AESTHETICS, BEAUTY, AND ROMANTICISM IN ENGLISH LITERATURE

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e-mail: dominantbooks@gmail.com
info@dominantbooks.com

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CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW ON THE JUDGING BEAUTY

Neha Anand, Assistant Professor
College of Engineering, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- nehaanand002@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

A beautiful concept that dates back to Plato and Plotinus has found its way via many channels into Christian theological thought. This viewpoint holds that beauty is the highest value, something we desire for its own sake with no further justification needed. Since truth and goodness are two of the three fundamental values that support our rational impulses, beauty should be compared to them. Why should I believe p? Because it is accurate. Why do you desire x? Because it is excellent. Why would you want to look at y? Because it is lovely. Philosophers have said that these responses are comparable in that they both rationalise a mental state by linking it to an objective that rational individuals are wired to seek. Someone once questioned, etc. understanding of the nature of thinking is flawed. He fails to understand that, in order to explain our ideas and wants in any way, they must be rooted in what is right and true.

KEYWORDS:

Beautiful, Judging, Natural, Things, Truth.

INTRODUCTION

In things, animals, and people, as well as in abstract concepts and natural creations, as well as in things, traits, and acts, we may recognise beauty. It becomes clear that we are not describing a property like shape, size, or colour, which are unquestionably present to all who can navigate the physical world, as the list expands to include nearly every ontological category (there are beautiful propositions as well as beautiful worlds, beautiful proofs as well as beautiful snails, even beautiful diseases and beautiful deaths). For starters, how could so many different sorts of things exhibit the same property? Okay, so why not? We label a variety of things as blue, including songs, landscapes, emotions, fragrances, and even souls; doesn't this demonstrate how a single characteristic may appear in several contexts? The answer is no. For while all those things may in a way be They cannot be blue in the same manner as my coat, thus they cannot be blue. We use a metaphor when referring to so many different kinds of things as blue, and for it to be properly comprehended, a leap of the imagination is necessary. Metaphors produce associations that are not part of the world itself but rather are the result of our own associative abilities. What a metaphor indicates as an experience, not what it stands for as a property, is what matters most. But even while "beautiful" covers an infinite number of object categories, it is not a metaphor in any of its everyday usages. What justifies the term "beautiful" then? What are we trying to say, and what attitude does our judgement convey?

The real, the good, and the lovely

Does this also apply to beauty? The question, "Why are you interested in x? "Is 'because it is beautiful' a conclusive response, impervious to opposition, like 'because it is excellent' and 'because it is true'? To say as much is to ignore how subversive beauty is. In this instance, beauty is the adversary of truth because someone who is fascinated by a tale can be enticed to accept it. (See, for example, Pindar's First Olympian Ode, "Beauty, which gives the myths acceptance, renders the incredible credible.") A man drawn to a lady can be persuaded to excuse her vices; in this situation, beauty is the adversary of virtue. Goodness and truth never compete; we believe (see. L'Abb'e Pr'evost, Manon Lescaut, which details the moral collapse of the Chevalier des GrieuX by the lovely Manon) suppose, and a healthy respect for the other is always consistent with the pursuit of the one. But the desire of beauty raises even more troubling issues. The 'aesthetic' style of life, which pursues beauty as the highest value, has been in opposition to the life of virtue from Kierkegaard to Wilde. People have been attracted to religious beliefs regardless of whether such beliefs are accurate because of their love of myths, tales, and rituals, their need for solace and peace, and their profound yearning for order. By those who think they depict depravity in seductive hues, the writing of Flaubert, the imagery of Baudelaire, the harmonies of Wagner, and the sensual shapes of Canova have all been charged with immorality [1], [2].

We need not agree with these conclusions in order to see their validity. In contrast to the standing of goodness and truth, the status of beauty as an ultimate value is debatable. Let's at least acknowledge that a contemporary thinker does not have easy access to this specific route to comprehending beauty. The notion stated explicit in Plotinus' Enneads that truth, beauty, and goodness are properties of the god and ways in which the divine oneness manifests itself to the human soul accounts for the confidence with which philosophers formerly walked on it. St. Thomas Aquinas modified this theological vision for Christian application and incorporated it into the sophisticated and thorough reasoning for which he is well renowned. But because it is not a vision that we can assume, I suggest putting it aside for the time being and thinking about beauty without making any theological assertions [3], [4].

However, Aquinas' own perspective on the subject is noteworthy since it raises a significant issue with the philosophy of beauty. Truth, goodness, and unity were seen by Aquinas as "transcendentals"—realities that all things had since they are manifestations of being, the greatest gift of existence. Although he wrote as if beauty too were such a transcendental (which is one way of explaining the argument earlier), his opinions on beauty are suggested rather than explicitly stated created, that beauty fits into every area. He also believed that goodness and beauty are ultimately equivalent since they are two different ways for a single positive truth to be logically seen. But if that's the case, what exactly is ugliness and why do we run from it? And how are there potentially harmful, corrupting, and immoral beauties? Alternatively, if such things are impossible, why are they impossible and what is it that deceives us into believing they are possible? I don't claim that Aquinas lacks a response to such inquiries. However, they highlight the challenges faced by any philosophy that sets beauty on the same metaphysical level as truth in order to ingrain it in the very fabric of existence. The obvious reaction is to assert that beauty is a matter of appearance rather than existence, and maybe that when we explore beauty, we are instead looking at people's feelings rather than the fundamental makeup of the universe.

Several clichés

Having stated that, we must learn from the philosophy of truth. Since they invariably end by assuming what they seek to show, attempts to define truth, to tell us what truth profoundly and fundamentally is, have seldom borne conviction. How can you define truth without presuming to know the difference between a genuine definition and a false definition? Philosophers who have grappled with this issue have proposed that a theory of truth must adhere to a set of logical clichés, and that these platitudes—however innocent they may seem to the untrained eye—provide the yardstick by which all philosophical theories should be judged. The axiom that states that if a phrase s is true, then it is true' is also true and vice versa is a good example of this [5], [6].

DISCUSSION

There are adages that suggest one fact cannot contradict another, that claims are false just because we make them, and that claims are false just because we make them. Philosophers make what appear to be significant statements about truth. But often, the pretence of depth comes at the expense of downplaying one or more of those simple clichés.

Therefore, starting with a set of similar axioms regarding beauty would help us define our topic and allow us to test our beliefs. As follows are five of them:

(i) We like beauty.

(ii) Sometimes one object is more stunning than another.

(iii) Beauty always serves as justification for taking care of the item that has it.

(iv) Beauty is the focus of a judgement, specifically a judgement of taste.

(v) The thing being judged as attractive, not the subject's mental state, is the focus of the taste evaluation. I am not describing myself when I say something is wonderful.

However, there are no second-hand evaluations of attractiveness (vi). You cannot persuade me to agree with a conclusion that I have not reached for myself, and you cannot make me an expert on beauty by having me only read what others have said about beautiful things rather than having me experience and decide for myself. This last adage could be contested. I may swear by a certain music critic, whose assessments of songs and performances I consider to be the word of God. Isn't it the same as adopting my scientific or legal ideas based on the judgements of experts or the rulings of the courts? No, is the response.

No personal judgements have been made by me. My personal assessment, however, is dependent on experience. My borrowed opinion cannot really become a judgement of mine until I have heard the music in issue, at the moment of appreciation. Hence the humour in the following exchange from Emma by Jane Austen: Mr. DiXon, you claim, is not handsome strictly speaking. Oh! Far from it, in fact; it's obvious. I warned you that was simple. My darling, you said Miss Campbell forbade him from being frank and that you yourself— 'Oh! As for me, my opinion is useless. Where I have high esteem for someone, I always consider them to be attractive. But when I labelled him plain, I was expressing what I thought was the popular impression. Jane Fairfax, the second speaker in this interaction, fails to mention her own impression of Mr. DiXon's appearance, thus when she describes him as plain, she is only reflecting the opinion of others [7], [8].

An anomaly

The appealing and delightful fall under the first three of the adages. A reason to be interested in anything is when it is pleasurable, and some things are more delightful than others. In another sense, you can't judge something to be enjoyable after the fact because your own enjoyment is the standard for sincerity. As a result, when reporting on something that others find enjoyable, the most you can say with sincerity is that it appears to be enjoyable or that it appears to be enjoyable because others find it to be so. It is not at all evident, however, that whether or not something is delightful has more to do with it than with human nature and character. We categorise the things we find enjoyable: it is appropriate to like certain things while disapproving of others. But rather than focusing on an aspect of the object, these evaluations are more concerned with the subject's mental state. We may argue all we want about the moral rightness or wrongness of our pleasures without ever mentioning the concept that certain things are really delightful while others are merely ostensibly so.

Concerning beauty, things are different. Here, the judgement is made in relation to the assessed object rather than the judge. True beauty is distinguished from artificial beauty, kitsch, schmaltz, and whimsy. We debate aesthetics and work to develop our taste. Additionally, critical reasoning, which focuses only on the nature of the thing, often supports our assessments of beauty. Even though each of these ideas seems apparent, when paired with the other cliches that I've determined that they produce a paradox that poses a danger to the integrity of aesthetics as a whole. The evaluation of taste is a valid evaluation that is backed by logic. These justifications, however, can never support a deductive argument. If they were able to, there may be secondhand assessments of attractiveness. Experts on beauty may not have personally experienced the things they are describing, and anybody with no sense of aesthetics might follow the criteria for making beauty.

It is true that artists sometimes make an effort to conjure beauty other than that which they themselves have created. For example, Wordsworth invokes the beauty of the Lake District; Proust, the beauty of a sonata of Vinteuil; Mann, the beauty of Joseph; and Homer, the beauty of Helen of Troy. However, the beauty we find in these invocations lies inside them, not in the objects they describe. Even while you and I are horrified by the ugliness of the lady portrayed and disgusted to conceive of a war being waged for such an unappealing cause, it is feasible that a bust of Helen may one day be excavated from the soil of Troy and authenticated as a real resemblance. I have had a love-hate relationship with both the lady depicted in Tristan und Isolde and the one in Janacek’s second quartet. Those creations provide undeniable proof of the beauty that served as their inspiration. To my dismay, pictures of Kamila Stoslova and Mathilda Wesendonck depict a couple of awkward schlumps. So this is the paradoX. The assessment of beauty makes a claim about the thing it is applied to, and this claim may be justified. However, the reasoning is not required to support the conclusion and may be disregarded without conflict. So, are they justifications or not?

Simple beauty

It's crucial to create place for our second cliché here. Things may often be compared and ranked based on their level of beauty, and there is also minimum beauty—beautiful at the lowest possible level—which may be quite different from the "sacred" beauties of nature and art that philosophers analyse. The aesthetic heroism shown by Bernini's St Teresa in Ecstasy

or Bach's Well-Tempered Clavier seems at first to be rather far from the aesthetic simplicity exemplified by setting the table, organising your space, and developing a website. You don't labour over these things in the same way that Beethoven laboured over his last quartets, nor do you expect them to rank among the pinnacles of musical accomplishment in the future. However, you want the table, the room, or the website to look good, and good looks matter in the same way that beauty generally matters—not just by appealing to the eye, but also by communicating meanings and values that are significant to you and that you are consciously putting on display. This adage is crucial to understanding architecture. Without the magnificent structures that adorn the waterfronts, Venice would be less appealing—buildings like the Ducal Palace, the Ca' d'Oro, and Longhena's cathedral of St. Maria della Salute. However, these structures are surrounded by unassuming neighbours who neither compete with nor detract from them. These neighbours are notable for their neighbourliness and reluctance to call attention to themselves or claim the exalted position of fine art. In terms of architecture's aesthetics, stunning beauty is less significant than elements that work well together to create a calming and harmonious continuity, similar to a street or a square where nothing sticks out particularly and good manners are the rule.

The simple beauty of an unassuming street, a fine pair of shoes, or a stylish piece of wrapping paper is sometimes ignored when discussing beauty and its significance in our lives, as if these things were of a lower worth than a chapel by Bramante or a Shakespeare sonnet. However, compared to the great masterpieces that (if we are fortunate) fill our free time, these little beauties are considerably more significant to our everyday lives and deeply entwined in our own logical judgements. They are a component of the environment in which we live, and they serve as both an expression and a confirmation of our desire for peace, propriety, and politeness. Furthermore, the great works of architecture often get their grace from the modest backdrop that these lesser beauties provide. If the modest structures that huddle in its shade were to be replaced by cast-concrete office buildings, of the sort that destroy the aspect of St. Paul's, Longhena's church on the Grand Canal would lose its self-assured and invoking presence [9], [10].

Some repercussions

The second cliché we've chosen has repercussions. The idea that value assessments often include comparisons is one that has to be taken carefully. When we assess something's quality and attractiveness, our main focus is often to rank several options, using a with a view to selecting one of them. The quest of ultimate or ideal beauty could draw our attention away from the more pressing task of doing things correctly. It is admirable when theologians, poets, and philosophers draw attention to beauty in its purest form. But for the majority of us, maintaining order in our immediate environment and making sure that our senses of hearing, seeing, and fittingness are not continuously insulted are considerably more crucial.

Another point to consider is that placing too much emphasis on beauty may, in certain instances, lead to self-defeating choices since it suggests that we must constantly strive for the most attractive option when making decisions. In fact, giving beauty too much attention might work against it. For example, when it comes to urban design, the main objective is to blend in rather than stick out. If you want to be noticed, like Longhena's church, you must merit the attention you ask for. This does not imply that the modest and peaceful street is not lovely. Instead, research argues that describing its attractiveness in a different, less

condescending approach, such as a kind of fittingness or harmony, can help us better grasp it. If we tried to emulate Sta Maria della Salute's level of extreme beauty in every situation, we would experience aesthetic overload. The individuality of the clamorous masterpieces, competing for attention side by side, would be lost, and the beauty of each would compete with the beauty of the others.

This leads to the next issue, which is that 'beautiful' is by no means the sole adjective we use in making evaluations of this kind. We praise things for their elegance, delicacy, and fine patina; we adore music for its expressiveness, structure, and orderliness; we value the pretty, the charming, and the attractive—and we frequently have far more faith in these evaluations than in a blanket declaration that something is beautiful. Speaking about beauty requires entering a higher domain that is sufficiently far from daily problems to only be stated with some hesitance praise and the quest of beauty are an embarrassment, much as those who constantly demonstrate their religious beliefs. We believe that such matters should be kept private and should not be discussed over dinner or paraded in front of others.

Of course, we may agree that being attractive, expressive, elegant, or any other quality is equivalent to being beautiful to that extent—but only to that extent, not to the extent that Plato, Plotinus, or Walter Pater would have us go in order to express our dedication to aesthetics. We would be asking for artistic common sense by offering this conditional acceptance. But common sense also emphasises how flexible our language is. Both "She is very pretty—yes, beautiful!" and "She is very pretty, but hardly beautiful" are persuasive statements. More significant than the words used to express it, and more significant even than the phrases themselves, is the concept of delight. Without an anchor, it is used more to indicate an outcome than to specify the factors that cause it.

Two ideas on beauty

It becomes clear that judging beauty is more than just a matter of personal choice. It takes a conscious effort. And there are several ways to express it. The endeavour to demonstrate what is proper, appropriate, valuable, beautiful, or expressive about the object—that is, to pinpoint the feature that commands our attention—is less significant than the final judgement. It's possible that we won't use the term "beauty" while describing and coordinating our choices. And this shows a contrast between the evaluation of beauty, seen as a defence of taste, and the focus on beauty, as a unique means of appealing to that evaluation. It makes little sense to praise Barto'k's composition for The Miraculous Mandarin as one of the achievements of early modern music while also calling it harsh, rebuking, and even ugly. When compared to Faur'e's Pavane, which merely seeks to be exquisitely lovely and succeeds, it has various artistic merits.

Making a distinction between two definitions of beauty is another approach to state the argument. In one meaning, "beauty" refers to aesthetic achievement; in another, it refers to simply a certain kind of aesthetic achievement. There are certain pieces of art that we hold in high respect for their unadulterated beauty—works that "take our breath away," as Botticelli's Birth of Venus, Keats's Ode to a Nightingale, or Susanna's garden aria from Mozart's Marriage of Figaro. Such works are frequently referred to as "ravishing," which implies that they inspire awe and veneration in us as well as a carefree and soothing joy. We often reserve the epithet "beautiful" for works of this sort because words, in the context of aesthetic evaluation, are loose and fluid, emphasising their particular kind of entrancing attraction.

Similar to how we see pristine and stunning examples of people and settings that leave us awestruck, satisfied to just bask in their radiance. And we give them admiration for their "sheer" beauty, meaning that words would fall short if we tried to describe how they affect us.

We may even go so far as to claim that certain pieces of art are excessively lovely; they ravish when they should upset or give dreamy intoXication when a sharp gesture of sorrow is called for. Although both Tennyson's In Memoriam and maybe Faure's Requiem are in their own unique ways the pinnacles of creative accomplishment, I believe that the same might be said of them. All of this shows that we should be cautious about focusing too much on words, even the term that describes the topic of this book. A certain form of evaluation, for which the technical word "aesthetic" is now often used, is what counts most. We must keep in mind the idea that there could be a pinnacle aesthetic value, for which the word "beauty" might be more appropriately reserved. However, for the time being, it is more crucial to comprehend beauty in its broadest meaning, as the object of aesthetic appraisal.

Goals, means, and reflection

There is a widely held belief that separates the desire in beauty from the interest in getting things done. This belief is less of a platitude than it is a first attempt at a theory. We value beautiful things not only for their usefulness but also for who they are—or perhaps more accurately, how they appear in themselves. According to Schiller, "man is merely in earnest with the good, the true, and the useful; but with the beautiful he plays." When an object completely captures our attention independent of any possible uses for it—in our view, that is when we start to talk about it as being beautiful.

Having said that, we must acknowledge that the line separating aesthetic from practical objectives is as hazy as the terminology employed to define it. What exactly do people mean when they claim that we are engaged in a piece of art for its own sake, because of its inherent worth, as a means of fulfilment in and of itself? These are philosophical jargon phrases that don't really distinguish between aesthetic appeal and the utilitarian mindset that daily decision-making demands of us. The difference between art and craft that we now so often draw did not exist in earlier eras. The ability to make things is the root of our term "poetry," which is derived from the Roman arts, which included all kinds of practical work. And to take our second axiom about beauty seriously is to be wary of the notion that the beautiful exists in a separate world unaffected by everyday realities [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

This idea led to an essential divide between the fine and the practical arts in the seventeenth century. Useful Like building, carpet weaving, and carpentry, the arts have a purpose, and their effectiveness may be assessed. However, a practical structure or carpet cannot be considered attractive. We emphasize another part of architecture by referring to it as a useful art—the aspect that goes beyond usefulness. We are suggesting that an architectural work may be recognized both as a means and as an end in and of itself, as something with inherent value. The first steps towards our current understanding of the work of art as something whose worth is in it and not in its function were taken by Enlightenment philosophers as they struggled with the difference between the fine and useful arts. The statement "all art is quite

useless" was made by Oscar Wilde, who did not intend to downplay the impact that art can have, using his own play Salome as one graphic example.

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CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT OF BEAUTY AND SENSES

Jyoti Puri, Associate Professor
College of Education, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- puri20.j@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

A traditional belief holds that in order to really appreciate beauty, one must constantly engage one's senses rather than relying just on one's mind. Because of this, the philosophy of art chose the name "aesthetics" from the Greek word for feeling, aesthesis, around the beginning of the seventeenth century. Kant added a rich intellectual refinement to this way of thinking when he said that the beautiful is that which is instantly pleasing and devoid of notions. Aquinas seems to have agreed with the notion as well, describing the beautiful as anything that is appealing to the eye in the first section of the Summa. The second section of his essay, however, modifies this claim, stating that "the beautiful relates only to sight and hearing of all the senses, since these are the most cognitive (maxima cognoscitive) among them." And this implies that he did not limit the study of beauty to the sense of sight, but also that he was more interested in the intellectual significance of the beautiful than its sensory effect, even if that significance can only be understood by hearing or seeing.

KEYWORDS:

Beauty, Interest, Pleasure, Aesthetic, Kant.

INTRODUCTION

The question at hand may appear straightforward: Is the enjoyment of beauty a sensory or an intellectual enjoyment? Then then, what makes the two different? A hot bath is a sensual delight, while a mathematical problem is an intellectual one. However, there are a thousand intermediate positions in between those two, making the subject of where aesthetic pleasure falls on the spectrum one of the most contentious ones in aesthetics. In a well-known passage from Modern Painters, Ruskin distinguished between the purely sensual interest, or aesthesis, and the true interest in art, or theories, which he named after the Greek word for contemplation. He did not, however, wish to assimilate art to science or deny that the senses are deeply entwined in the appreciation of beauty. Ruskin's language invention has been shunned by the majority of philosophers, and kept the word "aesthesis" but acknowledged that it did not refer to a merely sensory state of mind. A beautiful face, a beautiful flower, a beautiful symphony, or a beautiful colour are all examples of things that may be enjoyed just by sight or hearing. But what about a lovely book, a lovely speech, a lovely physics theory, or a lovely mathematical proof? A book in translation must be seen as an entirely distinct work of art from the same novel in its native language if we connect a novel's beauty too tightly to how it sounds. And this is undoubtedly to ignore the narrative's development, the carefully timed disclosure of details about a fictional setting, and the reflections that support and deepen the storyline. These are the things that make the art of the book so fascinating [1], [2].

Furthermore, if we connect the experience of beauty with the senses too tightly, we could start to ask why so many philosophers, like Plato and Hegel, have decided to exclude the

senses of taste, touch, and smell from the experience of beauty. Aren't foodies and wine enthusiasts dedicated to their own kind of beauty? Aren't there lovely tastes and smells in addition to lovely sights and sounds? Is there not a strong correlation between the arts of the stomach and the arts of the spirit, according to the large critical literature dedicated to the evaluation of food and wine? Here is how I would answer to such ideas in a nutshell. We are undoubtedly more engaged in what is being said while we are enjoying a narrative than in the sensory qualities of the sounds that are being utilised to tell it. The fact that we continue to return to the words, reread our favourite passages, and let the sentences percolate through our minds long after we have understood the plot, however, defies the idea that stories and novels can simply be reduced to the information they contain. The progression of a tale, the tension, the harmony between narration and conversation, as well as both of these elements and commentary, are all important aspects of writing [3], [4].

Sensory elements since they rely on buildup and release as well as the smooth progression of a story in our perception. In that sense, a book engages the senses, but not in the same way that a rich chocolate bar or an aged wine would. Rather, the mind is exposed to something via the senses. Take any Chekhov short tale. It is irrelevant if the translated phrases sound nothing like the Russian originals. Still, they keep repeating the same scenes in the same oblique order. Still, they convey as much with their silence as they do with their words. Still, they continue to follow one another according to observable rather than summarised logic. As a drop of dew contains the sky, Chekhov's work distils life as it is experienced into pictures that hold drama. By inventing a universe based on such a tale, we are constantly constrained by the images and sounds in our minds. Regarding taste and smell, I believe philosophers were correct to place them on the periphery of our interest in beauty. Tastes and scents are unable to organise sounds into words and tones in the same way that hearing does. We can savour them but just in a pleasurable manner, scarcely provoking our imagination or cognition. They lack the intellectual capacity, if you will, to arouse interest in beauty. These are only quick suggestions at conclusions that deserve considerably more justification than I can provide them in this context. Instead of focusing on how "immediate," "sensory," and "intuitive" the experience of beauty is, I suggest that we instead think on how an item seems to us while we are experiencing beauty. When we talk about the "aesthetic" aspect of our appreciation of beauty, we mean presentation rather than experience [5], [6].

Apathetic Interest

We may make a rough conclusion based on those observations and our six clichés, which is that we define anything as beautiful when we enjoy looking at it as an individual item, for its own sake, and in its given form. This is true even of things like landscapes and streets, which are really just limitless collections of little parts rather than distinct objects. Such composite forms are kept together, so to speak, by a single, unifying gaze, and are framed by aesthetic appeal. The specific date of contemporary aesthetics' emergence is difficult to determine. However, it cannot be denied that the third Earl of Shaftesbury, a Locke student and one of the most significant essayists of the eighteenth century, made a significant contribution to the field with the Characteristics (1711). Shaftesbury explained the distinctive characteristics of the evaluation of beauty in that work in terms of the judge's disinterested attitude. Setting all other interests aside in order to focus on the object itself is what it means to be interested in beauty.

DISCUSSION

In The Critique of Judgement, published in 1795, Kant picked up the issue and developed a potent aesthetic theory out of the concept of indifference. Kant asserts that anytime we use objects or people as means to further one of our interests, such as when we use a hammer to drive in a nail or a person to deliver a message, we are acting "interestedly." Animals only have 'interested' attitudes because they are always motivated by their own wants, appetites, and desires, and they see objects and other living beings as tools to satisfy those needs. However, we distinguish between things that are means to us and those that are also goals in themselves in our thoughts and action. We have an interest in certain things that is not driven by another interest but rather is, so to say, totally committed to the object [7], [8].

That method of phrasing things is debatable, not least since Kant, as in all of his works, is gently nudging us in the direction of the endorsing a system that has profound effects on how we think about everything. Nevertheless, by using a simple example, we may comprehend his point. Imagine a mother holding her child in her arms while beaming love and joy at it. We don't state that she has a need that this baby fills, as though another baby would have served that purpose just as well for her. The infant does not serve the mother's interests or function as a means to an end for which she has other goals. She is interested in the infant because it is interesting in and of itself. The infant would no longer be the entire and only focus of the woman's state of mind if she were driven by an interest she had, such as an interest in convincing someone to hire her as a babysitter. She would have done just as well with any other infant who gave her the ability to utter the appropriate sounds and eXpressions. Disinterested attitudes don't see their goal as one of many alternatives, which is one indication of their indifference. No other infant would 'do just as well' for the mother who is adoring of the thing she is holding in her arms, it is obvious [9], [10].

Uninterested Enjoyment

Being disinterested in something doesn't necessary mean you don't care about it; it just means you care about it in a certain manner. People who freely provide assistance to others in need are sometimes described as acting disinterestedly, which implies that they are driven only by the desire to assist their neighbours rather than by self-interest or any other kind of motivation. They are uninterested in you. How is it even doable? Kant said that it is impossible if all of our wants dictate our interests since each interest that arises from a desire of mine would attempt to further that interest. However, if interests are only motivated by (stem from) reason, they may become uninterested.

Kant went on to make a startling deduction from this contentious formulation. There is a particular kind of he claimed that disinterested interest, which is an interest of reason, is an interest in myself rather than one of mine. Kant explains the moral motivation in this way. I step aside from myself and adopt the role of an impartial judge when I ask myself what I should do rather than what I want to do. The moral motivation comes from putting all of my interests aside and approaching the issue at hand with an appeal to reason alone, which entails highlighting factors that any rational human would find equally compelling. According to Kant, from this position of impartial inquiry, we are inexorably brought to the categorical imperative, which instructs us to only follow the rules that we can wish to be the rules for all rational beings.

However, there is another sense in which the moral motivation is involved: my will is determined by the interest of reason. The term "ought" suggests that I am deciding to do something and that it will be what reason dictates. But when it comes to judging beauty, I am totally uninterested, removing myself from pragmatic concerns and focusing just on the thing in front of me, suspending all other wants, interests, and objectives. The link between beauty and pleasure seems to be in jeopardy due to this rigid notion of indifference. When I have a positive experience, I want to replicate it because I'm interested in doing so. So what exactly do we mean when we say "a disinterested pleasure"? How, and whose pleasure, can reason be 'in me'? We are undoubtedly attracted to beautiful objects by the pleasure they provide, just as we are to other kinds of pleasure. Beauty is just the subject of a universal interest—our interest in beauty and the pleasure it brings—rather than the source of disinterested pleasure.

