potential. The collision of conflicting conceptions of perfection results in the clash of ideals. The idea of human perfection is being redefined and expanded by culture, which promotes adaptation, acceptance of variety, and the quest of knowledge as means of reaching it.

Religious values, on the other hand, could promote a more conventional and set image of human perfection, which can cause disagreement and friction. The intricacy of the road to human perfection is further explored in the conversation. It draws attention to the difficulties in balancing the desires of individuals with those of society as a whole. Religious organizations, which promote obedience and loyalty to established ideas, often clash with cultural institutions, which place a focus on intellectual curiosity and personal progress. Understanding the complex interplay between culture, religion, and human development is essential for navigating this complex terrain. This discussion's historical component gives the investigation more depth. A recurrent topic in history has been the battle of ideologies, with movements like the Oxford movement and the emergence of liberalism serving as examples of the tensions between culture and religion. These historical examples provide important light on how conflicting ideas have influenced the course of development and knowledge throughout history.

CONCLUSION

The book "The Clash of Ideals: Culture, Religion, and the Complex Path to Human Perfection" concludes with a provocative analysis of the complex interactions between culture and religion in the quest for human perfection. It urges readers to consider how human perfection changes through time, the difficulties presented by conflicting goals, and the possibility of peace and harmonious development in the face of complexity. This conversation promotes further investigation into the ways that tradition and faith might advance a civilized and morally upright society.

REFERENCES

- [1] R. C. Utrup, "Yeatsian modernism," *F. Scott Fitzgerald Review*. 2018. doi: 10.5325/fscotfitzrevi.16.1.0060.
- [2] S. Lecourt, "Matthew Arnold and religion's cosmopolitan histories," *Victorian Literature and Culture*. 2010. doi: 10.1017/S1060150310000124.

- [3] C. Hogsbjerg, “‘We Lived According to the Tenets of Matthew Arnold’: Reflections on the ‘Colonial Victorianism’ of the Young C. L. R. James,” *Twent. Century Br. Hist.*, 2013, doi: 10.1093/tcbh/hws010.
- [4] M. A. R. Habib, “Introduction,” *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: The Nineteenth Century, c. 1830-1914*. 2008. doi: 10.1017/CHO9781139018456.001.
- [5] R. C. Utrup, “Yeatsian Modernism: Romantic Nationalism, Hero Worship, and the ‘Celtic Element’ in *Tender Is the Night* and *The Love of the Last Tycoon*,” *F. Scott Fitzgerald Rev.*, 2018, doi: 10.5325/fscotfitzrevi.16.1.0060.
- [6] J. Buzard, “The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment (review),” *Vic. Stud.*, 2002, doi: 10.1353/vic.2003.0043.
- [7] B. Sheils, “‘Dark cognition’: W.B. Yeats, J.G. Herder and the imperfection of tradition,” *Ir. Stud. Rev.*, 2012, doi: 10.1080/09670882.2012.699699.
- [8] M. G. Blaber, M. D. Arnold, and M. J. Ford, “Search for the ideal lasmonic nanoshell: the effects of surface scattering and alternatives to gold and silver,” *J. Phys. Chem. C*, 2009, doi: 10.1021/jp810808h.