But if we make a distinction between pleasures, we might approach Kant's ideas with greater sympathy. These occur in numerous forms, as seen by the comparison between the pleasure experienced from using drugs, the joy from drinking wine, and the pleasure that your kid feels passed his exam and enjoys a piece of music or art. When my kid tells me he got the maths award at school, I'm happy. However, this happiness is motivated as it results from the fulfilment of a personal interest of mine—my interest as a parent in my son's achievement. My enjoyment of a poem relies only on my interest in the specific work that is on my mind when I read it. Of course, I have hobbies outside of poetry, such as military strategy, which attracts me to the Iliad, and gardening, which draws me to Paradise Lost. The enjoyment of a poem's beauty, though, comes from an interest in it for what it is.

It's possible that I had to read the poem to pass an exam. In this situation, I like having read it. Such a pleasure is, once again, one that I am interested in, one that results from my interest in reading the poem. I'm glad I read the poem, with the preposition 'that' here being key to describing the nature of my enjoyment. We differentiate between pleasure from, pleasure in, and pleasure that in our language, which somewhat reflects the complexity of the idea of pleasure. Disinterested pleasure is never joy in actuality, according quote Malcolm Budd. Furthermore, despite the fact that humans like taking warm baths, as I have explained, the enjoyment of beauty is not solely sensory like that of a warm bath. It also differs significantly from the pleasure experienced after snorting cocaine, which does not include the cocaine itself but just results in pleasure.

One kind of pleasure is disinterested pleasure. But it has a distinct "intentionality," to use the technical phrase; it is centered on its aim and depends upon cognition. A hot bath is always enjoyable since it doesn't need any consideration of the bath itself. Contrarily, intentional joys are a component of cognitive existence. For example, my delight at seeing my kid win the long jump fades when I realise it was a lookalike who won instead of my son. My first joy was incorrect, and such errors may have serious consequences, as seen by Lucretia's misguided joy at the man's hug whom she believes to be her husband but who is really a rapist named Tarquin.

Therefore, an intriguing subclass of pleasures is intentional pleasures. They are completely incorporated into mental existence. They may be reduced by debate and increased by attentiveness. They are not derived from enjoyable experiences like eating and drinking are, but instead are essential to the development of our mental and emotional faculties. The enjoyment of beauty is comparable. However, it goes beyond simple purpose; it is also

meditative, drawing energy from the object's given shape and always replenishing itself. Therefore, my enjoyment of beauty acts as a present to the item, which in turn serves as a gift to me. It is similar to how individuals feel when they are with their pals in this way. The joy of beauty is inquisitive, much like the pleasure of friendship; it seeks to comprehend its target and to respect what it discovers. As a result, it tends to appraise the validity of itself. Additionally, this judgement implicitly appeals to the group of rational creatures, just as any sensible judgement does. This is what Kant meant when he said that, in the case of taste judgement, I am "a suitor for agreement," expressing my judgement not as a personal opinion but rather as a legally binding conclusion that would be accepted by all rational creatures if they performed what I am doing and set their own interests aside.

Objectivity

The assertion made by Kant is that a person's own opinion of taste is presented to others as binding even when it is not. That is a really interesting concept, yet the clichés I repeated previously support it. When I say something is lovely, I'm describing it, not how I feel about it making an assertion that appears to indicate that others would agree with me if they had the correct perspective. Furthermore, calling anything lovely has the same connotations of passing judgement, rendering a decision, and calling for an explanation from me.

I may not be able to provide any compelling justifications for my decision, but if I am unable to, it speaks more to who I am than it does to the decision. Perhaps another person who has more experience with criticism might defend the decision. Whether crucial reasons are indeed reasons is a hotly debated issue, as I said previously. According to Kant, aesthetic assessments are universal but subjective; they are based on the individual's current experience rather than any logical justification. However, we shouldn't disregard the reality that individuals are continuously debating aesthetic judgement issues and attempting to come to some kind of consensus. Like arguments over culinary preferences, which are more like differences than disagreements, aesthetic disagreements are uncomfortable. For instance, when it comes to the built environment, disputes about aesthetics often the focus of abrasive legal action and governmental enforcement.

After that, with its effort to define aesthetic perception and assign it a key position in the life of a rational human, Kant's theory is far from platitudinous and, in fact, essentially problematic. We started with certain generalizations about beauty and progressed towards it. I disagree that Kant's theory is accurate. However, it offers an intriguing entry point to a topic that is as debatable now as it was when Kant published his third Critique. One aspect of Kant's argument, that rational people have the right to experience beauty and pass judgement on it, is unquestionably correct. Only beings similar to ourselves, with morality, self-awareness, language, and practical reason judgment—is capable of seeing the environment with this level of alertness and indifference in order to grab and enjoy the thing being offered. However, it is crucial to address two problems that I have so far avoided: the origins of the sense of beauty in evolutionary terms and the related question of the role of beauty in sexual desire**.**

There is disagreement among evolutionary psychologists regarding whether group selection is possible and others who claim that selection takes place at the level of the individual organism since genes replicate themselves there and not in the community, like Richard Dawkins. Without taking sides in this debate, there are two main schools of evolutionary

aesthetics that we can distinguish. One demonstrates the group advantage that the aesthetic sense confers, and the other contends that people with aesthetic interests have a better chance of passing on their genes.

The first type of theory is put forth by the anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake, who claims in Homo Aestheticus that rituals and festivals belong with art and aesthetic interest as they are the natural outgrowths of human need to "make special," to remove things, occasions, and human relationships from daily use and to make them the Centre of collective attention. This "making special" improves collective cohesiveness and encourages individuals to approach the events that are really important for the community's survival—whether they include weddings, weapons, funerals, or offices—as public events with an aura that guards against casual disdain and emotional deterioration. The benefit it has provided to human groups, keeping them together in times of peril and boosting their reproductive confidence in times of tranquil flourishing, helps to explain the deeply ingrained impulse to "make special."

The argument is intriguing and undoubtedly true in some respects, yet it fails miserably to explain what makes aesthetics different. Beauty itself is a particular sort of special, not to be confused with ritual, festival, or ceremony, even if those things may sometimes contain it. The feeling of beauty may be founded in some communal impulse to "make special," but beauty itself is a distinct kind of special. Without the experience of beauty, a community wouldn't benefit from the ceremonial endorsement of its most important values.

For instance, via competitive athletic events like the games described by Homer; or by serious religious rites invoking the protection of the gods to defend whatever institution or practise needs widespread support. Sport and religion are near neighbours of the sense of beauty from an anthropological perspective, but from a philosophical one, the differences here are just as significant as the links. When people refer to football as "the beautiful game," they are portraying it as a quasi-aesthetic phenomenon from the perspective of the viewer.

Sport is significantly different from both art and religion in that it is a competitive activity in which strength and ability are tested, and each of the three phenomena has a unique significance in the lives of rational individuals. Similar criticisms might be levelled towards the more individualistic view put out by Steven Pinker in How the Mind Works and Geoffrey Miller in The Mating Mind. This hypothesis supports Darwin's initial proposal in The Descent of Man that the concept of beauty developed via the process of sexual selection. According to Miller's additions, the theory contends that by emphasising his physical attractiveness, a man does what a peacock does when he displays his tail: he is making a sign of his reproductive fitness, to which a woman responds as a peahen would, by claiming him on behalf of her genes without being aware of what she is doing. Obviously, human artistic behaviour is more complex than a bird's instinctual exhibition. Men do more than just sport tattoos and feathers; they also create art, poetry, and music. However, all of these traits are indicators of power, cunning, and prowess and are thus accurate measures of reproductive fitness [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

These aesthetic efforts inspire amazement, wonder, and desire in women, allowing nature to run her course to the mutual victory of the genes that convey her enduring words. However, it is evident that vigorous activities other than artistic production would contribute equally to

such a genetic strategy. Therefore, even if the explanation is correct, we will not be able to identify what characterises the emotion of beauty. Even if the Art of Fugue and the tail of a peacock have a similar ancestor, the admiration aroused by one is of an entirely different character from that of the other. The reasoning in the first chapter should make it apparent that only rational creatures have aesthetic interests and that beauty engages their rationality in the same way that moral judgement and scientific conviction do.

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CHAPTER 3

EXPLORING THE BEAUTY AND DESIRE

Sonia Jayant, Assistant Professor
Department of Computing Sciences and I.T, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- soniaj.jayant@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Plato was writing about eros, the overpowering need that, according to Plato, exists at its most important between persons of the same sex, being particularly felt by an older man affected by the beauty of a youth. He was not writing about sex and sexual difference as we now understand them. Greeks thought of Eros as a cosmic energy similar to love that, in Dante's words, "moves the sun and the other stars." Therefore, Plato's discussion of beauty in the Phaedrus and the Symposium starts with yet another cliché. A person's beauty arouses desire. This desire, according to Plato, is both genuine and a type of error, but a mistake that teaches us valuable lessons about the universe and ourselves. Some claim that desire brings forth beauty; that is, when I want someone, I regard them as lovely. This is one of the ways in which the mind, to use Hume's metaphor, "spreads itself upon objects." However, that does not adequately capture the sensation of sexual desire. Your eyes are drawn to the attractive lad or girl, and this is when your desire starts. It's possible that there is a different, more mature type of sexual desire that develops from love and finds beauty in the absence longer, more youthful qualities of a partner for life

KEYWORDS:

Beauty, Desire, Love, Sexual, Soul.

INTRODUCTION

But categorically speaking, it is not the phenomena Plato had in mind. Whatever angle we choose, the seventh platitude poses a challenge to aesthetics. In the world of art, beauty is something to be contemplated rather than desired. Even if I could wish to steal the artwork for financial gain, I cannot leave the music hall with a symphony in my pocket. To enjoy the beauty of a painting or a symphony is not to be inspired to any concupiscent attitude. Does this imply that there are two different types of beauty—beauty in art and beauty in people? Or does it imply that our desire is mistakenly sparked by the sight of human beauty and that we really have a reflective approach towards beauty in all of its forms?

Plato's love and Eros’s

The second of those comments drew Plato in. Eros, according to him, is the source of both sexual desire and a love of beauty. Eros is a kind of love that aspires to union with its target as well as to duplicate it just like men and women do when they engage in sexual reproduction. Along with that, basic shape. There is also a higher type of sexual love (as defined by Plato), in which the object of love is pondered rather than possessed, and the act of copying takes place in the domain of abstract ideas rather than the world of concrete particulars, or the world of the 'forms,' as Plato put it. The soul ascends to a higher realm through the study of beauty, leaving behind its immersion in purely sensual and material

things to study the form of the beautiful, which takes up residence in the soul as a true possession, much like ideas typically do in the souls of those who comprehend them. This more advanced type of reproduction is a part of the soul's deepest ambition in this world, which is to become eternal. However, it is hampered by an excessive fixation on the inferior form of reproduction, which is a kind of present-day incarceration [1], [2].

Plato claims that the most basic type of sexual desire is the desire to obtain something fleeting and temporary, which leads to slavery to the lower, more sensual, immediate, and materialistic side of the soul. The desire for beauty is really a signal to let go of our connection to the senses and to start ascension of the soul into the realm of ideas, where we may take part in the divine form of reproduction, which is the comprehension and transmission of everlasting truths. The chaste connection between a man and a youngster, in which the man assumes the position of teacher, conquers his carnal impulses, and views the boy's beauty as an object of contemplation, an instance in the here-and-now, is an example of this real sort of erotic love and now of the timeless notion of the lovely [3], [4].

That influential group of ideas has a lengthy history after that. Through the ages, it has touched the hearts of teachers (particularly male instructors) with its intoxicating method of fusing homoerotic love, the vocation of the teacher, and the salvation of the soul. The heterosexual interpretation of the Platonic myth also had a significant impact on mediaeval poetry, Christian conceptions of women, and how women should be perceived. It was this influence that led to some of the most exquisite works of Western art, including Botticelli's Birth of Venus, Michelangelo's sonnets, and Chaucer's Knight's Tale. However, it simply takes a little amount of cynicism to see that the Platonic picture is more wishful thinking than reality. How is it possible to feel both sexual love for a male and (after exercising some self-control) pleased contemplation of an abstract notion at the same moment? That would be like stating that gazing at an image of a cow may satisfy you want for a steak (after some mental effort).

Considering and wishing

Even if they pique a person's attention in a very different way, the object of aesthetic assessment and the object of sexual desire may both be defined as lovely explains them. A person can think that an elderly man's face is lovely because it has many intriguing creases and wrinkles, a fine, calm eye, and a wise, inviting expression. However, we comprehend that assessment differently from "She's beautiful!"', a girl's eager youngster stated. The boy is pursuing the girl; he wants her not only for him to gaze at her but also for him to hold her and give her a kiss. The act of sexual activity is referred to as the "consummation" of this kind of want, but we shouldn't assume that this means it is always what is meant or that it ends the desire in the same way as drinking a cup of water ends the need for water [5], [6].

There is no such "going after" in the instance of the attractive older guy; there is no purpose, no desire to acquire, and no attempt to benefit in any other way from the attractive object. If we are seeking for fulfilment, we will find it in the old man's face, in the object of our attention, and in the act of contemplation. To imagine that this is the same mindset as the young person who is hot on their heels is undoubtedly ludicrous. When you look at your partner with sexual desire, you are stepping back from your desire to channel it towards a more overarching, longer-term goal that is not instantly sensual. In fact, this is the sexual

gaze's metaphysical significance: it is a quest for knowledge and an invitation to the other person to manifest himself in sensory form and make himself known.

On the other hand, when arousal occurs, beauty surely arouses desire. So, is your desire aimed at the other person's beauty? Is there a desire to use that beauty in any way? But what good is another person's attractiveness to you? The contented lover has just as little ability to own his beloved's beauty as someone who helplessly sees it from a distance. One of the ideas that influenced Plato's thesis was this. In terms of sexual desire, what motivates us is something we can only ever consider. It's possible that our need will be satisfied, briefly quenching it. Though it is not completed by owning the object that inspires it since it is always beyond of our grasp and is the other person's exclusive property that cannot be shared.

DISCUSSION

The ideas of Plato bring us back to the challenging concept of desiring the individual. Let's say you want a glass of water. There isn't a certain glass of water you desire in this situation. Any glass of water will do; a glass is not required. You want to use the water for something else as well, namely to drink it. Your desire will then have been gratified and is now a thing of the past. That is the typical character of our sensual desires: they are illogical, focused on a certain activity, and they are satiated and terminated by that action. The same cannot be said for sexual desire. Sexual desire is fixed; you have a certain individual in mind. Even though they are similarly gorgeous, people are not the same as objects of desire. You may have feelings for one person, then another, or even for both at once. Although the 'kind' is, at another level, what it's all about, your desire for John or Mary cannot be satisfied by Alfred or Jane since each want is unique to its target and is for that person as the unique individual that he is. That glass of water might satisfy my need for this one as it doesn't concentrate on this particular bulk of water but rather on the components of water. In certain cases, making love to another person might help you let go of your desire for one individual. However, this does not imply that the second person has fulfilled the same wish that the first person was focusing on. The same way that you cannot fulfil you want to know how a book ends by getting unforeseenlly immersed in a movie, you cannot satiate one sexual desire by smothering it with another [7], [8].

Additionally, you don't have a clear idea of what you want to do with the person you like in order to express your feelings fully. No doubt, there is the sexual act, but want may exist without desire for that, and the act neither satisfies nor ends the need in the same way that drinking does. Lucretius gives a renowned account of this paradoX in which the lovers are shown attempting to unite their bodies in every manner that passion may suggest Only in the ferocious froth of pure desire when both go forward, mutter, and eventually expire, As each would try to push their way into the other's heart, they hold, they squeeze, and they dart their steamy tongues: They merely cruise the seashore in vain.

Because neither bodies nor lost bodies can be penetrated. ..(Adapted from Dryden) In a sexual act, there is no one objective that is sought for, fulfilled, or satisfied; all objectives are provisional, transient, and leave the situation essentially unaltered. And the mismatch between the desire and its fulfilment, which is not a fulfilment at all but rather a little pause in an endless cycle, constantly astounds lovers: They would eventually lose each other, but they are still separated by iron bars. They make every effort to heal the hidden wound of enduring love, but to no avail. This brings us back to the subject of "for its own sake." In most cases,

the need for a drink of water is accompanied with a desire to use it for anything. However, a person's desire for another person is just that a want for that person. It is a need that a person has that is expressed by sexual closeness but isn't met by, much less satisfied by, it. This may be related to the significance of beauty in arousing sexual desire. In order to appreciate the existence of the particular item, beauty compels us to concentrate on it.

The lover's thoughts and senses are filled with attention on the person. Because animal reproductive drives have the same appetitive structure as hunger and thirst, eros appeared to Plato to be quite distinct from those desires. We may say that an animal's impulses are the expression of its basic drives, where necessity takes precedence over free will. On the other hand, Ero's is not to take its position among our rational ambitions, it requires a drive but also a single-out, a protracted look from I to I that is stronger than the desires from which it emerges. This is true even if sexual attraction is anchored in such a drive, which is definitely the case. Like how our interest in dancing and music is influenced by our desire to coordinate our physical motions, our sensual experiences are motivated by the reproductive drive that we share with other animals. In a manner, humanity is an extended rescue effort in which human motivations and desires are diverted from the world of interchangeable appetites and put forward in a different way as to seek out free people who are picked out and valued as "ends in themselves."

Gorgeous Bodies

The temptation to separate one's interest from the person and attach it to the body, to give up on the morally challenging attempt to possess the other as a free individual, and instead to treat him or her as a mere tool for one's own localised pleasure, was one that no one was more aware of than Plato. Although he did not express it in that way, Plato's works on the topic of both beauty and desire both rest on this idea. He believed that there are two levels of desire: a lower level that targets the body, a higher level that targets the spirit, and—through the soul—the eternal sphere from which we rational creatures inevitably fall. We don't have to agree with that metaphysical viewpoint in order to admit that Plato's claim has some element of truth. Exists a contrast between an interest in a person's physique and an interest in a person as embodied that is known to all of us. An embodied person is a free entity who has manifested themselves in the flesh; a body is an assembly of bodily components. When we talk about a beautiful human body, we are not only talking about a physique that is regarded lovely in and of itself.

If we concentrate on a specific area, like the lips or the eye, this becomes clear. You may think of the mouth as nothing more than an aperture—a fleshy hole through which objects enter and exit. When addressing a condition, a surgeon may observe the mouth in this manner. When we are face to face with another person, we do not perceive the mouth in that manner. For us, the mouth is a speaking device that is continuous with the "I" whose voice it is rather than an aperture through which sounds emanate. Kissing someone on the lips is touching them in their truest self rather than pressing one body part against another. The kiss is thus compromising since it is a gesture from one self to another and a calling of the other into the top of his being.

Even when eating, good table manners preserve the idea that the mouth is one of the soul's windows. People try to avoid speaking or eating when their lips are full in order to avoid spilling food onto their plates. For this reason, forks and chopsticks were developed, and

when Africans eat with their fingers, they beautifully curve their palms so that the food enters the mouth without leaving any traces and maintains its social quality as it is consumed. The occurrences in question are well-known yet challenging to explain. Recall the sickening sensation that follows the unexpected discovery of a body part where, up until that point, an embodied person had been standing [9], [10].

In that moment, the body has become opaque. Behind his own flesh, which is now an object, an instrument rather than the person himself, the free being has vanished. the time of this lunar eclipse. Obscenity is when a person's body is made on purpose. The offensive gesture eliminates the experience of embodiment by displaying the body as pure body. Obscenity disgusts us for the same reason that physical love revolted Plato: it entails, in a sense, the eclipse of the soul by the body. Those ideas raise a crucial point concerning physical attractiveness. The human body's unique beauty derives from its status as an embodiment. Its beauty transcends simple form and proportion and is not comparable to that of a doll. When human beauty is shown in a statue, such as the Apollo Belvedere or the Daphne by Bernini, it is the beauty of a person flesh energised by the unique soul and expressing uniqueness in all its parts that is being depicted. The tragi-comic impact of Hoffmann's story's hero falling in love with the doll Olympia is fully attributable to the fact that Olympia's beauty is just an illusion and disappears when the clockwork runs out.

This has a huge impact on the topic of sexual art, as I'll demonstrate later. But it already nudges us in the direction of a crucial finding. Human beauty is seen in terms of how it affects the individual, whether it inspires desire or contemplation. It is particularly present in the physical characteristics of the face, eyes, lips, and hands that draw our attention during intimate interactions and serve as the foundation for our one-to-one relationships. The human eyes, lips, and hands have a universal allure despite the fact that there may be trends in human beauty and that different civilizations may beautify the body in various ways. Because these are the characteristics via which another person's soul manifests itself to us.

Gorgeous Souls

Hegel devoted a section of The Phenomenology of Spirit to "the beautiful soul," addressing topics prevalent in literary romanticism of the time, especially in the works of Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel, and Goethe. Despite being conscious of evil, the beautiful spirit maintains a distance from it by forgiving others and oneself at the same time. It avoids direct interaction with the outside world because of fear that it would tarnish its inner purity, and instead of using its actions to alleviate its pain, chooses to reflect on them. Later authors continued the topic of the lovely soul, and there were several efforts in nineteenth-century literature to either depict or critique this increasingly prevalent human type. Even today, it is common for someone to refer to another as having a "beautiful soul," which implies that his goodness is more of a thing to ponder than a force in the universe.

This incident in intellectual history serves as a reminder of how the concept of beauty permeates our perception of others. Every part of a person that we may, for however short a period and from whatever purpose, pull back from direct involvement in order to place it inside our own reflective gaze is affected by the pursuit of beauty. When someone becomes significant to us and begins to exert a gravitational pull on our life, we are first somewhat surprised by his uniqueness. We sometimes stop in his presence to allow the unbelievable reality of his existence to sink in. And if we feel comfort in his company and love and trust

him, then our feelings in these circumstances are pure approval of the other, whose soul radiates in his face and actions just as beauty does in a piece of art.

Therefore, it is not strange that we refer to people's moral qualities as being "beautiful" so often. The assessment of beauty contains a meditative component that cannot be reduced, much as in the case of sexual attraction. The morally discernible, morally present, and with the sort of virtue that manifests itself to the contemplative gaze is the morally lovely soul. When we see selfless compassion in action, as in the instance of Mother Teresa, we may sense ourselves in the presence of such a person. But we may experience it while sharing another person's ideas, such as when reading Franz Kafka's diaries or St. John of the Cross' poetry. In these situations, moral appreciation and the aesthetic feeling are mutually reinforcing and both emphasise the distinctiveness of the person.

The Holy and Aesthetics

Reason, freedom, and self-awareness are different names for the same situation, which is that of a creature that not only thinks, feels, and acts, but also wonders what to think, feel, and act. These inquiries need a distinct viewpoint on the physical universe. We observe the world from the vantage point of where we now are, which is the edge of the planet. We use concepts like the soul, the psyche, the self, or the "transcendental subject" to attempt to make sense of the paradoxical truth that we are both in and not of the world. These pictures don't simply come from philosophy; they organically develop throughout life, where the ability to defend and refute our ideas, convictions, emotions, and behaviour forms the cornerstone of the social structure that defines who we are. Thus, a fundamental aspect of the human situation is the subject's point of view. Many of the unique features of human existence reflect this friction between this point of view and the world of things.

It may be found in our perception of human attractiveness. Additionally, it may be found in the experience of the holy, which anthropologists have been puzzling about for at least 200 years and which seems to be a trait shared by all people. Every civilisation throughout history has given time and effort to holy objects. Each and every kind of thing is included in the holy, just as the beautiful. There are holy words, holy deeds, holy rituals, holy garments, holy locations, and holy hours. Sacred objects are not of this world; they are separated from everyday reality and cannot be handled or spoken of without the benefit of religious office or initiation procedures.

The danger of preparedness is blasphemy. By bringing it into the realm of commonplace happenings, it is to defile and taint the sacred. Both the perception of beauty and sexual desire have similarities with the divine experiences. The experience of envy may be the seXual event that most clearly distinguishes humans from other animals. Animals compete for mates and engage in conflict over them. But the battle is done when victory is confirmed. Fighting may or may not occur, but it has no effect on the jealous lover's experience, which is one of intense existential shame and dismay. In his view, the beloved has been tainted or desecrated; she has somehow become obscene, much as Desdemona does in Othello's eyes, despite her innocence. This experience is comparable to the feeling of degradation associated with the improper usage of sacred objects.

The defilement of something kept separate and untouchable. The 'fall' of Criseyde from the position of precious deity to that of a mortal is described in the mediaeval tale Troilus and

Criseyde. Returnable products. And Chaucer added in the mediaeval romance writers' descriptions of Troilus' experience that it was one of defilement. His dismay at the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem is analogous to that expressed in Jeremiah's Lamentations, and what was once most beautiful to him has now been ruined. (Some may argue that this is a uniquely male experience in societies where women are destined for marriage and domesticity, but it seems to me that some equivalent of Troilus' dismay will be found wherever lovers of either sex make exclusive sexual claims because these claims are existential rather than contractual [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the notions of beauty and desire have many facets and are influenced by a variety of personal experiences, cultural influences, and social pressures. There is no universally applicable conclusion since these issues are still developing and being formed by shifting society norms and beliefs. To more effectively comprehend and navigate the link between beauty and desire in our lives, it is crucial to acknowledge the complexity of these topics and to promote candid, sympathetic conversations. Aspects of the human experience that have been examined, contested, and cherished throughout history include beauty and desire. Even if there may not be a clear conclusion on this subject, it is feasible to condense some significant findings and viewpoints.

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CHAPTER 4

AN OVERVIEW ON CHILDHOOD AND VIRGINITY

Sandeep Verma, Associate Professor
Department of Computing Sciences and I.T, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- dr.sandeepverma2003@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

We shall see that our seventh platitude runs into a moral roadblock if we take those ideas seriously. There is barely anybody living who is unaffected by the perfection of the child's form. However, the majority of people find it horrifying to consider that this beauty may inspire desires other than that of warmth and affection. In these conditions, any sign of arousal is forbidden. However, the beauty of a kid is the same as the beauty of an attractive adult, completely different from the beauty of an elderly face that has, in a sense, emerged from a life of moral struggles. This feeling of forbiddance does not only apply to kids. In fact, as I'll argue in Chapter 7, it's essential to developing a mature sexual sensation. It serves as the foundation for the profound regard for virginity that we see in practically all articulate religious writings, including classical and Biblical texts. The Holy Virgin, a woman whose sexual maturity is expressed in maternity but who yet remains untouchable and hardly discernible, as an object of worship, from the infant in her arms, is one of the greatest tributes to human beauty found in mediaeval and Renaissance art. Mary is a symbol of an idealised love between corporeal people that is both human and heavenly since she has never been subjugated by her body in the way that others have.

KEYWORDS:

Aesthetic, Beauty, Human, Natural, World.

INTRODUCTION

Because the virgin is a sign of purity, her beauty is viewed in a different category from that of sexual desire. This perspective harkens back to Plato's original notion that beauty is both a call to abandon desire and an invitation to indulge it. Therefore, in the Virgin Mary, we find the Platonic idea of human beauty as the portal to a world beyond desire in a Christian context. This argues that in order to differentiate between the many interests we have in human beauty, our seventh platitude should be reformulated in a different, more cautious form The fact that human beauty arouses desire is not a coincidence. This reality is entirely consistent with the finding that desire is naturally constrained by restrictions. Indeed, by defying these restrictions, the experience of human beauty allows us to see another realm—divine but equally human—where beauty exists outside from desire as a sign of redemption. This is the world that Fra Lippo Lippi and Fra Angelico depicted in their paintings of the Virgin and Child, and Simone Martini caught in his magnificent Annunciation via the glorious moment of astonishment and submission [1], [2].

Radiance and Allure

In order to remember our second platitude, that beauty is a question of degree, it would be smart to take a few steps back from the concept of the holy, which places us at the top of the

beauty scale. True, human beauty—the beauty of the real Venus or Apollo—can evoke all the admonitions that really belong to the heavenly. However, most attractive individuals are just somewhat stunning, and the vocabulary employed to describe them makes use of a variety of softer adjectives including pretty, engaging, charming, wonderful, and appealing. And by utilising these phrases, we are providing more of a reaction than a precise description. We indicate that our reactions to human beauty are diverse and often fairly pleasant, seldom the intense emotion that Plato evokes in his theory of ero's or Thomas Mann's horrifying narrative of Mut-em-enet, the wife of Potiphar, being destroyed by the beauty of the untouchable Joseph [3], [4].

Apathetic Interest

I expressed some sympathy for the viewpoint that the definition of beauty derives from and expresses a "disinterested interest" in its subject in the previous chapter. However, in this chapter, we have been exploring the significance of beauty in very curious mental states, such as curiosity in how people are interested in one another. So, is the definition of beauty vague and are there two different sorts of beauty? My hesitant response is no. Even in the context of sexual desire, how something seems to the pondering mind is the main consideration in the assessment of beauty. It is not strange that beauty arouses desire since beauty is found in a person's presentation and desire longs for the individual and enjoys the shape another presents. But the desire that beauty arouses is not an object. Additionally, we treat beautiful people differently from ordinary people in the same way that we treat holy objects: as objects that can only be handled and used once all the formalities have been addressed and accomplished.

In fact, it is not very fantastical to claim that the holy and the beautiful are linked in our emotions and that they both derive from the strong embodiment that characterises our sexual wants. The idea that sexual attraction, a feeling of beauty, and respect for the holy are proximate states of mind that feed into one another and arise from a same root is thus reached via another road, and we may, without too much anachronism, trace it to Plato. Furthermore, if there were to be a true evolutionary psychology of beauty, this idea would have to be one of its tenets. However, we did not arrive at this conclusion by equating humans with animals or logical reasoning with instinct. By considering the uniquely human character of our interest in those things and placing them firmly in the sphere of freedom and rational choice, we have arrived at the relationship between sexy, beauty, and the holy [5], [6].

Universality

However, there was another, deeper philosophical reason for this fascination with the natural world. Beauty or the pursuit of it should be a human universal if it were to have a position among the subjects of philosophical inquiry. Kant adopted Shaftesbury's assumption that taste is a trait shared by all people, a quality based in the very power of reason that sets humans apart from the rest of nature. He believed that all rational individuals are capable of making aesthetic assessments, and that taste plays a crucial role in a fully lived life.

Many individuals, however, seem to live in an aesthetic vacuum, spending their time doing pragmatic calculations and having no awareness that they are losing out on the better life. In answer, Kant refutes this. He would assert that only individuals who think aesthetic judgement must be applied to a particular field, such as music, literature, or painting, would

see people as being in an artistic vacuum. However, appreciating the arts is really a side activity of aesthetic interest. The appreciation of nature is the main exercise in judgement. We are all equally involved in this, and even if our opinions may vary, we all agree to make the decisions. Natural beauty is accessible to all cultures and historical periods since, unlike art, it has no past. Therefore, there is a probability that a quality that is focused on natural beauty will be shared by all people, making assessments that have weight across all cultures.

DISCUSSION

The majority of Kant's examples of natural beauty are living things, such as plants, flowers, birds, and marine animals, whose exquisite shape and precise harmony of detail speak to us of a profound order. Landscapes, scenery, and "views" took a more significant position in the groundbreaking work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson, who had made natural beauty the Centre of the field of aesthetics. Kant seldom ever brings up such topics. The distinction in this case reflects two quite different experiences and is not only a question of emphasis [7], [8]. The judgement of beauty, according to Kant, is a "singular" assessment that holds its subject "apart from all interest." This implies that beauty is something that belongs to people who may be separated and seen as such. However, landscapes and perspectives are infinitely permeable and have ambiguous identification requirements. They leak out in all directions. Although we may see them as unique people, this is really our doing and not theirs. Even if we were successful in enclosing a landscape by enclosing it in thick hedges, it be protected against aesthetic infection in this way. The fields look different because of the unseen suburbs over each horizon, which make what would have otherwise been an open view seem confined and hindered. And even the most picturesque terrain might be overshadowed by the factory or highway next door, which leaves an enduring imprint of human rule.

In contrast, animals like birds, bees, and flowers are surrounded by natural limits. And regardless of how we see them, they have a profound quality that makes them uniquely themselves. Organisms have a sense of aesthetic invulnerability, similar to paintings that are protected from aesthetic tampering by their frames. With the exception of the relationship with the person studying them, they isolate themselves from all relationships under the aesthetic gaze. As a result, it is simple to define natural items that we can touch in our hands or bring into view as works of art, which conditions the kind of pleasure we get from them. They are gems, diamonds, and other objects troves' whose perfection appears to emanate from them as from an innate light. Landscapes, on the other hand, are extremely different from works of art; rather of being attracted by symmetry, unity, and shape, they do so because of their openness, grandeur, and sense of expansiveness that makes us feel confined rather than the other way around [9], [10].

Learning about Nature

This divergence is significant, even though it has no direct bearing on the first issue we must address about the religion of natural beauty, which is the issue of its historical context. The need to see the natural world as an object of contemplation rather than as a tool to achieve our objectives was fueled by our ability to control nature, its transformation into a secure and shared habitat for our species, and our desire to preserve the disappearing wildness. However, the natural beauty theory of the eighteenth century fell far short of the universality it sought. It was a byproduct of its time in the same way that Ossian's songs and Rousseau's Nouvelle

were, and it was as time-bound in its concentration as the romantic landscape paintings of Friedrich, Wordsworth, and Mendelssohn. The thoughtful approach to the natural world is often useless in other ages and civilizations. The natural world has been unforgiving and hostile throughout most of history. We must battle it in order to survive, and it provides little solace when seen with a clear mind. Perhaps the occasional times of rest are gifts from our "niggardly stepmother Nature," as Kant calls her in another place.

Ideologies and Aesthetics

Some theorists in the Marxist tradition give that argument another spin. According to these philosophers, when Shaftesbury's disciples presented their ideas of disinterested interest, they were essentially expressing a bourgeois ideology in the language of philosophy rather than explaining a human universal. Only under certain historical circumstances can this 'disinterested' interest become accessible, and it is available because it serves a purpose. The "disinterested" perspective of nature, things, people, and their interactions gives them a trans-historical quality. It makes them irreversible, permanent, and a component of the unchanging natural order. This style of thinking serves the purpose of enshrining bourgeois social relations in nature, putting them beyond the purview of social reform. When I see anything as a "end in itself," I immortalise it, remove it from the realm of pragmatic considerations, obscure its relationship to society, and the production and consumption processes that are essential to human existence. Generally speaking, the concept of the aesthetic leads us to assume that by removing items from their context and purging them.

We somehow understand what they genuinely are and what they truly represent when we consider the economic circumstances that formed them or connected them to human interests. By doing this, we divert our focus from the economic situation and look at the world from an eternal perspective, accepting as inevitable and unavoidable what should be the topic of organised political reform. Furthermore, the capitalist system views everything and everyone as a means, albeit revelling in the fiction that both people and things are regarded as "ends in themselves." By creating a false consciousness that prevents us from seeing the social reality, the ideological lie aids in the material exploitation.

A Response

I have distilled a heritage of challenging, often flamboyant arguments into those paragraphs. The effort to label one or more aspects of our thought as "bourgeois ideology" may cause readers to ask why they should care, especially in light of the collapse of the Marxist notion of the "bourgeoisie" as an economic class. To approach the topic of aesthetics as if the Marxist tradition had nothing to do with its definition, however, would be naïve.

The Marxist criticism may be found in works by Lukacs, Deleuze, Bourdieu, Eagleton, and many others. It continues to have influence on the humanities as they are taught in English and American institutions. And in every iteration, the criticism poses a problem. beautiful assessment is philosophically unfounded if we are unable to defend the fundamental notion of the beautiful outside of the context of ideology. Instead of being embraced for its truth, a "ideology" is chosen for its social or political value. And demonstrating the ideological nature of a concept—be it holiness, justice, beauty, or anything else—undermines its claim to objectivity. It implies that there is simply belief in holiness, justice, and beauty, a belief that develops under certain social and economic ties and contributes to their establishment but

will disappear as circumstances change. We should shift the burden of evidence in response. Although the term "aesthetic" did not first enter common use until the seventeenth century, it served to signify something that was universal to all humans. Plato and Aristotle, the Sanskrit author Baharat two centuries later, Confucius in the Analects, and a long line of Christian philosophers from Augustine and Boethius through Aquinas to the current day have all addressed the themes I have been addressing in this book in various ways. Practical thinking requires the differences between means and goals, instrumental and contemplative attitudes, and use and meaning, all of which are independent of any given social system. And while if the idea of nature as a contemplative object may have gained particular popularity in eighteenth-century Europe, we know that this idea is not exclusive to that region or period thanks to Chinese tapestries, Japanese woodcuts, and writings by the Confucians and Basho. The onus is on you to describe the non-bourgeois alternative, in which the aesthetic attitude would be somehow superfluous and people would no longer need to find solace in the contemplation of beauty, if you want to dismiss the idea of aesthetic interest as a piece of bourgeois ideology. That obligation has never been fulfilled.

The value of beauty in nature to all people

Kant was naturally tempted to characterise aesthetic interest's distinctive object as something that was not manufactured but rather discovered after identifying it as being fundamentally contemplative. He appeared to believe that when it comes to objects, our practical reason is often too strongly engaged to allow for the stepping back that aesthetic judgement demands. He also distinguished between the 'free' beauty we experience from natural things, which comes to us without the deployment of any notions on our side, and the 'dependent' beauty we experience from works of art, which relies upon a previous conceptualization of the item. We can only maintain a disinterest in nature when our own goals, including contemplation renders obsolete the intellectual goals that rely on conceptual differences. The notion that nature contemplation is both unique to our species and shared by all of its members, regardless of the social and economic circumstances into which they are born, is conceivable. It is also conceivable that this contemplation inspires us to wonder about the cosmos and drives us to look for meaning and value there, as Blake did.

From the earliest paintings in the LascauX caves through Cezanne's landscapes, Guido Gezelle's lyrics, and Messiaen's music, art has looked for inspiration in the natural environment. Natural beauty cannot be experienced as a feeling of "how nice!" or "how pleasant!" It provides confidence that this world is a proper and suitable place to live—a place where our human abilities and possibilities find validation. There are several methods to receive this confirmation. The pleasure you get is an affirmation of both the objects you are seeing and of you, the observer, when you are on a wild moor and the sky fills with scudding clouds, the shadows sprint over the heather, and you hear the curlew's lyrical scream from hilltop to hilltop. You feel more a part of the world when you stop to admire a wildflower's beautiful shape or a bird's perfectly blended feathers. A world that allows such things also allows for you.

Therefore, aesthetic curiosity has a transformative impact regardless of whether we focus on the big picture or the individual organism. It's as though the natural world, as it is represented in awareness, defends both you and the environment around you. And there is a metaphysical connection to this experience. The basis for consciousness is found in changing the turning

the outside world into a notion that will endure in memory. Further, Rilke implies in the Duino Elegies that the earth also finds its fulfilment in this metamorphosis by attaining, when dissolved in awareness, the inwardness that redeems both itself and the one who properly watches it. This changing power of nature comes not from knowledge but rather from experience. The intricate details of the natural world are appreciated by scientists. However, science is not sufficient nor required to produce the moments of transfiguration that Wordsworth captures in The Prelude or the delight that John Clare expresses in lines like this. I see the wild flowers consuming the succulent hours of bliss in their summer morning splendour. The Agape for honey streams from the flamboyant convolvulus around the thorn; Additionally, a thin kingcup that was polished by the dew in the morning's early hours looked like freshly minted gold. The world comes home to us and we to it through the experience of beauty. But rather than via usage, it makes a distinct impact through display.

Art and nature

However, a problem now appears. How can we distinguish between the works of nature and the works of man in our experiences and thinking? Clare's convolvulus wreaths around a thorn that is obviously part of a blackthorn hedge. The organisation of fields, copses, and coverts, as well as the hedgerows and walls that are seen everywhere and are an essential component of the English landscape as captured by Constable, are all the result of human labour a feeling of harmony. Constable is depicting a house, a setting tailored to human needs and imprinted with human aspirations in every detail (though others claim he omits the true plight of the agricultural worker).

In other words, a landscape's beauty is often linked to its human significance as a kind of object that carries a culture's aesthetic stamp. And in order to appreciate it, we must study Wordsworth. By using plants and animals as his main sources of material, Kant gets over this problem. However, the mark of human design may be seen in plants and animals as well. Horses and tulips, for example, are some of the most beautiful things that have been created with deliberate artifice across time. Although dogs and horses are shown for their beauty, their breeders deserve the praise.

In contrast, others claim that humans only see natural objects as beautiful through analogy, treating them as if they were works of art. However, this is improbable. Because they depict things, tell stories about things, express ideas and emotions, and transmit meanings that are actively planned, works of art hold our attention in part. It is incorrect to approach natural items with comparable expectations. It also omits the fundamental source of their beauty, which is their autonomy, uniqueness, and potential to demonstrate the existence of things outside of ourselves that are just as fascinating as we are. Because natural beauty only clings to an item when it is viewed as natural and when its appearance is not the result of human design, several authors, including Allen Carlson and Malcolm Budd, have made this claim that there is any justification for believing that there is such a thing as intrinsic beauty, with its own position in the hierarchy of values.

This is not meant to imply that we should disregard human activities when defining nature. I am more than just conscious that the English countryside's meadows and hedgerows are the result of human effort and design when I appreciate them. I value the image as being emblematic of a way of life, of always developing and returning home. Because of this, not just for myself but for many Englishmen over the ages including artists like John Clare, Paul

Nash, and Ralph Vaughan Williams who captured its meaning in art—this landscape has such a profound spiritual significance. Even while they were motivated by aesthetic aspirations in many instances (the placement of that hedge, the symmetry of that fence, the construction of that dry stone wall), I do not believe that humans intentionally created the environment to appear the way it does. I also don't approach the landscape with the limitations and expectations I bring to my artistic experience. I view it as the uninhibited development of nature, in which humans exist because they are also naturally occurring and leave behind them an unexpected trace of their presence as well as an inadvertent record of their pleasures and sorrows.

Allen Carlson has further argued that by "seeing nature as nature," which is at the core of our experience of the beauty of nature, we are compelled to approach nature as it actually is. To do this, we must adopt the stance of a naturalist and examine what we see in the context of scientific and environmental knowledge. Ornithology, which completes the act of appreciation that started with the experience of beauty, is accessed via an aesthetic interest in the form, flight, and song of a bird, for instance [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

The study of agriculture and environmental science are both influenced by an aesthetic interest in the hues and shapes of a landscape. Despite the fact that this scientific advancement of our interest in natural beauty is undoubtedly possible, we should not lose sight of the fact that the aesthetic interest in nature is primarily concerned with appearances and is not always a valid interest in the science that provides an explanation. Oscar Wilde's remark that only a superficial person does not judge by looks is true. Because meaning is conveyed via looks, and the subject of our emotional worries. The beauty of what I see does not cause me to think about the muscles, nerves, or bones that would somehow explain it when I am impressed by a human face. Neither is this experience a preface to some anatomical research. To perceive "the skull beneath the skin," on the other hand, is to see the body rather than the embodied person. In light of the previous chapter's reasoning, it is thus to overlook the face's attractiveness. The same often holds true for natural beauty. Ornithologist is familiar with the song of the blackbird serves as a territorial marking, a unique adaption that influences sexual selection. We perceive it as music, yet the idea of melody has no place in the blackbird's experience and is irrelevant to the study of his activity.

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CHAPTER 5

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Indu Tripathi, Assistant Professor
Department of Engineering, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- indu_tripathi@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT:

That second statement may also be expressed as belonging to our "intentional" rather than scientific knowledge since it is more concerned with how nature is portrayed in our experience than how it really is. To comprehend what makes anything beautiful in nature, we must define how such things seem to the aesthetic eye. And how things look is influenced by the categories we apply to them. I experiment with notions, categories, and ideas that are molded by my self-conscious nature when I observe the world with indifference rather than merely allowing myself to be exposed to its offered aspects. The practice of painting serves as one example of this technique. Similar arrangements of mountains, fields, and trees may be shown in the landscape paintings of Poussin, Corot, Harpignies, and Friedrich. However, in each instance, the posture of concentration imbues the perception with the unique spirit of the painter and produces a picture that is exclusively his. Similar to that, nature gives every one of us a space for unrestricted perception. We don't have to figure out what is being said to us; instead, we may let our minds wander while we take in and explore the sight before us

KEYWORDS:

Beauty, Experience, Natural, Phenomenology, Purpose.

INTRODUCTION

Even though humans were involved in the creation of the environment I'm looking at, its intricacies have been laid down by history and may alter from day to day; they are not there to convey any exact aesthetic aim. But it is the sheer 'there-ness' of the natural world that allows me to get lost in it, to see it at different times from different angles, under different descriptions, and so on. Expressly offered as objects for contemplation are works of art. They are displayed in the museum, framed on the wall, housed inside the pages of a book, solemnly performed in music halls, or encased within installations. Without the artist's permission, changing them would be against basic artistic decorum. The enduring containers of messages that are fervently meant are works of art. And often, only the expert, connoisseur, or adept is completely receptive to what they signify. In contrast, nature is kind, satisfied to mean just herself, independent, without an external framework, and ever-changing [1], [2].

The cynic may reasonably argue that, when the experience is described in such a detailed and intellectual manner, it is straining the bounds of credulity to assume that everyone, especially the ignorant and the obstinately practical, should be prone to experiencing natural beauty. However, such argument misses the point of phenomenology, which is to try to explain how things look even to those who have never attempted it themselves. The most commonplace individuals fall in love, but how many can articulate the intentionality of such an odd feeling or identify the notions that capture how lovers see the world? Similar to this, the most

common people assess the beauty of nature even if few, if any, are able to express what they see when the world around them abruptly transforms from something to be utilised to something to be observed [3], [4].

The Magnificent and Sublime

I previously commented that the word "beautiful" is used both broadly to describe aesthetic acclaim and more specifically to describe a certain type of elegance and charm that may enrapture us. Words have a propensity to slip and slide in the artistic context, acting more like metaphors than actual descriptions. And the cause of this is obvious. In making an aesthetic evaluation, we are not only describing a thing in the real world. We are giving voice to a meeting of subject and object in which the attributes of the second are just as significant as the first's reaction. Therefore, in order to comprehend beauty, we must become more aware of the range of our reactions to the objects that we see it in.

At least since Edmund Burke's essay On the Sublime and Beautiful from 1756, this idea has been clear. Burke identified two profoundly different reactions to beauty—one born of love and the other of fear to beauty in general and natural beauty in particular. However, when we experience the vastness, the power, and the threatening majesty of the natural world—as on some wind-blown mountain crag and feel our own littleness in the face of it—then we should speak of the sublime. When we are drawn to the harmony, order, and serenity of nature and feel at home in it and confirmed by it, then we speak of its beauty. Both of these answers are uplifting; they both take us out of our daily, practical notions of everyday use. Additionally, they both entail the type of detached thought that Kant would later characterise as the essence of the aesthetic experience [5], [6].

Kant, who believed it to be crucial to comprehending the judgement of taste, thereby took up the difference between the sublime and the beautiful. The tranquil and slumbering scenery we are familiar with from English fields and the raging rivers of an Alpine slope or the great panoply of the sky cannot be meaningfully compared. It overwhelms us with a picture of nature's infinite strength while her infinite extent is shown in the second. The breathtaking perspective encourages a different sort of evaluation, one in which we evaluate ourselves in relation to the amazing infinity of the universe and become aware of our limitations and fragility. The gorgeous landscape pushes us to make a judgement of taste. Kant continued, "In the experience of the sublime, we are presented with an intimation of our own worth, as creatures who are both conscious of the vastness of nature and also able to affirm ourselves against it," but in a manner that interpreters have considered to be more suggestive than compelling. We perceive our own capacity as free humans to measure up to it and to reaffirm our adherence to the moral code, which no natural force could ever destroy or put aside, in the exact awe that we experience before the might of the natural universe [7], [8].

Landscape Architecture

Landscapes don't provide us with design the way paintings do, and if they do, it's not because they're the intermediary in a communication act. As I previously said, human design may influence nature at the borders via boundaries, ploughed fields, and plantations, but our response to nature is focused on forces that are more deeply ingrained in the whole scheme of things and more durable than any human desire. At least that is how it seems. Therefore, it stands to reason that the meaning we get from nature's beauty cannot be very similar to the

meaning that art conveys to us, since each and every element—whether it a phrase, tone, or pigment—is infused with purpose and motivated by a creative concept. While the shelves of libraries groan under the weight of literary critique, musical analysis, comparative art history, and a hundred other efforts to make sense of our cultural heritage and to understand the lessons it bears for us, it is not unexpected that, despite this, there are still works of art that continue to elude us.

DISCUSSION

There are no or few books on the shelf dedicated to natural beauty, where we may look to find out if it would be preferable to look at the hills of Andalusia or Mongolia. Since there is no art to elicit criticism here, it is unsuccessful. The best we have are manuals. Although generally accurate, such statement misses two crucial aspects of how we interact with the natural environment. The first is the use of nature as a source of inspiration for works of art. The best landscape gardeners of the eighteenth century, including Capability Brown and William Kent, were adjusting their designs to suit their clients' preferences. They lived at a period when well-to-do individuals drew distinctions between landscapes, debated what was or was not in good taste, and went out to construct, dig, plant, and make adjustments with goals like to those of the painter they would later hire to capture the results.

In fact, the worship of the "picturesque" developed because our reactions to the natural world and to art interact. Because Poussin and Claude had painted the Roman Campagna rather of seeing it in real life, the eighteenth-century practise of adorning the landscape with ruins had its start. In order to better enjoy the environment, tourists in the eighteenth century would often travel with a "Claude Glass": a tiny colored convex mirror. The landscape designers of the time also saw the trees, lakes, and man-made earthen mounds that served as the foundation for their work as being continuous with architectural ruins, follies, as well as classical bridges and temples. Given how closely the two are related, it is difficult to imagine that our attitudes towards art and natural beauty are grounded on entirely distinct principles. Planning legislation in Europe has long been cognizant of the danger that structures represent to the beauty of the natural world and has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to regulate the design, scale, and construction of buildings in rural areas in order to preserve our common visual heritage. Buildings and the environment are interconnected, as the artworks that hang in the gallery are separate from its walls and windows because their frames protect them from their surroundings. The landscape includes buildings as a component of it. Therefore, the experience of beauty includes both architecture and landscape equally.

Additionally, our sentiments are linked to both beauty and design. Even while we enjoy the seashell, the tree, or the rock face without thinking about why they were produced, each one of them evokes the idea of a "purposiveness without purpose," in the words of Kant. In some passages, Kant seems to imply that even though this idea lacks a rational foundation and cannot reveal anything about the purpose of creation or the nature of God, it nonetheless contains some sort of wordless hint about our value as moral beings and the orderliness and "finality" of our universe. Therefore, at a time of calm weather Even if we are far inland, our souls can still see the eternal sea that carried us here may quickly get there, see the kids playing on the beach, and hear the powerful seas roaring in the distance [9], [10].

Ode: Intimations of Immortality

Kant also thought that natural beauty is a "symbol" of morality and that those who really care about it demonstrate that they have the beginnings of a "good will" or morally upright disposition. Although his justification for this viewpoint is evasive, it is one that he and other authors of the eighteenth century, such as Samuel Johnson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, held. Although it is difficult to build an a priori argument in its behalf, it is an opinion to which we are immediately attracted.

Lack of purpose without purpose

This chapter's debate has led us to a cruX. The idea that aesthetic assessment, like the pleasure that drives it, is disinterested is where I started. And this appeared to indicate that beauty and usefulness are separate qualities, making the distinction between admiring something for its beauty and appreciating it as a tool for a useful purpose clear. However, despite my initial exclusion of purpose, interest, and practical reason, these factors keep coming back into my decision. For instance, it is impossible to separate the experience of beauty in architecture from the understanding of the purposes that a structure must fulfil, just as it is difficult to separate the experience of human beauty from the intense desire that it arouses. The perception of creative aim is closely related to the experience of beauty in art. Even the perception of natural beauty suggests a "purposelessness without purpose." Everywhere, whether in the object or in ourselves, the consciousness of purpose influences the evaluation of beauty, and when we apply this evaluation to the natural world, it is scarcely unexpected if it prompts us to ask the fundamental theological question: What function does this beauty serve? Whose purpose is that, if we claim that it has no other purpose but its own? Once again, we see how the holy and the beautiful coexist in our experience and how our sentiments for one often overflow into the space held by the other.

But to say that beauty is "purposive without purpose" just heightens the mystique. Therefore, I suggest leaving these exalted areas and entering the sphere of common beauty, which is where all sensible humans live and work, regardless of how uninterested in aesthetics they may seem to be. I'll attempt to demonstrate why aesthetic perception is essential to accomplishing anything effectively by examining the role of beauty in everyday practical reasoning, where purpose is at the forefront of our thinking. Gardens would only make sense as human-only vegetable patches without the essential experience of natural beauty. Even vegetable patches, which are properly spaced out in rows to suit our desire for visual order, have aesthetic limitations. In the case of pleasure gardens, we come across a common passion that individuals from all over the world invest a significant amount of their free time in. Additionally, gardens have a unique phenomenology in which nature is embraced, controlled, and made compliant with socially acceptable aesthetic standards.

A garden is a surrounding area rather than an open place like a landscape. And everything that grows and persists there expands and persists everywhere around the observer. A tree in a garden differs from one in a field or a forest. It is not just a seed that grew accidentally in the right location at the wrong time. It establishes a connection with those who are strolling through the garden and engages them in a dialogue. It occupies a position as an extension of the human world, serving as a bridge between the natural and manmade environments. There is a phenomenological "between-ness" that permeates all of our common methods of taking pleasure in a garden, in fact. This experience adds to our fundamental understanding of

architectural shapes and ornamentation as objects created to control and confine space, seize it from nature, and display it as our own. Because of this, treatises on architecture often draw the whimsical analogy between a column and a tree trunk. As a result, there are several types of garden art, which we may accurately refer to as the art of between—the art of being neither art nor nature, but both, one wrapped over the other so as to be at one, as in Gertrude Jekyll's flower borders or the garden installations of the Scottish poet Ian Hamilton Finlay. Perhaps a characteristic of all humans is the desire to adapt both to our environment and to ourselves. And it implies that judging beauty is not only a choice to add to the range of human assessments, but rather the inevitable result of taking life seriously and developing true awareness of our affairs.

Carpentry and manual labor

The conclusion becomes further clearer if we focus on one of those middle ground situations where regular people are compelled to make aesthetic judgements: the realm of craftsmanship and décor, where we decide how to decorate our surroundings. Consider that you are installing a door in a wall and noting the location of the frame. You'll sometimes take a step back and ask yourself, "Does that look right?" This is a valid question, but one that cannot be addressed in terms of function or utility. The door frame could be exactly what is required for traffic to pass through, it might be in compliance with all health and safety regulations, but it might just not look right because it is too high, too low, too broad, the incorrect shape, etc. (In fact, the present building code makes it all but impossible to design a front door that looks correct, in the manner that typical Georgian pattern-book doors look right, since it requires entry doors to be wide enough and doorsteps low enough to accept a huge invalid's wheelchair.) These conclusions are reasonable despite the fact that they do not point us towards any utilitarian objectives. They might mark the beginning of a conversation in which contrasts are drawn, examples are presented, and potential solutions are debated. The topic of this conversation also has something to do with how things fit together and a desired harmony in the accomplishment of a routine physical action.

It seems to me that Kant could have used an example like that to illustrate his thesis that using the reasoning powers may be both purposeful and point beyond purpose to the observation of how things look. Because the example demonstrates that such a rational faculties exercise is not only possible, but also plays a crucial role in real decision-making. There are further examples that emphasise the concept. Think about how you set the table for guests: you won't just throw the dishes and silverware down. You'll be driven by a need for everything to seem perfect, both to you and to your visitors. Similar to how you strive for the proper or acceptable arrangement when you dress for a party or a dance, or even when you set up your workstation or clean your bedroom in the morning, this arrangement has to do with how things seem. The examples draw our attention to "the aesthetics of everyday life," a subject that has long been ignored. This neglect eXplains, in fact, many of the ways in which people misinterpret architecture and design, mistaking what is often an exercise in discretion for a work of great art.

Aesthetics and Rationality

Non-rational creatures live in a world of redundant, just like humans. When presented with a level barrier, a horse has an infinite number of spots to leap it. He will only leap if he wants to whether to flee from an adversary or join the herd. However, there is no solution for the

horse to the issue of where in the fence is the best location to leap, not because all areas are equal, but rather because the horse does not have such a question. We are able to pose such queries because we have a habit of eliminating duplications, defending individual choices, and doing not just what advances our objectives but also what does so in the most suitable or fitting manner. The example of songbirds may be used to illustrate this concept. Songs are produced by songbirds throughout the times of day—after awakening and before sleeping—when an active male has to define the limits of his patch and serve a purpose in the process of sexual selection. Even while the bird is driven by wants, his existence is not conducted in accordance with any plans, therefore this function is not one of his goals. Furthermore, the song's role, which merely calls for that it be audible to rivals and possible mates, and recognisable as the voice of the species or, in limited and close-knit regions, as the voice of the particular resident, underdetermines the song's characteristics. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that songbirds often make a variety of calls. They experiment with different notes and phrases before deciding on a few distinctive phrases that serve as refrains in their daily litany.

These words and phrases seem like songs to humans, thus we refer to bird song as a kind of music since that is how we perceive it. But nothing about the bird's behaviour suggests that he has picked one note to go after another, that he has decided that this phrase is exactly what the context calls for, that he hears one note as a continuation of the phrase before it, etc. None of those conclusions apply to ornithology since they are conclusions that only apply to rational beings that don't just choose one of the infinitely numerous options available to them but also seek out justifications for doing so, who perceive sound sequences in terms of the musical logic that connects them, whether before or after the occurrence. How can a rational entity close loopholes of the sort that remain unclosed in a bird's song indefinitely? Let's go back to the carpenter's example. How does the carpenter decide which doorframes would work best for the specified purpose? based on what seems appropriate. He is evaluating the item based on its appearance and looking for a justification for his decision inside this appearance.

Reason and presentation

There are important repercussions. When I choose a doorframe just because it looks good, I have to answer the question "why," whether it comes from myself or someone else. One response is "It just does." Alternately, I may draw similarities, hunt for deeper meanings, or look for practises and traditions that support my decision. However, I am unable to give the look a purely functional value, such as declaring that "doors of that shape attract older customers." For to do that would be to disregard my first assessment. My argument would be put to rest if I focused on the door's usefulness to others rather than how it seems to myself. It would mean turning back to a utilitarian evaluation, which I could logically and truly affirm even if the doorframe seemed to be completely off-center. The carpenter discovers a solution to eliminate the redundant options in front of him by thinking about how the doorframe looks. Since the practical arguments that suggest an infinite number of doorframes are equally suited have been separated in his mind from the appearance, he is now on a road of exploration to find the justifications for this frame, and which would justify it because of how it appears. He will evaluate the doorframe in comparison to others as well as the window frames that will be installed on each side. He will look for things that complement other architectural aspects in the structure. He will attempt to fit the doorframe to the building's

components as well as to the structure as a whole. A visual language is one outcome of this matching process: having similar mouldings for the door and window, for instance, makes the visual match simpler to identify and accept. Another outcome is what is roughly referred to as style—the repetitive employment of forms, contours, materials, and other elements, their adaptation to unique functions, and the pursuit of a visual gesture repertory [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

You would assume that, up to this point, the carpenter's considerations haven't changed much other than a game he plays with himself to eliminate any remaining overlap from actual practical decision-making. Two factors, nevertheless, call into question that answer. The first is that there are other people who will have opinions on the doorframe besides the carpenter. The dimensions of the doorframe will also catch the attention of others, who may find them pleasing or unappealing. Some of them will be occupants of the building where the door will be installed, thus they will have an interest in the door. Others will catch the attention of neighbours and bystanders. However, everyone will be interested in how the door seems, and the more impractical their engagement, the higher the attraction. This marks the start of what game theorists refer to as a "coordination problem."

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CHAPTER 6

THE CONCEPT OF AGREEMENT AND MEANING

Zareen Usmani Farooq, Associate Professor
Department of Engineering, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- farooqzf@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT:

Strive for consensus as a means of settling such issues. If there is a single option or a set of options on which we can all agree, the issue no longer exists. However, even in the lack of explicit consensus, a solution may eventually materialize if unpopular options are rejected and preferred over time. Thus, although ordinary street builders adapt via a process of trial and error, great innovators like Palladio create forms and compositions (such as the Palladian window) that evoke the spontaneous acceptance of others. The common language of shapes, materials, and embellishments is expanded by both processes. The purpose of this form of reasonable dialogue is to create a community where we can all feel comfortable and that meets our need for everything to seem to be in order. Its function as a redundancy closure mechanism suggests this feature of aesthetics socially generated and socially driven position as a guide to our common world. Redundancy is not a constant trait of our objectives or products. Redundancies occur in various fields like the design of gardens, for example surround us on all sides, whereas in other fields, like the design of aero planes, rigid necessity controls practically everything that is possible. However, even when practicality takes precedence, our sense of beauty quickly tells the fashionable from the makeshift and the appropriate from the arbitrary

KEYWORDS:

Aesthetic, Agreement, Beautiful, Consensus, Style.

INTRODUCTION

We find elegant aerodynamics more beautiful than bloated accretions. However, the lovely aircraft does for our fictitious carpenter what the lovely doorframe did: it provides a suitable answer to a conundrum that may be resolved in a variety of ways. The second point is that when something is the subject of intrinsic attention, its appearance takes on significance. You may just appreciate the appearance for what it is. However, as rational creatures must interpret everything, they will perceive an appearance as having intrinsic significance when it is the focus of their attention. Even anything as basic as the design of a doorframe will be affected by this need. The carpenter will relate door designs to certain social life types, methods of entering and exiting a space, and fashion and behavioral trends. Indeed, it has long been observed that fads in architecture and clothing often replicate one another and both express the shifting attitudes towards the human person and the human body [1], [2].

Combining these two ideas, we arrive at the intriguing proposition that whenever people attempt to eliminate the redundant nature of practical reasoning by selecting between

appearances, they are also predisposed to interpret those appearances as intrinsically meaningful and to present the meaning they discover through a kind of reasoned dialogue, the purpose of which is to achieve some degree of agreement in judgments among those who have an intuitive understanding of the situation. By stating this, we very nearly adhere to the eighteenth-century conception of taste as a capacity by which logical beings organize their lives based on a sense of appropriate and inappropriate appearance that is fostered by society. Furthermore, it is acceptable to assert that we are starting to identify a true domain of rational life that corresponds to the intellectual concept of the aesthetic, which is both significant in and of itself from a philosophical standpoint [3], [4].

Style

To convey meaning, we rely on our habit of aesthetic perception. And style is a key tool that we use. This entails deliberate abuse of socially constructed norms. The flower in the buttonhole, the jug of wine, and the folded napkin are all examples of small details that cause observers to have an experience of recognition. This is because they perceive a background order without a specific meaning against which the gesture is to be judged, which allows them to see a specific meaning in the small detail. How come the wine is in a jug rather than a bottle? Why does this jug have my interest in the first place? Why should it be left on the table alone? so on. Such inquiries guide us towards the allusiveness of style. The jug relates to a certain way of living—a way of life in the Mediterranean where rough wine is readily available and flows well into both work and pleasure. Because of this, the hostess placed a jug of crudely painted pottery in the center of the table to symbolize the carefree way in which we are to use it. These may not have been deliberate decisions. The hostess is learning about the message she wants to transmit while she engages in artistic pursuits. The example does in fact imply that aesthetic preferences play a part in fostering self-knowledge in learning how one fits into the larger scheme of human meanings. Fichte and Hegel described the Entausserung (the outward projection) of the self and the Selbstbestimmung that it produces as the self-certainty that results from creating a presence in other people's lives. Aesthetic decisions are a component of this [5], [6].

The majority of table setting techniques are steady explorations of the backdrop; no specifics are hinted at, and order is the primary concern; this order should not interfere with our senses but rather convey a straightforward message of tranquilly sociability. The stylish hostess veers that order in a different way by making references to items that she makes clearly visible at the table and that have the appearance of a story. Through style, we can understand what is being highlighted, what is being pushed to the side, and what is related to what. Style is therefore one of the aspects of common aesthetic evaluation that we carry over into art, where it has a whole new significance. In art, what guarantees our place in regular social existence becomes the guiding principle of fantastical universes [7], [8].

Fashion

The reasoning of this chapter makes it evident that seeking aesthetic solutions in daily life also functions as a concealed attempt to achieve agreement. Even individuals who intentionally stand out and attract attention via their attire do so so that others would be aware of their purpose. Therefore, the aesthetics of daily life will express itself via fashion—or, more specifically, through the collective adoption of a style—in any typical human group. A fashion is a set of guidelines for aesthetic decisions that provides some assurance that others

will approve of them. Additionally, it enables individuals to experiment with their appearance, communicate clearly with others, and be at peace with it in a culture where looks matter.

DISCUSSION

Fashion first emerges via imitation. When individuals mimic one another via social contagion, for example, the imitation may sometimes be the consequence of the "invisible hand." This is the typical genesis of folk costumes, which develop through time via the interactions of innumerable individuals who are all trying to avoid causing unnecessary offence and project an image of belonging in society. However, imitation may also come from leadership, as it did when Beau Brummel established Regency England's fashion or when the Beatles altered the language, manner of clothing, and hairstyles of their generation in addition to its musical idiom. Such occurrences attest to the significant role that aesthetic thought plays in the lives of rational individuals. And they provide a kind of evidence for Kant's claim that when humans think aesthetically, they are "suitors for agreement" with their kind.

Eternity and permanence

According to our debate, there are two different ways that aesthetic judgement may be used: to blend in or to stand out. The permanent emblems of a firmly established way of life are what we are 'home building' in a large portion of our activities, establishing in the face of change and deterioration. The invisible hand I just mentioned naturally gravitates towards style, language, and convention, as seen in vernacular architecture, folk clothing, table manners, and traditional cultural practises and rites. Conventions provide our lives a backdrop of constant order and the impression that there are right and incorrect ways to do things. They provide a means of completing our gestures and making them acceptable in public, much as how a moulding completes an architrave or how well wrapped presents are complete. There are certain civilizations where this need for the fixed and the permanent manifests itself in an oppressive and even crushing way; one such society is ancient Egypt, whose norms moulded and mummified every element of existence. In the historical record that the Egyptians have left behind, we see a way of life where aesthetic standards have absorbed and extinguished individual style due to an inflexible need for order. The aesthetic of ancient Rome, as seen in the frescoes at Pompei and Herculaneum and in the sculptures and grottoes of the Roman garden, is more appealing to us because it combines a desire for permanence with an equal awareness of the transience of life's pleasures.

Because of this, even while we cherish permanency, we are also conscious of the transience of our bonds and are driven to express this knowledge via an aesthetic that is accepted by the general public. There are cultures, with the traditional Japanese one being the most prevalent. Notable—in which the aesthetics of daily life emphasizes what is transient, ephemeral, and driven by a tender sorrow. Such societies are just as devoted to tradition and rule-following as those that place an emphasis on permanence. A poignant example of this aesthetic of transience may be seen in the Japanese tea ceremony, in which serving tea to guests is raised to the status of a sacred rite. The utensils, gestures, flower arrangements, and style of the tea hut are all governed by strict customs. The host and guest's motions across the tea garden and their expressions when the tea bowl is presented and accepted all take on a unique significance and poignancy as a result of these norms. The phrase "ichigo, ichie" (one

opportunity, one meeting) perfectly expresses the intention, which is to capture the singularity and transience of the moment. We may learn something from the tea ceremony that we can also learn from the local architecture of our European towns, namely that momentary pleasures and fleeting interactions can be transformed into timeless values when they are memorialized in ritual and stone.

Fit and aesthetics

I've been examining a specific kind of practical reasoning where we choose an option based on how well it fits the situation. Fit is determined by how things seem and by the meaning that appears in how they appear. However, I have not explicitly addressed the topic of beauty, and my fictitious carpenter would not find the term to be very useful. To rapidly show how the kind of judgement. I have been talking in this chapter connects to the judgement of beauty, let's go back to our initial clichés. The suitability The appealing quality I've been describing is also a cause to pay attention to the object it is present in. It is something to ponder for its own purpose, and its significance is not contingent on another application. It is the focus of a considered decision that being founded on experience, it cannot be created from a copy. Similar to how beauty is a matter of degree, fittingness is likewise a matter of degree. In order to put it simply, what I have been explaining in this chapter is that very ‘minimal beauty' that is a constant interest of rational people as they attempt to bring order to their surrounds and feel at home in their shared universe [9], [10].

The next step is to apply the ideas from this chapter to the "higher" types of beauty that art exemplifies and to see if we can add anything to what we have already said about the sort of meaning that is sought when we defend our aesthetic judgements. The subject of art eventually took the place of natural beauty as the main focus of aesthetics until later in the nineteenth century, after Hegel's posthumously released lectures on the subject. And this transition was a result of the romantic movement, a significant shift in educated thinking that put the individual's emotions at the core of our civilization and made the self-more intriguing than others and travelling more honourable than belonging. Art evolved as a means for a person to declare their identity to the world and petition the gods for justice. However, it has shown to be utterly untrustworthy in its role as our higher ambitions' protector. The torch of beauty was taken up by art, who then carried it for a time before dropping it in one of Paris' pissoirs.

Laughing aside

Marcel Duchamp inscribed his name on a urinal a century ago. 'R. Mutt', gave it the name "La Fontaine," and displayed it as an artwork. One direct impact of Duchamp's joke was the emergence of an academic field committed to exploring the definition of art.'This industry's literature is just as dull as the imitations of Duchamp's gesture that never cease. However, it has left a trace of doubt behind. What purpose does anything serve to be considered art, if anything can qualify? The only thing left is the notion that some individuals look at some things while others look at other things is fascinating but baseless. The idea that criticism is an endeavour that seeks for immutable truths and enduring symbols of the human spirit is scorned outright since it is predicated on an understanding of the art that Duchamp's "fountain" flushed down the drain.

The claim is enthusiastically embraced because it seems to free people from the burden of culture, telling them that they can disregard all those venerable masterpieces without consequence, that TV soap operas are "as good as" Shakespeare, and that Radiohead is equal to Brahms, and that nothing is superior to anything else and that all claims to aesthetic value are false. As a result, the argument is in line with current theories of cultural relativism and establishes the starting point and often the conclusion of university courses in aesthetics.

Jokes may be used as a beneficial analogy in this situation. Both the class of jokes and the class of art are difficult to define. Any joke that someone tells is true. A joke is a piece of art intended for laughter. It may not serve its purpose, in which case it would be considered a joke that "falls flat." Or it could serve its purpose while being insulting, in which case it would be a joke "in bad taste." All of this does not, however, imply that jokes fall into an arbitrary category or that there is no difference between excellent and terrible jokes. It also in no way implies that there is no room for funny critique or for moral instruction with an acceptable sense of humour as its primary objective. In fact, the first thing you would discover when thinking about jokes is that Marcel Duchamp's urinal was one. It was a brilliant joke when it was first told, but by the time Andy Warhol's Brillo boxes were created, it had become corny and is now simply ridiculous.

Similar to humour, art has a prevailing purpose. They are attractive aesthetic things. They might do this duty in a satisfying way. Hence gaining a devoted following that turns to them time and time again for solace or inspiration while also providing food for thought and spiritual inspiration. They could carry out their duties in ways that are seen to be humiliating or disrespectful. Or they could completely fail to arouse the desired aesthetic interest. The uplifting and the degrading are the kind of artistic creations that we remember most. Total failures are forgotten in the public's mind.

And it truly counts what sort of art you follow, what you save in your heart as a treasure trove of symbolism and allusions. Both aesthetics and comedy benefit from having good taste, which is really what it's all about. Students will leave their studies of art and culture just as clueless as they started if university courses do not begin from that foundation. When it comes to art, aesthetic judgement involves what you ought and ought not to enjoy, and (I will argue) the 'ought' here, even if it is not quite a moral requirement, has a moral weight.

It is true, nevertheless, that people no longer see artistic creations as definable entities or as expressions of morality: a growing number of humanities professors concur with their entering freshmen that there is no difference between good and terrible taste, just between your taste and mine. But consider the opposite being said of comedy. A tightrope walker's fatal fall from the high wire at the circus is one of the rare instances in history when the young Mao Ze Dong was seen laughing, according to Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. Imagine a society where people solely made fun of other people's misfortunes. What would such universe have in common with the worlds of Tartuffe by Molière, Mozart's Marriage of Figaro, Don Quixote by Cervantes, or Tristram Shandy by Laurence Sterne? Nothing other from the laughing itself. It would be a corrupt society, one in which humour no longer served as a support for human goodness, and in which a whole component of the human spirit had become stunted and repulsive.

Imagine a world where people were only interested in replica Brillo boxes, signed urinals, pickled crucifixes, or other items similarly plucked from the ashes of life and displayed with

a satirical or 'look at me' intent—in other words, the increasingly common fare of official modern art exhibitions in Europe and America. What would the worlds of Duccio, Giotto, Velazquez, or even Cezanne have in common? Of course, there would also be the exhibition of the things and our viewing of them via aesthetic lenses. However, it would be a world where human ambitions no longer find creative expression, where we stop creating visions of the sublime for ourselves, and where the locations of our ideals are covered in mountains of trash.

Entertainment and the Arts

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce made a significant difference between what is legitimately referred to as art and pseudo-art that is intended to amuse, provoke, or entertain in a book that was released a century ago. The English philosopher R., a student of Croce, adopted the distinction. G. Collingwood made the following argument. When confronted with a genuine work of art, I am more interested in the meaning and substance of the piece than in my personal feelings. I am receiving experience that is specifically embodied in this particular sensory form. However, while looking for amusement. The consequence is what interests me, not the reason. There is no issue of aesthetic or other assessment; whatever has the proper impact on me is correct for me. Why can't I be amused by a piece of art while still being interested in it for its significance, as Croce and Collingwood exaggeratedly argue? We laugh because the joke is funny, not because it's amusing. Since amusement is already an aesthetic concern, it is not in opposition to it. Therefore, it is not shocking if, as a result of their exaggerated disdain of entertainment art, both Croce and Collingwood developed absurd aesthetic ideas that rival anything in the literature.

However, they were correct to see the significant distinction between the artistic treatment of a topic and the simple cultivation of impact. We have been somewhat deafened to the contrast in this situation by the photographic picture. The camera allows the world in, spreading the same bland endorsement over the actor who is supposed to die on the sidewalk and the incidental balloon that is accidentally floating over the street in the backdrop, while the theatrical stage, like the frame of a painting, locks off the actual world. The temptation is to use this flaw as an attraction by pushing the spectator to develop a "reality addiction." The temptation is to concentrate on real-life events that captivate or excite us, regardless of their dramatic significance. Genuine art also amuses us, but it does so by putting a barrier between us and the events it depicts—a barrier great enough to inspire apathy for the characters rather of our own vicarious feelings.

Given that cinema and its offshoots are the guiltiest of sacrificing meaning in the sake of effect, it is appropriate to provide an example of cinematic art in which this flaw is not present. Few film directors have ever been as aware of the temptation the camera poses and the necessity to avoid it as Ingmar Bergman. A still from a Bergman movie might be framed and displayed on your wall like an etching. Examples are the dream sequences in Wild Strawberries, the Dance of Death in The Seventh Seal, and the dinner scene in The Hour of the Wolf. Bergman chose to shoot Wild Strawberries in black and white even though colour had already established itself as the de facto standard by the time it was released in 1957. This was done specifically to reduce distraction and to ensure that everything on the screen light, shade, form, and allusion, as much as person and character is making its own

contribution to the drama. Each element in Ingmar Bergman's memory sequence from Wild Strawberries speaks.

The movie is about a self-centered but admirable old man who has avoided love, who is nearing death and feeling hollow, and who, through a single day of brief encounters, memories, and dreams, is miraculously able to save himself, to accept that he must give love in order to receive it, and who is given, at the end, a transformative vision of his childhood and a final welcome into the world of others. The drama that is amplified by the film media is contained in the episodes of dreams and recollections, which carry the weight of the plot. By forging identities where words would simply impose distinctions, the camera presses these moments into the present and blends them with the story. The camera chases the growing plot like a hunter, stopping to take aim at the present just to bring it into jarring proximity with the past. As a result, the faces in the dreams have already gained new significance in the actual events of the day. Furthermore, the photos are often blurry, have highly defined features, and numerous items linger like ghosts in the out-of-focus areas.

In Wild Strawberries, the camera draws the viewer into the narrative by giving each detail an awareness of its own. Things, like humans, are soaked with the mental moods of their observers. The outcome is not random or whimsical, but rather completely objective, turning to reality whenever the camera would otherwise be inclined to do so. One of many examples of great cinematic art is Wild Strawberries, which uses cinematic methods for dramatic effect to show circumstances and people in the context of our own sympathetic reaction to them. It serves as an example of the difference between aesthetic appeal and simple effect, with the one fostering distance and the latter eradicating it. By focusing attention on the imagined other rather than the current self, this distance serves to concentrate emotion rather than to suppress it. Understanding this difference is one step towards comprehending creative beauty.

Reality and fiction

The difference may be made between fantasy and imagination. Effects evoke fantasy, but true art appeals to the imagination. Fantasy and speculative thoughts are entertained. Fantasy and imagination both deal with unrealities; but, while the unrealities of fantasy permeate and contaminate our reality, those of the imagination exist in a universe of their own, in which we may freely roam while maintaining a sympathetic distance. Since the actual picture in a photograph, movie, or television screen gives a substitute fulfilment for our prohibited impulses, therefore enabling them, modern society is full with fantasy products.

A fantasy desire looks for a simulacrum a picture from which all barriers to uncertainty have been removed rather than a literary description, fine artwork, or delicate representation of its goal. Style and convention are avoided since they hinder the development of the surrogate and make it vulnerable to criticism. The perfect dream is realized, and perfectly unreal—a made-up item that offers no room for interpretation. Such items are sold through advertisements, which float in the backdrop of contemporary life and persuade us to chase our aspirations rather than the reality. In contrast, imagined situations are not actualized but rather represented; they come to us drenched in thought and are not in any way stand-ins for the impossibly impossible. Instead, they are purposefully positioned apart, in a different realm. The creative process depends on convention, framing, and restriction. Only the frame that blocks off the environment in which we are standing allows us to enter a painting. Convention and style are more significant than reality, and when artists give their works a

trompe-l'oeil quality, we often criticize the outcome as being unappealing or disdain it as kitsch.

It is true that illusionist effects may be used in art, as shown in Bernini's sculpture of St. Teresa in Ecstasy and Masaccio's representation of the Holy Trinity. But in certain situations, illusion serves as a theatrical tool to transfer the observer into celestial spheres where mind and emotion are freed from their connections to the earth. In no way are Masaccio and Bernini engaging in trickery or encouraging the audience to satisfy his regular pleasures in other ways. Even if the emotions experienced in the theatre are aimed at fictitious things, they are controlled by a sense of reality and change with time things change as our knowledge expands. They come from the empathy we have for others of our kind, and empathy is important because it wants to understand its target, evaluate its value, and avoid wasting its heartbeats unnecessarily. Adam Smith claimed that sympathy naturally goes to the viewpoint of the disinterested observer in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Because of this, compassion is never as active or as heavily influenced by judgment as it is in the aesthetic context. We may assume the disinterested stance I discussed in Chapter 1 with regard to the imagined and the framed. When we put aside our personal interests, we also have the capacity for empathy that we do not often have in our regular interactions. It would be reasonable to propose that this sums up one goal of art, which is to offer fictional settings in which we might adopt an objective concern stance as a fundamental aspect of our aesthetic attitude.

Style

True artists have complete control over their subject matter, thus it should be their choice how we react to it rather than ours. Style is one method to exert this control, much as Picasso used it through his cubist reconstruction of the feminine face or Pope via the elegant logic of the heroic couplet to exert control over misanthropy. Style is not only shown in art; rather, as I discussed in the last chapter, it is a component of our daily aesthetics by which we organize our surroundings and establish meaningful relationships with them. For instance, flair in dressing is the capacity to shift a common repertory in a personal direction so that a separate character emerges in each of them. This is not the same as demanding uniqueness. That is what we mean by style and the stylishness that results when style oversteps its bounds and takes centre stage in someone's attire. Like the styles of Haydn and Mozart or Coleridge and Wordsworth, styles may be similar to one another and have significant idiomatic overlap. Or they could be distinctive, like Van Gogh's style, such that anybody who uses the repertoire is seen as a simple copyist or pasticheur rather than as a creative individual with a unique flair. Our propensity to think in this manner may be related to our sense of human integrity. According to Buffon, a distinctive style is one that has identified a particular individual whose individuality has been completely objectified in his work. That idea instantly brings up a challenge that has emerged in aesthetics, literary criticism, and the study of the arts in general: how can you distinguish between the form and the substance of a piece of art? And if you could separate the content, wouldn't it only demonstrate that it is unrelated to the aesthetic purpose and has no bearing on the true meaning of the work [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

There is no such thing as concealed style; it must be obvious. Even if it does so in artistic ways that mask the difficulty and complexity, as in the Chopin Mazurkas or the paintings, it

still manifests itself. Paul Klee's. It also becomes perceptible as a result of our comparison perceptions since it requires deviating from standards, which must also be subtly present in our perception in order to pick up on stylistic idioms and deviations. Artists can achieve the kind of concentration of meaning we see in Britten's Cello Symphony or Eliot's Four Quartets by using style to allude to things they do not explicitly state, summon comparisons they do not explicitly make, and situate their work and its subject matter in a context that makes every gesture significant. The action is not actual but rather is shown in the theatre as well, and although being realistic, these sequences are often avoided. Greek tragedies have off-stage killings, which are described in lines that establish the chorus' rhythmic motion while simultaneously spelling out the horror and restraining it by taming it to the verse's meter. The goal is to confine death to the realm of the imagination, where we may roam freely while putting our own interests and wants on hold, rather than robbing it of its emotional potency.

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CHAPTER 7

BENEFITS OF PERMANENCE AND EVANESCENCE

Pirtibha Sharma, Associate Professor
Department of Management, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- ica.pratibha.pdp@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The permanent emblems of a firmly established way of life are what we are 'home building' in a large portion of our activities, establishing in the face of change and deterioration. The invisible hand I just mentioned naturally gravitates towards style, language, and convention, as seen in vernacular architecture, folk clothing, table manners, and traditional cultural practises and rites. Conventions provide our lives a backdrop of constant order and the impression that there are right and incorrect ways to do things. They provide a means of completing our gestures and making them acceptable in public, much as how a moulding completes an architrave or how well wrapped presents are complete. There are certain civilizations where this need for the fixed and the permanent manifests itself in an oppressive and even crushing way; one such society is ancient Egypt, whose norms moulded and mummified every element of existence

KEYWORDS:

Aesthetic, Emblem, Evanescence, Judgment, Permanence.

INTRODUCTION

According to our debate, there are two different ways that aesthetic judgement may be used: to blend in or to stand out. In the historical record that the Egyptians have left behind, we see a way of life where aesthetic standards have absorbed and extinguished individual style due to an inflexible need for order. The aesthetic of ancient Rome, as seen in the frescoes at Pompei and Herculaneum and in the sculptures and grottoes of the Roman garden, is more appealing to us because it combines a desire for permanence with an equal awareness of the transience of life's pleasures. Because of this, even while we cherish permanency, we are also conscious of the transience of our bonds and are driven to express this knowledge via an aesthetic that is accepted by the general public [1], [2].

There are cultures, with the traditional Japanese one being the most prevalent. Notable—in which the aesthetics of daily life emphasises what is transient, ephemeral, and driven by a tender sorrow. Such societies are just as devoted to tradition and rule-following as those that place an emphasis on permanence. A poignant example of this aesthetic of transience may be seen in the Japanese tea ceremony, in which serving tea to guests is raised to the status of a sacred rite. The utensils, gestures, flower arrangements, and style of the tea hut are all governed by strict customs. The host and guest's motions across the tea garden and their expressions when the tea bowl is presented and accepted all take on a unique significance and poignancy as a result of these norms. The phrase "ichigo, ichie" (one opportunity, one meeting) perfectly expresses the intention, which is to capture the singularity and transience of the moment. We may learn something from the tea ceremony that we can also learn from the local architecture of our European towns, namely that momentary pleasures and fleeting

interactions can be transformed into timeless values when they are memorialized in ritual and stone [3], [4].

Fit and aesthetics

I've been examining a specific kind of practical reasoning where we choose an option based on how well it fits the situation. Fit is determined by how things seem and by the meaning that appears in how they appear. However, I have not explicitly addressed the topic of beauty, and my fictitious carpenter would not find the term to be very useful. To rapidly show how the kind of judgement I have been talking in this chapter connects to the judgment of beauty, let's go back to our initial clichés. The appealing quality I've been describing is also a cause to pay attention to the object it is present in. It is something to ponder for its own purpose, and its significance is not contingent on another application. It is the focus of a considered decision that, being founded on experience, it cannot be created from a copy. Similar to how beauty is a matter of degree, fittingness is likewise a matter of degree. In order to put it simply, what I have been explaining in this chapter is that very 'minimal beauty' that is a constant interest of rational people as they attempt to bring order to their surrounds and feel at home in their shared universe [5], [6].

The next step is to apply the ideas from this chapter to the "higher" types of beauty that art exemplifies and to see if we can add anything to what we have already said about the sort of meaning that is sought when we defend our aesthetic judgements. The subject of art eventually took the place of natural beauty as the main focus of aesthetics until later in the nineteenth century, after Hegel's posthumously released lectures on the subject. And this transition was a result of the romantic movement, a significant shift in educated thinking that put the individual's emotions at the core of our civilization and made the self-more intriguing than others and travelling more honourable than belonging. Art evolved as a means for a person to declare their identity to the world and petition the gods for justice. However, it has shown to be utterly untrustworthy in its role as our higher ambitions' protector.

The torch of beauty was taken up by art, who then carried it for a time before dropping it in one of Paris' pissoirs. Marcel Duchamp inscribed his name on a urinal a century ago. 'R. Mutt' gave it the name 'La Fontaine' and displayed it as a piece of art. One direct effect of Duchamp's joke was to spark an academic sector committed to defining what art is. This industry's literature is just as dull as the imitations of Duchamp's gesture that never cease. However, it has left a trace of doubt behind. What purpose does anything serve to be considered art, if anything can qualify? The only thing left is the notion that some individuals look at some things while others look at other things is fascinating but baseless. The idea that criticism is an endeavour that seeks for immutable truths and enduring symbols of the human spirit is scorned outright since it is predicated on an understanding of the art that Duchamp's "fountain" flushed down the drain. The claim is enthusiastically embraced because it seems to free people from the burden of culture, telling them that they can disregard all those venerable masterpieces without consequence, that TV soap operas are "as good as" Shakespeare, and that Radiohead is equal to Brahms, and that nothing is superior to anything else and that all claims to aesthetic value are false. As a result, the argument is in line with current theories of cultural relativism and establishes the starting point and often the conclusion of university courses in aesthetics [7], [8].

Jokes may be used as a beneficial analogy in this situation. Both the class of jokes and the class of art are difficult to define. Any joke that someone tells is true. A joke is a piece of art intended for laughter. It may not serve its purpose, in which case it would be considered a joke that "falls flat." Or it could serve its purpose while being insulting, in which case it would be a joke "in bad taste." All of this does not, however, imply that jokes fall into an arbitrary category or that there is no difference between excellent and terrible jokes. It also in no way implies that there is no room for funny critique or for moral instruction with an acceptable sense of humour as its primary objective. In fact, the first thing you would discover when thinking about jokes is that Marcel Duchamp's urinal was one. It was a brilliant joke when it was first told, but by the time Andy Warhol's Brillo boxes were created, it had become corny and is now simply ridiculous.

DISCUSSION

Similar to humour, art has a prevailing purpose. They are attractive aesthetic things. They might do this duty in a satisfying way hence gaining a devoted following that turns to them time and time again for solace or inspiration while also providing food for thought and spiritual inspiration. They could carry out their duties in ways that are seen to be humiliating or disrespectful. Or they could completely fail to arouse the desired aesthetic interest. The uplifting and the degrading are the kind of artistic creations that we remember most. Total failures are forgotten in the public's mind.

And it truly counts what sort of art you follow, what you save in your heart as a treasure trove of symbolism and allusions. Both aesthetics and comedy benefit from having good taste, which is really what it's all about. Students will leave their studies of art and culture just as clueless as they started if university courses do not begin from that foundation. When it comes to art, aesthetic judgement involves what you ought and ought not to enjoy, and (I will argue) the 'ought' here, even if it is not quite a moral requirement, has a moral weight. It is true, nevertheless, that people no longer see artistic creations as definable entities or as expressions of morality: a growing number of humanities professors concur with their entering freshmen that there is no difference between good and terrible taste, just between your taste and mine. But consider the opposite being said of comedy. A tightrope walker's fatal fall from the high wire at the circus is one of the rare instances in history when the young Mao Ze Dong was seen laughing, according to Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. Imagine a society where people solely made fun of other people's misfortunes. What would such universe have in common with the worlds of Tartuffe by Molière, Mozart's Marriage of Figaro, Don Quixote by Cervantes, or Tristram Shandy by Laurence Sterne? Nothing other from the laughing itself. It would be a corrupt society, one in which humour no longer served as a support for human goodness, and in which a whole component of the human spirit had become stunted and repulsive.

Imagine a world where people were only interested in replica Brillo boXes, signed urinals, pickled crucifixes, or other items similarly plucked from the ashes of life and displayed with a satirical or 'look at me' intent—in other words, the increasingly common fare of official modern art exhibitions in Europe and America. What would the worlds of Duccio, Giotto, Velazquez, or even Cezanne have in common? Of course, there would also be the exhibition of the things and our viewing of them via aesthetic lenses. However, it would be a world where human ambitions no longer find creative expression, where we stop creating visions of

the sublime for ourselves, and where the locations of our ideals are covered in mountains of trash.

Entertainment and the Arts

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce made a significant difference between what is legitimately referred to as art and pseudo-art that is intended to amuse, provoke, or entertain in a book that was released a century ago. The contrast was seized upon by R. G. Collingwood, an English philosopher who was a student of Croce, and he made the following claims. When confronted with a genuine work of art, I am more interested in the meaning and substance of the piece than in my personal feelings. I am receiving experience that is specifically embodied in this particular sensory form. However, while looking for enjoyment, I am more focused on the result than the reason. There is no issue of aesthetic or other assessment; whatever has the proper impact on me is correct for me [9], [10].

Why can't I be amused by a piece of art while still being interested in it for its significance, as Croce and Collingwood exaggerately argue? We laugh because the joke is funny, not because it's amusing. Since amusement is already an aesthetic concern, it is not in opposition to it. Therefore, it is not shocking if, as a result of their exaggerated disdain of entertainment art, Both Croce and Collingwood developed absurd aesthetic ideas that rival anything in the literature.

However, they were correct to see the significant distinction between the artistic treatment of a topic and the simple cultivation of impact. We have been somewhat deafened to the contrast in this situation by the photographic picture. The camera allows the world in, spreading the same bland endorsement over the actor who is supposed to die on the sidewalk and the incidental balloon that is accidentally floating over the street in the backdrop, while the theatrical stage, like the frame of a painting, locks off the actual world. The temptation is to use this flaw as an attraction by pushing the spectator to develop a "reality addiction." The temptation is to concentrate on real-life events that captivate or excite us, regardless of their dramatic significance. Genuine art also amuses us, but it does so by putting a barrier between us and the events it depicts—a barrier great enough to inspire apathy for the characters rather of our own vicarious feelings.

Given that cinema and its offshoots are the guiltiest of sacrificing meaning in the sake of effect, it is appropriate to provide an example of cinematic art in which this flaw is not present. Few film directors have ever been as aware of the temptation the camera poses and the necessity to avoid it as Ingmar Bergman. A still from a Bergman movie might be framed and displayed on your wall like an etching. Examples are the dream sequences in Wild Strawberries, the Dance of Death in The Seventh Seal, and the dinner scene in The Hour of the Wolf. Bergman chose to shoot Wild Strawberries in black and white even though colour had already established itself as the de facto standard by the time it was released in 1957. This was done specifically to reduce distraction and to ensure that everything on the screen—light, shade, form, and allusion, as much as person and character—is making its own contribution to the drama.

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One of many examples of great cinematic art is Wild Strawberries, which uses cinematic methods for dramatic effect to show circumstances and people in the context of our own sympathetic reaction to them. It serves as an example of the difference between aesthetic appeal and simple effect, with the one fostering distance and the latter eradicating it. By focusing attention on the imagined other rather than the current self, this distance serves to concentrate emotion rather than to suppress it. Understanding this difference is one step towards comprehending creative beauty.

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A fantasy desire looks for a simulacrum—an picture from which all barriers to uncertainty have been removed—rather than a literary description, fine artwork, or delicate representation of its goal. Style and convention are avoided since they hinder the development of the surrogate and make it vulnerable to criticism. The perfect dream is realised, and perfectly unreal—a made-up item that offers no room for interpretation. Such items are sold through advertisements, which float in the backdrop of contemporary life and persuade us to chase our aspirations rather than the reality.

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Even if the emotions experienced in the theatre are aimed at fictitious things, they are controlled by a sense of reality and change with time things change as our knowledge expands. They come from the empathy we have for others of our kind, and empathy is important because it wants to understand its target, evaluate its value, and avoid wasting its heartbeats unnecessarily. Adam Smith claimed that sympathy naturally goes to the viewpoint of the disinterested observer in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Because of this, compassion is never as active or as heavily influenced by judgement as it is in the aesthetic context. We may assume the disinterested stance I discussed in Chapter 1 with regard to the imagined and the framed. When we put aside our personal interests, we also have the capacity for empathy that we do not often have in our regular interactions. It would be reasonable to propose that this sums up one goal of art, which is to offer fictional settings in which we might adopt an objective concern stance as a fundamental aspect of our aesthetic attitude.

Style

True artists have complete control over their subject matter, thus it should be their choice how we react to it rather than ours. Style is one method to exert this control, much as Picasso used it through his cubist reconstruction of the feminine face or Pope via the elegant logic of the heroic couplet to exert control over misanthropy. Style is not only shown in art; rather, as I discussed in the last chapter, it is a component of our daily aesthetics by which we organise our surroundings and establish meaningful relationships with them. For instance, flair in dressing is the capacity to shift a common repertory in a personal direction so that a separate character emerges in each of them. This is not the same as demanding uniqueness. That is what we mean by style and the ‘stylishness' that results when style oversteps its bounds and takes centre stage in someone's attire. Like the styles of Haydn and Mozart or Coleridge and Wordsworth, styles may be similar to one another and have significant idiomatic overlap. Or they could be distinctive, like Van Gogh's style, such that anybody who uses the repertoire is seen as a simple copyist or pasticheur rather than as a creative individual with a unique flair. Our propensity to think in this manner may be related to our sense of human integrity. According to Buffon, a distinctive style is one that has identified a particular individual whose individuality has been completely objectified in his work. (It's fascinating to explore why we believe Mozart, who modified Haydn's musical language, is an original composer, yet Utrillo, who is undeniably his own even when plainly imitating Pissarro or Van Gogh, is totally derivative.)

There is no such thing as concealed style; it must be obvious. Even if it does so in artistic ways that mask the difficulty and complexity, as in the Chopin Mazurkas or the paintings, it still manifests itself. Paul Klee's. It also becomes perceptible as a result of our comparison perceptions since it requires deviating from standards, which must also be subtly present in our perception in order to pick up on stylistic idioms and deviations. Artists can achieve the kind of concentration of meaning we see in Britten's Cello Symphony or Eliot's Four Quartets by using style to allude to things they do not explicitly state, summon comparisons they do not explicitly make, and situate their work and its subject matter in a context that makes every gesture significant.

Format and content

That idea instantly brings up a challenge that has emerged in aesthetics, literary criticism, and the study of the arts in general: how can you distinguish between the form and the substance of a piece of art? And if you could separate the content, wouldn't it only demonstrate that it is unrelated to the aesthetic purpose and has no bearing on the true meaning of the work? Let's say you wanted to know what was shown in Van Gogh's well-known painting of the yellow chair. What does that imply exactly? You query What am I expected to comprehend, about this chair or just on looking at this image, the whole world? I may respond, "It's just a chair," to that. But in that scenario, what makes the image so unique? Wouldn't a picture of a chair suffice instead? Why make the long trip only to see a photo of a chair? I'm going to contend that this artwork is conveying something unique about this specific chair as well as about the world as it is represented by this chair. I could make an effort to express my emotions and ideas verbally. "It is an invitation to explore how life radiates from individuals into all of their goods, how life emanates from the meanest objects, But couldn't he have put that message on the bottom of the painting instead? so that nothing is at rest, everything is developing. Why does he need a chair to convey such a concept? The real meaning of the painting is bound up with, inseparable from, the image. It resides in the very shapes and colours of the chair, is inseparable from Van Gogh's distinctive style, and cannot be completely translated into another idiom, I'm likely to say in response.

This kind of argument is increasingly commonplace and is based on how we typically discuss art, whether it be in relation to poetry, music, or paintings. We wish to convey that artistic creations have more significance than just being fascinating shapes that arouse our curiosity. They are acts of communication that give us meaning, and we must comprehend this meaning. We often claim that a performer did not comprehend the part he was performing. We may claim that we do not grasp abstract compositions like Bartok and Schoenberg's quartets when we listen to them. All of these references to meaning and comprehension imply that works of art are conveying a message, or even that each piece of artor at least any work of any note—has its own particular message that we must comprehend in order to enjoy the work and grasp its worth. Some works, including Goethe's Faust, Beethoven's later quartets, Shakespeare's Hamlet, Vergil's Aeneid, Michelangelo's Moses, the Psalms of David, and the Book of Job, have altered the way we see the world. People who are unfamiliar with such works of art may find the world to be less intriguing.

However, when asked to describe the possible substance of a specific piece of art, we quickly find ourselves reduced to silence. The meaning is not included in a piece of material that can be easily understood. It is a specific piece of material that has been presented, or, to put it

another way, is considered as integral to both form and style. Thus, we reach the notion of the inseparability of form and content, which has become a critical standard. a specific a literary critic named Cleanth Brooks used the word "heresy of paraphrase" to describe this argument in the field of literary criticism. The heresy Brooks was alluding to is the idea that a poem's meaning can be summed up in a paraphrase, from which you can easily conclude that it is heresy to believe that it can be expressed in a translation, another style, another art form, or any other way than in the form of this particular poem.

Brooks is highlighting a number of unique characteristics of poetry. The first is that a line of poetry may express numerous ideas at once, but a paraphrase can only present them one at a time. For instance, the phrase "bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang" may be used to depict both the autumnal trees and the newly destroyed choirs of the monasteries that Shakespeare's youth still visited. A paraphrase would give one of those readings, then the other, but the line's power comes in part from the fact that you hear them simultaneously, like voices in music. Then, the autumnal doom intrudes on the image of the abandoned monastery, much like the idea of sacrilege intrudes on the image of the tree with no leaves.

Second, poetry is "polysemous," developing its meaning on several levels, including those of image, assertion, metaphor, allegory, and so on. This idea was established seven centuries ago in Dante's Convivio and in the famous letter to Can Grande della Scala that explains the allegorical significance of the Divine Comedy. And it spread across the poetry of the late mediaeval and early Renaissance. The layers of meaning in poetry must be provided concurrently, while they must be explained individually in a paraphrase. Third, any paraphrase loses meaning. The famous first line of Hamlet's soliloquy may be rephrased as "To live or to die: that's the choice" or "to exist or not to exist; that's the problem."

Shakespeare aimed to convey the mystery of "contingent being," as Avicenna and Aquinas had put it, via the word "to be," with all of its philosophical resonance. In Hamlet's existential dread, being is already a question that has an unanswerable component that has a fresh and unsettling resonance. In poetry, words' sense is determined by more than only their meaning and associations. It's not simply the music that matters; it must also be organised by grammar and fashioned like language. Finally, there is the conceptual atmosphere of poetry, which is utterly untranslatable. How on earth would you translate the indescribable sorrow of "Les sanglots longs | Des violons | De l'automne" into English? Although it implies the same, the phrase "the long sighs of autumn's violins" is absolutely ridiculous. But we also don't want to draw the conclusion that the meaning of a poem, or of any other piece of art, is just enigmatic or that it is so closely tied to the form that nothing can be said about it. I've previously talked a lot about those examples. It is true that there are certain instances—like, example, Celan's poems—where nothing can be spoken. The imagery could be difficult to decipher and include too much implication; it may even be careful to avoid straightforward statements in order to preserve the intensity of the experience. But the fact that these occurrences are so extraordinary just serves to support the argument. Generally speaking, you may express a lot about a poem's, a painting's, or even a piece of music's meaning. However, nothing you say can adequately explain the unique intensity of meaning that transforms a piece of art into the unique vehicle of its meaning.

Expression and representation

Here, philosophers distinguish between representation and expression as the two types of meaning in art. The difference, albeit it relates to ideas that have existed for much longer, dates back to Croce and Collingwood. It seems that there are at least two ways in which works of art might have significance: by portraying a reality (whether actual or imagined) that is independent of being expressive in and of themselves, as in figurative art, drama, or prose story, objects may convey meaning. The first kind of meaning is often referred to as "representation" since it suggests a symbolic connection between the work and its context. One may determine if a representation is more or less realistic, or more or less consistent with the generality of the objects and circumstances being depicted. It is amenable to translation and paraphrasing; two works of art may depict the same subject, circumstance, or event, as can Mantegna's and Grunewald's Crucifixions, which both depict the crucifixion of Jesus (though how differently they do so need not be stressed).

An exact portrayal may also lack significance as a work of art, either because of the meaninglessness of what it portrays or because, like Bouguereau's nymphs, it fails to transmit any significant information about its subject. Croce rejected representation as unimportant to the artistic endeavour as a result of all those characteristics. It is never the root of the meaning in an artist's work; at most, it serves as a framework within which they might create. Of course, understanding a work's representational content is still necessary if you want to understand its artistic meaning. To do this, you may need to be familiar with its critical, historical, and iconographical context knowledge that is not always simple to come by, as we have learned from our attempts to understand works like Rembrandt's Night watch and Shakespeare's The Phoenix and the Turtle. However, a representation may be understood by someone who has no aesthetic interest, and it may still be a good representation while failing to arouse one. For example, most B films are effective representations of bizarre situations with uninteresting characters for no artistic reason.

Expression of feeling

Therefore, according to Croce, the responsibility for expression, not depiction, bears the weight of aesthetic significance. And the means of artistic worth is expression. Even abstract art, such as instrumental music or abstract painting, may be an effective environment for expression since works of art express things. How therefore can we comprehend Why is expression important, and how? One theory is that art expresses emotion, and that this is valuable to us because it helps us understand human nature and makes us feel empathy for experiences we may not otherwise have. But it's obvious that works of art don't express emotion in the same way that you could yell at your kid to express your rage or talk to him lovingly to express your love. The majority of works of art are not produced in an instantaneous fit of rage, and we lack the information necessary to determine if the artist was driven by rage (if at all). We may not accept that artists' descriptions of the feeling their work is supposed to express are accurate, even when they do so. The slow movement of Beethoven's Op. 132 is introduced with the phrase "Hymn of thanksgiving from the convalescent to the Godhead in the Lydian mode." Does it indicate that you don't understand the movement if you answer, "To me, it is just a serene expression of contentment, and convalescence has nothing to do with it?" Why is Beethoven any more qualified than you to describe the emotion his music evokes? The emotional substance of a piece of music may be

better expressed by you, the reviewer, than by the composer. There are many artists who are made aware of the significance of their own works through criticism; one such artist is T. At now I know what it means, was S. Eliot's answer to Helen Gardner's book about his poetry.

In fact, every effort to capture the emotional depth of a piece of art seems to miss the mark. The notes, the pigments, and the words all contain the sensation; efforts to extract it and capture it in a description seem weak and insufficient when seen alongside the artwork. Croce responded to this criticism with a clever idea. He said that representation deals with concepts characterizations that may be transferred from one medium to another without losing meaning. Despite how clever that notion is, it takes what it offers with one hand while giving it with the other. It seems to be arguing that a piece of art has significance because of the intuition it expresses. However, the creative expression of the intuition is the only way to recognise it. The only way to respond to the question of what intuition a particular work of art expresses is to point to that piece of art and say, "This is the intuition contained in this." The item that seemed to be a relation (expression) is not what it seems to be, and to suggest that a piece of art expresses an intuition is to equate it with oneself. The old form and substance issue has returned, and we wish to insist on a distinction only to reject it as unfounded. In recent years, there have been numerous attempts to revisit and resurrect the distinction between representation and expression, as well as to provide accounts of expression that will demonstrate its significance and how it captures the aspect of aesthetic experience that we are prone to describe in terms of meaning. We have seen efforts to explain how emotion is expressed in art and why this is significant using theories like semantic, semiotic, cognitive, and others. This is particularly true in music philosophy in my opinion, none of these hypotheses have really made the topic any farther [11], [12].

Music Significance

Readers may be perplexed as to why the convolute issue of artistic meaning has to be explored in a book dedicated to the concept of beauty. But it is beauty itself that brings us to this issue. We are moved by art because it is beautiful, and beauty is a function of meaning. It doesn't have to be beautiful to be significant; anything may be meaningful without being attractive. A musical example might help to explain this. Take the melancholy Adagio for Strings by Samuel Barber, unquestionably one of the most expressive compositions in the instrumental repertoire. How can its expressive capacity be understood? It is unveiling its own unique grave expression rather than conveying a tale about a mental condition that might have been expressed in another manner by another work. The expression of the music is linked to its beauty; so, the beauty and the expression are one characteristic rather than two. This brings us right to the issue I've been raising: how can one tell the difference between someone who understands the expression and someone who doesn't?

CONCLUSION

As a result, the Yarmouth scenes in David Copperfield are shown in a Constable drawing of the same location. Both provide generic descriptions of the Yarmouth flats and messages that may be expressed differently and via different mediums. A work's relationship to its world, whether expressed in words or visuals, may be compared to how ideas relate to the objects that come under them by providing a basic description of those things. Expression is not about ideas but about intuitions specific experiences that are communicated by highlighting their individuality. Two pieces of art may both depict the same thing, but they cannot both

express the same thing since a piece of art can only express an intuition by showcasing its unique nature, which calls for just these words or only these pictures if it is to be communicated. In art, individual experiences are communicated in the distinctive manner that best captures their personality.

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CHAPTER 8

EXPLORING THE IDEAS OF MUSIC FORMALISM

Vandana Whig, Professor
Department of Management, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- vandanawhig@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The 1854 essay On the Musically Beautiful by Hans lick, which defended the idea that music is a dramatic art that gives form and coherence to our states of mind, was to become a key piece of evidence in the debate between Brahms's supporters, who believed that the art of music is primarily architectural and consists of the development of tonal structures, and Wagner's supporters. According to Hans lick, because emotions are based on ideas about their objects, music can only express certain feelings if it can provide defined objects of emotion. However, music is an abstract kind of art that is unable to convey clear ideas. The claim that a piece of music expresses a certain emotion is thus rendered meaningless since there is no clear solution Instead, according to Hans lick, music is best described as "forms moved through sound." Emotional connections are only associations, not the meaning of what we hear, and this is the crucial characteristic. Understanding music doesn't include falling into a narcissistic trance that is possibly sparked by the music but not in any way guided by it. Understanding involves recognizing the many motions that make up the musical surface and listening to how they interact, evolve from one another, and proceed towards resolution and closure.

KEYWORDS:

Aesthetic, Art, Beauty, Ideas, Music.

INTRODUCTION

The joy that this brings is similar to the joy that pattern in architecture brings, particularly when such pattern overcomes difficulties and impediments like the one that is shown to an octagonal foundation and a circular dome had to fit together in the Longhena at St. Maria della Salute. But what exactly does "musical movement" mean? Think about the last theme of Beethoven's Erotica symphony. The majority of this is silent. Beginning on E-flat, it moves through a protracted period of stillness during which it seems to ascend to B-flat, dips an octave, and so on. With a beginning, an ongoing process, and moves up and down the pitch spectrum, we can simply define the movement. However, nothing truly changes, and the majority of the movement takes place while there is silence. We also hear a type of causal link: the first note initiates the second. However, in actuality, there is no such link. The metaphor of musical movement appears to be strongly ingrained. If that's the case, then Hans lick's thesis isn't all that different from the romantics he criticises. They both agree that music moves, but they both also add that if you're going to use one metaphor, why not use another? They say that music moves in the same way as the heart moves when it is stirred by emotion. In other words, musical beauty has emotional substance in addition to form [1], [2].

Architecture's form and content

I focused a lot on the minute details of practical logic that a carpenter uses to fit each component of a door together while thinking about "the aesthetics of everyday life." A tradition in architectural thought dates back to Alberti's Ten Books of Architecture (De re aedificatoria, 1452) and defines architectural beauty (concinnities) as the proper apposition of one element to another. This is similar to the formalist approach favoured by Hans lick and is as unsatisfactory and untenable in the topic of architectural criticism as it is in the discussion of music. Reconsider the St. Maria della Salute Church in Longhena. As one of those "contemptible edifices" that "have good stage effect so long as we do not approach them," Ruskin dismissed it in Stones of Venice, criticising "the meagre windows in the sides of the cupola and the bare walls." The buttresses are a "ridiculous disguise of the buttresses under the form of colossal scrolls," the author said, adding that the buttresses are "a hypocrisy" since the cupola is a wood structure and does not need such support. Ruskin saw the theatrical insincerity of the Counter-Reformation (the "Grotesque Renaissance") in the shapes and features of this church, where incense and flowing robes masked the hand-crafted realities of true devotion. Geoffrey Scott answered with what he saw to be a purely formal description of the church's beauty and perfection in his influential work of critique [3], [4].

The volutes' clever matching creates a seamless transition from the circular layout to the octagonal one. Their piled-up and rolling shape resembles that of a solid object that has reached its correct and final alignment. The large sculptures and pedestals that they hold seem to stop the volutes' outward motion and to pin them against the church. Like the obelisks on the lantern, the statues' silhouettes help to give the composition a pyramidal shape, which more than any other line gives the mass its cohesion and power. ..Nearly every aspect of the church extols the beauty of mass and its capacity to give even the richest and most fantastical ideas of the baroque a necessary simplicity and dignity [5], [6].

The church's apparent invocation of the Virgin Queen of the Sea, who reaches out to help the stranded man, is not mentioned by Scott, and he generally ignores the church's religious symbolism. The intricacy of Scott's description, however, reveals that it is a series of metaphors and similes, as shown by the statement that "their heaped and rolling form" (two metaphors) is similar to that of a heavy substance (simile). ..the impressive pedestals and sculptures. ..appear to stop the movement outside (simile). ..the baroque's inherent simplicity and dignity (metaphors). ..'. To put it another way, this merely formal definition may readily be compared to the most daring effort to explain what the church means.

That way was pushed. Isn't this use of the mass to foster simplicity and dignity an exact equivalent to the Counter-Reformational view of the church, which saw it as elevating everyday life and occupying a position of fruitful guardianship over it? Observe how the statues appear to ride and control the waves as they balance on the undulating shape of the volutes, representing the protection provided to "those in peril on the sea." The cathedral resembles a meeting between comfort and prayer: between the protection Mary, stella maris, promised in the all-encompassing dome, and the prayers of the sailor, symbolised by chapels that turn to each point of the compass. It is just as fair to draw attention to these comparisons and symbolic links when criticising architecture as it is when criticising expressionist music. By means of a remark on a piece written in the shadow of the Salute (A Toccata of Galuppi), in which the voice is that of an imagined Victorian Englishman invoking the world of

Galuppi as he listens, Browning created a famous example of such expressionist criticism. What? When compared to the sixths, the lower thirds are sombre and moan continuously said anything to them? Those suspensions, those fixes: "Do we have to pass away?' Those sevens of sorrow: "Life might last, we can only try!"' The municipal energy and seafaring adventurism that were waning in the time of Baldassare Galuppi are shown in Baldassare Longhena's church. When attempting to explain either, metaphor is always used and bridges between experiences are always built, it seems strange to create a stark separation between form and substance. Both Scott and Browning make reference to the fact that aesthetic assessment influences and alters one experience when applied to another. And as Browning demonstrates, the metamorphosis that results may provide a surprising window into the human heart.

DISCUSSION

Therefore, it seems that our greatest efforts to explain the beauty of abstract artistic creations like music and architecture require connecting them via metaphorical links to human action, life, and emotion. Therefore, we must first comprehend the logic of figurative language if we are to comprehend the essence of creative meaning. Figurative language is used to link ideas rather than to explain them, and the connection is created by the perceiver's feelings. There are other techniques to draw the link, including metaphor, metonymy, simile, personification, and transferred names. Sometimes a writer may juxtapose two ideas without employing a figure of speech, only allowing the experiences of the two to overlap [7], [8].

Her heart and tongue are communicating via the down feather of the swan, which is perched on the wave at high tide. And neither direction incline. ..A powerful visual with many ramifications completely alters the audience's perception of Octavia's reluctance. Metaphors seek this type of transformation: whereas inert metaphors do nothing, active metaphors alter how objects are viewed. Generally speaking, figurative language serves this purpose. A preliminary conclusion is suggested by our reflections on the metaphorical character of our efforts to give music an expressive meaning. Conventions or a "theory of musical meaning" do not create the relationship between music and emotion. It is based on playing and listening experiences. By'matching' expressive music to other aspects of our experience, making links with human existence, and so on, we may better grasp it to other things that are meaningful to us via music. Because of its magnificent seriousness, we admire the Barber Adagio for Strings. The metaphor is not random since it connects to morality, which explains why we identify with the work and feel uplifted by it. However, as a metaphor, it makes sense. If this is an accurate representation of the piece's meaning, it must be grounded in the musical structure and reasoning. The long step-wise melody in B-flat minor, which is less of a melody than a melody remembered; the tensions resolved on half cadences, as though pausing for breath but refusing to come to a stop; the constant fall of the melodic line that burdens every attempt to rise, until the sudden climb through a pair of diminished fifths, like the last efforts of someone struggling to free himself so as to reach the rock while still standing; and the sudden climb through a pair of diminished sevenths.

Similar issues arise in architectural critique. In order to justify our metaphorical descriptions, we will use the same strategy that Scott uses in the passage cited, which entails connecting one metaphor to another and one part of the building to another in an elaborate exploration of how one part fits into the other and how both relate to the observer's moral life. This proposes

an alternative expression paradigm to the one Croce and his supporters advocated. The Crocean approach proposes that an unconscious inner condition (an "intuition") may become aware and expressive via creative expression. The alternative approach involves an artist putting elements together to create connections that appeal to the emotions of the viewer. What is being said becomes irrelevant as a question. The question is whether or whether this emotionally fits with that. This concept of fitting in or belonging brings to mind the more formal notion of fittingness that we explored in the previous chapter when talking about the aesthetics of daily living. Fittingness is the key to successful aesthetic design in both life and art. We want that things come together in a manner that works for us. This is not to say that conflict and discord don't exist in the creative process; of course they do. However, discord and conflict may sometimes be appropriate, like as the shocking disarray of Hamlet's confrontation with his mother or the climax 9-note dissonance in Mahler's 10th Symphony [9], [10].

The worth of art

There are several methods to compliment a piece of art. They may be balancing, melodic, graceful, dramatic, sad, happy, and exciting. Although in art, meaning and beauty are intertwined, some consider Schoenberg's A Survivor from Warsaw, Gunther Grass's Tin Drum, or Picasso's Guernica as examples of some of the most profound works of recent times that were outright ugly and even repulsive in their raw-nerve effect. To describe such works as beautiful is to, in some ways, diminish and even trivialise what they are attempting to communicate. But why should a theory of art have anything to say about beauty if it is only one of many aesthetic values?

The link Schiller draws between art and play in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man offers some guidance. He contends that art frees us from our daily practical worries by giving us playable items, fictional people, captivating settings, and engaging acts that we can appreciate for who they are rather than for what they can accomplish for us. The artist is also having fun, creating imagined worlds with the same impromptu excitement that youngsters get when someone suggests, "Let's pretend!', or creating things that help us comprehend and control our emotions, as Beethoven does in his later quartets. Because we are always pulled between the strict demands of reason, which force us to follow the rules, and the temptations of sense, which compel us to go out in quest of novel eXperience, this activity, according to Schiller, is all the more important. Reason and sense are reconciled in play, which art elevates to the level of free contemplation, and we are given a glimpse of human existence in its whole.

We play when we appreciate art, and the artist plays when they make it. Additionally, the outcome is not necessarily lovely or lovely in a predictable sense. But beauty and the type of orderliness that holds our attention and encourages us to look for the deeper meaning of the sensory world satisfy this ludic mentality. Therefore, we expect that those items be organised and meaningful as soon as we start creating and valuing them as ends in themselves rather than as tools to fulfil our wishes and purposes. The first urge of creative creativity contains this "blessed rage for order," along with the desire to impose structure and the primary goal of all art is to impart meaning to human existence via the enjoyment of something pleasurable. By giving our lives a feeling of fittingness, art explains why we exist and provides the solution to the enigma of eXistence. The logic that links the end of things with

their origin, as it is related in Paradise Lost, Phe'dre, and Der Ring des Nibelungen, makes existence its own justification and redeems it from contingency. One of life's greatest gifts to us is the ultimate form of beauty, as shown by those sublime creative works. It is the real foundation of art's worth since it is what only art can provide.

Truth and beauty

Keats' depiction of the Grecian urn, which proclaims that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all. You know on earth, and all ye need to know" (Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all), is inspired by a longing glimpse at a past era. However, it captures a typical experience. Our finest works of art appear to lead us to the reality of the human condition and demonstrate the value of being human by showcasing finished examples of human behaviours and passions, free from the constraints of daily life.

Maybe an example may best illustrate the concept. We understand what it's like to fall in love, have your love rejected, and then have your passivity infected as you explore the globe. Most of us must go through this experience, in all its ugliness and arbitraryness. But when Schubert explores it via song in Die Winterreise, selecting exquisite melodies to reveal one by one the many hidden nooks and crannies of a broken heart, we are given an understanding of a different order. Loss is no longer an accident; it is transformed into an archetype in the music that it inhabits, advancing along the melodic and harmonic impulse to a conclusion with a convincing aesthetic logic. It's as if we were able to see beyond the protagonist of the song cycle's contingent loss to another kind of loss entirely: an inevitable loss, whose justness exists in the whole of it. By presenting an experience under the guise of need, beauty gets to the heart of the matter. It's challenging for me to express this point. I also understand the lesson we must learn from the arguments about form and substance. To make reference to a truth found in a piece of art is to inevitably expose oneself to the destructive power of the question: what truth? But such inquiry must be rejected. The understanding that art offers can only be accessed in the form in which it is presented; it resides in an immediate eXperience with the calming effect of eliminating the arbitrariness from the human condition, just as the arbitrariness of suffering is overcome in tragedy and the arbitrariness of rejection in Schubert's song-cycle.

In this context, Kant spoke of "aesthetic ideas," which are sensory cues to ideas that are not expressible as literal facts because they are beyond the scope of human comprehension. But Kant's limitations are too stringent. Because we are capable of making comparisons. And they support the concept that the art is pointing to a truth that lies outside of it. For instance, we might consider whether Mahler's Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen convey the same ideas as Schubert did. The answer is unquestionably "no" since Mahler's music has a self-referential quality that somewhat lessens its appeal to a wider audience. This view might be expressed, for example, by saying that Mahler's song cycle loses sight of the reality of loss in order to wallow in sentimental anguish over a loss that is not actually mourned. The profound sincerity of the Schubert becomes apparent when compared to this gorgeous but flawed piece of art.

Morals and the arts

The "art for art's sake" movement, or l'art pour l'art, emerged in the nineteenth century. Th'eophile Gautier, who had the following view, said that if art is to be respected for its own

purpose. Consequently, it must be separated from all goals, even those of the moral life. A piece of art that preaches, aspires to elevate its audience, or deviates from the heights of unadulterated beauty to advance some social or didactic cause violates the autonomy of the aesthetic experience by exchanging intrinsic for instrumental values and forfeiting any claim to beauty it may have once held.

It is unquestionably a flaw in a piece of art when it prioritises a message above the enjoyment of its audience. Propaganda pieces, like as Mikhail Sholokhov's Quiet Flows the Don or (their literary counterpart) the socialist realism sculptures of the Soviet era sacrifice artistic integrity to political correctness, character to caricature, and drama to sermonising. On the other hand, the untruthfulness of such works is one of the things we find objectionable. The propaganda message is not a part of the aesthetic meaning but is instead extraneous to it—an intrusion from the outside world that only loses its persuasiveness when it is forced upon us in the middle of aesthetic contemplation. The lessons urged upon us are neither compelled by the story nor illustrated in the exaggerated figures and characters.

On the other hand, some pieces of art have strong moral messages wrapped up in beautiful frames. Think about the Pilgrim's Progress by John Bunyan. Here, straightforward allegory and schematic figures represent the Christian life's advocacy. However, the writing is so immediate, and it conveys the weight of words and the gravity of mood with such authenticity that the Christian message is woven into the fabric of the book and made beautiful by the words' power. Bunyan's work reveals a coherence of form and meaning that prevents us from dismissing it as just a propaganda exercise. While appreciating Pilgrim's Progress for its accuracy, we may disagree with its basic assumptions. Atheists, Jews, and Muslims may all find truth in Bunyan's account of the lived reality of Christian discipleship, which is truth to the human condition circumstances and to the soul of a person who has seen the possibility of a better world in the chaos of his own existence. Bunyan's moralising is also not offensive since it stems from experiences that were eloquently described and honestly documented.

Because moralizing distorts a work of art's essential moral worth, which rests in its capacity to broaden our horizons and regulate our sympathies towards reality as it is, moralising is disallowed in works of art. Art has its own method of stating and defending moral ideas, hence it is not ethically neutral. An artist, like Tolstoy in Anna Karenina, may challenge the restrictions of an overly stringent moral order by evoking compassion when the world withholds it. In the same way that Berg do in Lulu, an artist might give narcissism and selfishness a misleading allure by romanticizing individuals who do not merit such treatment. Numerous aesthetic flaws in art are moral flaws, such as sentimentality, insincerity, self-righteousness, and self-moralizing. And in every one of them, there is a lack of the moral sincerity that I complimented Schubert's unrivalled song cycle for in the previous part. People in democratic cultures tend to think it is arrogant to say you have superior taste than your neighbour. You are essentially denying him the right to be what he is by doing this. You prefer Leonardo, he loves Mucha; she likes Jane Austen, you like Danielle Steele; you like Bach, she likes U2; etc. There is nothing more to say as long as neither of you does damage to the other and you both say good morning over the fence since each of you exists in your own little beautiful universe.

The Shared Goal

However, as the democratic argument already indicates, things are not always that cut and dry. Because taste is so closely linked to our personal lives and moral identities, it is very disrespectful to judge another person's taste, as the democrat acknowledges. Since reason and the moral life need a community of judgement and a common notion of worth, it is part of our rational nature to seek for these things. And the need for a logical agreement extends to the appreciation of beauty.

When we consider how personal preferences affect the general populace, we learn this. This need for unanimity extends beyond the generally accepted fields of architecture and landscape design. Consider how these things may make us feel excluded or included, within or outside the suggested group, or on edge. We try to reach an understanding via comparison and conversation so that we can feel at home. Many of the garments we wear have uniform-like qualities and are intended to express and confirm our respectable membership in the community (the office). Suits, tuxedos, baseball caps, school uniforms, or possibly our support for a group of criminals (the "convict" look of black American "gangstas") might be examples of this. Others, like women's party attire, are made to highlight our uniqueness while being respectful of propriety. As I said earlier, fashion is fundamental to who we are as social creatures. It develops from and amplifies the aesthetic signals that we use to communicate our social identities to others. We can now understand why ideas like decorum and appropriateness are essential to the perception of beauty, even if these ideas cut equally across the moral and aesthetic worlds [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

The view from your window is spoiled by your neighbor's tacky mermaids and Disneyland gnomes in her garden, and her home is built in a ridiculous Costa Brava style manner, in vibrant primary colors that completely destroy the calm ambiance of the street, and so on. Her taste has now entered the public sphere and ceased to be a private concern. We start to argue the issue: you make an appeal to the town council, claiming that her home and garden are out of character for the street, that this specific area of town is designated to preserve a Georgian tranquilly, and that her home clashes with the classical façade of other structures. (In a recent British example, a home owner was inspired by art-school trends and built a shark sculpture out of plastic on his roof to create the illusion that a large fish had crashed through the roof tiles and into the attic. A protracted court dispute that the home's owner—an American who no longer resides in the property finally won as a result of objections from neighbors and the local planning official. Experience has shown us that there is plenty to debate about in this situation, and that the goal of the argument should be to reach a consensus rather than try to win by any means possible. The idea of community of the agreement in opinions that makes social life feasible and worthwhile is implicit in our perception of beauty. That is one of the reasons we have planning laws, which in the great eras of Western civilization have been extremely strict, controlling building heights (nineteenth-century Helsinki), building materials (eighteenth-century Paris), roofing materials (twentieth-century Provence), and even crenellations on buildings that face the thoroughfares.

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CHAPTER 9

SUBJECTIVITY AND ASSOCIATED REASONS

Kanchan Gupta, Assistant Professor
Department of Paramedical Sciences, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- kanchanricha63@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

This tendency is also present in the critique of poetry. When I respond with a theory of its Christian iconology and interpret the worm and the bed of crimson joy as lust and the soul respectively, you start to hear Blake's "Oh rose, thou art sick: The invisible worm that flies in the night" differently. That "dark secret love" has a new resonance, and one that is filled with ominous meaning for your own life. Such critique goes beyond just outlining the poem's meaning and suggesting that you ignore it in favour of my excellent translation. As if a translation would suffice, poetry is not a means to its meaning. I specifically seek for a shift in your view with my critical argument because I want you to read the poem differently. The case may be made for architecture, sculpture, plays, literature, and plays. It can also be made for natural items like flowers and landscapes. In every instance, we acknowledge the existence of reasoning, which aims to alter perception. Aside from that, no argument could be regarded as critical if it did not seek to alter the audience's view since it would not be an accurate reflection of its subject as an object of aesthetic evaluation.

KEYWORDS:

Beauty, Human, Reason, Subjectivity, Taste.

INTRODUCTION

Someone can counter that there isn't really a disagreement here since any consensus that is reached originates in another means, such as via emotional contamination as opposed to logic. Say that you like Brahms, and he disgusts me. You then ask me to hear your preferred music, and eventually they "work on me." Perhaps my friendship with you influences me to take extra care of you. How that occurs is a mystery to me, but if I do end up liking Brahms, it was neither a reasonable choice nor a sensible reaction. My assessment is that it is similar to the transformation toddlers go through after learning to like greens at a young age the last to enjoy them. It was not an argument that convinced them; rather, an experience that once repulsed them is now drawing them in. A change in taste does not constitute a "change of mind," in the same sense that a shift in moral principles or even beliefs would. This does not imply that there aren't other factors that might support the shift in taste. After all, a variety of factors support the child's transition from hamburgers to vegetables. According to vegans, vegetables are far healthier, may be a component of a better lifestyle, and can increase one's spirituality. However, those factors do not directly cause the change in taste; rather, they serve to justify the change, which does not occur since it is not the kind of change that might be brought about by reasoned reasoning [1], [2].

This area is in deep water. But it's worth reflecting on what really occurs when people disagree on issues of taste in aesthetics. You could ask me how I feel about Brahms' Fourth Symphony after we've been listening to it. I call it "heavy, lugubrious, oily, and gross." You

play me the piano's opening theme from the first movement. "Listen," you command. I hear how the theme moves down one ladder of thirds and up another when you flip the sixths so that they become thirds. You demonstrate for me how the third progressions are also used to organise the harmonies and how the subsequent themes develop from the same melodic and harmonic units that produce the opening melody. After hearing this happening for a while, everything starts out as a concentrated seed of musical material, and all of a sudden, it all sounds right to me. The heaviness and oiliness vanish in an instant, and in their place, I hear the beginning of the leaf and flower of a beautiful plant. Or consider this Whistler "Nocturne" as another example. You find it dull, maybe (in keeping with a well-known Ruskin assessment) despicable in its emphasis on transient results, and in its failure to explore the deeper truths. You claim that this artwork obscures the hardships and struggles of contemporary life by misrepresenting what is really labour and exploitation as charm and evocation. All of this is encapsulated in the title, "Nocturne in grey and silver," which makes it seem as if you could ignore the human energy that went into creating it and only assess the outcome as a play of lit hues [3], [4].

You may view it that way, I reply. However, the picture is more than simply an aesthetic impression; its very murky appearance shows how much the planet has been darkened by humans and their endeavours. Here, work and its exploitation are not denied; rather, an effort is made to discern the extent of man's violation of nature in this period of darkness. The term really draws our attention to the fact that a "nocturne" is a modern human invention, unheard of prior to the industrial revolution and the retreat of the property-owning classes into their drawing rooms to be entertained by willowy aesthetes at the piano. Silver and grey are the hues associated with widowhood, and the painting's mood is one of sorrowful acceptance that, as a result of human production, the planet will henceforth have an artificial gloss. To support this opinion, I shall use the colour hues, both the conspicuous forms on the painting and the spots of light on it are examples of man-made objects.

To some extent, we may decide how the modern industrial world should be seen. We may find situations of this kind of aspect shift that are simpler and logically more apparent, such as the well-known duck-rabbit that Wittgenstein described. There may be a correct and incorrect way to see these figures, and I can help you see a rabbit when you should see a duck by using logic. Such instances are not unusual (let's say the image is on a bag of rabbit food). On the other hand, there are decisions to be made in every perspective painting about the size to give each figure and the separation between the different grounds. And the justification will be the same as what I provided in relation to the Whistler: it will be based on the significance of the image and how you should see it if the significance is, in a sense, correctly to live it. This may be verified by thinking about how you would respond to queries like: Is the Grand Canyon magnificent or corny? Is Bambi sentimental or corny? Madame Bovary: sad or inhumane? The Magic Flute: exquisite or childish? These are valid concerns that are also highly contested. However, arguing against them entails presenting an experience and arguing that it is acceptable or correct.

Looking for objectivity

Let's assume that you agree, in broad strokes, with what I just said, namely that there is a kind of reasoning that has aesthetic judgement as its purpose and that this judgement is correlated with the maker's experience. You may still wonder whether this line of thinking is objective

in the sense that it is founded on and appeals to criteria that persuade all reasonable creatures. In fact, there are significant factors that are the opposite. First, societies have wider cultural contexts that taste is anchored in are not all-encompassing. The whole purpose of the idea of culture is to identify the key distinctions between the various ways that individuals live their lives and the satisfactions they get from them. Consider the ragas of Indian classical music. They are a part of a lengthy history of listening to and performing them, a tradition that is reliant on the discipline brought on by religious rites and a pious way of life. Conventions, references, and applications reverberate in the thoughts and ears of individuals who play and like this music, thus it is impossible to distinguish between a good and a terrible performance using criteria that might also be applied to a Mozart symphony or a jazz composition [5], [6].

DISCUSSION

There is no logical relationship between the premises and conclusion. In contrast to being unable to reject an accurate scientific conclusion, I am always free to reject a critical argument or a strong moral argument. Last but not least, we must understand that every effort to establish objective criteria endangers the same endeavour that it is meant to appraise. Since innovation and questioning orthodoxies are vital, rules and precepts should be disregarded. There is freedom inherent in the quest of beauty, whether it is the simple beauty of ordinary situations or the more complex beauties of art.

What might we say in response to such arguments? First, it's crucial to understand that cultural diversity does not mean the lack of universal principles that apply to all cultures. It also doesn't suggest that such universals, if they exist, are not a part of human nature or that they don't fundamentally serve our rational goals. All of these concepts—symmetry and order, proportion, closure, convention, harmony, as well as novelty and excitement—seem to have a lasting effect on the human mind. Of course, all of those terms are imprecise and vague, and you can argue that they are also prone to break down along the lines that separate one culture from another in the human race. Early medievals considered the fourth to be harmonic and the third to be discordant; for us, it is quite the opposite. For the Greeks, harmony was the relationship between succeeding sounds in a song rather than the consonance of notes played at the same time.so on.

Universality and objectivity

But that gets me to a more significant insight, which is that objectivity and universality fall apart when it comes to aesthetic judgements. The pursuit of objectivity in science and morality is looking for findings that are accepted by all people, findings that each and every sensible creature must acknowledge this. The quest for objectivity in the assessment of beauty is for genuine and elevated human experiences forms in which human existence may blossom in accordance with its inner need and come to the type of fullness that we see in the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, in Parsifal, or in Hamlet [5], [6].

Criticism doesn't want to convince you that you should enjoy Hamlet, for instance; rather, it wants to expose the play's conception of human existence and the forms of belonging that it supports and convince you of their worth. It does not assert that this interpretation of human existence is open to everyone. This is not to say that no cross-cultural parallels may be made; for instance, it is conceivable and has been done to compare a play like Hamlet to a puppet show by Chikamatsu. The issue of whether Beaumarchais' Le Mariage de Figaro is a deeper

study of human sexuality than Hokaibo is fully valid given the fact that there are works of Japanese theatre that both satirise human existence (the Kabuki comedy Hokaibo, for example) and works that exalt it. The argument that aesthetic judgements are only based on persuasive arguments just reiterates the idea that aesthetic evaluations are grounded in subjective experience. The assessment of colours is similar. And isn't the fact that red things are red and blue things are blue not an objective reality?

Norms and creativity

However, the last criticism is more significant. There could be standards of taste, but they are not a guarantee of beauty, and often the beauty of a piece of art lies exactly in breaking them. Bach's Forty-Eight demonstrate every fugal compositional norm, but they do so by creatively abiding by them and demonstrating how they may be utilised as a springboard for ascending to a greater plane of freedom. Simply following them would be boring, much as all the exercises we do to start our counterpoint lessons. Similar to this, there may be structures, like the Parthenon, that we perceive to be totally rule-governed, yet this does not account for their perfection. The calm and sturdiness of the size, proportions, and intricacy of the Parthenon result from the extra creative something that starts when rule-following ends. As in Michelangelo's Laurentian library, there are once more beauty that result from the blatant disregard for the law. It should be clear that nature does not "follow rules" or "defy rules." However, there are harmonies, proportions, symmetries, and as well as the unattractive absence of such things. Burke's distinction between the sublime and the beautiful was consequently quickly embraced by eighteenth-century intellectuals who desired to use natural beauty as their prototype of the object of taste [7], [8].

Similar distinctions could be made between works of art that appeal to us because of the harmony, order, and rule-governed perfection they exhibit, such as Bach's fugues, Bellini's Holy Virgins, or Verlaine's lyrics, and those that appeal to us instead by upsetting our routines, breaking free from convention, and defying the conventions to which they belong, such as King Lear or Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony. But as soon as we notice this difference, we see that there is no way to establish a "standard of taste" by referring to the rules, even in the most structured and rule-governed work. In a Bach fugue or a Virgin by Bellini, the interest is not in the rules themselves but in how they are used. When it is pointed out that following the norms is not required nor sufficient for beauty, those who look to them as a standard expose themselves up to criticism. Because if it were sufficient, we might once again learn taste from others, and if it were essential, uniqueness would stop being a sign of success.

The Accepted Aesthetics

So where do we seek for criteria when evaluating beauty? Or will our efforts be in vain? Hume attempted to reframe the debate in a well-known article by stating, basically, that taste is a sort of choice and that this preference is the foundation of the evaluation of beauty, not its end. Therefore, in order to fix the standard, we must identify the trustworthy judge, whose preferences and judgement serve as the finest benchmarks which guide? This might lead to a vicious cycle: beauty is what the trustworthy critic sees, and the trustworthy critic is the one who recognises beauty. But we should expect such a circle since, in Hume's words, "gilding or staining it with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment" is what makes anything beautiful. If there is a standard, it is not based on the characteristics of the thing being judged

but rather on the judge's feelings. Therefore, Hume advises that we put an end to the pointless debate about beauty and instead focus on the traits of a critic we should value, such as delicacy and judgement.

However, this invites us to question why it should be those traits that we appreciate. Even if it would have appeared natural in Hume's day in Scotland to respect subtlety and insight, it does not seem so in our day and age, when facetiousness and stupidity, which the austere sages of the Enlightenment unjustly left out, are vying for and getting their due share of attention. Is this where we should stop talking about this? I disagree. Hume's position contends that character counts since taste judgments reflect the maker's personality. In Hume's view, the attributes of a good critic indicate to values that are essential for good behavior in life as a whole, not merely for the evaluation of aesthetic qualities. When it comes down to it, our assessments of beauty are just as objective as our assessments of virtue and vice. Therefore, beauty has a similar foundation to goodness in the grand scheme of things. It talks to us about human fulfilment in a similar way that virtue communicates to us—not about things we desire, but about things we should want because they are necessary for human nature. At least, that is my opinion, which I will attempt to defend in the next two chapters.

However, this invites us to question why it should be those traits that we appreciate. Even if it would have appeared natural in Hume's day in Scotland to respect subtlety and insight, it does not seem so in our day and age, when facetiousness and stupidity, which the austere sages of the Enlightenment unjustly left out, are vying for and getting their due share of attention. Is this where we should stop talking about this? I disagree. Hume's position contends that character counts since taste judgements reflect the maker's personality. In Hume's view, the attributes of a good critic indicate to values that are essential for good behaviour in life as a whole, not merely for the evaluation of aesthetic qualities. When it comes down to it, our assessments of beauty are just as objective as our assessments of virtue and vice. Therefore, beauty has a similar foundation to goodness in the grand scheme of things. It talks to us about human satisfaction in a similar way that virtue communicates to us—not about things we desire, but about things we should want because they are necessary for human nature. At least, that is my opinion, which I will attempt to defend in the next two chapters. I have covered four different types of beauty: artistic beauty as a form of meaning and an object of taste; human beauty as an object of desire; natural beauty as an object of contemplation; common beauty as an object of practical reason. In this chapter, I want to think about how the first sort of beauty interacts with the last in order to take the research to a new level. I'll inquire as to how beauty, as a thing of want, may be portrayed in works of art as something to ponder. We shall learn more about the idea of uniqueness from this argument, as well as about sexual desire and the aesthetic endeavour, and we will be given fresh justifications for believing that there is, in fact, a standard of taste [9], [10].

Individuality

Only humans among animals may express their uniqueness via their looks. The mouth that talks, the eyes that stare, and the flushed skin are all physical manifestations of freedom, character, and judgement that express the individuality of the self-inside. The excellent portraitist will make sure that these moments of peak body expression disclose not merely the fleeting thoughts of the subject, but also their long-term ambitions, moral position, and self-

concept. The eyes scan the scene, but they only focus on little details. They have no soul, no look that ponders, bothers, or enthralls; everything is fixed in the calm of beings who are too impersonal to claim existence for themselves. The nereids in The Triumph of Venus, for instance, are not independent from the goddess; rather, they are all examples of the same universal, which is void of expression since, unlike people, universals have nothing unique to express.

Divine and natural beauty

It is tempting to contrast the work with its well-known forerunner, The Birth of Venus. Who cares if Botticelli's Venus is an anatomically incorrect caricature, kept together by neither skeletal support nor muscle tension, a helpless appendage to the face that gazes so longingly beyond the spectator rather than at him? This is a face that people have fantasised about, yearned for, and remembered. It is the face of an idealised lady, therefore it is not the face of any mortal, yet it is nonetheless a face that both defines and mystifies people. Not that Botticelli's Venus should be seen as sensuous; rather, it is an early Renaissance Venus who flies in celestial realms and is above the grasp of carnal desires. This lady, who was summoned by want, is beyond the realm of desire as we know it, which is why the picture is so menacing. With Titian's reclining Venuses, we are no longer in the celestial world but firmly on earth, although a secure and passionate home earth. The face of a naked Titian lady is that of a unique woman who has claimed her surroundings and is unmistakably at home there.

Indulging in a life that is greater, deeper, and more enigmatic than the present instant alone, she lies back amid her curtains with complete assurance of her own claim to them. She shows us her body, but she doesn't display it to us since she typically isn't aware that anybody is seeing her, with the possible exception of a puppy or a cupid whose unflappable calmness just emphasises how voyeurs are unable to disturb her serenity of mind, which extends to her tranquilly of body. She does not have any reason to be embarrassed or excited. She is in harmony with her physique, and this harmony can be seen in her face. As Rembrandt depicts Susannah and the Elders so well, sexual guilt alters the female body's curves and is seen in both the face and the limb. Place this next to the Titian and you'll observe right away that the body in the Titian's image is simply at rest in its freedom, a person disclosed in her flesh, neither on offer nor withdrawn. The beauty of the artwork and the beauty of the lady it depicts are, in a strange manner, not two beauties, but rather one.

Sexy Artwork

The extent to which the nude, in our history, is not naked but unclothed has been discussed by Anne Hollander. According to her, the nude is a body that has been defined by the forms and materials of its usual covering. In Titian, the body is at rest as it would be if it were concealed by an imperceptible layer of clothing, shielding it from our view. We don't separate it from the face or the personality any more than we would separate a fully clothed woman's body. And by depicting the corpse in this manner, Titian gets rid of its sinister essence and uncanny appearance. If the face were swapped out with a pre-made stereotype similar to the ones employed by Boucher, the impact would disappear. According to Boucher, the purpose of the face is to point to the body. It's not quite the other way around in Titian's work; the entire feminine form's light, softness, and promise, as well as the flesh tones, all contribute to the painting's emotional content. In contrast, Titian's visage maintains watch

over this shape, subtly claiming possession and withdrawing it from our grasp. Venus is not being shown to us as a potential object of our own desire; this is erotic art, not concupiscent art.

She is being kept from us by being incorporated into the personality that calmly gazes out of those eyes and is preoccupied with its own wishes and concerns. The boulevardienne of nineteenth-century Paris was famously portrayed by Manet in the position of a Titian Venus, but his goal was not to depict her body as a sexual object but rather to expose a different and morestern kind of subjectivity. Manet's Olympia's hand on the thigh is not the hand Titian depicts, trained in tender caresses and resting with a fairy touch; rather, it is a rough, harsh hand that trades with money, grips far more easily than it strokes, and is employed to ward off cheaters, nerds, and perverts. The knowing expression has its own method of expressing that this body is entirely mine even while it neither provides nor withholds the body. Olympia looks at the audience with an astute, non-erotic appraisal that is everything but, and the large bouquet that the servant obediently offers illustrates how pointless it is to approach such a lady with amorous gestures. This artwork captures an intense moment of individualization that is connected, if ironically, to the time in the Titian Venus. This woman's body is shown to us via the prism of her own consciousness. And her rugged reclining shape makes the link between self-identity and self-awareness more clear [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

The reclining Venus is a departure from ancient depictions of the goddess, which never showed the goddess in a horizontal posture, as noted by Kenneth Clark in his well-known study of the nude. The body is shown in a reclining, naked position, not as a statue to be revered but as a woman to be desired. Even in the Venus of Urbino, the most seductive of Titian's female nudes, the woman calls our attention to her face, indicating that her body is only available to the lover who can honestly meet her gaze in the same manner that the woman herself is. The body is off limits to everyone else because it is the private possession of the gaze that emanates from it; to borrow the terminology from Chapter 2, it is not a body but an embodiment. The face de-humanises the body, claims it as its own in the name of freedom, and declares every envious gaze to be a sin. The Titian nude neither provokes nor excites, but rather maintains a cool composure—the composure of someone whose thoughts and wants are hers, not ours. In this regard, it's intriguing to contrast Titian's reclined Venuses with Francois Boucher's nude paintings from the Louis XV period in Paris. The faces of Boucher's nudes do not distinguish them. In actuality, they all share a single face, which is really just a collection of facial features. The oval contours filled with flushing cheeks that swell like sails in a summer breeze, the clear eyes under lowered lashes, and the lips slightly apart as though anticipating a kiss—all such features, brilliantly displayed from every angle and in every light, carry a single meaning, which is that of sexual appetite.

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CHAPTER 10

AN OVERVIEW ON THE MORAL QUESTION

Anuradha Pawar, Assistant Professor
Department of Pharmacy, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- anumayak@yahoo.co.in

ABSTRACT:

It is challenging to navigate the moral minefield that is soft pornography. It is difficult to disapprove of page three in the current climate, where the most egregious explicit images are accessible at the touch of a keyboard, hard core pornography is protected as "free speech" by the US Supreme Court, and human sexuality is discussed as though modesty, decency, and shame were nothing more than oppressive illusions. What damage does it cause? Such is the natural reaction, and you can understand it when it is brought on by censorious feminists. But we shouldn't fool ourselves, as some commentators do, into assuming that the interest in page three is motivated by a need for beauty, a female ideal, or some other higher value than what is presented in the text. The girl on page three, on the other hand, stands out for being genuine and being shown as a sexual object. We should not think that she competes for aesthetic appeal, not even for the attention focused on Boucher's Blonde Odalisque, even if the attitude towards her is subdued and even if she serves some compensatory purpose in a life devoid of actual sexual satisfaction. While not provoking our thoughts with the knowledge that this woman is real, ready, and available the knowledge that causes the jump from imagination to fantasy and from the aesthetic appreciation of female beauty to the desire to embrace the particular instance of it. Boucher's canvas straddles the line between the aesthetic and the sexual behaviour.

KEYWORDS:

Attitude, Censorious, Decency, Modesty, Shame.

INTRODUCTION

I believe that the debate of Titian's Venus demonstrates why pornography is not considered art, why it is incapable of expressing beauty in and of itself, and why it degrades the beauty of the subjects it depicts. The pornographic picture is like a magic wand that disenchants subjects and destroys the wellspring of their beauty by turning them into objects and persons into things. People hide behind their bodies as a result of it, acting like puppets with concealed strings. Ever Since Descartes's Cogito, the concept of the self as an inner homunculus has influenced how we see what it means to be a human. The Cartesian image tempts us to think that we spend our whole lives dragging an animal behind us and forcing it to perform what we want until, at last, it gives out and passes away. My body is an object and I am a subject: I am I, it is it. As a result, my body is reduced to a thing among things, and the only way to save it is to claim ownership of it and declare that my body is not just any item but one that I own. And that is exactly how the pornographic picture depicts the relationship between the soul and the body [1], [2].

However, there is another and better way to look at things, and it explains a lot of the traditional morality that many people today claim to find so perplexing. According to this

viewpoint, my body is not my property but rather—to use religious terminology—my incarnation. My body is a subject, just as I am; it is not an object. Like I don't own myself, I don't own this either. What is done to my body is also done to me since I am inextricably linked to it. And there are methods of handling it that lead me to think and feel in ways that I wouldn't ordinarily think or feel, lose my moral compass, harden or lose compassion for others, stop making judgements, or be governed by values and beliefs. When this occurs, not only do I suffer; so do all others who depend on me or have a relationship with me. Because I harmed the foundation upon which relationships are created [3], [4].

There was some validity to the traditional morality that said selling one's body is incompatible with giving oneself. Sexual emotion is not a state that can be activated or deactivated at whim rather, it is a gift from one self to another and, at its peak, a brilliant revelation of who you are. Treating it like a thing that can be purchased and sold like any other would be detrimental to both the current and the future of the other. The chastisement against prostitution, there was more than just puritanical intolerance; there was also an understanding of a basic truth—namely, that by selling your body for money, you harden your soul since you are not two separate beings. And the same is true of pornography as it is of prostitution. It is a degradation of human beauty rather than an homage to it.

Eros's and beauty

I chose to concentrate on painting in this chapter in order to draw a distinction between erotic art and sexual imagination. My goal was to thoroughly demonstrate how the traditional Platonic view—is the guiding principle of beauty in all its forms misrepresents both the nature of aesthetic appeal and the kind of moral teaching that genuine art is capable of achieving. Setting human existence, including sexes, at a distance that allows one to see it without distaste or voyeurism is what makes anything beautiful. Beauty may persist when distance is lost and the imagination is subsumed by fantasy, but it will be ruined beauty that has been severed from the owner's unique identity. It now has a price and has lost its worth [5], [6].

The actual beauty of the human form cannot be captured by art that "objectifies" the body by separating it from the context of moral connections. Human beauty is a property of our embodiment. It desecrates itself by defiling the beauty of others. The contrast between sexual art and pornography demonstrates how taste is founded in broader choices, and how these tastes express and foster elements of our own moral character. The argument against pornography is the argument against the desire it serves the interest in seeing individuals objectified as objects, reduced to their bodies, and rendered disgusting. Many individuals share this fascination, yet it is an interest at odds with our humanity. By negatively evaluating this desire, I leave the realm of aesthetic evaluation and enter the realm of sexual virtue and vice. Therefore, pornography provides a striking example of the last chapter's conclusion touched on the thesis. The critic's qualities, which are tested and proven in the moral life, serve as the benchmark for taste.

Escaping from Beauty

In the first chapter, I made a distinction between two concepts of beauty—one signifying aesthetic achievement and the other a particular kind of it, the kind in which we are delighted by and at one with the feature of the universe that is being shown. I have discussed aesthetic

items throughout this book that are successful without necessarily being beautiful in this idealising sense, either because they are too commonplace, like clothing, or because they draw our attention by upsetting us, like Zola's books or Berg's operas. However, beauty is there in both Zola and Berg, as shown in the exquisite start of La Terre with the child Francoise and her cow or the equally lovely melody that Berg's orchestra uses to lament Lulu. In separate ways, Zola and Berg serve as a reminder that true beauty may be discovered in even the vilest, agonising, and decaying things. Our capacity to speak the truth about our circumstances with restrained language and tender melodies provides some degree of release from them. The most significant piece of English literature from the 20th century, T. The contemporary metropolis is described as a lifeless desert in S. Eliot's The Waste Land, yet it does so with imagery and allusions that support what the city rejects. The ultimate refutation of this claim comes from our mere capacity to make it. Because art suggests another way of being, and Eliot's poetry makes this alternative way accessible, we can understand the emptiness of contemporary existence.

DISCUSSION

The Waste Land follows in the literary traditions of James' The Golden Bowl, Flaubert's Madame Bovary, and Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal. As a result of our reaction to it, life in its most basic forms is justified. It portrays what is filthy and nasty in terms that are so resonant of the contrary, so rich with the potential to feel, sympathies, and comprehend. This' redemption via art' only happens when the artist pursues beauty in a limited sense. The paradox of fin-de-siècle culture was that it maintained its belief in beauty while emphasising all the grounds to question its attainability outside of the field of art [7], [8].

Since then, art has changed and has refused to give human existence anything like a vision of salvation. Baudelaire-style art soars above the earth under its gaze like an angel. It does not escape the sight of human foolishness, cruelty, and decay, but rather it welcomes us to another world by saying that "all there is order and beauty: | LuXe, calm, and voluptuousness." the present in order to match the ugliness of the objects it depicts with its own ugliness, art cultivates a transgressive stance. It is devalued as something that is too saccharine, too escapist, and too far from reality to merit our undivided attention. The quest of beauty is sometimes seen as a retreat from the essential mission of creative production, which is to challenge comfy illusions and present reality as it is. Qualities that formerly marked aesthetic failure are now touted as indicators of success. Arthur Danto has even claimed that the ideal of beauty is deceiving and in some ways at odds with the purpose of contemporary art. This shift in perspective might be seen in part as an acknowledgment of the ambiguous character of the word "beauty." However, it also entails a rejection of beauty in its purest meaning, a proclamation that the traditional invocations of family, peace, love, and satisfaction are false, and a declaration that art must henceforth focus on the painful reality of our position.

The contemporary apology

A certain interpretation of contemporary art and its development provides support for the rejection of beauty. Many critics of today assert that a piece of art justifies itself by identifying itself as a guest from the future. The purpose of art is to shock us into awareness of our historical position and to serve as a constant reminder that the only thing that is constant in human nature is change. Because of this, art historians frequently bring up Salon

Art from the middle of the nineteenth century, which was not art at all because it was created using a limited set of gestures, as well as the initial opposition Manet faced when attempting to establish himself as "le peintre de la vie moderne." They serve as a reminder of the tremendous power that Manet's iconoclasm unleashed into the world as well as the series of shocks that followed.

As the experiments continued one at a time, figurative painting eventually came to be considered obsolete by many Historians of music remind us of the last symphony and late quartets of Beethoven, in which the constraints of form seem to be burst asunder by a titanic power; they dwell on the case of Tristan und Isolde, whose shifting chromatic harmonies seem to stretch tonality to the very limit, and on the music of Stravinsky, Bartok and Schoenberg—music which at first shocked the world, and which was justified in terms used to justify the abolition of figurative painting. According to historians, the usage of the ancient language had reached its end and any further use would simply produce clichés. The new terminology was created to situate music in its historical context and to acknowledge the present as something apart from that the past, a brand-new experience that we can only fully appreciate by conceptualizing it as "other" from what has come before. However, as soon as we grasp the present, we see it has passed and is no longer relevant.

Orthodoxy and custom

The same narrative of art at odds with its history and obliged to defy clichés and go on a road of transgression can be seen in both literature and architecture. The tale is nonetheless fed a biased diet of examples. While Rothko, de Kooning, and Pollock were working on their (in my opinion, excessively repetitious) experiments', Edward Hopper was creating figurative works that demonstrated his ability to capture contemporary American life in paint, much like Manet had done with nineteenth-century Paris. Sibelius was starting his famous series of tonal symphonies at the same time that Schoenberg was abandoning tonality in favour of the twelve-tone serial technique. Janacek was also working on Katya Kabanova at the same time.

In addition, there is a second, more accurate history of modern art, which is the narrative provided by the greatest modernists themselves. The history was narrated by T. S. Eliot, by Ezra Pound in the Cantos, by Schoenberg in Moses und Aron and his critical works, by Pfitzner in Palestrina, and by S. Eliot in his essays and Four Quartets. And in situations when the creative history has made little to no preparation, it views the objective of the contemporary artist as a recapturing of tradition rather than a rupture with it. This history views the present as the location we have arrived at and whose character must be understood in terms of a continuum, rather than the present as having a past. If the shapes and styles are contemporary of art must be recreated, but this is done to revive rather than reject the ancient heritage. The goal of contemporary art is to express realities that have never been seen before and are particularly difficult to comprehend. But this is impossible unless we use the spiritual capital of our culture to illuminate the present and reveal it for what it really is. Eliot and his contemporaries believed that no really contemporary art could exist without also attempting to find orthodoxy by placing it in connection to the guarantees of an ongoing tradition, to accurately represent the essence of the contemporary experience.

You could find the end product opaque, incomprehensible, or even ugly—as many do in Schoenberg's case. But it is most definitely not the goal. Schoenberg, like Eliot, aimed to revive the tradition—not to obliterate it, but to revive it as a means of restoring the rule of

beauty over banality. The idea that Schoenberg's Erwartung's narrow lines have more true melody than its thick textures is not crazy a Symphony by Vaughan Williams. True, this little melodrama has a terrifying vibe that is quite different from the comforting charms of a Schubert tune. However, Schoenberg's style can be interpreted as an effort to both comprehend the nightmare and contain it—to confine it in a musical form that gives meaning and beauty to catastrophe, much like Aeschylus did with the vengeful furies, Shakespeare, and Verdi did with the horrifying death of Desdemona [9], [10].

The modernists worried that the aesthetic pursuit would become hollow, repetitive, mechanistic, and cliché-filled as it detached from the entire creative goal. Eliot, Matisse, and Schoenberg set out to defend an imperiled aesthetic ideal against the taints of popular culture because it was self-evident to them that this was occurring all around them. This ideal had linked the need for beauty with the want to dedicate human existence and give it meaning beyond this world. In other words, the modernists sought to reconnect the creative endeavour with its underlying spiritual purpose. Modernism was not intended to be a transgression but rather a recovery: a difficult journey back to a fought-for legacy of meaning, in which beauty would once again be revered as the living emblem of transcendent principles. The intentionally "transgressive" and "challenging" art of today, which exemplifies a flight from beauty rather than the opposite, does not reflect this a desire to get it back.

The humorous opera Die Entfuehrung aus dem Serail, which relates the tale of Konstanze, a shipwrecked woman who was stolen from her fiancé Belmonte and forced to serve in the harem of the Pasha Selim, is one of Mozart's most lovable compositions. Following many plots, Belmonte succeeds in rescuing her with the Pasha's compassion, who respects Konstanze's virginity by refusing to take her by force. The dubious storyline allows Mozart to express his Enlightenment idea that generosity is a virtue that exists everywhere, whether it is in the Christian realm of the enlightened Joseph II (who was barely a Christian) or in the Muslim empire of the Turks. The Pasha's compassion is motivated by the steadfast love of Belmonte and Konstanze. Even though Mozart's pure vision has no historical support, his conviction in the truth of unselfish love is universally expressed and supported by the music. Die Entfu hrung promotes a moral principle, and its songs both reflect the beauty of that principle and persuade the listener to accept it.

Die Entfu'hrung, performed in 2004 at the Comic Opera Producer Calixto Bieito of Berlin made the decision to situate the opera in a Berlin brothel, with Selim serving as the pimp and Konstanze serving as one of the prostitutes. Every justification for violence, whether or not there was a sexual climax, was used on stage, even when there was the most sensitive music. A prostitute is at one point murdered after being brutally tormented and having her nipples removed in a realistic manner with blood. The dramatically staged scenarios of murder and narcissistic behaviour overpower the lyrics and music's messages of love and compassion.

Things all over the stage

That is an illustration of a phenomena that permeates every facet of modern civilization. Artists, directors, musicians, and other people involved in the arts are not only running away from beauty. There is a drive to deface beauty by deeds like iconoclasm in the arts. Wherever beauty is waiting for us, the desire to anticipate it may step in and prevent its silent, little voice from being heard in the background of degradation. Because beauty puts a claim on us, it is a reminder to put aside our selfishness and have appreciation for all around us. Claggart's

soliloquy in Britten's Billy Budd, in which he rails against beauty for shedding light on his own moral worthlessness, and Iago of Cassio's line, "He hath a daily beauty in his life | Which makes me ugly."

By using the phrase "desecration," I am alluding to examination of the holy. In the world of consecrated things, to desecrate is to ruin anything that could otherwise be set aside. We have the power to profane a house of worship, a mosque, a cemetery, a tomb, as well as a holy object, a sacred text, or a sacred ritual. Insofar as these things have (as they do) a hint of some initial "apartness," we may likewise defile a corpse, a prized object, or even a live person. In all faiths, there is a fundamental component of sacrilege dread. In fact, the original meaning of the term religion was a cult or ritual intended to prevent the profanation of a holy site.

We cannot live without the desire for beauty and yet be happy as individuals. It is a yearning brought on by our metaphysical state as free people looking for our place in a communal and open society. We may walk this world feeling misunderstood, bitter, and alienated. Alternately, we may find our place here and unwind in peace with everyone else and ourselves. The second route is guided by the experience of beauty, which informs us that we belong in the world and that it is already structured in a way that makes sense for living creatures like ourselves. However, and this is yet another lesson from the early modernists, creatures like us can only really feel at home in the world by accepting our 'fallen' state, as Eliot did in The Waste Land. The experience of beauty thus also makes sense.

We are taken beyond this world to a "kingdom of ends," where our eternal yearnings and quest for perfection are at last satisfied. If not the truth of beauty, then at least a distant sight of it may be found in Zola's violent depictions of thwarted and malevolent existence, which are captured in the rhythm of the text and the invocations of quiet among the fruitless longings which fill his works push the characters towards their objectives. Like Baudelaire and Flaubert before him, Zola also wrote about realism as a sort of letdown to the ideal. The topic is obscene, but it is so by nature and not because the author deliberately desecrates the scarce few natural beauties he discovers. A new direction has been taken by the art of degradation, and since it is at the core of the postmodern experience, it is one that we should attempt to comprehend [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

Therefore, as both Plato and Kant observed, the appreciation of beauty is proximate to the religious mindset, emerging from a modest awareness of putting up with flaws while striving for the fullest degree of oneness with the transcendental. Any of the great landscape painters, such as Poussin, Guardi, Turner, Corot, and Cezanne, honoured and portrayed the notion of beauty in their works. These artists do not ignore misery or the immensity and danger of the cosmos, a part of which we inhabit such a little space. Not at all. The light on their slopes is disappearing, and the walls of their homes are patched and deteriorating like the stucco on the towns of Guardi, as shown by landscape artists. However, their pictures indicate the delight that is beginning to manifest in disintegration and to the eternal that is suggested by the fleeting.

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CHAPTER 11

UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF ETHICAL INQUIRY

Neha Anand, Assistant Professor
College of Engineering, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- nehaanand002@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

It is challenging to navigate the moral minefield that is soft pornography. It is difficult to disapprove of page three in the current climate, where the most egregious explicit images are accessible at the touch of a keyboard, hard core pornography is protected as "free speech" by the US Supreme Court, and human sexuality is discussed as though modesty, decency, and shame were nothing more than oppressive illusions. What damage does it cause? Such is the natural reaction, and you can understand it when it is brought on by censorious feminists. But we shouldn't fool ourselves, as some commentators do, into assuming that the interest in page three is motivated by a need for beauty, a female ideal, or some other higher value than what is presented in the text. The girl on page three, on the other hand, stands out for being genuine and being shown as a sexual object. We should not think that she competes for aesthetic appeal, not even for the attention focused on Boucher's Blonde Odalisque, even if the attitude towards her is subdued and even if she serves some compensatory purpose in a life devoid of actual sexual satisfaction

KEYWORDS:

Art, Beauty, Body, Human, Worldwide Concern.

INTRODUCTION

While not provoking our thoughts with the knowledge that this woman is real, ready, and available the knowledge that causes the jump from imagination to fantasy and from the aesthetic appreciation of female beauty to the desire to embrace the particular instance of it Boucher's canvas straddles the line between the aesthetic and the sexual. I believe that the debate of Titian's Venus demonstrates why pornography is not considered art, why it is incapable of expressing beauty in and of itself, and why it degrades the beauty of the subjects it depicts. The pornographic picture is like a magic wand that disenchants subjects and destroys the wellspring of their beauty by turning them into objects and persons into things. People hide behind their bodies as a result of it, acting like puppets with concealed strings. Ever Since Descartes's Cogito, the concept of the self as an inner homunculus has influenced how we see what it means to be a human. The Cartesian image tempts us to think that we spend our whole lives dragging an animal behind us and forcing it to perform what we want until, at last, it gives out and passes away. My body is an object and I am a subject: I am I, it is it. As a result, my body is reduced to a thing among things, and the only way to save it is to claim ownership of it and declare that my body is not just any item but one that I own. And that is exactly how the pornographic picture depicts the relationship between the soul and the body [1], [2].

However, there is another and better way to look at things, and it explains a lot of the traditional morality that many people today claim to find so perplexing. According to this

viewpoint, my body is not my property but rather to use religious terminology my incarnation. My body is a subject, just as I am; it is not an object. Like I don't own myself, I don't own this either. What is done to my body is also done to me since I am inextricably linked to it. And there are methods of handling it that lead me to think and feel in ways that I wouldn't ordinarily think or feel, lose my moral compass, harden or lose compassion for others, stop making judgements, or be governed by values and beliefs. When this occurs, not only do I suffer; so do all others who depend on me or have a relationship with me. Because I harmed the foundation upon which relationships are created.

There was some validity to the traditional morality that said selling one's body is incompatible with giving oneself. Sexual emotion is not a state that can be activated or deactivated at whim; rather, it is a gift from one self to another and, at its peak, a brilliant revelation of who you are. Treating it like a thing that can be purchased and sold like any other would be detrimental to both the current and the future of the other. The chastisement against prostitution, there was more than just puritanical intolerance; there was also an understanding of a basic truth—namely, that by selling your body for money, you harden your soul since you are not two separate beings. And the same is true of pornography as it is of prostitution. It is a degradation of human beauty rather than an homage to it [3], [4].

The actual beauty of the human form cannot be captured by art that "objectifies" the body by separating it from the context of moral connections. Human beauty is a property of our embodiment. It desecrates itself by defiling the beauty of others. The contrast between sexual art and pornography demonstrates how taste is founded in broader choices, and how these tastes express and foster elements of our own moral character. The argument against pornography is the argument against the desire it serves—the interest in seeing individuals objectified as objects, reduced to their bodies, and rendered disgusting. Many individuals share this fascination, yet it is an interest at odds with our humanity. By negatively evaluating this desire, I leave the realm of aesthetic evaluation and enter the realm of sexual virtue and vice. Therefore, pornography provides a striking example of the last chapter's conclusion touched on the thesis. The critic's qualities, which are tested and proven in the moral life, serve as the benchmark for taste [5], [6].

In the first chapter, I made a distinction between two concepts of beauty—one signifying aesthetic achievement and the other a particular kind of it, the kind in which we are delighted by and at one with the feature of the universe that is being shown. I have discussed aesthetic items throughout this book that are successful without necessarily being beautiful in this idealising sense, either because they are too commonplace, like clothing, or because they draw our attention by upsetting us, like Zola's books or Berg's operas. However, beauty is there in both Zola and Berg, as shown in the exquisite start of La Terre with the child Francoise and her cow or the equally lovely melody that Berg's orchestra uses to lament Lulu. In separate ways, Zola and Berg serve as a reminder that true beauty may be discovered in even the vilest, agonising, and decaying things.

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make it. Because art suggests another way of being, and Eliot's poetry makes this alternative way accessible, we can understand the emptiness of contemporary existence.

DISCUSSION

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terminology was created to situate music in its historical context and to acknowledge the present as something apart from that the past, a brand-new experience that we can only fully appreciate by conceptualizing it as "other" from what has come before. However, as soon as we grasp the present, we see it has passed and is no longer relevant.

The same narrative of art at odds with its history and obliged to defy clichés and go on a road of transgression can be seen in both literature and architecture. The tale is nonetheless fed a biassed diet of examples. While Rothko, de Kooning, and Pollock were working on their (in my opinion, excessively repetitious) experiments', Edward Hopper was creating figurative works that demonstrated his ability to capture contemporary American life in paint, much like Manet had done with nineteenth-century Paris. Sibelius was starting his famous series of tonal symphonies at the same time that Schoenberg was abandoning tonality in favour of the twelve-tone serial technique. Janacek was also working on Katya Kabanova at the same time.

In addition, there is a second, more accurate history of modern art, which is the narrative provided by the greatest modernists themselves. The history was narrated by T. S. Eliot, by Ezra Pound in the Cantos, by Schoenberg in Moses und Aron and his critical works, by Pfitzner in Palestrina, and by S. Eliot in his essays and Four Quartets. And in situations when the creative history has made little to no preparation, it views the objective of the contemporary artist as a recapturing of tradition rather than a rupture with it. This history views the present as the location we have arrived at and whose character must be understood in terms of a continuum, rather than the present as having a past. If the shapes and styles are contemporary of art must be recreated, but this is done to revive rather than reject the ancient heritage. The goal of contemporary art is to express realities that have never been seen before and are particularly difficult to comprehend. But this is impossible unless we use the spiritual capital of our culture to illuminate the present and reveal it for what it really is. Eliot and his contemporaries believed that no really contemporary art could exist without also attempting to find orthodoxy by placing it in connection to the guarantees of an ongoing tradition, to accurately represent the essence of the contemporary experience.

You could find the end product opaque, incomprehensible, or even ugly as many do in Schoenberg's case. But it is most definitely not the goal. Schoenberg, like Eliot, aimed to revive the tradition—not to obliterate it, but to revive it as a means of restoring the rule of beauty over banality. The idea that Schoenberg's Erwartung's narrow lines have more true melody than its thick textures is not crazy a Symphony by Vaughan Williams. True, this little melodrama has a terrifying vibe that is quite different from the comforting charms of a Schubert tune. However, Schoenberg's style can be interpreted as an effort to both comprehend the nightmare and contain it—to confine it in a musical form that gives meaning and beauty to catastrophe, much like Aeschylus did with the vengeful furies, Shakespeare, and Verdi did with the horrifying death of Desdemona.

The modernists worried that the aesthetic pursuit would become hollow, repetitive, mechanistic, as it detached from the entire creative goal. Eliot, Matisse, and Schoenberg set out to defend an imperiled aesthetic ideal against the taints of popular culture because it was self-evident to them that this was occurring all around them. This ideal had linked the need for beauty with the want to dedicate human existence and give it meaning beyond this world. In other words, the modernists sought to reconnect the creative endeavour with its underlying spiritual purpose. Modernism was not intended to be a transgression but rather a recovery: a

difficult journey back to a fought-for legacy of meaning, in which beauty would once again be revered as the living emblem of transcendent principles. The intentionally "transgressive" and "challenging" art of today, which exemplifies a flight from beauty rather than the opposite, does not reflect this a desire to get it back.

The humorous opera Die Entfuehrung aus dem Serail, which relates the tale of Konstanze, a shipwrecked woman who was stolen from her fiancé Belmonte and forced to serve in the harem of the Pasha Selim, is one of Mozart's most lovable compositions. Following many plots, Belmonte succeeds in rescuing her with the Pasha's compassion, who respects Konstanze's virginity by refusing to take her by force. The dubious storyline allows Mozart to express his Enlightenment idea that generosity is a virtue that exists everywhere, whether it is in the Christian realm of the enlightened Joseph II (who was barely a Christian) or in the Muslim empire of the Turks. The Pasha's compassion is motivated by the steadfast love of Belmonte and Konstanze. Even though Mozart's pure vision has no historical support, his conviction in the truth of unselfish love is universally expressed and supported by the music. Die Entfu hrung promotes a moral principle, and its songs both reflect the beauty of that principle and persuade the listener to accept it.

We cannot live without the desire for beauty and yet be happy as individuals. It is a yearning brought on by our metaphysical state as free people looking for our place in a communal and open society. We may walk this world feeling misunderstood, bitter, and alienated. Alternately, we may find our place here and unwind in peace with everyone else and ourselves. The second route is guided by the experience of beauty, which informs us that we belong in the world and that it is already structured in a way that makes sense for living creatures like ourselves. However, and this is yet another lesson from the early modernists, creatures like us can only really feel at home in the world by accepting our 'fallen' state, as Eliot did in The Waste Land. The experience of beauty thus also makes sense.

We are taken beyond this world to a "kingdom of ends," where our eternal yearnings and quest for perfection are at last satisfied. Therefore, as both Plato and Kant observed, the appreciation of beauty is proximate to the religious mindset, emerging from a modest awareness of putting up with flaws while striving for the fullest degree of one ness with the transcendental. Any of the great landscape painters, such as Poussin, Guardi, Turner, Corot, and Cezanne, honoured and portrayed the notion of beauty in their works. These artists do not ignore misery or the immensity and danger of the cosmos, a part of which we inhabit such a little space. Not at all. The light on their slopes is disappearing, and the walls of their homes are patched and deteriorating like the stucco on the towns of Guardi, as shown by landscape artists. However, their pictures indicate the delight that is beginning to manifest in disintegration and to the eternal that is suggested by the fleeting.

If not the truth of beauty, then at least a distant sight of it may be found in Zola's violent depictions of thwarted and malevolent existence, which are captured in the rhythm of the text and the invocations of quiet among the fruitless longings which fill his works push the characters towards their objectives. Like Baudelaire and Flaubert before him, Zola also wrote about realism as a sort of letdown to the ideal. The topic is obscene, but it is so by nature and not because the author deliberately desecrates the scarce few natural beauties he discovers. A new direction has been taken by the art of degradation, and since it is at the core of the postmodern experience, it is one that we should attempt to comprehend [9], [10].

In an effort to undermine the sacred's claims, desecration functions as a kind of defense. Our lives are assessed in the presence of holy objects, and we destroy the object that appears to be holding us accountable in an effort to avoid that judgement. But many philosophers and anthropologists contend that the experience of the holy is a characteristic of all people and cannot thus be simply avoided. Our lives are mostly structured around temporary goals. However, very few of these goals strike us as poignant or unforgettable. We sometimes feel as if we are in the presence of something that is far more important than our current interests and goals, which shakes us out of our complacency. We feel the existence of something priceless and enigmatic that claims to be in some manner not of this world while yet reaching out to us. This occurs when death is present, particularly when it is the death of a loved one. We stare in astonishment at the human body where life once existed. This is the 'mortal remains of a person, not the actual person. This concept also gives us a creepy feeling. We are hesitant to approach the dead corpse because we feel that it is somehow improperly a part of our universe and is almost like a guest from another realm. This experience serves as a metaphor for how we interact with the holy. And it requires some kind of formal acknowledgement from us.

Even individuals who don't believe in the hereafter partake in these rituals in an effort to get rid of the ghostly, supernatural nature of the deceased human body. By participating in rituals that recognise that the body also stands distinct from this world, the body is being reclaimed for it. In other words, the rites sanctify the body, cleanse it of its miasma, and reinstate it to its previous position as an embodiment. The dead body can also be desecrated when it is exposed to the public as a mere pile of discarded flesh. This is unquestionably one of the most fundamental acts of desecration, one to which people have been accustomed since the dawn of time, as when Achilles triumphantly drags Hector's body around the walls of Troy. And it is undoubtedly the most significant aspect of postmodern society, as shown by Bieito's production of Die Entfuhrung: it is a loveless civilization that is unsettled by love and hence terrified of beauty [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

There are other times as well when we are similarly jolted out of our routine concerns. There is the experience of falling in love, in particular. This is a bizarre experience, but it is also a human universal. The beloved's physique and face are infused with the utmost intensity of vitality. However, they are similar to a deceased person's corpse in one important way: neither one seems to belong in the real world. The beloved observes the lover from a vantage point beyond the progression of chronological events, much as Beatrice saw Dante. The treasured item implores us to cherish it and treat it with almost ceremonial devotion. And there is a type of spiritual completeness that emanates from those eyes, limbs, and words that renews everything. We hold the human body in high regard because it embodies who we are. For many individuals, it has become compelled to deliberately desecrate the human form, whether via sex pornography or pornography depicting violence and death. Additionally, this destruction of freedom also amounts to a rejection of love. It represents an effort to reimagine the world in which love no longer exists.

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CHAPTER 12

AN OVERVIEW ON THE CONCEPT OF IDOLATRY

Jyoti Puri, Associate Professor
College of Education, Teerthanker Mahaveer University, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, India
Email Id- puri20.j@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

Such inquiries highlight the distinctiveness of holy items, which forbids alternatives. The act of substituting something for something for which there is none, the "I am that I am," which must be worshipped for what it is and not as a means to an end that could be attained through some other means or through some other means, is profanation. There are no different degrees of profanation rival god. Since it invites the concept of money into the sphere of devotion, idolatry is the archetypal example of profanity. You may exchange idols, move them about, test out new iterations, evaluate which idol reacts to prayer the best, and discover which idol offers the greatest deals. All of this is a profanation since it entails trading the holy item itself, which cannot be exchanged without ceasing to exist. The object of devotion is to be set aside, in the world but not of it, and to be treated as the special entity that it is, in which all the meanings of our lives are somehow condensed and dedicated—"robed as destinies," in Larkin's words.

KEYWORDS:

Addiction, Aesthetic, Art, Kitsch, Pleasure.

INTRODUCTION

A major subject in the Jewish Bible is the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, which describes how Jews are always tempted to profane God by worshipping idols and pictures in lieu of him. God continually reveals himself to them through mysteries that highlight his hallowed nature. Why does idolatry desecrate God, and why are people drawn to it? Why God would sentence the Israelites to suffer a horrible genocidal retribution for what, by contemporary standards, is a minor transgression of dancing before the Golden Calf? Does God not understand the proper scale?

When we refer to anything as holy, we imply this. Why there should be a need for such artefacts is a complex anthropological issue, as is the subject if such need relates to any objectively existing reality in theology. However, it's crucial to realize that the attitude towards God that is encouraged in the Hebrew Bible is one that we intuitively understand, even though we are unable to rationalise it or explain why it plays such a significant role in the lives of religious believers. This attitude towards God is one that is somewhat novel (as is the notion that he is God rather than a god), but it is one that we instinctively understand [1], [2].

Profanation

In other situations, even while our attitude is not one of worship, it is still challenged by the search for alternatives. We attempt to concentrate on something, to enjoy it for its own sake,

as the thing that it is. The most obvious example is the one I've been thinking about intermittently throughout this book: romantic desire, in which the target is idealised, kept apart, and sought not as a commodity but for the unique person he or she is. The danger to that type of attraction, which is what we understand by "erotic love," is the advent of a replacement in whatever form. As I said envy hurts because it believes the object of love, which was once holy, has been profaned. One way to deal with the pain of desecration is to move towards total profanation, which means eradicating all traces of sanctity from the once-worshipped object and turning it into something that is nothing more than the alternatives that can always replace it. This may be seen in the growing addiction to pornography, which completely devalues the sexual relationship in terms of inherent qualities. In order to shield ourselves against the risk of falling in love with it and then losing it, it entails eradicating one location where the concept of the beautiful has already taken hold [3], [4].

The second place where this profanity often manifests itself is in the realm of artistic evaluation. Again, we are dealing with a mentality that seeks to isolate its target, to value it only for its own sake, to consider it to be unreplaceable, without alternatives, and containing all of its significance within itself. Although many of the greatest works of art, such as the sculptures and temples of the Greeks and Romans and the altarpieces of mediaeval Europe, began life as holy objects, I do not claim that works of art are sacred things. However, I do assert that they are, or have been, a component of the ongoing human effort to idealise and sanctify the objects of experience and to give pictures and stories that portray mankind as something to live up to rather than just existing. This is true even for brutally realistic works like Flaubert's Madame Bovary and Zola's Nana, whose strength and persuasion rely on the sarcastic contrast between things as they are and things as people wish they were. As I said, the urge to profane, which is obviously present in the sexual world, is there in the aesthetic as well. Artworks become targets for destruction, and the more they assert their own sanctity, the more probable it is that they will be [5], [6].

Anthropological Observations

Culture develops as a result of our efforts to establish norms that will win the approval of the majority of people while also elevating their ambitions towards the things that make individuals likeable and commendable. Therefore, culture is an investment that spans many generations and imposes huge, ill-defined duties, particularly the need to be better and different than we are in all the ways that others would find admirable. This is something that is taught to us via manners, morality, religious principles, and common decencies, which are the foundation of all cultures. However, people are compelled to care about what is widespread and simple to teach.

As I've made a point of highlighting, aesthetic perception is a crucial component of these fundamental types of social coordination, and the use of aesthetic judgement naturally leads to other, maybe "higher" and more stylized uses. It is always pointing away from our common flaws and shortcomings and towards a world of lofty aspirations. As a result, it carries within it two ongoing offences. First, it calls attention to differences in taste, refinement, and comprehension that are sure to serve as a reminder that not all individuals are equally fascinating, admirable, or capable of comprehending the world in which they live. The democratic approach is always at odds with itself since it is impossible to live as if there living a genuine life among humans without any aesthetic principles, aesthetic judgement

starts to seem like a disease. A universe of ideas and goals that are in stark contrast to the tawdry nature of our makeshift lives is imposed upon us, placing an unacceptable expectation on us to live up to it. We are trying to conceal our pet rats in our clothing as it perches like an owl on our shoulders.

DISCUSSION

The urge is to confront it and push it away. Desecration is a wish to turn aesthetic assessment against itself so that it ceases to seem to be a criticism of ourselves. You often see youngsters engaging in filthy sounds, phrases, and references as a means of distancing themselves from the adult world's judgment of them and want to challenge their authority. (Therefore the attraction of Roald Dahl.) The commonplace sanctuary that protects kids from the weight of adult opinion also protects adults from the weight of their society. They neutralize its claims by utilizing culture as a tool of degradation; it loses all authority and joins the conspiracy against value [7], [8].

Pleasure and beauty

You would be tempted to believe that the desire for degradation also provides a unique form of pleasure, a fresh incarnation of the esthe'tique du mal extolled by Baudelaire. We must briefly explore the to show that this is not the case conversation about Chapter 1. Pleasure in must be separated from pleasure that, as I said in that chapter. Additionally, I proposed that there should be a difference between two general types of pleasure: deliberate and sensory. The first is created automatically, starts immediately after a stimulation, and has an excitable shape. These are the benefits of eating and drinking, which are simple to attain, simple to overindulge in, and which don't call for any special mental abilities. The second kind of pleasure results from an act of understanding: not a sensory gratification of the subject but a gratifying interest in an item (even lab rats may experience such joys). Such deliberate joys have a cognitive component; they extend beyond the self to grasp the world, and their main emphasis is not the pleasure sensation itself but the thing that causes it. They are, if you will, objective joys that take into account the actuality of the object of their desire. Contrarily, subjective pleasures of the senses are those that are concerned with the experience itself and how it feels to the person experiencing them. There are a variety of middle situations between the two types of pleasure, such as the joys of the wine connoisseur, which include a special form of "relishing" but don't need an interpretation of the object's meaning or substance [9], [10].

Since aesthetic pleasure concentrates on the element of the item that is being presented, it is tempting for people to compare it to pure sensory pleasures like eating and drinking. Additionally, the study of sex is hampered by a similar tendency. There is a subset of sexual desire in which generalized scenes of sensory pleasure override inter-personal intentionality a tableau or picture to which the individual compulsively reacts, as well as impersonal excitement. Such a sexual curiosity is quickly transformed into an addiction. The temptation is to believe that the purpose of sexual desire in all of its manifestations is this de-personalized and sensory pleasure, and that sexual pleasure is a kind of subjective pleasure similar to the joys of eating and drinking—a point Freud articulated explicitly, for instance.

Gratification and addiction

Since they depend on exploration of the outside world and the unique contact with each particular item, whose attractiveness is uncontrollable by the subject, cognitive states of mind are seldom addictive. When a person has complete control over a pleasure and can create it whenever desired, addiction results. It involves a form of short-circuiting of the pleasure network and is essentially a question of sensory pleasure. The emotional dynamic that would normally guide an outward-directed, intellectually creative existence is lost in addiction. In this way, sexual addiction is similar to drug addiction; it fights against genuine sexual interest—interest in the other, the unique object of desire. Why go to the difficulty of shared arousal and mutual identification when there is a quicker way to achieve the same sensory objective?

As with sex addiction, which results from the decoupling of sexual pleasure from the interpersonal intentionality of desire, stimulus addiction—the desire to be startled, gripped, or otherwise stirred—occurs as a result of the decoupling of sensory interest from logical thought. This disease is well-known to us and was amusingly parodied by Aldous Huxley in his description of the "feelies"—the panoramic performances that take place in Brave New World and include every sense-modality. Perhaps the Roman games were comparable: quick routes to wonder, terror, and dread that reinforced the resulting feeling of safety by inducing the visceral satisfaction that someone else had been ripped to bits in the ring instead of myself. Perhaps the 5-second cut, which is a staple of B movies and TV commercials, works in a manner similar to this, creating addictive circuits that keep viewers captivated to the screen.

The comparison I've been making between the reverent love and the scornful disdain is similar to the one between taste and addiction. Beauty enthusiasts focus their attention on searching outside for a purpose and structure that gives their life some sense. They have a condescending and prejudiced attitude towards the item they adore. And they compare themselves to it in an effort to align their own life sentiments with its order. The psychologists point out that quick incentives contribute to addiction. The definition of an addict is someone who repeatedly hits the pleasure switch, allowing their pleasures to override reason and judgement and land them in a place of need. The demand for stimulation and routine excitement has barred the way to beauty by elevating acts of desecration to the front, and art is at battle with this addiction. However, my argument implies that the addiction to effect is the enemy of not only art but also happiness, and that anyone concerned about the future of humanity should research how to revive the "aesthetic education," as Schiller put it, which has the love of beauty as its goal. It is interesting to wonder why this addiction should be so virulent now.

Sacredness and kitsch

The traditional definition of art is on the verge of the transcendental. In another dimension, where human existence is gifted with an emotional logic that elevates pain and justifies love, it points beyond this one of incidental and unrelated objects. Therefore, the idea of redemption—of a final transcendence of mortal chaos into a "kingdom of ends"—is present in everyone who is sensitive to beauty. Art stands as a persistent testament to our species' spiritual hunger and eternal longings at a time of waning religious belief. As a result, aesthetic education is more important now than it has ever been. Wagner made the following

statement to make his point: "It is reserved to art to save the kernel of religion, inasmuch as the legendary pictures which religion would prefer to regard as genuine are seen in art for what they are its symbolic importance, and by perfectly depicting those symbols, art exposes the hidden underlying truth within.

The ‘real presence' of the holy is therefore today considered to be one of art's best gifts to the unbeliever. In contrast, it has never been easier to see how art is deteriorating. The most pervasive form of degradation, even more pervasive than the willful desecration of humanity through pornography and needless violence, is kitsch, that peculiar disease that we can instantly recognise but never precisely define, and whose Austro-German name connects it to the mass movements and crowd sentiments of the twentieth century.

In the renowned essay "Avant-garde and Kitsch," written by Clement Greenberg and published in Partisan Review in 1939, he confronted educated Americans with a conundrum. He said that figurative painting was no longer relevant since photography and film had surpassed it in terms of expressive ability and achieved the representational goals that it formerly sought. Any effort to maintain the figurative heritage would always result in kitsch, or work without a unique meaning in which all the effects were imitated and all the feelings were manufactured. The avant-garde is where true art belongs, rejecting the figurative past in favour of "abstract expressionism," which employs form and colour to free emotion from the confines of story. By doing so, Greenberg disparaged the great Edward Hopper, calling him "shabby, second-hand, and impersonal" while praising the works of de Kooning, Pollock, and Rothko.

There was primitive art, naïve art, routine and ornamental art, but no kitsch, if you look back at figurative art in the Western tradition before the seventeenth century. It's debatable exactly when the phenomena first arose; maybe Greuze displays hints of it, or perhaps Murillo foretold it. It is certain that kitsch had taken over by the time of Millet and the Pre-Raphaelites. A key aesthetic inspiration of the period was the dread of kitsch, which led to the impressionist and cubist movements as well as the invention of atonality in music. We see the continuous rise of kitsch not only in the realm of the arts. The kitschification of religion has been far more significant considering its impact on the collective psyche of society.

Religion places a great lot of value on pictures because they aid in our understanding of the Creator by providing us with idealised depictions of his creation—concrete representations of transcendental realities. The concept of maternity, as an encompassing purity and a promise of serenity, is encountered in the blue gown of a virgin by Bellini. Because of the image's strength and eloquence, we are able to grasp that this is not kitsch but the deepest spiritual truth. But as the Puritans have constantly emphasised, such an image is on the point of becoming an idol and, with just the smallest prod, may tumble from its lofty spiritual perch into the depths of sentimentality. That occurred all across the nineteenth century when mass-produced votive figures—the revered forerunners of today's garden gnomes—flooded regular houses.

When individuals prefer the sensual trappings of believing to the thing actually believed in, kitsch is a mould that covers all of a living culture's creations. Not only Christian civilisation has recently experienced kitschification. The kitschification of Hinduism and its culture has also been widely apparent. In bunjee music, the talas of Indian classical music are blown apart by tonal harmonies and rhythm machines. In literature, the sutras and puranas have been

severed from the sublime vision of Brahman and reissued as juvenile comic strips. Mass-produced Ganeshas have knocked the subtle temple sculpture from its aesthetic pedestal.

Simply speaking, kitsch is an illness of religion rather than first and foremost an aesthetic phenomenon. Doctrine and ideology are where kitsch starts, and it spreads from there to contaminate everything of culture. One facet of the Disneyfication of religion is the Disneyfication of art, and both include the profanation of our greatest ideals. The Disney case serves as a reminder that kitsch is not an excess of sentiment but rather a deficiency. In some ways, the realm of kitsch is a callous place where emotion is channelled away from its real objective and towards sweet tropes, allowing us to pay fleeting homage to love and loss without having to go through the work of experiencing them. It is no coincidence that the introduction of kitsch to history coincided with the previously unfathomable horrors of trench warfare, the Holocaust, and the Gulag—all of which fulfilled the kitsch prophecy that the human being will be transformed into a doll that we will kiss one moment and rip to pieces the next.

Kitsch and profanity

These ideas bring us back to the chapter's opening argument. In Greenberg's words, we may understand the modernist revolution in the arts: art struggles against the established norms as soon as kitsch takes over and colonises it. Because kitsch is a universe of consumable goods rather than venerated symbols, art cannot exist in this environment. True art calls on our higher selves, an effort to support the moral and spiritual order found in the other kingdom. Others exist in this world, not as submissive dolls, but as spiritual beings with unending and inevitable demands on us. Therefore, art has taken on a new significance for those of us who live in the aftermath of the kitsch plague. It represents our spiritual values in their truest form. This is why art is important. Without consciously seeking for beauty, we run the danger of slipping into a world of compulsive pleasures and everyday destruction, a world where the value of a person's existence is no longer readily apparent.

Paradoxically, a cult of nihilism is believed to result from the constant quest of creative novelty. Beauty has been exposed to postmodernist destruction in the struggle to protect it from pre-modernist kitsch. We seem to be torn between two different types of sacrilege, one involving sweet dreams and the other violent delusions. Both are fabrications that belittle and denigrate our humanity. Both require turning away from the higher life and rejecting beauty as its primary indicator. However, they both highlight how difficult it is to live a life that places a high value on beauty in today's society. Desecration increases the expense of feeling and scares us away from it because kitsch reduces the cost of feeling and so diminishes its actuality. The thing that they both reject, sacrifice, suggests the cure for both mental states. In Mozart's opera, Konstanze and Belmonte are willing to die for one another, and this willingness is the evidence of their love; all the opera's beauty derives from the consistent presentation of this proof. Because we see the deaths that take place in true tragedies as acts of sacrifice, we can tolerate them. The tragic hero is both a victim and a self-sacrificer, and the awe we experience at his passing is, in some sense, restorative, serving as evidence that his life was meaningful. Whether it be the little gestures that link Marcel to Saint Loup or the evidence provided by the sacrifices made by others, love and affection between individuals are only genuine to the extent that they pave the way for sacrifice.

Alcestis sacrifices her life for her spouse. So, if we can find it, it is the solution. It's a solution that cannot be attained via just artistic means. You must alter your life, advises Rilke's "Archaic Torso of Apollo" poem. Because we no longer practise sacrifice and instead constantly try to avoid it, beauty is disappearing from our environment because we live as if it were unimportant. One indication of this is the fake art of our period, which is buried in kitsch and defilement. It is not a call to despair to draw attention to this aspect of our situation. Rational humans are known for not living entirely or even at all in the present. They are free to reject their environment and choose an alternative way of life. Our culture's works of art, literature, and music serve as both a reminder of this and a guide to the route that is always open to them: the path away from profanity and towards the holy and the self-giving. In a word, it is what beauty instructs us to do [11], [12].

CONCLUSION

The essence of morality, the source of meaning, and the real subject of fine art are sacrifice. Kitsch is the grand deception that says we may keep our luxuries while avoiding sacrifice. Desecration might also render a sacrifice useless. But when sacrifice is made and honored, life is redeemed; it becomes a subject for thought, something that "bears looking at," and it wins our respect and affection. The rituals and tales of religion demonstrate this link between love and sacrifice. It is a recurrent motif in art as well. It was well aware that kitsch only served to exacerbate the error as poets attempted to make sense of the devastation all around them during the Great War. Their goal was to find a way to see the tragedy in terms of sacrifice rather than trying to downplay it. This endeavor gave rise to Wilfred Owen's war poetry and, long later, Benjamin Britten's War Requiem.

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